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ilHELL AS A TRANSLATION
OF 'il(W IN THE HEBREW BIBLE:
DE-HELLENIZING THE

KJV AND

NKJV OLD TESTAMENTS

. ..

w.

CREIGHTON MARLOWE

INTRODUCTION

Hell is no longer a hot issue for many theologians and Christians. Some evangelicals, however, are fired up over its traditional understanding being replaced by the
theory of annihilation in some, even evangelical, quarters and being removed as a
doctrine or seldom if ever remarked upon within the Church as a whole in recent
history. Liberal theology long ago dispensed with any need for such a negative and
non-universalistic notion. Evangelical theologians maintain a belief in an eschatological and eternal punishment of the unrepentant, but are accepting that the way in
which the Bible-especially the Old Testament-has been interpreted (usually prooftexted) and translated, in relation to topics like Hell, is ripe for review and reassessment, even reversal of some classic commentaries and conceptions.
A quick look at the major English versions since the KJV or AV (King James or
Authorized Version), based on revisions since the original version of 161 I, to the present will demonstrate a remarkable change in the frequency of "heIVHell" in the
Old Testament. "Hell" occurs thirty-one times in the current editions of the KJV and
nineteen times in the New King James Version (NKJV, 1982).1 It does not occur in
modem, major English versions; e.g., in the USA, the New International Version (NN,
1978), New American Standard Version (NASB, 1960), New Revised Standard Version
(NRSV, 1989), or New American Bible (NAB, 1970). In twenty-nine of the thirty-one
instances of "hell" in the KJV, the LXX has "Hades" (q,8T]~) and in all thirty-one the
Vulgate has some variant of the root infer- ("lower-world/-place").2 This demonstrates the KJV's dependence, at least in this instance, on these traditional and classic
works as much as, or more than, on the exegesis of the "original" Hebrew texts.
The topic of the concept of the earthly or eternal punishment of the wicked in
the Old Testament is too large for the nature of this presentation; as is also an evalu-

W Creighton Marlowe is a Professor of Old Testament Studies and the Academic Dean at Tyndale
Theological Seminary in The Netherlands.
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ation of every occurrence of 7'~W, even of iu~t the thirty-one verses where KJV translates
it as "hell."3 The purpose and scope of this paper, therefore, are limited to only a summary
examination of those eighteen verses where the NKJV preserves this KJV understanding
and the one passage where "hell" for ?ixw is used by the NKJV alone, of these two versions. Obviously if the NKJV has eliminated thirteen of the thirty-one times "hell" appears
in the KJV, then it is clear that scholars who are sympathetic to the KJV find that meaning
inappropriate in those cases and, consequently, this study can treat those instances as secondary and supplemental to this discussion and focus on those places where the NKJV
maintains the meaning of "hell" for ?ixw in the Hebrew Bible. It will be demonstrated
exegetically that none of these contexts calls for this translation or are concemed at all
with the forever fate of the unfaithful. In that sense the KJV and NKJV will be de-hellenized (especially when one remembers that much of what modems assume about Hell
or what the Bible says about it comes from the influence of Greek mythology).

t. AN EVALUATION OF THE EIGHTEEN TiMEs THE KJVINKJV RENDER ,;xw "HEll"
I. I Deuteronomy 32:22
This verse is part of a song which recites the past idolatry of the Israelites not long
saved from Egypt (vv. 16-18, 21 a) and reveals God's plan to judge them through the
means of a "foolish nation" (v. 21 b). Then in v. 22, which begins with "because," God
gives a reason why and further explanation how this chastisement will take place on these
chosen people who acted unfaithfully: i.e., because God's anger is red hot, hot enough to
burn throughout the earth's surface and through its crust into the realm of the dead
(which was believed to be subterranean}.4 This realm is translated as "Sheo!" in the NRSV
and "nether world" in the NAB. The former is less of a translation than a transliteration of
the Hebrew term, except for the fact that the English rendering is capitalized, which style
Hebrew does not employS The upper case use of the term does provide some meaning
since this tends to personify or institutionalize the term and consequently connect it with
ideas like the Underworld/ Netherworld or realm of the dead. "Hell" is a true translation
albeit inaccurate and anachronistic.6 Why? Because what is meant by "hell" today is not
consistent with the immediate historical and linguistical contexts of this passage. The verses that follow (vv. 23-) confirm that the judgment concerned is earthly and temporal not
spiritual and eternal, involving arrows, hunger, plague, wild animals, the sword, etc.

1.2 Psalm 9: 17
The main idea here is that the wicked Gentile nations (i.e., those who forget God by
ignoring that he is the God that chose Israel and thus mistreat his people) will be
destroyed, as Yahweh (mil') promised Abraham (Gen. 12:3). Consequently the psalmist
concludes with, "Rise up, 0 LORD! Do not let mortals prevail; let the nations be judged
before you. Put them in fear, 0 LORD; let the nations know that they are only human"
(vv. 19-20). In v. 18 (19 in the Masoretic Hebrew Text, MT hereafter}- which immediately follows the use of ?;XW and the statement about the nations that "forget God"- this
psalmist offers a reason why God will punish them; i.e., because God will remember the
promise to Abraham regarding those in need of rescue from persecution: "For the needy
shall not always be forgotten, nor the hope of the poor perish forever" (NRSY). "Needy"
and "poor" refer to those who are experiencing defeat at the hands of ungodly nations.
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1.3 Psalm 55: 15
This is a lament psalm of twenty-three verses. Psalm 55 is about David's fear of death
at the hands of an enemy who seems to be on the verge of victory over God's anointed
unless a divine rescue occurs (w. 2-7). The verse with which this debate is concerned (v.
15) must be read in context along with the three verses immediately following (w. 1618). That 7ir<1l.i in v. 15 is the grave or realm of death is obvious from the preceding
colon, which calls for the physical "death" (11m; v. 16 in MTI of David's enemies. 11m may
be pointed as either mdwet "death" or mot "one dying; to die." This verse is a combination
of a synonymous parallel bi-cola (v. I Sa-b) and a synthetic, explanatory monocolon (v.
lSd, with the major disjunction coming after the synonymous bi-cola:

A
8
Let-it-come
death
A'-C'
8'
[to] seal
Let-them-go-down
E
F
for-evil [is] in-their-homes [and]

[0']
C
upon them [by surprisel!
[C']
0
[them]
alive; II
G
in-their-midsts. (cf. NRSVI NM

Consequently 7ir<ll.i; and "death" have to be the same ideas, the parallel lines working
together like the two speakers of a stereo to produce a blended, harmonious sound.
These stereophonics, in linguistic tenns, mean that v. ISa-b has one idea: "May they [=
my enemies] be slain!" Perhaps David says "go down alive" because he hopes God will
create an earthquake so the ground will open and swallow them alive, as God had done
in the past with wicked Israelite rebels and traitors (cf. Num. 16:3-35).7 Colon ISc then
adds the reason: they are evil in act and attitude.

1.4 Psalm 139:8
Psalm 139 is one of the best known and loved Davidic psalms of the Old
Testament. Verse 8 is where 7ir<1l.i is used. The issue of whether to render what in
Hebrew is literally "heavens" as "heavens" (the celestial sky) or "H/ heaven" (where
God "lives") is a crucial matter for understanding the author's intention. Is he really
reflecting on the theoretical potential of hiding from God in Heaven or in Hell? God is
so obviously unavoidable in Heaven that the writer would seem silly to make such an
unnecessary observation. And one of the standard understandings of Hell is that,
whatever it is, it is the absence of God's personal presence. The verse under question
is brought about by the poet's rhetorical question in v. 7, where can I go where you
are not present?- to which the obvious answer is "no where!" Since God is also obviously in Heaven and the psalmist is clearly concentrating on the hypothetical idea of a
location where one could hide from God, then the concern of v. 8a cannot be with
Heaven but only the seemingly limitless sky above, which means the synonymous and
alternative parallelism in v. 8b has to be earthly in orientation. Also the larger and
immediate context of w . 7- 12 is earthly in focus. The text of v. 8 is structured literally as follows:
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B
to-the-[heights of thel-heavens (samayim) [abovel ,

A
If-I-ascend

C
there-are-You! / /
A'
Or-if-I-descend

B'
to-the-depths

(sean

[of the earth bel owl ,

C
behold,-You [are there alsol!
For David ?ixlV is only the grave, the tomb, the realm of death. He uses it again in
Psalm 141 , which even the KJV renders "grave" as well as NIV and NKJV. In Psalm 6:5
also the KJV accepts with NIV "grave" as the necessary sense, while NKJV uses "death."
Assonance is also a reason for the employment of shemayim ("heights above") and sheol
("depths below")'

1.5 Proverbs 5:5
Often individual proverbs stand alone without a context, but this verse is one of the
exceptions. Proverbs 5: 1-6 is an extended set of maxims about the wisdom of avoiding a
prostitute or, as the Hebrew puts it, "strange" woman. The text of v. 5 is easily spotted as
a synonymous parallelism with ?ixlV and "death" as a standard, stock-in-trade, poetic
word pair.
The contextual argument flows like this: My child, listen to my wisdom (v. I) so that
you will obtain prudent and practical understanding (v. 2). This is important because the
prostitute can have persuasively sweet words (v. 3); but when all is said and done, her
advice is extremely bitter and dangerously sharp (v. 4). The path upon which she will lead
you is deadly and dark (v. 5) because in her ignorance she wanders off the path that
enhances life (v. 6).
It may be the true that many people who visit prostitutes are also people that are
unbelievers and unrepentant and in the next world will be eternally cast away from Cod's
presence. But one can hardly imagine that the point of the proverbial perspective in v. 5 is
that all prostitutes and those who visit them will go to Hell. This is not consistent with the
nature of wisdom literature in particular or Scripture in general. Structurally the verse
makes it clear that ?ixlV is the counterpart to "death"; so as a restatement in a synonymous parallelism it has to mean the equivalent of "death," i.e. the grave or tomb. The
opposite idea is then presented in v. 6: sexual activity like this is antHabundant) life. The
point must be that prostitution is foolish because there is the real and present danger of
physical disease and emotional distress, which diminishes life. The end may well be disease, depression, or even death, i.e., a sooner-than-necessary progression towards or
entrance into the tomb or grave world.
1.6 Proverbs 7:27
The same is basically true of this passage as the foregoing one. Again the context is an
extended discussion of the attractions and distractions but also potential and probable
problems with adultery and/ or prostitution (sexual license outside marriage). The entire
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chapter of twenty-seven verses (of which the one with ?ixlli is the concluding verse) concerns this topic. That the issue is not the possible (especially certain) loss of eternal life but
physical life is seen in w. 2 1-23. The similarities with Proverbs 5: 1-6 can be seen with the
final verses (24-27) of chapter 7. ?ixlli is again a synonym with "death."

1.7 Proverbs 9: 18
In this verse prostitution ("foolish" woman; v. 13) is in view once more, so most or all
of what has been said about ?ixlli in Old Testament wisdom and Proverbs so far is applicable. The parallelism is the same, although the word used for "the dead" is different than
the normal one, which, unfortunately, is not apparent in many versions. The word rendered "dead" in both NRSV and KJV is not the usual 11m but tJ~X!)i (repii'iym), which
some render "shades," or "spirits of the dead (ghosts}"; but the basic idea is "dead ones."
Only the assumption that Old Testament authors shared certain views with the Egyptians
or Canaanites about the Netherworld can lead to ideas like "disembodied spirits or souls
in Sheo!." Another use of the same term or a homograph was as the name (Rephaim) of
some of the pre-Israelite dwellers of Canaan.8 In this latter capacity the questionable translation "giants" is sometimes given. When the same triconsonantal root is used for a verb it
means "to heal," and the feminine noun form means "medicine." But this masculine form,
when not used of the Rephaim, has to do, seemingly, with "the dead." It functions as an
alternative term for 11m. The immediate and larger contexts give unambiguous evidence
that the liabilities of illicit lust lie intrinsically in this world and not the next <Cf. 8:33-36;
9:1 -5; 9 :10-18).

1.8-9 Proverbs 15: 11;27:20
These proverbs have no essential or necessary connection to the surrounding verses. In
both cases the parallelism is synthetic, so no synonym for ?ixlli is used but it is paired with
li':Jx ('a12.addan, "destruction") as a closely related idea; and this same term is elsewhere
used as a structural synonym for ?ixlli or other terms for "grave." For example in the sirnilar and co-ordinate synonymous parallelism of Psalm 88: II [88: 12 MTl, literally portrayed as:
A
Will-it-be-declared?
[A]

[Will-it-be-declared?l

B
in-the-grave [qe12.erl
C'
your-faithfulness

Another example is Job 26:6, literally rendered as:
A
m'l
C
Naked
[isl
seal
B
A'
C'
And-there-is-no covering for-'a12.addan

C
your-lovingkindness / /

B'
in-destruction ['a12.addanl.

D
before-Him / /
[D'l
[before-Godl.

However i:JP (qe12.er, "grave") in the Old Testament never seems to be used in parallel
with ?ixlli ("death; grave," etc.) or mY.! ("death; one dying"); but often is found with "pit"
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hi::!, bor) since it represents the "grave" per se. 7ixIV is, however, often paired with "death"
(usually nm). When "death" and "grave" or "pit" are paired in Old Testament poetry the
terms are usually and respectively mawe.t, seal, and bar. In Job 2 1:3 2 ni.,:lj? (q e12iiral,
"graves") is parallel with lli'll, "tomb" (giid.iys; KJV = NRSv). In one instance (Psa. 49: 14)
in the Old Testament ?ixlli ("realm of death") and nm ("death") and .,:lj? ("grave") may all
be used interchangeably in the same verse (cf. NRSV; KJV; LXX; Vulgate).
As for Proverbs 15: I I ?iXIli and ji'1:lX are both described as things about which God
has complete understanding (v. Ila). The sage then makes the comparative statement
that, if this is true, then God certainly and even more so knows about all human thoughts
and schemes (v. II bl. While the surrounding verses of 15 : II do not help, ?ixlli does
appear again thirteen verses later, which is the next verse to occupy the concerns of this
study. No particular topic (other than assorted aphorisms of wise advice) or logical procedure, though, seem to guide the author's development of his dictums from I 5: I I to
15 :24. A number of exegetes see a change from "death" to "grave" with ?ixlli (cf. 15: II
and 27:20 in NRSV, KJV, LXX, and Vulgate).
As for Provo 27:20 most of the same arguments apply. In this case a different observation is being made: i.e., just as human desire seems endless so do the appetites of Death
(?ixlli) and Destruction (ji'1:lx). One additional point, showing how "hell" is improbable in
such a verse, that can be made for Provo I 5: I I as well, is that since the terms are used
coordinately in the same colon and not synonymously in parallel cola, then they cannot be
different words for the same idea (i.e., Hell) as thought by some who translate ?ixlli "hell"
and ji'1:lx "the pit." They are different words for a similar or overlapping semantic category
(i.e., the end of life); so they can be used in synonymous parallelism, where similar ideas
are stated and restated with different words. But if they are seen as strict synonyms for an
idea like Hell, then in verses like these two in Proverbs, the logical outcome would be
absurdly redundant: "Sheal CHell') and Abaddan ('Hell') are . ..." Even if these are taken as
strict synonyms, this would work in parallel structure but not in a coordinated sequence.

1. 10 Proverbs I S:24
This is a case where the phrase "upward" (v. 24a) paired with "downward" (v. 24b)
seems to be a major if not the major factor in explaining why some see "Hell" as the
meaning of ?ixlli. But this wording cannot prove "Hell" is intended in such a verse
because one could just as easily and sensibly speak of going down into the grave or to the
realm of death and contrast it with the upward path of life itself. It is mainly our preconceived notions about the Afterlife that makes us immediately think of Heaven and Hell
when we read expressions like these, but not the actual verses or contexts themselves.
Furthermore, in relation to Provo 15 :24, the expressions "down" and "up" as physical
directions are not as clear in the text as some versions suggest (cp. NRSV, NASB, KJV,
NJV). Even the KJV and NKJV avoid the wording that contrasts "going up" with "going
down," while translating ?ixlli as "hell." But the NN's "going down to the grave" makes
perfect sense; so without any other clues in the immediate context (unless "above" in the
previous parallel line can be proven to mean Heaven) "hell" is not warranted as a possible
or probable meaning. The point is simple and perfectly in line with what would be expected of wisdom literature: i.e., making wise choices in life leads one in a direction up and
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away from the grave below. 9 A major theme of Old Testament wisdom is the idea that the
wise life is usually a long life because the wise person avoids the type of attitudes and activities that often lead others (foolish people) to an early or untimely death. This verse in its
full sense and literal structure as a synthetic (reason-based) parallelism is as follows:
A
B
[is)
(The)-path-of life
F
C
In-order
to-keep

C
upward
[E)

[the wise)

[D')
[from se6n
D
from-se61

E

for-the-wise; / /
C'
below.

I.' , Proverbs 23:' 4
That anyone would think 7ixIV in this verse means "Hell" is utterly amazing and inexplicable. In this case a small context is formed by w. 12-14. The main theme is that of a
parent's discipline of a child. 1O Some important interpretive differences are found when various versions are compared, but the most significant is the meaning given to 7ixIV. The
value of beating a child dramatically- actually infinitely-increases when the result moves
from deliverance from mere physical (an early grave) to etemal death (HelD! In literary
terms this is a simple proverb making a simple, practical (but true and trustworthy) observation about a reality of life. It would be an abnormal assessment of this genre of revelation
and Scripture to see it as a philosophical puzzle which assumes the following logic: a child
must be beaten with a stick because that will cause the child to fear doing evil and in tum
make him fear Cod and the prospects of eternal judgment so he will naturally believe and
behave properly and thus be saved from Hell in the end. Proverbs are pithy principles
based on experiential patterns. The obvious fact being observed here is the value of discipline. It normally works in bringing about wise behavior, which in turn usually prolongs life,
quantitatively and qualitatively. Biblical theology and logic both argue strongly and conclusively against the idea that this verse says physical punishment normally nets a heavenly
reward. Spanked children and unspanked children will populate both Heaven and Hell in
the end (no pun intended). On the other hand many more disciplined children than undisciplined will make the kind of decisions that increase life; and many more undisciplined
children than disciplined will make bad decisions that lessen or lose life.
IV!)) in v. 14 should be translated "life" or "him" and not "soul." It seldom if ever means
in the Old Testament what the word "soul" does in current, popular usage; especially
when, as here, a possessive pronoun is attached. The context shows that discipline saves
from physical death, so the emphasis is on the prolongation of the child's physical and
earthly health and holiness. The phrase "he will not die" (v. 13) is not an attempt to console the parent with the opinion that "a spanking or beating will not kill someone" (obviously a beating might); but it means "discipline will keep him from an early grave." This
argues that the same sense is intended in v. 14. Punishment does not "save an eternal
soul from Hell" but 'preserves a life from an untimely death."
Also most, if not all, who would want to translate 7ixIV here as "hell"-or who accept the
KJV as the preferred or "perfect" translation- do not believe (or belong to a Church tradition
that believes) that one's eternal destiny is determined by how often or not one sins. But to
have "hell" in this verse seems to teach this: i.e., you must physically and painfully punish
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them (understood: because you will teach them obedience) and therefore they will be saved
from etemal damnation. The chief concem of the wise author of Provo23 is with the value
of discipline, whatever kind is used (although it is fair to say that harsh physical punishment
was the norm of that day), to achieve behavior pattems that are healthy, as long as not cruel
or crippling." Verse 14 should be read with v. 13, which demonstrates that [St'6n in the latter
is equivalent to mn ("to die") in the former. Both verses mapped out literally look like this:
A
B
C
Do-not-withhold from-a-child discipline [musiirl; II
E
F C
D
If-you-punish-him [takkennUl
with-the-rod l5e./zetJ not he-will-die.

B
C
with-the-rod l5e./ze(l punish-him [lakkennUl ; II

A
You

D
And-his-life [nepeiJ

E

F

from-death lS e611

you-will-save.

1.12 Amos 9:2
The context of this verse is an oracle about the destruction of Israel. It follows the Lord's
frightful introductory statement of his intention to bring death on the entire population
through collapsed buildings and the sword (v. I). Most interesting is the fact that the KJV
has a colon at the end of this verse, which means the translators understand the following
verse or verses to be explanatory or illustrative of what this verse says. And those verses are
about anything but Hell' Of course the parallel line contains "heaven," which begs the
question. The terms are clearly meant to be antithetical linguistically but these cola are synonymous semantically. The same idea being expressed in two different ways is that no one
can hide from the death Cod has declared he will execute on Israel, regardless of which
direction one runs, even if one tries to climb into the terrestrial tomb world or into the
celestial star world. The directions used are opposites for effect but the intentions of each
colon are identical. Verse 2 is meant to reiterate the synonymous parallelism at the end of
v. I : "not one of them shall flee away, I I not one of them shall escape" (9: I d; cf. NRSVl.
Contextually "them" can only refer to ancient Israelites caught in the catastrophic destruction of their cities and countryside. Furthermore the rest of the verses (vv. 3-4), which conclude the opening pericope of chapter nine, are structured as similar restatements of the
fact that whatever these Israelites-elected-for-execution try to do to escape will be hopeless.
All the parallel cola have a similar style: the protasis colon beginning with "though they [try
such and such]" and the apodasis colon following with "I will [stop theml." All these further
explicate v. 2 by giving other earthly and temporal examples of impossible escape plans, be
they high or low: hide on Mount Carmel or at the bottom of the sea (v. 3; cf. Jonah 2:3, 56) or into captivity as a political prisoner (v. 4). Verse 2 is composed of two synthetic parallelisms (second-line completion type) which are similar and altemative synonymous parallels. "Heavens" again has to be understood as 'the skies above us" (not "Heaven"), so the
poetically paired term, ?iKILi, has to be seen as the lower counterpart; i.e., 'the earth below
us." These may be literally represented as:
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A
Though-they-dig-down

C
from-there
A'
Or-if-they-c1imb
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B
to-[thel-depths-of-the-earth

[sean, /

o

E

my-hand

it-will-take-them; / /

B'
the-[heights of thel sky Lsamayiml, /

C'

[0'1

E'

from-there

[) myselfl

I-will-bring-them-down.

One other feature of interest in this passage-and one some might try to interpret as
another allusion to Hell- is the "sea-serpent" in v. 3b (NRSV), just rendered "serpent" in
KJV. In context, however, the idea is that individual Israelites cannot escape Cod's
inevitable destructive judgment, no matter where they try to hide on, in, or above the
earth. The language is hyperbolic. Even if they flee to the bottom of the sea, Cod will capture or kill them through the instrumentality of a sea-creature. This "serpent" has no connection with the crafty serpent of temptation at the beginning of human creation. But
each serpent episode does reflect the ancient religious mentality that understands seas
and sea monsters or serpents as representative of chaos or anti-creation in the cosmos.
The same Hebrew word for "serpent" (Ilim; riitm) is used in Cen. 3: I and Amos 9:3 . The
Canaanites viewed the Sea and the Sea Serpent as gods- named, respectively, Yam and
Lotan (= Hebrew Leviathan}.12 The Old Testament is careful to expose the truth that
Yahweh the Cod of Israel is the Creator and controller of all such forceful and fearsome
dark features and facts of existence in this fallen and sometimes seemingly undirected and
unstable universe.

1.13 Isaiah 14:9
This chapter of Isaiah is famous (or infamous) for its traditional and popular interpretation, which identifies the king of Babylon mentioned in v. 12 (if not in w . 3- 1 I) with
Satan- supposedly named "Lucifer" in this passage. In verse 12 the expression "shining
one" or "day star" was translated "Lucifer" in the KJV and NKJV, which rendering was a
transliteration of the Latin word used in the Vulgate: "lucifer," which means "light-bearing"
or "morning star."IJ The capitalization of the word as a proper noun in such versions is the
only time it is used as a name. No such name for Satan is known outside of this verse and
commentaries that take this interpretation.
With this in mind 7iKIli in v. 9 could not possibly be about Hell unless the author is saying that such would be the eternal destination of this king. And even if w . 12- 14 were
about Satan, this verse 9 (where NKJV has "hell") is in the section that most do interpret as
dealing with the human king of Babylon.14 The traditional Satan-view usually begins with v.
12 and is often limited to just w. 12-14. Also interesting is the fact that 7iKIli appears again
in v. I I but also in v. 12 in the so-called Satan section. Yet in both instances the NKJV renders it "Sheo!" not "hell." The KJV has "grave" in v. I I and "hell" in w . 9 and 15.
The 7iKIU of v. 9 should be the same as in w. I 1 and 15 since the destruction and
destiny of the same person is in view in each case. But is his eternal destruction in view?
None of these contexts supports this idea. Only if Satan is the subject can a case be made
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for something like "hell" as the meaning of 7iKIli in Isaiah 14. In v. 9 it is paired with a
synonym tJ'K!Ji rendered "spirits of the departed" in the NIV, "shades" in the NRSV, and
(ironically, most accurate) "the dead" in both KJV and NKJV. The basic idea should be
obvious to an objective reader: the grave, i.e. the realm of the dead, is anxious to receive
this one whose wicked pride is so great that the world longs to be rid of him as quickly as
possible. Now he is fallen, so the grave is personified as longing for his presence. This
"grave" poetically in synonymous parallelism is first named ?iK1Li ("the place of the dead")
and then tJ'K!Ji ("those in the grave" or "the dead/ departed ones"), Adding to this second
idea notions like "spirits of' or "shades" reads into them a specificity not required.
Contextually these terms just refer to the grave as the place where dead people end up.
Even this grave and its inhabitants are poetically and figuratively pictured as being relieved
that this king's time has come. This grave imagery is more explicit in v. I I, which is why
neither KJV nor NKJV continue with the meaning of "hell" for 7iK1Li there. In v. I I worms
are said to also inhabit ?iK1Li, such that they become a bed for the corpse of this king.
?iK1Li is simply and straightforwardly the pit or hole in the ground where a dead body is
laid to rest. However, in this case, this normal grave is only a potential reality. The actual
grave is not a stately sarcophagus, befitting a king, but the bare ground itself, where maggots and worms reside. The king described here is killed and, therefore, is a candidate for
a royal burial and grave site; but to add insult to injury, so to speak, his shame is intensified, for he is not only defeated in death but fails to receive the expected honor of a
king's burial. Instead he is left to rot on the ground for a grave. Beyond the disgrace of
dying in battle-which kings almost never did and which great kings were never supposed
to do- this king also was shamed by not receiving a royal reception for his body or a rich
and stately return of it to the earth (see vv. 18-20). In v. 15 the synonymous poetic parallel is between ?iK1Li and ii::l "pit." The one who sought divine heights as a god or demigod ended up in death like all mortals. Death in this verse is defined as being brought
down from pride and power of life to insignificance and indignation (i.e., as existence in
the grave, a hole in the ground), But this king ironically and justly does not even get to
the grave per se; he is left in his ruin and ridicule (vv. 16-17) to decay among the maggots, without proper burial (vv. 18-20a).

1. 14 Habakkuk 2:5
The notion that ?iK1Li means "hell" in this verse can be dispensed with quite readily.
The immediate context is God's reply to Habakkuk's question about the propriety of God
using the wicked Assyrians to judge the chosen, albeit imperfect, Hebrews. This answer
involves verses 2-5 of chapter 2 and contains the somewhat controversial and significant
statement quoted in the New Testament and applied to Christian soteriology, "but the
righteous live by their faith" (2:4b; NRSV). The following verse is the one that uses ?iK1Li
and makes the basic point that arrogant nations- i.e., those who abuse others- never stop
looking for another victim, but also will not go unpunished. Even v. 4 begins with the subject of proud people ("Look at the proud!" [NRSV]), who are then contrasted with the
righteous, who live by faith. They keep trusting God even when they do not understand
how the wicked can be allowed to win. In v. 5b the proud powers of earth are described
poetically as greedy for the gain of other nations' goods. This verse presents a continued-
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type synonymous and somewhat chiastic structure, which parallels "the grave" (Seal) with
"death." Literally the text reads:
B
D
C
it-makes-Iarge
like-seal
his-greed / /
Because
D
C'
E
F
And-it [his greedl like-the-mower that-never
it-is-satisfied.

A

The parallel and synonymous word pair is 7ixIV and nm, of which the latter means
"death"; which is the meaning also given in the NKJV. To be more exact and consistent, if
7ixIV does mean "hell" here, then nm should have been translated "eternal death." But
contextually it should be clear that the author's intention was to portray these vicious
nations as death personified (Madam Death). No one is excluded from death's design to
devour. 50 7ixIV is again used in its most common sense of "the realm of death" or the
"grave." The verse says nothing about the eternal destiny of these wicked nations, only
that they are characterized by an unquenchable thirst for the wealth of the world. That
they will be judged is stated but nothing more is said about the nature of that judgment.
Their relationship to 7ixIV is the same as death: a cavernous capacity. The final synonymous cola of the verse repeat this idea:
They gather
And [theyl collect

all nations
all peoples

for themselves / /
as their own. (cf. NR5v).

Hell is also hungry for many inhabitants, one could claim; but while that is also true it
is not the focus of this verse, since death itself is the twin term with 7ixlV.
1. 15- 16 EzehieI31 : 16- 17

Chapter 3 I of Ezekiel continues the pronouncement of judgment against the king
of Egypt begun in chapter 30. These chapters sit within and near the end of Ezekiel's
proclamations against the Gentile nations in chapters 25-32. In 31 : 1-9 this doomed
monarch is asked to remember the fallen fate of the mighty Assyrian nation, which is
compared metaphorically and poetically to a lofty cedar tree. Then in vv. 10- formal
verse gives way to poetic prose with some verse interspersed (vv. 13, 14b), wherein
Pharaoh's punishment is predicted due to his pride just as the ruler of Assyria. In v.
14, just before vv. 16-17 (where KJV and NKJV translate 7ixIV as "hell") the statement
is made that such godless pride has been and will continue to be answered with
"death" (nm, mower) . In the poetic stanzas which occupy the last half of v. 14, "being
given over to death " is in synonymous parallelism with "going to the lower
ground/ earth [Y1X, 'eresl" "and with "going down to the pit hi::I1 ." Then in vv. 15-16
God's felling of the lofty cedar tree (i.e., proud Assyria) is again reviewed and restated
as going down (v. 15) or being cast down (v. 16) to 7ixlV. In v. 16 7ixIV is used synonymously with the same "pit" hi::!) of v. 14. The original narrative text of v. 16aii-bi
translated literally is:

16

Marlowe

When-l-brought-down
it [Assyria1
with-those-going-down-into
Then-they-were-consoled

to-[the1-grave (Sean
[the1-pit [barl.
in-[the1-earth ['ere51 below ... .

The ':7ixlli of v. 16 is clearly the same as "the pit," which is the same as "death," which
is equated in the context with a hole in the ground ("piC) or the lower parts of the earth;
i.e., the grave or realm of the dead. V. I 7 continues the flow of thought already established and again uses ':7ixlli as "the grave," since going down to it is described in w . I 7
and 18 as being in the same place as those "killed by the sword" (what v. 18 also
describes as lying "among the uncircumcised"). The ':7ixlli of v. 15, logically and contextually, must be the same as that in w. 16-17; but surprisingly (although completely understandably in light of the immediately preceding verse, 14b) KJV renders it "grave" while
NKJV (obviously for the sake of consistency with w. 16- 17; see 2. below) has "hell."

T. T7- T8 Ezekiel 32:2 T, 27
Ezekiel 32 continues and concludes Cod's proclamation of doom and destruction for
Egypt (w. 17-) and its pharaoh (w. 2b- 16) by shifting to a lament or dirge (m'p, qiyriIh v.
2) over their fate and fall. The term ':7ixlli is not used until Egypt as a whole is addressed,
along with its king, in w . 21 and 27. The same or similar contextual and exegetical arguments may be made for the meaning of ':7ixlli as "grave' in these two verses as has just
been said about it in chapter 3 I regarding Assyria and Egypt. One merely has to read
these two verses within the overall and immediate context of w. 17-28. The same parallel concepts or words are used which depict death or the grave:
The mighty . . . will speak ... fro m the midst of seal: "They have come down ...
the uncircumcised, killed by the sword" [v. 21 , cf. v. 281 . . . lie with the fallen wa r riors of long ago who went down to seal with their weapons of war ...
whose shields are upon their bones [v. 271. (Cf. NRSVl.

2. AN

EVAlUATION OF THE VERSE WHERE THE

NKJV AND

NOT

KJV

RENDERS

,iXIli "HEll": EZEK. 3 t : t 5

Curiously the KJV translators resorted to "grave" instead of "hell" in Ezekiel 31: 15,
although they used "hell" for ':7ixlli in 3 I : 16 and 17. Contextually, of course, it is clear why
they were compelled to use this meaning in v. 15; but this would seem to raise strong
doubt about their practice of using "hell" in other similar contexts. The comments made in
1.15-16 above (regarding Ezek. 3 I : 16-17) are also pertinent to the argument as to why
"hell" should not be the translation of ':7ixlli in 3 I : I 5. The descent of Assyria into ':7ixlli in
this verse is described in v. 16 as something that made the surrounding nations shake with
fear. This has to refer to the past, historical horror and shock of the ancient Near Eastern
nations over the surprising downfall of the great Assyrian empire. If so then Ezekiel has no
intention in this passage of saying that the Assyrians went to Hell, especially as that expression would have meaning among believers today. Also v. I 6 <immediately after describing
this historic effect on the nations) repeats the fact of this same descent into ':7iXIli, which
means that if v. ISis about death, decay, defeat, and destruction, then so is v. I 6, not to
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mention v. I 7 for similar reasons. Consistently and correctly, either all three appearances of
?ixlV in vv. 15-17 are about the collapse of Assyria or its condemnation, but not both ideas
simultaneously or alternately. The logic of Chapter 3 I :3-17 runs as follows:
Consider Assyria [v. 3] ... because it .. . was proud [v. IOJ ... Foreigners ... cut it
down [v. 12] ... For all of them are handed over to death, [i.eJ to the world below [v.
14] ... On the day it went down to 'Se61 ... I restrained its rivers [v. 15] ... I made
the nations quake at the sound of its fall, when I cast it down to 'Se61 ... and all ...
were consoled in the world below [v. 16]. They also went down to e61 with it, to
those killed by the sword . . . those who lived in its shade among the nations [v.
171. (Cf. NRSV; emphasis added).

s

Verse 14b is particularly important because it prepares the reader for the meaning of
vv. I 5- and also is composed in poetic parallelism, which makes it unarguably clear and
certain that death is a synonym in this passage with "the world below" or se61. The poetic
nature of this verse is seein in the NRSV and NKjV, but not in the NIV or KJV. Here it is
displayed literally as to its synonymous parallelisms:

A
For-all-of-them

they-are-destined

C
for-the-death, / /

[A]

[8]

C

[For-all-of-them

they-are-destined]

[A]

[8]

C

o

E

[For-all-of-them

they-are]

sons-of

[A]

[8]

among
C[-O'-E']

[For-all-of-them

they-are]

with-those-down-in

humaness
F
[the} pit.

B

for-earth-of below.

CONCLUSION

None of the nineteen contexts (verses) where ?ixlV is translated "hell" by the NKJV
(eighteen of which have "hell" in the KJV also) is supportive of that translation. In each
case the flow of argumentation and/ or the poetic parallels proves that the author uses
?ixlV for the concept of the grave or death.

18

Marlowe
APPENDIX
THE STRUcruRE OF THE VERSES WHERE

A

NKJV RENDERS r,;Xll.ii

AS "H ELL"

Deut 32:22
For a fire is kindled in My anger, I I and shall bum to the lowest sheol;
It shall consume the earth with her increase, I I and set on fire the foundations of mountains.
Psalm 9:17
The wicked shall be turned into shea!, I I and all the nations that forget God.
Psalm 55: 15
Let death seize them; I I let them go down alive into shea!, I for wickedness is in their dwellings
and among them.
Psalm 139:8
If I ascend into heaven, You are there; I I if I make my bed in shea!, behold, You are there.
Proverbs 5:5
Her feet go down to death, I I her steps lay hold of shea!.
Proverbs 7:27
Her house is the way to shea!, I I descending to the chambers of death.
Proverbs 9: 18
But he does not know that the dead are there, I I that her guests are in the depths of shea!.
Proverbs I 5: I I
Shea! and Destruction are before the LORD; II so how much more the hearts of the sons of
men.
Proverbs 27:20
Shea! and Destruction are never full; I I so the eyes of man are never satisfied.
Proverbs 15:24
The way of life winds upward for the wise, I I that he may tum away from shea! below.
Proverbs 23: I 4
You shall beat him with a rod, I I and deliver his soul from shea!.
Amos 9:2
Though they dig into sheol, I from there My hand shall take them; II
Though they climb up to heaven, I from there I will bring them down.
Isaiah 14:9
Shea! from beneath is excited about you, to meet yau at your coming; II
It stirs up the dead for you, all the chief ones of the earth; I
It has raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations.
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Habakkuk 2:5
Indeed, because he transgresses by wine,- he is a proud man,! and he does not stay at home.!I
Because he enlarges his desire as sheot I and he is like death, and cannot be satisfied, II
He gathers to himself all nations I and heaps up for himself all peoples.
Ezekiel 3 I: I 6-17
I made the nations shake at the sound of its fall, when I cast it down to sheol together with those
who descend into the Pit; and all the trees of Eden, the choice and best of Lebanon, all that
drink water, were comforted in the depths of the earth. They also went down to sheof with it,
with those sfain by the sword; and those who were its strong arm dwelt in its shadows among the
nations.
Ezekiel 32:21
The strong among the mighty I shall speak to him out of the midst of sheof I with those who
help him: II
'They have gone down, I they lie with the uncircumcised, I slain by the sword."
Ezekiel 32:27
They do not lie with the mighty- who are fallen of the uncircumcised, I
who have gone down to sheol with their weapons of war; II
they have laid their swords under their heads, I but their iniquities will be on their
bones, because of the terror of the mighty in the land of the living.
Ezekiel 3 I: I 5
Thus says the LORD GOD: "In the day when it went down to sheof, I caused mourning. I covered the deep because of it. I restrained its rivers, and the great waters were held back. I caused
Lebanon to mourn for it, and all the trees of the field wilted because of it."
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APPENDIX B
THE USE OF

,ixu; IN ANCIENT AND

MODERN VERSIONS

"hell" in KJV
161 1Deut 32:22

NIV
NKJV
1982
1978
hell
death

LXX*
NAB*
NRSV NASB
1989
1960
1970
200Be
Sheaf
Sheaf nether world Hades

2 Sam 22:6

Sheaf

grave

Sheaf

Sheaf

nether world "death"

inferi

Job 11:8

grave

Sheol
Sheaf

inferno

death

Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades

Job 26:6

Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades

inferus

Psalm 9 :17

hell

grave

Sheol

Sheaf

nether world Hades

infemum

Psalm 16: 10

Sheol
Sheaf

grave

Sheol
Sheaf

Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades
nether world Hades

infero

Psalm 18:5
Psalm 55 :15

hell

grave

infemam

Sheaf

grave

Sheol
Sheol

nether world Hades

Psalm 86:13

Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades

inferno

Psalm 116:3
Psalm 139:8

Sheaf
hell

grave

infemi

nether world Hades

inferno

hell

grave

Sheaf
Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades

Prov 5:5

Sheaf
Sheaf
Sheol

nether world Hades

inferos

grave

depths

Vulgate*
400
infemi

inferi

Prov 7:27

hell
hell

grave
grave

Sheol
Sheaf

Sheaf
Sheol

nether world Hades
nether world Hades

infe ri

Prov 9:18
Prov15 :11

hell

death

Sheol

Sheol

nether world Hades

infemus

Prov 15:24

hell

grave

hell

death

Sheaf
Sheol

Sheol
Sheaf

nether world Hades
nether world "death"

inferno

Prov 23 :14
Prov 27:20

hell
Sheaf

Sheaf
Sheaf

Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades

infem us

grave

nether world Hades

infemus

Sheol
Sheaf

Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades
nether world Hades

infemus
infemum

Sheol
Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world Hades

inferno

nether world Hades
nether world Hades

inferno
inferos

Isa 5:14

death

infemi

inferno

hell
Sheaf

grave

Sheaf
Sheaf
Sheaf

grave
grave
grave

Sheaf
Sheaf
Sheaf

Ezek 31 :15
"grave"
Ezek 31 :16

hell

grave

Sheol

Sheaf

nether world Hades

inferos

hell

Ezek31 :17

hell

grave
grave

Sheol
Sheol

Sheaf
Sheol

nether world Hades
nether world Hades

infem um
infemum

Ezek 32:21

hell

grave

Amos 9 :2

nether world Hades
nether world Hades

infemum
infemum

Jonah 2:2

hell
Sheol

grave
grave
grave

Sheol
Sheol
Sheaf
Sheaf

infemi

hell

Sheaf
Sheaf
Sheaf
Sheaf

nether world "pit"

Ezek 32 :27

nether world Hades

infemi

Hab 2:5

hell

grave

Sheol

Sheaf

nether world Hades

infemus

lsa 14:9
Isa 14: 15
lsa 28: IS
Isa 28: 18
Isa 57:9

grave

' versification may differ; usually + or - one verse
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NOTES

I . However the NKJV uses "hell" for Heb. seal in one extra verse where KJV does not
(Ezek. 3 I : 15), KJV renders it "hell" 3 I times. TWOT says 30 times but I count 3 I as does the
OED.
2. Plus the extra passage where the NKJV uses "hell" (Ezek. 3 I : 15), in relation to the KJV
and LXX. For the Latin Vulgate: infer- i, os, ni, no, num, nus. It should be recognized that the
theology or interpretation of some or all of these verses mayor may not be the same among
these translators. The KJV translators may have read their theology into the Vulgate or based
their approach- regardless of Jerome's doctrinal beliefs-on the fact the Vulgate consistently
employed the root infer- and chose to interpret and translate 7iX1lJ as "underworld" (realm of
the dead; Helm rather than merely transliterate it, as now is often favored by modern translation committees.
3. This term appears in the Hebrew Old Testament over 60 times and only appears in
other Semitic languages as a loan-word from Hebrew. Cf. Smith, Old Testament Theology, p. 382,
citing T. H. Gaster, "The Abode of the Dead," IDB, vol. I (NY: Abingdon, 1962), p. 787. See
also R. Laird Harris, "she' 01" in Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, vol. 2, R. Laird Harris,
Gleason L. Archer, and Bruce K. Waltke, eds. (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980>, pp. 892-93. This
work is a very recent evangelical contribution to Old Testament lexicography and theology. The
KJV is described as having the two-meaning theory of "grave" in general for 7ix1lJ but later specialized as "hell"; however, KJV has "hell" very early in the Old Testament. Harris believes that
"hell" is probably at times the point in passages later than the Pentateuch; but KJV has "hell" as
early as Deut. 32:22 and Harris later in the article is quite attracted to the meaning of "grave" or
"tomb" for 7iX1lJ in most if not all places. Harris mentions the royal tombs of Ur which were thirty feet deep.
4. While God would know the truth that people do not go to a place under the earth
after death (except for the grave- which is why the connection to subterranean worlds along
with the influence of other ancient mythologies of that time and Greek mythology on later
times), the writer only knew what had been revealed up to that point in history and could only
use 7iX1lJ according to its then current Hebrew meanings, apart from strict copying of Egyptian
mythology, which in light of the other usages in the Pentateauch suggests "grave" or "death" or
"realm of the dead" (grave-world). The writer has to use and mean the term in a way that communicates to his audience. So the best explanation is an allusion to the grave or subterranean
death-world as people perceived it then. "Hell" as we know the term from progressive revelation would not be understood or assumed by anyone reading 7ix1lJ then. God makes the point
by using images and language with which the audience is familiar. This does not mean their perception of reality is correct or sanctioned by God as real and true, just that it is how they
thought and good communication has to start with where people are at and use language they
understand. "Hell" as we know it has not been revealed in Scripture yet, so it cannot be the
intended meaning here or the verse has no validity in its historical and literary context.
5. "Sheol" of course is in a way unfair to the reader because it is a non-translation. It tells
the reader what Hebrew word is used but not what it means. At least the KJV made a stab at a
meaning the reader could understand, even if misleading. The same problem occurs with a
number of biblical words. Various factors and forces make individual translators or translation
committees merely transliterate a difficult or controversial word (e.g., Greek baptizo becomes
English baptize). This allows the reader to give the word whatever meaning desired in line with
one's tradition, and allows the translation to escape from forcing a meaning on readers and be
charged with sectarianism or bias of some sort. Thus the translation is neutral on such an issue
and stays out of trouble with the majority of readers.
6. Especially for the NKJV because the modern sense of "hell" is clear, and for the KJV if
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their sense of "hell" was the same as today. The OED shows that "hell" in English has the usage
of a place of torment and the abode of devils in literary works dated at 1522 (Skelton, Why not
to Court, p. 590: "as ferce and as cruell as the fynd of hell") and 1667 (Milton, Paradise Lost; 230
times; e.g., "Within the Cates of Hell sate Sin and Death"). Naturally the question arise as to
what people in 161 I meant when they used the word "hell." Did they mean what we mean or
something like Hades or Underworld? If the latter then they cannot be accused of reading New
Testament theology anachronistically back into the Old Testament. But if they mean something
akin to "eternal, conscious retributive punishment of the unbelieving sinners after death" then
their rendering becomes hermeneutically and exegetically and translationally open to great
doubt in terms of accuracy. Only if the Bible is lifted out of history and spiritualized can such an
approach- where the same meanings can apply to Old Testament and New Testament regardless of progress of revelation and historical, cultural, and grammatical contexts- be possible and
defended with consistency- yet it is doubtful with any credibility.
7. Interestingly these Koraites who were swallowed alive in the earth for their rebellion
had relatives who were not killed at that time and whose descendants included the Sons (=
children, not just males, most likely) of Korah known for their musical abilities and, hence,
became resonsible for many psalms for generations, along with David as the "sweet singer of
Israel," the author ostensibly of Psa. 55, et al.
8. Cf. Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libras, 2nd
ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), p. 904 .
9. E.g., many of those that contrast the righteous and the wicked such as Provo 10: 1-. The
non-absolute nature of proverbial truth must be kept in mind and accepted to avoid misunderstandings and misapplications (which may be very harmful at times) of these scriptures in dayto-day life. This does not mean that truth is relative because absolute truth, like "You must not
commit murder," cannot ever be relativised; however, another type of truth- wisdom, experiential, horizontal- is relative and conditional. This is why one proverb can tell us to "answer a fool"
(26:5) and another command just the opposite "answer not a fool" (26:4), without being a contradiction. Both are true although opposites because the truth involved is that of practical, earthly advice (not direct, propositional and heavenly affirmations like the Ten Commandments).
Old Testament wisdom truth usually (though not always) deals with the circumstances of life,
which means the guidance can be different in various situations. Sometimes a foolish person
needs to be corrected with information, so it is right to confront them; but at other times a fool ish person is best handled with silence. It would be a waste of time and energy (and thus
wrong) to seek to convince him or her. The danger of making Old Testament proverbs into
inflexible promises rather than flexible principles is that of absolutizing a relative, which is just as
problematic as the reverse, relativizing and absolute. The fact that this latter must be carefully
avoided with the Bible is no reason to go to the other extreme. Both abuses will cause much
damage and division in the body of Christ. Many have been discouraged by thinking a certain
verse offered them in theory an iron-clad promise only to find out in practice that the expected
guaranteed outcome did not materialize as other Christians had sworn it would. The result has
been often to make the person feel as if their faith was the problem, when all along the problem was a faulty interpretation of Scripture. Cod's promises are absolute; but we must not mistake a principle for a promise or we can hurt people. We need to be very sure about what we
claim is absolutely true. Cod's Word is true but it includes absolute commands (Law; vertical
and propositional) and relative guidance (Wisdom; horizontal and experiential) . The former is
direct revelation from Cod; the latter is indirect revelation that comes from life (but the life
which Cod created with certain physical and moral laws humans can observe through common
sense and rationality apart from Cod's voice through a prophet). This is why one of the themes
of wisdom is the question "why do the righteous suffer?" or "why do the wicked prosper?"
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Since it seems God promises success for good people and poverty and peril for bad people, the
fact that experience teaches that the opposite happens frequently leads to questions about
God's fairness and consistency and faithfulness. The Bible shows wise people wrestling with
such issues, but overall the testimony and teaching of Scripture is that no such absolute promises have been made. Wisdom does not say that good people are absolutely guaranteed riches,
long lives, godly offspring, etc. What it says is that righteousness is the best pathway in life even
though pain, perplexity, poverty, and problems may plague the faithful believer and even
though health and wealth may be had by someone very evil and unfaithful. The point is that
experience teaches and God's Word supports that "crime does not pay" often enough to make
the risks of disobedience and depravity worth taking. In the end the wise life is the righteous life
and the foolish life is the wicked one. Exceptions only prove this rule.
10. Literally a father is indicated by the use of "my son" in the surrounding context, and a
son is described by the use of the term for "young man" hl1J} and the 3ms pronoun; but the
overall sense must relate to all children, male or female, and must be applicable to whomever
dispenses the punishment in a given case, father or mother, although the ancient, cultural context would emphasize the father's responsibility.
I I. Cf. Eph. 6:4, where Paul warns parents to be careful not to "provoke anger" in children
but rather "bring them up in the discipline and instruction of the Lon!' (italics added; cf. NRSV) .
12. These terms are both the Hebrew and Ugaritic words for "sea" and "sea monster."
Ugaritic is the language of Canaanite religious poetic texts, and is a northwest Semitic dialect
like Hebrew. 0 . Ugaritic lotan (= m;?) with Old Testament Hebrew liwyiitiin (Tn;?>'
13. However the NKJV adds a footnote that the term literally means "Day Star." In Holland,
matches are called "Iucifers."
14. The text says "king of Babylon" (see vv. 4, 22 e.g. but cpo v. 25) but the time period
concerned (Isaiah's) is Assyrian. It has been demonstrated that Assyrian kings sometimes were
called kings of Babylon (before the rise of the neo-Babylonian empire) because Assyria dominated the region that once was the old Babylonian kingdom, centered around the city of Babylon
and its glorious history. Therefore Assyrian kings saw themselves in the grand tradition of being
rulers of Babylon or Babylonia, even thought their capital was elsewhere. An exact identity of
this Assyrian king is difficult but Sargon II fits the time period and did die a disgraceful death on
the battlefield as the text describes (vv. 18-20>.
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INTRODUCTION

The span of John Howard Yoder's life and scholarship encompassed the rise of
one of the most significant theological movements of the latter half of the twentieth
century: liberation theology. I Naturally, Yoder was aware that liberation theology
was and is not a monolithic entity as most people would like to think,2 a fact that
only serves to complicate the task of considering its major premises for a Yoderian
appraisai.3 Yoder did esteem the movement sufficiently both to affirm and to criticize some of its tenets; nevertheless, the format in which Yoder addressed the
movement (articles in scholarly joumals and broader compendiums), is important:
Yoder dealt with particular issues within the movement in an ad hoc manner (similar
to many of his other endeavors), yet he did not offer a systematic and comprehensive criticism of the entire movement. The latter notion is important given the fact
that Yoder could have thwarted some of the themes usually associated with the
movement given some of his more prominent arguments.'
This observation of the manner in which Yoder dealt with LALT tempers the
present work, thereby requiring a careful appraisal of the liberationists that is not at
once completely dismissive nor unreservedly acquiescent. Such an appraisal must
take into account some of the broad, methodological parallels and divergences
between Yoder and LALT in order to account for some of the more refined particularities of each, which would subsequently lead to more nuanced considerations that
would hopefully illumine the endeavor without resorting to haphazard generalizations and/ or categorizations. s
REsPONDING TO THE MASSES

A Yoderian appraisal of LALT must begin with a certain rudimentary assessment
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of the movement's Sitz im Leben. LALT began within the context of a culture dominated
historically by exploitation and conquest. Rather than attaining the self-determining status
of some of the countries of the north (some of which were achieved through violent revolutions), the countries of Latin America continued to embody a status of "subordinacy"
and "underdevelopment" due to the continuance of certain political, economic, and religious structures dating to their colonization. During the tumultuous decade of the I 960s,
many of these arrangements were questioned in Latin America and were blamed for
many of the unjust and oppressive conditions of the day.6 The Roman Catholic Church,
because of its historical and continued presence within these cultural arrangements, did
not escape some of the backlash of this collective criticism.
Despite the role of the Roman Catholic Church within these arrangements, a group
of priests within Latin America came to acknowledge the outcry of these oppressive
circumstances and took steps at organizing their concerns in a way that would be associated with the Christian Church while at the same time responding in an active way to
the social reality in which they lived. The collective efforts of this group in rendering "a
theological reflection [that was] born of the experience of shared efforts to abolish the
current unjust situation and to build a different society, freer and more human"7 came
to be called "liberation theology." The movement came to be characterized as a new
way of doing theology in which there was a "commitment to, and solidarity with, the
poor and the vulnerable ... "8 Through this solidarity with the poor, the actions of these
priests led them to the "prophetic" denunciation of the unjust structures contributing to
the oppressive malaise, actions which did not fall short of indicting even the complicity
of the Roman Catholic Church. 9
By being an internal movement within Catholicism, LAL T exemplifies certain
methodological tendencies that typically are Catholic. The active role of denouncing
the unjust structures of modernity stems from the tradition of the Magisterium. With
the tradition of social encyclicals begun by Rerum Novarum by Leo XIII, there exists
within Catholicism a heritage of denouncing the inhumane living conditions occasioned by modernization.1O In many respects, the liberationists saw themselves as continuing this tradition through specific efforts within the Latin American context.
Interestingly, many of the liberationists adopted Marxist categories 11 to interpret the
present system of injustice and poverty, claiming all the while that these categories
were already present within the Catholic encyclical tradition. 12 Needless to say, the
Magisterium refused such associations with this atheistic ideologyn
Additionally, Roman Catholicism, as exemplified through certain Tridentine formulations and encyclical pattems, seems to be more at ease in accepting the existence of a
"wider wisdom" than would Protestantism, 14 as embodied in the repeated phrase of noticing the "signs of the times."l s Hence, from the outset, there are considerable methodological differences between the liberationists and Yoder. On the hand, the former wishes to
partake in a process that is already taking place in the world; the latter believes that the
church is a microcosm of what the world should be. The differences are considerable and
yet not insurmountable for the present task.
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INTRAFAlTH TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMARS

Yoder's ecumenical and evangelistic concerns demonstrate that he was initially quite
open to begin dialogue with various groups by meeting individuals within their own
world of referents;'6 hence, the use itself of Marxist categories by the liberationists would
not be as important for Yoder as the way these categories functioned in their speech and
reasoning. The usage of these categories would be particularly important in that they are
usages taking place within a Christian tradition. Hence, it is important to note that these
Marxist categories are being used within a tradition that already has a certain set of referents and resources that can be used to interpret present reality, thereby providing a foundation by which a Yoderian appraisal can be more exacting.
Marxist categories are used by some liberationists as "scientific" means l7 by which to
interpret the past, present, and future. Although there is an acknowledgment of the broader idealistic and philosophical contexts from which certain Marxist categories derive their
more elaborate connotations and functions, liberationists do not hesitate employing
Marxism in interpreting social reality.18 Such usage and the givenness of certain terms make
Marxism, whether explicitly or implicitly, a significant factor in the liberationists' social critique. As an example of this usage, history is interpreted as being an interplay between a
majority of disenfranchised individuals and a powerful, elite minority. Such a condition,
however, gradually is changing as individuals come to realize their present status through a
process of "conscientization."19The rising, unsettling Zeitgeist calls for action that can only be
revolutionary/o given that the powerful elite will not hand over their privileged status in
any other way. The future calls for a ruling of the majority in which a fairer and more just
society will be insured by virtue of the change of power. In sum the Marxist categories
function as a hermeneutical grid for interpreting social reality and action.
In fact it is the primacy of the social reality that dictates the usage of Marxist categories
and of the sources available within the Christian tradition.21 One of the more prominent
methodological moves by the Iiberationists is their theological starting point: the conditions of the poor and oppressed of Latin America.22 From their commitment expressed in
solidarity with the poor/ 3 the liberationists seem to be trying to make sense of present
reality in Latin America in order to offer some sort of Christian response to these conditions. Hence, the givenness of the rising awareness of the general populace of their conditions and the revolutionary expedients required for the necessary changes envisioned by
these conscientized individuals are affirmed throughout the work of the liberationists.24
Naturally, Yoder would want to question some of these moves. In typical Barthian fashion, Yoder would affirm the primacy of revelation, as embodied and demonstrated in the
person of Jesus Christ. Additionally, Yoder would want to stress whether there exist the
necessary "criteria for the church's necessary appropriation of non-Christian moral ideas,"25
which in this case are Marxist categories in the work of the liberationists.26 Such a suggestion at this point, however, would by untypically Yoderian, for despite the primacy of Jesus
Christ for all of his considerations, Yoder would be willing to suspend this notion for a time
in order to communicate more effectively to his audience.27 The flexibility demonstrated by
Yoder at this point is quite appropriate, for if differing methodological starting points would
be raised from the beginning of dialogue with the liberationists, resentment could possibly
ensue in that it would appear that the conditions of the poor would be easily dismissed.

28

Castelo

Hence, I believe Yoder would join with the liberationists in affirming the conditions of
the common Latin American as being one of poverty and oppression. The existence of
structural and institutional oppression can be seen as a real experience, and Yoder would
interpret much of that reality through the terminology of the "powers." These powers are
"invisibly determining human events" and are the biblical equivalents to "the modem
term structures. .. "28 The powers "were part of the good creation of Cod," but their biblical
depiction portray them as fallen 29 and as ruling the world.lo Hence, the activity of these
powers in determining social conditions are destructive and very real, a notion that I
believe both Yoder and the liberationists could affirm.
Yoder perhaps would proceed to critique the meaning and functions of the terms
employed by the liberationists in describing their project. To begin with, Yoder would
probably question the presence of "class conflict," for such a term is used by the liberationists largely to describe present circumstances rather than to explain their causes.
Perhaps, Yoder would pose the question of whether descriptive categories are sufficiently
substantive to then be programmatic for future action. In other words, would the Marxist
analysis of history go far enough in analyzing the present conditions of the poor?ll
The reality that exists for the poor of Latin America drives liberationists to want to
ameliorate the situation in a manner that is in conformity with much of Westem Christian
history, for the attempt to interpret history in order to change it to fit a predetermined
agenda l2 is a mode of acting that the Church has been struggling with for centuries. Yoder
terms this kind of tendency as constituting part of Constantinianism,ll and he would classify the liberationists' project as being a form of neo-neo-neo-neo Constantin ian ism, which
would be "the conviction . .. that everything is so bad that·revolution is the only meaningful imperative."l4 Therefore, despite siding with the poor, the Iiberationists nevertheless are
functioning as the interpreters and formers of social action by virtue of their clerical status,
thereby exemplifying a form of theological reasoning that would only contribute to the
continuance of a church-world relation that would not be sufficiently revolutionaryl5 to
accomplish their desired goals. l6
Yoder would certainly press the liberationists on the urgency and necessity of revolution. Many liberationists would pose the alternatives as being either for revolution or for
being complicitous with the present social regime with its oppressive actions.l7 Yoder
would want to reconfigure the question and ask what kind of revolution would be foreseen as being necessary. "How clear is it that a given 'revolution' will genuinely liberate?l8
Must nonviolent techniques be ready-to-wear immediately whereas military techniques
have had millennia to develop ... ?"l9 These questions are serious considerations that the
liberationists cannot answer in advance. 4o
Additionally, the "success" of overpowering one social structure by a certain group
does not guarantee that the new rulers will form a more just society; history has proven
otherwise. 41 Hence, the threat of replacing one unjust structure with another is a very real
possibility when considering the altemative of revolutionary violence. Do the liberationists
have an understanding of what they are liberated to in their programmatic efforts,42 or are
they inordinately focused on the present circumstances?
Naturally, Yoder's form of revolution entails a programmatic agenda in that the revolution he envisions is generally persistent throughout (as opposed to the liberationists' "now
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and then" categories), for Yoder places a primacy on the Church which entails her as
being a microcosm of what society should be because of her "doing already on behalf of
the wider world what the world is destined for in God's creative purpose."43 This stems
from Yoder's conviction of seeing history doxologically<4 with its ultimate turning point
being the person of Jesus Christ. 4s By resorting to the "revolutionary" love ethic of Jesus,
Yoder would counter any form of revolution that would not be consistent with the life
and teachings of Jesus. 46
One of the downfalls of separating individuals into social classes is falling short of the
redemptive purposes of Christ for all individuals, oppressors and oppressed. Hence, Yoder
would surely question where the oppressors fall into the schema of liberation for the liberationists. How does Marxism view the oppressors, and is this consistent with the
demands placed upon believers?"?
With all of these considerations in mind, Yoder would probably use the Marxist categories to demonstrate some of the difficulties that they would pose for accomplishing the
liberationists' ultimate goals: interpreting the present context for an informed Christian
praxis. Overall, it seems that Yoder would conceive of revelation (in particular the example of Jesus Christ) as being the primary "tool" of choice for interpreting social reality in
order to render a Christian praxis in impoverished and oppressive circumstances.
THE BIBLE AND SOCIAL REALITY:

A

CROSSING OF PLANES

Having considered in Yoderian perspective the role of Marxist categories in the work
of the liberationists, the next logical theme of importance in this study would be the
appropriation of the Scriptures in the liberationist agenda. Yoder considered the theme of
Scripture among liberationists sufficiently important to write about it on several occasions.
From Yoder's own assessment, there are some parallels and divergences between his
usage of Scripture and the usage of the liberationists.
The title of this section is purposeful in that it alludes to a concept developed by
Gustavo Gutierrez called the "distinction of planes."48 According to Gutierrez's analysis,
the history of the Roman Catholic Church up to Vatican II had made a "a very clear distinction between the Church and the world, within the unity of God's plan;" the Church
evangelized and inspired the temporal sphere but did not actually construct the world.49
Similarly, the roles of the priest and layperson were likewise differentiated. From these distinctions there occur distortions as to the political irrelevancy of the clergy and the spiritual destitution of the laity.so
Yoder for the most part agreed with Gutierrez's analysis,SI given that much of the same
points are considered in The Politics ofJesus. [n this work, Yoder demonstrates how research
of New Testament scholars and of Christian ethicists has largely functioned independently
of each other, thereby depriving each a more comprehensive analysis. Hence, Yoder
undertakes to report on the state of New Testament scholarship in order to demonstrate
some of the applications of this work for the interests of Christian ethicists. Yoder implicitly
has his own set of dualisms to counter, namely Ceschichte and Historie in general, the Jesus
of history and the Christ of faith, the precepts and the evangelical counsels, etc.
By acknowledging these distinctions, Gutierrez proceeds to point out some themes of
the Bible that for some time had been ignored by most of Western Christianity. Some of
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these themes include the prominence of the poor, liberation, exodus, alienation, etc. All
of these themes serve Gutierrez in a more significant fashion, namely of showing the
political relevance of the Bible for present society. Naturally, this is the broader agenda of
Yoder in The Politics of Jesus. Rather than letting others interpret and select the particular
peri copes and themes to explore, both individuals would want to let the Bible speak for
itself with all of its diversity and relevance for contemporary belief and practice.52
True diversity, however, would attempt to consider all of the major themes of the Bible,
and Yoder found this lacking in some of the work of the liberationists, particularly with
their exorbitant reliance on the Exodus motif. 53 The liberationists came to associate the
Exodus passage as being one that was indicative of the kind of revolution required for the
people of God to attain liberation/salvation.54 The oppression of slavery suffered by the
Israelites under the hands of the Egyptians was a theme that resonated well with "enslaved"
masses of Latin Americans who were and are at the mercy of the ruling elite. The narrative
is interpreted further by the liberationists as the Israelites uniting and overcoming their alien
status by overthrowing the Egyptians, thereby beginning a nation in a new land. The people of God in this story are depicted as overcoming their status, even to the point of violent, revolutionary means in order to attain a more just and peaceful society.
Yoder found this depiction highly problematic, particularly since it represented more of
a re-narration of the events in light of the pre-existent agenda by some of the liberationists. Rather than criticizing this usage from an outside, neutral point, Yoder perceived
to engage the Exodus motif in order to show how some of the implications of the narrative are not included and/ or altered by the liberationists 55
In the first place, Yoder states that the Exodus was not a program but a miracle. 56 The
Israelites did not gather together and by their own means overcome the Egyptians 57 nor
was this even a model that was repeatedly followed in Scripture; rather, the Exodus event
occurred because of the providential action of God, and it was His actions (the plagues,
the separation of the Red Sea, the destruction of the Egyptian army) that allowed the
Exodus to be successful.
Secondly, the Exodus was not a takeover but a withdrawal. Rather than overcoming
the Egyptians in order to subject them to similar practices that they had endured, the
Israelites refused this option and obeyed God's calling of forming a new people in a new
land. Certainly, the option of takeover was possible (by the sheer numbers themselves),
but it was not God's will to do so.
Thirdly, the Exodus was not a beginning but a culmination of a particular community who had in common their beliefs of faithfulness and obedience to Yahweh, fo r
"peoplehood is the presupposition, not the product of Exodus."5B Moses appealed to
the God of their fathers in his speeches, and the people believed in God's promises
through Moses. Hence, the social location of the Israelites (their poverty and their disenfranchisement) was not the primary factor that unified them for their liberation;
rather, it was their faith in God.
Fourthly, the Exodus also marked a beginning in the life of Israel in the sense that subsequent, constitutive events were required for the Israelites. Rather than concluding the
narrative as a completed event after the Exqdus, the narrative proceeds to document the
falling away of the children of Israel within a forty year span of wilderness wandering.
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Such a faUing away required further acts, including the dying away of the Exodus generation and the giving of the law on Sinai.
FinaUy, Yoder wishes to point out that the Exodus is an exception and not a norm for
the people of God. Given the fuU scope of the biblical narratives, the status of God's people is more often depicted as one of alienation and diaspora.59 This point is closely related
to the prophetic function that liberationists wish to draw upon in their deliberations.
Many of the liberationists caU upon the prophetic denouncement of the structures and
alignments of this world, but it is important to note that the prophetic in the Old
Testament usuaUy occurred for the people of God themselves who were in a state of exile
because of their unfaithfulness.
What Yoder wishes to point out in these observations are the limitations involved in
relying on one particular theme to the exclusion of the many others found in Scripture.
Hence, one can adopt the language of Scripture (e.g., liberation) without the full extent of
its corresponding meanings. Hence, as Scripture denotes, liberation takes place in a particular form (a confessing community, not guerrilla warfare) and has a particular content
(covenant peoplehood, not nation-state brotherhood), means ("might Acts" and not justified violence), and atmosphere (wonderment/praise/ doxology, not compUlsive management of events).60
Although the matter cannot be treated exhaustively here, the topic of Biblical usage
naturally raises the place of Christ within the Yoderian and liberationist perspectives. Both
parties would consider jesus Christ as a model for Christian action, but their interpretation
of the actual content of such action varies. 61 Gutierrez states, "Christ is presented as the
one who brings us liberation. Christ the Savior liberates from sin, which is the ultimate
root of all disruption of friendship and of all injustice and oppression."62 Yoder would
affirm this statement but would wish to amplify the way in which jesus brought us liberation as a program for our discipleship. One way Yoder demonstrates the way of Jesus is
by pointing to Jesus' action of sacrificing, "in the interest of nonresistant love, all other
forms of human solidarity, including the legitimate national interests of the chosen people."63 Certainly, the social setting in which jesus lived was in many ways similar to the
Latin American context, particularly since the Jews of his day were for the most part politically disenfranchised. Jesus had many of the similar options open to him that are open to
many today; yet, jesus' form of revolution was bearing the crosS.64
Given these considerations, it is worthwhile to note that both the liberationists and
Yoder find the biblical narratives as having important ramifications for social reality, but
they have different ways of interpreting that influence. These differences in appropriation undoubtedly stem from the liberationists' starting point of the conditions of the
poor. The Iiberationists might find in Yoder's option a certain disregard for the reality of
the present circumstances of most Latin Americans, but Yoder would further reply that
such conditions, as legitimately deplorable as they might be, cannot function in and of
themselves as interpretive tools for assessing the Scriptures and the will of God.
Nevertheless, despite these differences in starting points, both Yoder and the liberationists would affirm that such conditions demand a certain response by attentive and
faithful Christians 65

32

Castelo

CONCLUSION

There are many other topics that could have been pursued to render a potential
Yoderian appraisal of liberation theology,66 but the purpose of this work was to use some
of the more direct comments Yoder made with regards to the movement. By contextualising the liberationist movement and proceeding to consider its appropriation of Marxist
categories and biblical themes within a Yoderian point of view, the present work points to
some of the key similarities and differences between the two parties. Undoubtedly, Yoder
and the liberationists viewed (and continue to view, in the case of the latter) the conditions of poverty and oppression for the majority of Latin Americans as requiring a
Christian response. The crucial point for both, however, is the way this response is articulated and enacted.
Ultimately, Yoder took the liberationists seriously. Rather than considering the movement a fad that would eventually subside, Yoder considered liberation theology as making
serious claims that could not be swept aside; therefore, any critical judgments made by
Yoder or implicit in his writings were and should be made for the sake of offering to the
poor and oppressed a truly revolutionary option: one that takes Jesus Christ as the norm
for all human actions and endeavors.
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NOTES

I. Given the particularities of both Yoder's work and Latin American liberation theology
(hereafter LALn as a movement itself, this work will proceed in several distinct ways. The term "liberation theology" will refer in all cases to Latin American liberation theology due to the fact that the
Latin American form is generally considered as the most popular and unified strand and because of
the primacy which it was given by Yoder himself (see "Biblical Roots of Liberation Theology," Grail
I (September 1985): 56; hereafter Roots). Because Yoder addresses the movement directly, the present study will be both descriptive (in relation to these works) and constructive (in relation to the
potential implications of a Yoderian appraisal of this movement given his other works). As far as the
operational definition for liberation theology, the definition provided by Gustavo Gutierrez will be
used: "a critical reflection on Christian praxis in light of the word of God" (A Theology of Liberation
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), xix) . Although Gutierrez is willing to say at another point that "liberation
theology is a critical reflection on the word of God received in the church" (Ibid., xxxiii), it is clear
that praxis, with all of its connotations and implications, remains the starting point that tempers and
shapes A Theology of Liberation.
2. See Roots, 64. Yoder states that LALT has different components, including a "martyr minority" who challenge the ready approval of violence and who "raise deeper critical questions, both of
pragmatic effectiveness and of faithful moral reasoning."
3. Because of this fact, this work will focus on the thinkers in LALT whom Yoder considered
as primary, namely Gustavo Gutierrez and Juan Luis Segundo (See Roots, 57). This is not to exclude
other voices but to narrow the field to a manageable level. Additionally, the fact that Yoder was
aware of these thinkers sets the stage for a more legitimate Yoderian appraisal since he would have
been acquainted with these individuals and their work.
4. In fact certain places in which one would think that Yoder would come hard against the
liberationists show him giving the movement the benefit of the doubt. One particular instance of
this preference is in 'The Wider Setting of 'Liberation Theology'" (The Review of Politics 52 (Spring
1990) : 285-296) where Yoder states, "Nonviolent commitment and initiatives in nonviolent action
(whether on principled or on pragmatic grounds) arise more frequently within liberation theology
settings than within establishment or uninvolved theological milieux. To hold against liberation theology the room made by some thinkers for some violence in extreme revolutionary situations coming from anyone but some kind of padfist is in serious danger of being an argument in bad faith. A liberationist non pacifist is probably more restrained in the room he or she is ready to make for violence
than is the average nonliberationist nonpacifisf (287). Yoder emphasizes the same point differently
in Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and Revolution (Elkhart, IN : Co-Op Bookstore, 1983), 533.
Therefore, Yoder does not fit the categorization in which Robert McAfee Brown places some critics
who believe the liberationists glorify violence (See Theology in a New Key <Philadelphia: Westminster,
1978), 110), for Yoder admits of a pacifist strand within the liberationist tradition (see Roots, 64).
Perhaps Yoder's interests in the liberationists stem from the fact that they might be people "within
majority Christianity . . . who at least begin to ask fundamental questions, even though their being
in a majority position may keep them from following those questions to their natural conclusions"
(The Priestly Kingdom (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2000), 89). Part of this tendency to ask fundamental questions stems from the methodological approach of the "hermeneutic circle" espoused by
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Juan Luis Segundo (See Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1976), 8ff.l.
5. The use of "appraisal" in this context is purposeful; this work does not intend to be a "comparison" or a "mutual corrective of one to another." Hence, Yoder's positions will be considered as
primary, but operating this way will require a certain degree of attentiveness in order to attempt a
certain degree of faimess. The problem of broad generalizations in studies of comparison is exemplified in a recent chapter by George Hunsinger devoted to Karl Barth and liberation theology in
Disruptive Grace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). By reverting to the category of "controlling passion," Hunsinger myopically places Barth within the controlling passion of loving and fearing God
above all else while placing liberation theology (as exemplified by Gustavo Gutierrez) within the
passion "to love one's neighbor as oneself' (54). This is a most unfortunate example of reductionism that I believe both Barth and Gutierrez would find intolerable.
6. See Phillip Berryman's Liberation Theology (New York: Pantheon, 1987), particularly
Chapter I, for a general overview of these conditions. Gutierrez labels this process as the oppressed
becoming "the agents of their own destiny" (A Theology of Liberation, xxix) .
7. Ibid., xiii.
8. Christopher Rowland, "Introduction: the theology of liberation" in The Cambridge
Companion to Liberation Theology, ed. Christopher Rowland (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 3-4.
9. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church was and is involved to some degree in the unjust
conditions of Latin Americans is not seriously disputed, for as Gutierrez mentions, "People are also
more keenly and painfully aware that a large part of the Church is in one way or another linked to
those who wield economic and political power in today's world" (A Theology of Liberation, 40); nevertheless, it is remarkable that priests within Catholicism were willing to take this step of acknowledging some of their own faults. Robert McAfee Brown attributes the actions of these liberationist
priests to the fact that they did not want to be "puppets" in such a system any more and to the tradition of social teachings in the Church (Makers of Contemporary Theology: Gustavo Gutierrez
(Atlanta: John Knox, 1980), 14-15).
10. Gutierrez states that Mater et Magistra, Pacem in terris, and Gaudium et spes "all stress the
urgency of eliminating the existing injustices and the need for an economic development geared to the
service of humankind" (A Theology of Liberation, 22). References to the social encyclicals are rampant
throughout the works of the liberationists and the documents arising from ecclesiastical conferences.
I I. The reference to "Marxist categories" includes the existence of classes, the inevitability of
class conflict, the necessity of a revolution by which to establish a society govemed by the disenfranchised majority (jn Marx, the proletariat; in liberation theology, the poorl, and the epistemological
primacy of praxis. Much of this Marxist usage is implicit rather than explicit, as when Gutierrez
states, "the social praxis of contemporary humankind has begun to reach maturity," "... the political
arena is necessarily conflictual," and "... our understanding of history - that is, a liberating praxis" (A
Theology of Liberation, 30, 31 , 32, respectively). The ensuing exploration of the Marxist categories
within liberationist thought should not be taken to imply that a Marxist agenda is the same as the
liberationist agenda. Hence, this exploration is not trying to dismiss these categories or the usage of
them by the liberationists but is trying to analyze these categories (as all tools should be) in order to
evaluate their functional role.
12. Jose Porfiro Miranda states that 'There is no doubt that the encyclicals take their diagnosis of
society from Marx ..." !.Marx and the Bible (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1974), xiii>. Certain elements of such a
diagnosis include the presence of classes and the inevitability of the class struggle. Nevertheless, the
hints offered by the Magisterium, which had little in the form of programmatic substance, might have
created the possibility for the praxis-oriented program of the liberationists; in this regard, the latter
might have thought that the Magisterium did not go far enough in its statements.
13 . The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has issued two statements conceming liberation
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theology: Instruction on Certain Aspects of the "Theology of Liberation" <Libertatis Nuntius) (1984) and
Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation <Libertatis Conscientia) (1986). The fonner document
defies the notion of the Magisterium's usage of Marxist categories by beginning its analysis of the
human condition from a strong hamartiological basis and proceeding to chide the "insufficiently critical manner" in which concepts are borrowed from Marxist thought given the fact that "the ideological principles come prior to the study of the social reality and are presupposed in it. Thus no separation of the parts of this epistemologically unique complex is possible. If one tries to take only one
part, say, the analysis [of social realityl, one ends up having to accept the entire ideology" MI, 6).
Naturally, this assessment of the liberationists' appropriation of Marx is not without protest. One
notable example of such protest is Juan Luis Segundo's Theology and the Church (New York: Harper
and Row, 1987), in which he states that "I understand that my theology (that is, my interpretation
of Christian faith) is false if the theology of ILibertatis Nuntiasl is true - or if it is the only one" (14).
Obviously, Segundo is protesting not only against the charges of Marxist appropriations by liberationists but against all of the generalized references in the document to "deviations" from the faith.
Additionally, Gutierrez does not think these charges made by Libertatis Nuntius apply to him (See
"Criticism Will Deepen, Clarify Liberation Theology" in Liberation Theology: A Documentary History,
Alfred T. Hennelly, S. J., ed. (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990), 423).
14. See Roots, 71 -72. This line of thought is pursued by Yoder along the lines of the analysis
made by James Gustafson in Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1978). Of course, this is a generalization that cannot be pushed too far since many Protestants have
a confidence in a "wider wisdom" (whatever that might be). Another way of describing what I
believe Yoder and Gustafson to be advocating is to say that Protestants and Catholics approach and
appropriate Scripture differently in their theological methodologies, a point which Gustafson explicitly makes (29). The issue of a "wider wisdom" raises the broader notion of what Yoder's views
might be in relation to natural theology. Yoder states that natural theology usually functions as a
"vehicle on which value judgments could be introduced into ethical discussion without needing support in revelation," and although Yoder would admit that there is an "ordering" that is true in the
world by virtue of its relation to the Redeemer, he states that "historical study shows that it has been
possible to understand under order of nature just about anything a philosopher wanted" (The
Christian Witness to the State (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1998), 33). Yoder mentions that natural
law is often used in justifying war (Original Revolution, 134) and in relativizing the ethical impact of
Jesus (The Royal Priesthood, 114).
I S. This "willingness to hear the voice of God in the signs of the times" is especially evident in
the documents of Medellin (See The Church in the Present-Day Transformation: Second General
Conference of Latin American Bishops, 2 vols. (Bogota: Indo-American Press, 1970), 2:38).
16. I am partially indebted to the work of Scott Williams, a peer of mine at Duke, concerning
issues of translatibility in Yoder for this point. The works of particular importance within this discussion revolve around Yoder's The Christian Witness to the State, where he proposes the use of "middle
axioms" <32 ff.l, and The Priestly Kingdom, where he proposes the use of the "interworld transfonnationa I grammar" (56). The function of the fonner for Yoder is that they "will translate into meaningful and concrete tenns the general relevance of the lordship of Christ for a given social ethical issue"
(The Christian Witness to the State, 32) while the latter functions to aid in the discernment of "what
will need to happen if the collision of the message of Jesus with our pluralistic/ relativistic world is to
lead to a reconception of the shape of the world, instead of to rendering Jesus optional or innocuous" (The Priestly Kingdom, 56). The presence of these tenns in Yoder's work is sparse; therefore,
they cannot attain a status beyond the functional usage Yoder seems to foresee in their appropriation. Nevertheless, their presence do indicate that Yoder was willing to adopt (at least during the initial stages of engagement) a certain set of pre-existent tenns within the world in order to reconfigure
and adapt their usages to make the gospel and its ramifications intelligible.
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17. 'This analysis of the situation is at the level of scientific rationality. Only a radical break
from the status quo, that is, a profound transformation of the private property system, access to
power of the exploited class, and a social revolution that would break this dependence would allow
for the change to a new society . . ." (Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 17). The use of "scientific" is
problematic because of its connotations of "truth;" more appropriate would be the use of "theory,"
although the liberationists would probably not revert to this option given their excessive dependence on these categories for their entire program. Although it can be said that the liberationists use
Marxism as "an instrument of social analysis" <Brown, Theology in a New Key, 66; emphasis mine), it
seems from the evidence that Marxism is the primary instrument of social analysis for many of the
liberationists.
18. It seems that Yoder attributes this readiness to employ Marxist terminology to the novelty
for the liberationists to consider moral involvement as testing truth. Yoder believes that this methodological assumption is apparent in various strands of Protestantism, but for the liberationists such a
notion is radical given the manner in which theology is structured and pursued in their contexts.
See Roots, 62ff.
19. Of course, this term was employed and popularized by Paulo Freire. For a discussion of the
background and range of meaning of this term in relation to liberation, see Freire's "Conscientizing
as a Way of Liberating" in Henelly, Liberation Theology, 5-13.
20. Is the Marxist revolution similar to the revolution called for by the liberationists 7 This question is important to consider, given the plethora of references to "revolution" in some of the liberationists' writings. Gutierrez is willing to go as far as to state, "In Latin America, the Church must
place itself squarely within the process of revolution, amid the violence which is present in different
ways. The Church's mission is defined practically and theoretically, pastorally and theologically, in
relation to this revolutionary process" (A Theology of Liberation, 75-76). Although Gutierrez makes
similar statements in his other works, he nevertheless states that liberation theology is not a theology
of development, revolution, and violence (See The Power of the Poor in History (Maryknoll: Orbis,
1983), 61). Gutierrez feels that it is sufficient to state that liberation theology "has its point of departure precisely in an involvement with that [revolutionary] process and attempts to help make it
more critical of itself ... [by situating] liberating political commitment within a perspective of the
free gift of Christ's total liberation" <lbid.l How the Church is to maintain her identity while engaging in this process is ambiguous.
2 I. "Any recourse to the Word of the Lord as well as all references to contemporary theology
will be made with reference to this praxis" (Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 79). The referent to
the kind of praxis seems to be one which is committed to the process of liberation.
22. "But once the evident course of history is held to be empirically discemible, and the prosperity of our regime is the measure of good, all morality boils down to efficacy. Right action is what
works; what does not promise results can hardly be right" (The Priestly Kingdom, 140). Therefore,
the inordinate emphasis on effectiveness is one of the problems Yoder would have with starting
with the praxis of liberation as derived from the conditions of the Latin American populace because
such an emphasis would resort to violence to accomplish the desired goals.
23. This commitment to the poor is considered the first act from which theology follows; this
sequence is affirmed both by Segundo (Liberation of Theology, 71 ff.l and Gutierrez (A Theology of

Liberation, 9ft).
24. Yoder would label such actions as being "theocratic" in the sense that "it finds the locus of
meaningfulness in the course of the history of a society or of the world at large and calls upon the
church to discem God as the agent of that movement and upon Christians to join God in bringing
it about" (The Royal Priesthood, 90).
25. The Priestly Kingdom, 76. Yoder in this context is speaking about the process by which violence came to be legitimated in Christendom, but the point is still relevant in this context.
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26. Yoder hints at the need for arguing the relevancy of Marxist terms within the liberationists'
framework in Christian Attitudes to War; Peace, and Revolution, 534.
27. Yoder clearly states this flexibility in his discussion in witnessing to the statesman when he
says, 'Then we would wrongly understand the witness to a person in authority as a sort of second
best, as if we had first called him to believe in Jesus Christ, and then when he had said he would
not, we would go on to plead, 'Well, all right then, but will you please at least be decent and honese' What we ask of him does not cease to be gospel by virtue of the fact that we relate it to his
present available options" (The Christian Witness to the State, 25).

28. The Christian Witness to the State, 8.
29. The Politics ofjesus, 140-141.
30. The Christian Witness to the State, 8-9.
3 I. The liberationists will admit that sin is the ultimate source of poverty, injustice, etc. (See
Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 24ff'); how much harmartiology figures into their overall program, however, is another consideration that is debatable.
32. Within this move, Yoder identifies at least three assumptions: I) "that the relationship of
cause and effect is visible, understandable, and manageable, so that if we make our choices on the
basis of how we hope society will be moved, it will be moved in that direction," 2) "that we are
adequately informed to be able to set for ourselves and for all society the goal toward which we
seek to move it," and 3) "that effectiveness in moving toward these goals which have been set is
itself a moral yardstick" (The Politics ofjesus, 229-230). Gutierrez in his work exemplifies to a degree
these characteristics, yet he avoids a total program in that he considers "the concrete measures of
effecting the denunciation and the annunciation ho] be discerned little by little" (A Theology of

Liberation, 155).
33. Yoder sees some of the marks of Constantinianism as being that civil government "is the
main bearer of historical movement ..." and "the place of the church or of persons speaking for
Christian morality <including academic theologians) is that of 'chaplaincy,' i.e., a part of the power
structure itself' (The Priestly Kingdom, 138). Because of the status of the church, new ethical questions come to the fore, induding "Can you ask such behavior of everyone?" and "What would happen if everyone did it?" (Ibid, 139). Gutierrez is aware of the term "Constantianism" and finds the
social influence of the Church as a given reality that must be affirmed by casting her lot with the
oppressed and exploited (A Theology of Liberation, 151). Yoder explicitly states that he believes that
some liberation theologians "lay themselves open" to the Constantinian temptation (Roots, 72-73).

34. The Original Revolution, 155.
35. Yoder clearly indicates that "many efforts to renew Christian thought regarding power and
society remain the captives of the fallen system they mean to reject" (The Priestly Kingdom, 144).
Hence, Yoder envisions what he terms an "alternative consciousness" in which "the experience of
isolationloppressionlsuffering/powerlessness .. . renews the community in its awareness that it is
nonetheless worthwhile to go on living," "one learns to trust in the power of weakness ... [and] to
see through the weakness of power," a community depends on "an alternative narrative," and such
a community hopes "when there is no reason to hope" (Ibid., 94-95) .
36. The issue of goals raises the notion of discernment, which already has been alluded to
above. Suffice it to say that Yoder would caution that "we cannot 'go where the action is' until we
know which action should be blessed and joined and which should be denounced" (The Royal

Priesthood( 94).
37. "... the dilemma now confronting the whole [Latin American] continent [is]: to be for or
against the system, or more subtly, to be for reform or revolution" (Gutierrez, A Theology of
Liberation, 76). This set of alternatives, of course, is severely myopic, for being complicitous with revolution to the extent of condoning and performing evil acts is in a sense precisely what the liberationists wish to avoid: being complicitous with evil ("But the kind of faithfulness that is willing to
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accept evident defeat rather than complicity with evil is, by virtue of its conformity with what happens to Cod when he works among us, aligned with the ultimate triumph of the Lamb" The Politics
of jesus, 238). The way this question is phrased also forces one to consider the divine role in these
events; in other words, would this question forcibly make Cod's patience to be perceived as complicity because Cod does not take the immediate actions that the liberationists wish to see? See Original
Revolution, 65.
38. Yoder pursues this same line of questioning conceming the concept of "freedom" when he
questions if the liberationists' idea of freedom is sufficiently original, critical, and biblical. See Roots, 68.
39. The Priestly Kingdom, 21 I, n. 12.
40. As Yoder alludes to the point made by Reinhold Niebuhr, the irony of history is "that when
people try to manage history, it almost always tums out to have taken another direction than that in
which they thought they were guiding it" (The Politics of jesus, 230l. Such an observation presses the
point that legitimate ends must be coupled with legitimate means (Ibid., 237).
41. Yoder cites as an example Cuba, which up to Yoder's time had not proven itself to be
more of a just society after the revolution of Castro (Roots, 65).
42. Yoder states quite lucidly that "liberation is from bondage and for covenant and what for matters more than what from" ("Exodus and Exile," 304). Yoder further asks, "Can the various 'fronts' and
'movements' which today call themselves 'liberation' point us with any confidence ... to a constitutive event following the 'exodus' that will give substance to their separate existence? Or is not what is
today called 'liberation' sparked and justified only by the wrongness of the oppression it denounces,
while sharing with the oppressor many of his ethical assumptions about how to deal with dissent,
about the use of violence, about the political vocation of the liberating elite?" (lbid.l This shortcoming
is one of the arguments against the liberationists by Michael Novak, who is led to believe that the liberationist program is at a "pre-theoretical stage" (See Will It Liberate? (New York: Paulist, 1986),34).

43. The Priestly Kingdom, 92.
44. Yoder uses such terminology in relation to the Apocalypse. "To see history doxologically, in
the metaphor of this cultic vision, is to describe the cosmos in terms dictated by the knowledge that
a once slaughtered Lamb is now living" (The Royal Priesthood, 128). Yoder goes on to explain this
process through nine points, but two points should suffice in this discussion: "To see history doxologically demands and enables that we appropriate especially/ specifically those modes of witness
which explode the limits that our own systems impose ori our capacity to be illuminated and led"
and "to be empowered and obligated to discem, down through the centuries, which historical
developments can be welcomed as progress in the light of the Rule of the Lamb and which as setbacks" (Ibid., 129, 132).
45. Yoder views the Cos pel as having "to do with the reign of Cod among men in all their
interpersonal relations, and not solely with the forgiveness of sins or the regeneration of individuals"
(The Christian Witness to the State, 23; emphasis minel.
46. Yoder affirms this notion when he states, "Every strand of New Testament literature testifies
to a direct relationship between the way Christ suffered on the cross and the way the Christian, as
disciple, is called to suffer in the face of evil" (Original Revolution, 60l. Even in the most difficult of
circumstances, we are called to follow Christ, for, as Yoder mentions earlier, "it is especially in relation to evil that discipleship is meaningful" (lbidJ
47. With each mutation of the Constantinian arrangement, Yoder points out that the "level of
the church's capacity to be critical decreases as well" (The Priestly Kingdom, 144). Perhaps this loss of
critical acumen is taking place here with regards to enemy-love, for "it is of the nature of the love of
Cod not to let itself be limited by models or options or opportunities which are offered to it by a situation" (Original Revolution, SOl .
48. A Theology of Liberation, 36ff. This term also is affirmed by Segundo (Liberation of Theology,
140ffJ
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49. A Theology of Liberation, 36-37.
50. As useful as these points are, Gutierrez is nevertheless not without his own dualisms; of
particular importance here is the dichotomy he makes of action and thinking: "From the perspective
of the theology of liberation, it is argued that the first step is to contemplate God and put God's will
into practice; and only in a second moment can we think about God" ("The Task and Content of
Liberation Theology" in The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, 28). Naturally, the questions must be posed as to what differences there are between "contemplation" and "thinking" for
Gutierrez and whether this distinction itself poses a "distinction of planes" that hampers legitimacy
and faithfulness in enacting God's will.
51. Yoder's affirmations are found in Roots, 58, 66.
52. Yoder will go as far as to state that, "no biblically-oriented theology can fail in some sense, I
would claim, to be a theology of liberation" <Roots, 67).
53. 'The Old Testament, and the Exodus event in particular, show us two central elements
completely fused into one: i.e., God the liberator and the political process of liberation .. . In no
other portion of Scripture does God the liberator reveal himself in such close connection with the
political plane of human existence" (Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, 110-111).
54. The link between these two concepts is alluded to when Gutierrez states, 'The building of a
just society has worth in terms of the Kingdom, or in more current phraseology, to participate in the
process of liberation is already in a certain sense, a salvific work" (A Theology of Liberation, 46).
55. Hence, Yoder in "Exodus and Exile" proceeds in a manner similar to that which was proposed above as a way to engage the Marxist categories. Yoder states his purpose in appropriating
the Exodus motif as facing "that liberation language in its own right . ..to test the legitimacy of its
claim to be echoing a biblical message," and to see if there is any unjustified selectivity ("Exodus and
Exile," 298).
56. Each of the subsequent five paragraph headings are taken from "Exodus and Exile," 299ff.
57. "Every portion of the Exodus account, difficult to interpret at other points, is clear in the
report that the Israelites did nothing to bring about the destruction of the Egyptians. The only call to
them was to believe and obey" (The Politics of Jesus, 77). Of course, this is in contradistinction to
Gutierrez's call for the poor "to see themselves as subjects of their own history [and] as being able
to take their destiny in their own hands" ("The Task and Content of Liberation Theology," The
Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, 2 I ).
58. "Exodus and Exile," 30 I .
59. Yoder elaborates more fully his understanding of the Jewish community's role in diaspora
in "See How They Go with Their Face to the Sun" in For the Nations (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1997). Interestingly, Gutierrez touches on some of these themes in his We Drink from Our Own
Wells (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995), which is a "spirituality" as distinguished from his other theologically
programmatic works.
60. See Yoder's 'Withdrawal and Diaspora" in Freedom and Discipleship, Daniel S. Schipani, ed.
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989), 76-84.
6 I. An extreme example of this difference stems from Segundo's characterization of Jesus as
being politically neutral (Liberation of Theology, 71) and his main interests being on an apolitical plane
(Ibid., I 1 I>' Gutierrez is much more complex about Jesus' political ramifications (A Theology of
Liberation, 132) but nevertheless falls short of labeling Jesus' cross as paradigmatic.
62. A Theology of Liberation, 25.

63 . The Original Revolution, 61.
64. One might think that the Zealot option elaborated by Yoder in The Original Revolution
would be applicable to the liberationists. It seems Yoder could make this move since he speaks of
the Zealot temptation (in relation to student groups) as proclaiming "that the only option for the
Christian church is to 'take sides' with those forces which demand immediate social remodeling,
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even at the cost if necessary of much bloodshed" (22). Gutierrez is aware of the complex relationship between Jesus and the Zealots, and he elaborates quite effectively about the limitations of the
Zealots (e.g., their exorbitant nationalism and their desire to see the Kingdom "as the fruit of their
own efforts") (A Theology of Liberation, 131 -132). Interestingly, Gutierrez does not make a connection between the possible similarities between the Zealots and the liberationists.
65. Yoder is willing to affirm that the New Testament indicates, in continuance with the Old,
that "God calls his people to a prophetically critical relationship to structures of power and oppression .. ." (The Royal Priesthood, 245). The role assigned to the prophetic here is seen as complimentary, and not in contradiction to, what was said above in relation to the same theme. Obviously, the
liberationists have achieved some of these measures through the documents of the different bishops' conferences.
66. Some of these possibilities could include a closer examination of the interpretation of history, Christ's lordship, and the documents of the General Conferences of the Latin American Bishops
(especially Puebla, which Yoder seemed to find favorable; see Roots, 73 -74).

Is

FAITH IN CHRIST A SINFUL ACT?

.....
MICHAEL ROBINSON

The Anninian doctrine of prevenient grace long has been a source of dispute
among evangelical theologians, and its apparent limited scriptural support sometimes
has been a fountain of embarrassment fo r those who affinn it. In this essay, I hope
to offer a brief defense of this doctrine in its traditional fonn, but even more to propose a couple of altematives to its customary rendering. One of these altematives is,
as the title suggests, to claim that the act of faith is not a morally pure act, but one
that nevertheless is accepted by God as a means toward salvation. The conventional
Arminian/Wesleyan doctrine of prevenient grace assumes two important dogmas of
the Augustinian/ Calvinistic tradition, namely the doctrines of depravity and of
human inability to perform genuine righteousness. Before discussing prevenient
grace, let us briefly examine these teachings and their relationship to the traditional
Anninian doctrine.
The doctrine of depravity claims that humans have a corrupted nature, one
which makes them prone to commit sin and unwilling fully to submit to God in
love. Often this evil propensity is thought somehow to be passed down to each
human from our earliest ancestors. Closely tied to this teaching is the doctrine of
inability. This doctrine asserts that, in some sense, human beings are unable to perfonn any genuinely righteous act before God. Consequently, without divine grace,
humans are unable to restore themselves to fellowship with God and so stand condemned before the divine judgment.
Augustine of Hippo expressed each of these teachings. He insisted that originally,
Adam and Eve were free to do either good or evil. ' But they transgressed God's command and as a result received a corrupted, sinful, nature. In this condition, the two
could no longer choose good, but only evil. They were free, but only free to choose
between various evil actions.2 In tum, the human race inherited from them this sinful
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nature, which includes the inability to do what is right.) John Calvin followed Augustine on
these points. He proclaimed that the deity created Adam and Eve with free will.
Sorrowfully, however, in an act of rebellion, the two freely sinned against Cod and, therefore, became corrupted in nature. Because of this, they could no longer do good or even
desire to do good. In tum, their sinful nature was transferred from them to their descendants, so that now each human is bom with a corrupted nature and with the inability to
desire good or to do it. 4 Indeed, Calvin insisted that humans are totally evil, that only
damnable things come from us in our sinful state. Calvin admitted that throughout the
ages unbelievers have done noble deeds, but he insisted that such noble actions result from
an unseen divine restraint upon such persons. Allegedly, the deity operates grace upon
them, not sufficient to save them, but only enough to hold back the full flood of their evil
nature.s The only "freedom " that corrupted humans have is the capacity to choose
between evil options. Consequently, the whole human race stands condemned by Cod.
In light of these commitments to the doctrines of depravity and to human inability,
both Augustine and Calvin endorsed the notion of unconditional divine predestination
unto salvation. Augustine taught that because humans are inwardly sinful and, therefore,
unwilling and unable to do good, salvation is solely the act of Cod. The deity has provided a means for forgiveness of sin through the work of Christ. This forgiveness may be
appropriated by humans through faith in Christ. 6 However, both the desire to exercise
faith and the performance of such faith result from a divine action upon the human soul.
Faith is not an action self-determined by the believer. It is "the gift of Cod."7 And so, Cod
alone decides who is saved. He empowers some to desire and to perform faith. Others he
does not so empower and, consequently, they do not exercise faith and are not saved.8
Augustine rejected the idea that Cod's choice to save is based on divine foreknowledge
of the future righteous actions or faith of persons. Instead, such future meritorious actions
and faith can only be grounded in the divine decision to save those persons. 9 In light of
this, Augustine distinguishes two divine calls to salvation. One calling is to all people but is
not accepted by all. Another calling is to a select group and always is accepted. This latter
call is offered to those who are "predestined . .. to conform to the image of His Son."lo
The other call is to all people, even those who will not believe.
Calvin essentially duplicated Augustine's reasoning at these points. According to
Calvin, Cod did not want all humankind to remain in their sinful condition .
Subsequently, the deity chose to save some through the atoning work of Jesus Christ.
The benefits of this work are received by faith; but faith is not an autonomous human
act. Rather, Cod must give saving faith to persons so that they might believe in Christ. II
Those to whom Cod gives faith most certainly believe and are saved. Those to whom
Cod does not give faith cannot believe and are doomed to etemal punishment. The
choice of who is saved and who is damned is solely Cod's. Calvin explicitly rejects the
notion that Cod might predestine by foreseeing the faith or good works of various individuals. Rather, faith occurs only because Cod gives it, and foreknowledge is grounded
in the divine decree that certain events will happen. 12 Like Augustine, Calvin recognized
two types of divine call-a general call to all people and an effective call only to those
whom Cod has chosen to save. 13
James Arminius, and later John Wesley, rejected key elements of thi s
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Augustinian/ Calvinistic consensus. In particular, they spumed that tradition's denial of
human libertarian freedom. For Arminius and Wesley, such a denial makes it impossible
to affirm human responsibility for sin or to justify Cod's condemnation of human behavior. 14 Dismissing the infra- and supra-Iapsarianism of his day, which asserted that Cod
unconditionally decrees who will and will not be saved, Arminius insisted that Cod's
decree unto salvation is conditional; it is conditioned by the free choice that humans
make for or against Christ. Arminius writes:
I. The first absolute decree of Cod concerning the salvation of man, is that by
which he decreed to appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator, Redeemer, Savior,
Priest and King, who might destroy sin by his own death, might by obedience obtain
the salvation which had been lost, and might communicate it by his own virtue.
2. The second precise and absolute decree of Cod, is that in which he decreed to
receive into favor those who repent and believe, and, in Christ for his sake and
through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as persevered to
the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ. IS
Wesley essentially agreed with Arminius' interpretation of the divine decrees.16
While Arminius and Wesley both denounced the Augustinian/Calvinistic affirmation
of unconditional divine predestination, they each basically agreed with that tradition's
understanding of depravity and of the human inability to please Cod. Arminius writes:
.. . in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to
think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be
regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by
Cod in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good.l ?
Wesley concurs, noting through a string of biblical quotes that
. .. there is in every man a "carnal mind, which is enmity against Cod, which is not,
cannot be subject to" his "law;" and which so infects the whole soul, that "there
dwelleth in" him, "in his flesh," in his natural state, "no good thing;" but "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is evil," only evil, and that "continually."IB
Nevertheless, even though they affirmed the doctrines of depravity and of human
inability, Arminius and Wesley each denounced the notions of a limited call and of irresistible grace, the respective ideas that Cod only calls a few people to salvation and that
those whom he calls cannot resist, but must exercise faith in Christ and be saved. Instead,
these men taught that God calls all to salvation, that a\l who receive this offer positively
can respond to it, but that many freely reject it.
Arminius explicitly denied that his views implied salvation by works. Rather, he insisted
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that salvation is by grace, but not by irresistible grace. He notes:
I ascribe to grace the commencement, the continuance and the consummation of
all good, and to such an extent do I carry its influence, that a man, though already
regenerate, can neither conceive, will, nor do any good at all, nor resist any evil
temptation without this preventing and exciting, this following and co-operating
grace. From this statement it will clearly appear, that I by no means do injustice to
grace, by attributing, as it is reported of me, too much to man's free-will. For the
whole controversy reduces itself to the solution of this question, "is the grace of
Cod a certain irresistible force?" That is, the controversy does not relate to those
actions or operations which may be ascribed to grace (for I acknowledge and inculcate as many of these actions or operations as any man ever did), but it relates solely to the mode of operation, whether it be irresistible or not. With respect to which,
I believe, according to scriptures, that many persons resist the Holy Spirit and reject
the grace that is offered. 19
Arminius distinguished between two forms of divine grace. These are preventing grace
and subsequent or cooperating grace. The former is a grace offered to all humans so that
they freely may choose for or against Christ and, thus, for or against salvation. Without
this grace, no one could choose Christ or be saved. 20 The latter is a grace which follows
after one's initial faith in Christ. It is a
perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy Spirit, according to which he
acts upon and excites to good the man who has been already renewed, by infusing
into him salutary cogitations, and by inspiring him with good desires, that he may
thus actually will whatever is good; and according to which Cod may then will and
work together with man, that man may perform whatever he wills.21
At each level of grace, human free will is active. Like Arminius, Wesley also insisted
that grace is necessary for salvation. Humans cannot turn to Cod without divine aid.
However, Cod has given to all humans a prevenient grace that allows them freely to
choose Christ or remain in sin. This grace is required for salvation, but it is not irresistible. 22
The close tie between the traditional Arminian doctrine of prevenient grace and
the doctrines of human depravity and inability leaves the contemporary Arminian
with two fundamental options in defending the core elements of the Arminian model
of salvation. One option is to accept, with Arminius and Wesley, the notion that
humans utterly are corrupted by sin and unable positively to respond to Christ without some direct divine spiritual aid. A second option is to reevaluate the alleged
impact of the sinful nature upon humans, questioning whether such a nature makes it
impossible for humans to respond in faith to Christ. We will consider each alternative
in turn. We begin with a defense of the traditional Arminian/ Wesleyan understanding
of prevenient grace.
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A DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL ARMINlAN PREVENIENT GRACE

As we have just noted, the conventional Calvinist and Anninian models agree that
humans are corrupted to such a degree that they are unable to desire or actually to tum
to Christ in faith. For each theory, a special act of divine inner influence must enable the
sinner to exercise faith. Where these models diverge is in the matter of the human's ability
to resist such inner divine empowering. Augustine and Calvin insisted that God's gracious
influence is irresistible, that faith in Christ is directly given to the individual by God, and
that salvation certainly follows from that divinely given faith. Sorrowfully, faith is not given
to all persons, but only to a few- to those predestined to salvation by God. Contrary to
these tenets, Anninius and Wesley contended that God's grace can be (and often is)
resisted by humans. Those who accept this gracious aid are able to exercise faith and are
saved. Those who reject this influence do not believe and, subsequently, reject salvation.
Further (and here the notion of prevenient grace especially emerges), Arminius and
Wesley maintain that the divine inner spiritual influence is made available to all persons,
not just to a select few. The result is that all persons are given a genuine opportunity to
respond positively to Christ (or at least, each person genuinely could respond if given the
opportunity). In other words, God universally offers a spiritual influence that neutralizes
the disabling effect of the sinful nature to a degree sufficient for each sinner potentially to
desire and to exercise faith in Christ. In her freedom, with the aid of God's gracious spiritual empowerment, the individual is free either to accept or to reject Christ.
Calvinists often charge that such a doctrine of prevenient grace simply is not affmned
in the Bible. And the Anninian must admit that the scriptures do not explicitly teach "the
doctrine of prevenient grace." In its developed form, this teaching is the result of systematic theological reflection upon diverse claims found in the Bible. It is interesting to point
out, however, that a similar charge might be leveled at Calvinism. The Bible does not
explicitly teach that God's call to salvation is irresistible, nor that humans are totally
depraved. While certain Biblical passages may hint at these assertions, none explicitly
affirms them in the detail outlined by later theologians. These doctrines also are the result
of later systematic theological reflection. In light of this, the Arminian might argue that
while the doctrine of prevenient grace is not explicitly affirmed in scripture, it is implied at
key points. And here a positive case materializes for the doctrine of prevenient grace as
formulated by Anninius and Wesley.
Several scriptural considerations lend support to affirming this traditional Arminian
doctrine. First, the Bible indicates that God is gracious, merciful, and loving and that he
desires that all persons come to salvation. But if this is the case, it hardly makes sense to
claim that God, in fact, refuses to grant to humans the grace necessary for them to choose
salvation. 23 Consider the following passages:
Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world. (john 1:29)
For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him
should not perish but have eternal life. (john 3 : 16)
For God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all.
(Romans 11 :32)
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For there is one Cod, and there is one mediator between Cod and men, the man
Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all, the testimony to which was
borne at the proper time. (I Timothy 2: 5-6)
But we see Jesus, who for a little while was made lower than the angels, crowned
with glory and honor because of the suffering of death, so that by the grace of Cod
he might taste death for every one. (Hebrews 2 :9)
The Lord is not slow about his promise as some count slowness, but is forbearing
toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance. (2 Peter 3 :9)24

Obviously, these verses do not directly teach prevenient grace. But they do proclaim that
Cod is gracious, that his grace has been extended to the whole world (all persons) through
Christ, and that he is unwilling that any should perish. Surely these texts at least suggest a
pervasive grace that works toward achieving God's desire to bring all sinners to him.
A second biblical support for the doctrine of prevenient grace is that throughout scripture Cod admonishes persons to exercise faith in him and in Christ (2 Chronicles 20:20,
Isaiah 43:10, John 6:29, 14:1, Acts 16:31, etc.), and encourages them to repent of sin (I
Kings 8 :47, Matthew 3:2, Mark 1:15, Luke 13:3, 5, Acts 3:19, 2:38, etc.). In tum, often
failure to exercise faith and to repent of sin directly is condemned by God (John 3 : 18).
Here, it makes little sense to suppose that Cod calls persons to repentance and asks them
to believe, then condemns them for failing to do so, all the while knowing that they cannot repent or believe without his aid and in tum refusing to grant them such assistance.25
A third justification for the doctrine of prevenient grace is that some scriptures insinuate
that Cod's enlightening and convicting power is active in all persons, and is drawing all to
Christ. John 1:9 speaks of the Logos which "gives light to every man," suggesting that some
measure of knowledge of God is available to all humans through the enlightening power of
Christ. Romans 2 : 14-15 asserts that through conscience Gentiles often show that the
requirements of Cod's law are "written on their hearts . ..." Sometimes this awareness condemns their actions; sometimes it defends them. Presumably the source of this knowledge
is God, and through it persons are aware that some of their actions are good and others
evil. John 16:7-1 I speaks of the role of the Holy Spirit in convicting "the world of guilt in
regard to sin and righteousness and judgment," intimating that Cod's inner spiritual testimony is made to all persons. In tum, in John 12:32, Jesus proclaims that when he is lifted up
(on the cross) he will "draw all men to" himself, possibly implying that the human heart will
be drawn/dragged to Christ by the powerful picture of grace that Calvary manifests. None
of these passages explicitly speaks of a divine prevenient grace which overcomes the effects
of the sinful nature, but each leaves room for just such an idea. Here we see advocated a
universal divine influence upon the hearts of all persons, both convicting of sin and making
persons aware of or even drawing them toward the divine righteousness.
In light of these biblical considerations, there is some warrant for affirming the doctrine
of prevenient grace as originally formulated by Arminius and Wesley. While the doctrine
is not explicitly taught, it fits well with the general tone of these scriptural principles. This
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particularly is true if one assumes that in their corrupt state humans cannot exercise faith
in Christ without inner divine influence. For if this is the case, and if God is sincere in his
willingness to save all and eamest in his call to all persons to repent and believe, then
there must be some mechanism by which the deity frees humans sufficiently to enable
them to respond positively to his call.
But the Arminian defense of divine grace need not stop here. For it also is possible for
one to question whether the Bible teaches that the sinful nature makes it impossible for
humans to respond in faith to Christ. To this second defense we now tum.

Two ALTERNATIVE ARMINIAN DEFENSES OF PREVENIENT G RACE
As we have seen, the traditional Arminian doctrine of prevenient grace assumes that
humans are depraved to such a degree that they cannot want or exercise faith in Christ
without special divine aid, without an inner spiritual aid that neutralizes the power of the
corrupt nature. But if this assumption could be challenged, the need for the doctrine of
prevenient grace (understood as a divine empowering of sinners so that they might desire
and exercise faith in Christl largely could be eliminated. This assumption concerning
human inability can be challenged in either of two ways. First, one can question whether
the sinful nature of humans entails that every concrete action of unregenerate humans is
sinful, displeasing to God, deprived of any true good. Second, one can contest whether,
even if the sinful nature does entail that every unregenerate human action is sinful, that
the act of faith of such persons is not sufficient for God graciously to grant salvation to
them. We will consider each of these responses in tum. Before doing so, however, it will
be helpful to reexamine the basic content of the Calvinistic (and traditional Arminian)
doctrine of human depravity.
The meaning of the doctrine of human depravity is subject to varied interpretations.
Calvin understood human sinful nature to mean that, independent of direct inner divine
spiritual influence, humans can in no way do good. He insisted that only damnable actions
come from the corrupt nature of humans and that "the soul, plunged into this deadly
abyss, is not only burdened with vices, but is utterly devoid of all good."26 Calvin admits
that by human standards various unbelievers have lived noble lives and have done good
things. He also acknowledges that not every person is willing to execute or actually commits every possible sin. However, Calvin rationalizes this state of affairs by asserting that
God's grace pervasively restrains the hearts of humans, preventing them from performing
many of the evils that they are inclined to do. According to Calvin, such restraining grace
does not bring salvation to individuals; it only tempers their evil.27 Indeed, whatever actual
good nonbelievers perform only occurs as a result of the special and direct inner action of
God's grace in their lives. 28 Interestingly, then, Calvin endorses his own form of prevenient
grace, but it is a grace that only restrains from some sin and aids in producing non-saving
righteous acts. It is not a grace that enables persons to respond in faith to Christ. This latter
form of grace requires yet a further activity by God's Spirit upon the human heart, an
action administered only to those that God has predestined for salvation. 29
Later Calvinistic writers offer a deeper analysis of human depravity, often softening the
edges of Calvin's conjectures. For example, Louis Berkhof contends that due to the original sin of Adam and Eve, humans are corrupted and totally depraved. This means that
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every aspect of human life is plagued by sin, and there is no spiritual good in humans.
That is, "the unrenewed sinner cannot do any act . .. which fundamentally meets with
Cod's approval and answers to the demands of Cod's holy law."lo Further, the sinner
"cannot change his fundamental preference for sin and self to love for Cod, nor even
make an approach to such a change."ll The doctrine of total depravity, however, does not
mean that each human is as depraved as she possibly can be, nor that the unregenerate
person practices every kind of evil. Further, it does not entail that unregenerate persons
have no moral conscience, no innate awareness of Cod's moral expectations. Further, it
does not mean that the unsaved never perform good acts or never act in the interest of
others over themselves. For Berkhof, the key depravity of humans is that they can never
perform an act whose motive is authentic love for Cod.l2
While Berkhof s account echoes Calvin's views in numerous ways, it also ameliorates
his harsher claims. Berkhof interprets human depravity in terms of the inability to perform
acts whose motive is genuine love for Cod, rather than as an inability to do any good.
This allows him to acknowledge the authentic goodness of some unregenerate human
acts and to avoid claiming that the only reason unsaved humans do any acts of good is by
a direct, non-saving, divine influence upon those persons. As I understand him, Berkhof is
claiming that some good flows from human nature, even in its corrupted state, and even
without direct divine spiritual aid. The catch is that no such good acts are truly motivated
by love for Cod and, consequently, none leads to salvation in a person's life.

Challenging Total Inability.
At this point, Arminians may offer one of two nontraditional interpretations of human
depravity and human faith . The first is to deny that the sinful nature of humans entails
that every action of unregenerate individuals is sinful and displeasing to Cod. Several Bible
passages insinuate that this denial is accurate. For example, in Matthew 7 :9-1 I Jesus asks
who of us would give a stone or a snake to a son if the boy were to ask for bread or fish?
The answer is obvious. Jesus concludes that even though we are evil, we know how to
give good gifts to our children. In other words, Jesus seems to say that even though we
are sinners, we are capable of generating some righteous acts. Indeed, such actions on our
part are analogous to how the Holy and Heavenly Father responds to our requests! In
such situations, perhaps we are (unconsciously) imitators of Cod (Ephesians 5: I)! Or consider another example: In Romans 2: 14- 15, the apostle Paul asserts that when humans
follow the dictates of conscience, they perform acts that conform to divine law and show
that Cod's law is written on their hearts. Paul here is not declaring that humans are not
inwardly sinful. Rather, he seems to be saying that even in our sinful condition we occasionally do good by following the dictates of conscience. Now if these scriptures indicate
that sinners sometimes can perform good acts, then it may also mean that on certain
occasions the act of faith, even on the part of a sinful person, is a genuinely good act, one
that pleases and is accepted by Cod.
This interpretation does not deny that humans are sinful, that humans have a depraved
nature. Instead, it simply declares that even though sin dominates a person's life, upon
occasion she is capable of freely enacting genuinely good deeds. Further, this does not
mean that any human ever does or even could completely avoid sin. While the fact that
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sinful persons can perform some good acts may lead to the theoretical possibility that
some individuals could live a morally perfect life, it does not mean that such an occurrence is practically possible. The weight of the sinful nature, of the proneness to sin, may
be so great that even if sinful persons occasionally do good things, the prospect of never
doing evil, of living a perfect moral life, may be so astronomically slim that it is a virtual or
statistical impossible. Sin remains an inevitability, even if not a logical or causal necessity.33
Such an understanding of the human condition suggests a nuanced understanding of
God's holy expectations. Rather than assuming, as did Calvin (and apparently Arminius
and Wesley), that every unregenerate human act is evil and unacceptable to God, one
may maintain that even a life full of genuinely good acts is not sufficient to fulfill the
divine expectations. For the holiness of God does not merely demand some good works,
or even a greater balance of good over evil. Instead, God expects a life of only good
deeds with absolutely no sin. Humans stand condemned not because their every act is
spiritually evil, but because God demands that none of their acts be evil. Since no human
utterly avoids sin, none avoids divine condemnation. All fall short of God's glorious
expectations (Romans 3 :23).
The good news, the Gospel, however, is that God has provided a means to salvation
independent of a person completely fulfilling the moral law. God conditionally has
ordained that by the free choice of the sinful person to exercise faith in Jesus Christ,
that individual graciously will be granted salvation. She will be declared righteous even
though in fact she has not perfectly met the demands of the moral law (Romans 3:2 124). In this case, the act of faith is a good act performed by a sinner. It is not sufficient
to meet the holy demands of God, the demand to live a morally perfect life.
Nevertheless, because of Christ's atonement and because of God's gracious decree, this
good act will be accounted sufficient to receive a salvation that was neither deserved
(by living a perfect life) nor attainable through human effort (because all in fact sin and
fall short of God's expectations).
Two Calvinistic protests against this perspective may be anticipated. First, some will
maintain that this proposal affirms salvation by merit. Augustine insisted that because
Pelagius taught that faith is a natural human act, that this implies that salvation is earned
by a person's faith. For Augustine, unless faith itself directly is given by God, salvation is
not a gift, but something earned. We may question the cogency of Augustine's claims.
That faith in Christ is a free human act hardly implies that salvation is somehow earned. It
remains the case that the human believer has not lived a perfect moral life and, thus, has
not fulfilled God's moral expectations. Subsequently, the believer still deserves divine condemnation. But this condemnation is not forthcoming, because graciously God has
ordained that those who exercise faith in Christ will be granted remission of sin and will
receive spiritual union with Christ- i.e., salvation. Salvation is still by grace because God
has accepted the atoning sacrifice of Christ in the place of our living morally perfect lives.
Further, it is not even the case that faith itself is an act that the human could perform
absent of divine (non-deterministic) influence. The Arminian may contend that without
the inner urging of the Holy Spirit, without the inner light of the Logos, perhaps without
the hearing of the Good News of Jesus Christ, the sinner could not exercise faith . God's
pervasive activity is still required in this model of the human condition.
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A second anticipated Calvinistic reply to this model of the human condition is that
allegedly it contradicts the Bible's declaration that humans can do no genuine good. Calvin
understood the apostle Paul literally to mean that persons can do no good. He got this
from Paul's assertion that "there is no one righteous, not even one .. . . there is no one
who seeks God .... there is no one who does good, not even one (Romans 3: 10-12)."
For this reason, Calvin asserted that the good that we see unregenerate persons do is the
result of the divine restraining of evil and the divine inducing of good in persons. Berkhof,
on the other hand, insinuates that Paul's words here mean that while unregenerate
humans can do some good, they can do no spiritual good, no act genuinely pleasing to
God. But it may be better to understand Paul to mean not that unregenerate humans literally never do good. Instead, he means that whatever good we do is not sufficient or salvific
because in fact we also all sin and thus fall short of God's expectations. Humans do in fact
keep many of God's laws, either consciously through a knowledge of the law or unconsciously through a tacit awareness of the law written in their consciences. But no one completely keeps that law and, so, all stand condemned. In such an interpretation, Paul's
quotes from the Psalms here can be seen as hyperbole, as poetic over-statement designed
to emphasize a quite literal truth that no human ever lives up to God's holy and holistic
expectations. This seems reasonable in light of Paul's own acknowledgment that through
conscience humans sometimes can do works in conformity with God's law. 14 At any rate,
one possible non-traditional Arminian response to the problem of human depravity is simply to deny that every act of corrupt humans is evil and displeasing to God.

Crace In Spite of Sin.
A second augmented Arminian response would be to assert that even if unregenerate
persons cannot enact genuinely good acts, God graciously ordains that some of these acts
will be sufficient for receiving the saving benefits of Jesus' atonement. In other words,
even if no act of unregenerate humans is truly righteous (because such acts are never
motivated by a genuine love for God), this need not mean that such persons cannot
freely exercise a faith sufficient to receive the blessings of divine salvation. It could be that
the deity has ordained that even an act of faith whose motive is not fully based on love
for God nevertheless will be sufficient to receive the benefits of Christ's saving power.
Such an act of faith would not be pure; it would still be the act of a sinner. But in God's
amazing grace, even such an action would be accredited as righteousness (Romans 4:3).
Here we perhaps expose an ironic aspect of the Augustinian/ Calvinistic system- namely, the presumption that the act of faith itself must be morally pure, untainted by sinful
motives or self love. In short, in order for God to grant salvation, the act of faith must be
worthy of God's acceptance; it must merit the divine granting of salvation; it cannot be
tainted by the sinful nature. For this reason, both Augustine and Calvin declare that God
must empower the sinful soul with a genuine/ saving faith. But why should we think this?
Why should we believe that the act of faith must be morally pure? Does not such an
assumption usher in its own peculiar form of works-righteousness? Are not Calvinists tacitly asserting that because God has made the act of faith truly moral, the deity is able to
grant salvation? But what if the grace of God is so magnanimous that the deity accepts as
sufficient for salvation even the faith of the morally impure sinner! What if the act of faith
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is tainted with false motives, and with failure to love God, and yet God accepts it any
way? Amazing grace indeed' It seems to me that such a scenario is the more realistic view
of human faith. What Christian is willing to claim that his act of faith in Christ was or is
utterly pure, motivated by a complete and untainted love for God? Is it not more realistic,
and for that matter more scriptural, to believe that God accepts our faith, even though we
are sinners and our acts are not pure? It seems to me the answer is, Yes.
The benefit of this second proposed Arminian reinterpretation of the human condition
is that it takes seriously the traditional doctrine of human depravity. Humans may well
never generate acts that are morally pure, completely satisfYing in God's estimate. As Emil
Brunner notes, even if an individual in principle could perform every act of the divine law,
it need not follow that that person is not a sinner. Sin may well cut deeper than that, so that
while individuals may be able to keep the law extemally, they never fully keep it intemally.
They never fully live in covenant with God, nor in love with God.'s Even if this is the case,
however, this second Arminian interpretation allows for the faith that exudes from such sinful persons to be sufficient to receive the benefits of Christ's atonement. This is not because
such faith deserves these benefits, but because God graciously has willed it to be so.
Again, an anticipated Calvinist response to this second augmented Arminian perspective might be to assert that this view makes faith a human work that merits salvation. At
least the Calvinistic system makes faith a divine work that (in a qualified sense) merits salvation. But again this is not quite right. In the model I have proposed, faith does not merit
salvation at all. Faith does not meet the righteous demands of God's law. It is only
because God graciously has willed that Christ's death atones for sin and that faith in
Christ will be the condition upon which the benefits of this atonement are received that
faith in any way affects salvation. Further, the activity of the Spirit of God upon the individual heart may still be required in order to urge the person toward this (blemished) faith
in Christ. Even if the faith itself is not utterly guileless, without a divine nudge, no human
response would unfold. Further still, and perhaps most profoundly, in the model of faith
proposed here, divine grace accepts an act of faith that itself is not even morally righteous.
It is not utterly pure, not motivated by sheer love for God. Nevertheless, in grace, God
accepts it anyway! This is not salvation by works. It is grace, through and through.
I conclude that a substantial case can be made for the Arminian doctrine of grace. This
is possible either by affirming prevenient grace as traditionally taught by Arminius and
Wesley, or by reinterpreting the implications of the doctrine of human depravity. In either
case, it seems that a biblical case can be made for the notion that humans are free to
accept or reject the gift of salvation offered in Jesus Christ; they are free to exercise faith
or not exercise it.
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sinful condition and need for God, and to (in some sense) tum toward the deity. See Charles Rogers,
The Concept of Prevenient Grace in the Theology of fohn Weslty (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University,
1967), pp. 2 15-242. Also see Mark Royster, fohn Wesltys Doctrine of Prevenient Grace in Missiological
Perspective (D.Miss. Dissertation, Asbury Theological Seminary, 19B9), pp. 90-9 1.
23 . See Vernon Grounds, "God's Universal Salvific Grace," in Grace Unlimited, ed. Clark
Pinnock (Eugene, Oregon: WlPF and Stock Publishers, 1999), pp. 2 1-30.
24. Each of these renderings of these passages is from the Revised Standard Version of the
Holy Bible.
25. For a similar argument see Henry Thiessen, Lectures in Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids,
Michigan : Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 155-156.
26. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Battles, in the Library of Christian
Classics, vol. XX, ed' John McNeill (philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), Book 2, chapter 3,
section 2. Hereafter, 2.3.2. The title of this chapter in the Institutes is "Only Damnable Things Come
Forth From Man's Corrupt Nature."
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27. Ibid, 2.3.3. Calvin writes that "it ought to occur to us that amid this corruption of nature
there is some place for God's grace; not such grace as to cleanse it, but to restrain it inwardly.... "
Further, while God cures the corrupt nature of the elect, those not selected for salvation "he merely
restrains by throwing a bridle over them only that they may not break loose, inasmuch as he foresees their control to be expedient to preserve all that is." Ibid.
28. Ibid., 2.3.4.
29. Ibid., 2.3.6-7.
30. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1939), p. 247.
3 1. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 246-247.
33. This understanding of the inevitability versus the necessity of sin is similar to the kinds of
statistical inevitabilities found in empirical science. For example, it is impossible to tract with certainly
the deterioration of any give single atom, but it quite easily is possible to discern the likely behavior
of a collective mass of such atoms, to such a degree that its future behavior as a collection is virtually certain.
34. That the scriptures often use hyperbole can hardly be denied, even by Calvinists. Few
Reformed thinkers take Jesus's recommendation literally in Matthew 5:29-30.
35. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics: Volume II, trans.
Olive Wyon (philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), pp. 108-1 12.
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MUSING ON Two APPROACHES
TO THE STUDY OF MALCOLM AND
MARTIN: A REVIEW ARTICLE

. ..

RUFUS BURROW,

JR.

In 1991 James H. Cone published Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a
Nightmare. This was the first thorough, systematic scholarly study on Martin Luther
King, Jr. (the Christian) and Malcolm X (the Muslim). Cone made much of Martin's
integrationism and Malcolm's black nationalism, I placing these in an either-or relationship, or what Baldwin characterizes in Between Cross and Crescent as the
"Cartesian model" of comparing, contrasting, and interpreting Malcolm and Martin.
Baldwin's co-author, Amiri YaSin Al-Hadid, agrees with Cone's approach (246, Ch.
7}.2 Influenced in part by Sterling Stuckey, Baldwin examines and rejects this
approach as too narrow (7, 360n27). He argues for a more open-ended or bothand approach. At any rate, this difference in approach to the study of Martin and
Malcolm is one of the major differences between the book by Cone and that of
Baldwin and AI-Hadid. Although we learn much about Malcolm and Martin
through the dualistic approach of Cone and Al-Hadid, what we leam about these
two giants is even more enhanced by Baldwin's wholistic or dialectical approach,
which more easily and clearly acknowledges commonalities between them.
The dialectical approach is more consistent with King's method than Malcolm's.
As a personalist and one formally trained in philosophical studies, King adopted as
his own the method of synopsis and the criterion of coherence as the test of truth.
This means that he was generally adamant about the need to look at all sides of an
issue, taking into consideration all relevant facts on the way to discerning truth. This
approach necessarily means that one has to be willing to critically examine what
might otherwise be left out if an either-or method is utilized.
In any event, this review article focuses not only on Between Cross and Crescen~
but at various places will point to differences and similarities with the aforementioned pioneering study by Cone. Although I have already noted (and will retum to)
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one important difference, viz., the methodological approach to the study of Martin and
Malcolm, there are others that may be highlighted, which may in some ways be a result
of the methodological difference. There are some important similarities to be noted as
well. After a brief summary of basic themes in Between Cross and Crescen~ I note the significance of chapter one, and then discuss a number of early hopes that I had while this
book was still in the manuscript stage.
Baldwin comes to this text as an accomplished scholar and writer, having already written three well received books on King, in addition to being the lead writer in the recently
published The Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Boundaries of Law, Politics, and Religion
(University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).3 Although A1-Hadid has not published as much,
he clearly has risen to the occasion, as his chapters are generally well written, despite
some irregularities in his writing style, especially when quoting the work of others. By and
large the reader will find that the authors have worked well together and have contributed significantly to scholarship on Malcolm and Martin.
The contents of this book are based on more than ten years of collaboration, research,
lectures, and debates between Baldwin, a Christian and professor of religious studies at
Vanderbilt University, and A1-Hadid, a Muslim and professor and chair of Africana Studies
at Tennessee State University. The collaborative effort of these two men of different religious faiths is one of the most outstanding features of this book. It is, among other things,
an excellent model for interfaith dialog, especially since September I I, 200 I. Although
one of the authors, A1-Hadid, favors the either-or approach to interpreting Malcolm and
Martin (Ch. 7), the other rejects this as too narrow, and favors instead the both-and or
dialectical model (ch. I). Nonetheless, the authors argue that both models have strengths
and limitations. 'To assume that one or the other approach alone is sufficient is to ignore
the different levels of creativity that Malcolm and Martin brought to their tasks as ministers, theologians, and agents of cultural and social change" (2).
The authors identify four themes that frame their interpretations of Martin and
Malcolm. One of these is that the men were staunch prophetic critics of their culture, and
yet each was also captive to it, e.g., regarding their perspective on women and children
(chs. 4-6). Significantly, the authors place Malcolm and Martin in the tradition of eighth
century ethical prophecy. Both had deep religious roots and convictions and believed in a
Creator-God who expected justice to be done in the world. A second prominent theme
is the centrality of interfaith dialog as an important means to the survival-liberationempowerment of Afrikan Americans in particular, and all people in general. Interfaith dialog is shown to be an excellent means to the establishment of ummah or the beloved
community (chs. 2-3). A third theme that frames this book is the idea of Malcolm and
Martin as intemational socio-cultural icons and the ethical obligation of Afrikans both on
the Continent and throughout diaspora to be internationalists (chs. 7-9). The fourth
theme is the ideal of ummah or the beloved community as the highest ideal that both
Martin and Malcolm sought. Although they differed on the means to achieve this, both
men were committed to this goal. Malcolm, of course, came to his commitment only
after his pilgrimage to Mecca and his travels in Nigeria and Ghana.
This book is comprised of an Introduction and nine chapters. The Table of Contents
informs the reader that the Introduction and chapter nine are co-authored; that A1-Hadid
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contributed chapters 2, 4, 7, and Baldwin the remainder. Having agreed to this division of
labor the authors avoid the difficult task of achieving consistency in style, approach, and
format in the writing. One who is already familiar with Baldwin's writing easily identifies
his contributions to the text. One also observes a sharpness of writing style. Al-Hadid's
chapters tend to be written in a more conversational style, which, in my judgment adds to
the richness of the text.
I consider chapter one to be pivotal inasmuch as it actually frames the entire book.
Here Baldwin seeks to situate Malcolm and Martin culturally in the Afrikan American
community and the broader society of the United States. Against the regional or nondialectical approach of his co-author (and James Cone), Baldwin takes great pains to show
that Martin and Malcolm came from essentially the same black, southern flavored culture.
He is skeptical of the common tendency of scholars to suggest that the northern culture
in which Malcolm was reared was substantially different from the southern Georgia culture wherein Martin was reared. Among other things, Baldwin calls attention to the fact
that when blacks migrated North they did not leave southern culture behind. Instead,
they took much of it with them. It is not that the southern culture blacks carried North
was not influenced by that region. It was, even as what they took with them influenced
northern culture. There was, then, mutual influence between the two. More specifically,
Baldwin reminds us that Malcolm's father was reared in Georgia and that he took much
of southern black culture North with him. Malcolm and his siblings would have been
exposed to and influenced by this. Baldwin therefore reasons that both Malcolm and
Martin were exposed to all major aspects of southern culture, including the cooking,
music, religion, folklore, etc. This is why Baldwin, against Al-Hadid (246) and Cone:
rejects the regional approach to interpreting the two men. He contends instead that such
an approach makes it more difficult to see and understand the two men in all their complexities. A more wholistic cultural approach helps one to avoid some of the simple
dichotomies, e.g., that Martin was influenced by the South, Malcolm was not; or that
Malcolm was nationalistic/Pan Afrikanist, and Martin was integrationist. The truth is that
when we look closely at both men, the different periods of their lives, how they reacted to
the forces and events of their time, and how they influenced each other, it becomes clear
that at different stages in their development each had nationalistic/ Pan Afrikanist tendencies, as well as integrationist ones.
This book takes a different path than traditional scholarship on Malcolm and Martin,
individually or together. There is some attention to methodological and philosophical
issues, but this is not the authors' primary focus. Rather, more attention is given how these
two giants actually came to their mature religious, theological, ethical, and philosophical
stances through their own development in Afrikan American culture and their actual day
to day contributions to the human rights struggle. Their daily activity in the struggle, and
their love for their people necessarily made them critics of American culture, even as they
developed their own visions of a radically transformed America which would embrace all
of its citizens equally, and make possible equal access to a radically different socio-politicoeconomic system that would be based on the principles of sharing and equality.
During the time that Baldwin and Al-Hadid were writing Between Cross and Crescent I
told an editor who was considering the work for publication that since the appearance
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and excellent reception of Cone's book on Martin and Malcolm, nothing like it had been
published. Books on King continued to proliferate, while Malcolm continued to receive
far too little attention by scholars. No book length comparative study had been done on
the two men since I 991.
What Baldwin and AI-Hadid have done is quite remarkable and original. Indeed, the
very fact that the book is a result of more than ten years of research, discussion, and lectures by a Christian and Muslim scholar who exhibit deep interest in and knowledge of
both Malcolm and Martin is in itself original. The research that supports this book is simply exceptional. The work is also informed by the authors' participation in ''The Creat
Debate: The Ideas and Views of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. & Malcolm X," a project
developed at Tennessee State University. This means that the book is also informed by
the contributions of the authors' students. It is also of interest to note that in all but a few
instances the authors place Malcolm's name first whenever his and Martin's name are presented together. The rationale for this seems simple. Martin has gotten the lion's share of
scholarly attention since his assassination. Baldwin and AI-Hadid want to highlight
Malcolm whenever they can in the text.
The authors take seriously the idea that both Martin and Malcolm were fundamentally
religious men. In this sense we may say that all that each did in the human rights struggle
was first and foremost for religious or theological reasons. That is, Malcolm and Martin
were not politicians as such, although each surely understood the role and significance of
politics in the struggle for social justice, and that religious or not, persons are political
whether they like it or not. They were both radical-active political, not passive-political.
That is, they were intentionally political, not political by default or by failure to be proactive. It is significant that what each man sought to contribute to the struggle was in fact
grounded in his deep faith and belief in a Cod who creates all and loves all equally.
Therefore, the sense we get from this book is that any effort toward the achievement of
human rights was not for either Malcolm or Martin a political move first and foremost,
but a religious one. For to believe in a loving and Creator-Cod, as both men surely did,
necessarily meant for them that they must intentionally fight for the human rights of their
people in particular and all people in general, not primarily because of the human rights
clause in the Declaration of Independence or because of the Constitution of the United
States, 5 but because Cod imbues in persons inalienable human rights.
My own sense, therefore, is that Between Cross and Crescent is primarily a discussion on
Martin's and Malcolm's religious faith and how it informed their critique of both
American and intemational cultures, as well as their perspectives on religion and faith,
women, marriage, family, children and youth in the struggle, manhood, each other, black
nationalism, integration, and the beloved community. The authors show that Malcolm
and Martin had strong opinions about most of these issues, each of which is significant
both to the Nrikan American community (regardless of religious faith) and the broader
United States community. For example, the issues of manhood, sexism, children, and
youth continue to be burning issues in both the Afrikan American community and the
United States. Although their perspectives on some of these, e.g., women, were fraught
with contradictions, Martin and Malcolm contributed something that may challenge our
own thinking and practices today.
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Baldwin contributed chapter 6, "A New Spirit of Resistance: Malcolm and Martin on
Children and Youth." This is a very significant chapter, not least because it is the first
extensive discussion of the topic to appear in a book. The author reveals the extent to
which Martin and Malcolm had a deep concern and love for Afrikan American children
and youth. Each placed great significance on the role of youth and their contributions in
the human rights struggle, although we find that Malcolm was quite critical of Martin's
inclination to allow children and youth to be on the front line of demonstrations in
Birmingham, Selma, and other places. Malcolm clearly expressed a strong sense of appreciation for what youth, especially those in college (whether white or black) could contribute to the struggle. Baldwin makes it clear that both men would be deeply saddened
by the phenomenal amount of intra-community violence and murder being perpetrated
today by (especially) black youth (321). Neither Malcolm nor Martin would be surprised
about such violence today, however, for each was aware of its existence to a frightening
degree in northern ghettos. Criticizing Martin's teaching blacks to be nonviolent toward
the white man, Malcolm spoke of how easily blacks are provoked to violence against
each other. 6 Similarly, reflecting on his experience of living in slumlord housing in Chicago
and talking with young black male gang members, Martin lamented their proneness to
violence toward each other? Baldwin suggests both what the two men would feel about
intra-community violence today and what each would propose as a remedy.
Al-Hadid contributed chapter seven, 'The Great Debate: Multiethnic Democracy or
National Liberation." As observed earlier, although Cone presented an excellent discussion on black nationalism and integrationism in his book, he basically framed the discussion as a dualism, with Malcolm representing the black nationalist tradition of David
Walker and W.E.B. DuBois, and King the integration tradition of Frederick Douglass and
Booker T. Washington. Al-Hadid essentially frames his discussion similarly, i.e., as an integrationist-nationalist dualism. Acknowledging the importance of integrationism and
nationalisrnlPan-Afrikanism for Martin and Malcolm, Baldwin prefers not to frame the
two as a dichotomy, maintaining that this is too simplistic when discussing the contributions of two men of such complexity. Al-Hadid, as well as Cone, makes it clear that near
the end of their lives Malcolm and Martin were moving closer together in terms of ideology. In like regard, they each make a sound case for the view that increasingly one cannot
study Martin and hope to adequately understand him without also paying serious attention to the life, thought, and work of Malcolm, and vice versa (241). However, Baldwin
makes the important point that to frame the discussion as Al-Hadid, Cone, and other likeminded scholars do is too narrow and fails to take seriously enough the fact that
Malcolm's and Martin's views on Afrikans and Afrikan Americans actually overlap at
many points. Consequently, he maintains that the integrationiPan-Afrikan dichotomy is a
false one. Baldwin makes the point.
Because Malcolm's and Martin's views on Africans and blacks in the diaspora overlapped at many points, the words nationalist and integrationis~ when perceived as
mutually exclusive, are simply inadequate for understanding them . To say that
Malcolm was a Pan-Africanist and Martin was not is equally inadequate and misleading, especially in view of their emphasis on the common cultural characteristics and
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problems shared by all people of African ancestry. Unlike Malcolm, Martin was never
a full-blown black nationalist or a Pan-Africanist, but his perspective clearly contained
elements of Pan-Africanism and black nationalism. Perhaps more important is the fact
that both he and Malcolm ultimately transcended the limits of black nationalism and
Pan-Africanism to embrace the idea of the essential oneness of humanity (349-350).

Baldwin clearly prefers a more dialectical model for discussing these categories (integrationism and Pan-Africanism) in relation to Malcolm and Martin.
In Martin & Malcolm & America, Cone devoted considerable attention to Islamic ideas and
practices in the Nation of Islam. However, he did not focus on the ideas and practices of the
orthodox or Sunni Islam that Malcolm adopted after his trip to Mecca. 8 In Between Cross and
Crescen~ however, we find an extensive discussion on basic ideas and practices in both the
Nation of Islam and Sunni Islam. Here we see A1-Hadid at his best. He is well acquainted
with the basic ideas and practices of the Black Muslims as well as Sunni Islam. A1-Hadid provides much helpful information for the novice. Although very critical of the Nation of Islam's
interpretation and practice of Islamic ideas, he does not allow himself to be critical of orthodox Islamic views and practices. This is especially interesting in light of the emphasis this
book places on the need to be critical in discussions on Malcolm and Martin. In any case, to
paraphrase Aristotle the scholar is bound to honor and care for truth more than for uncriticized ideas and theories. 9 Nor does A1-Hadid challenge Malcolm's lack of criticism regarding
various Sunni Islamic ideas and practices. For example, writing from Mecca, Malcolm said
that Islam "is the one religion that erases the race problem from its society" (264). A1-Hadid
cites this, but does not offer a criticism of what was clearly evidence of Malcolm's apparent
naivete. Malcolm seemed to imply that a religious idea itself is capable of eradicating racism.
Baldwin, on the other hand, rightly considers this to be an "amazingly na'ive" stance. He
maintains further that Malcolm "seemed unaware that Muslims, like Christians, were guilty
of promoting prejudice and oppression based on skin color and religious and cultural differences" (103). Martin, according to Baldwin, was much more realistic regarding the matter of
what religion is capable of. "Malcolm's essentially uncritical attitude toward orthodox Islam
blinded him to a problem that became increasingly obvious to Martin, namely, that no religion can transform a people as long as they benefit from and are truly determined to maintain structures of evil and injustice" (103).
But just how na'ive was Malcolm? It is true that he wrote passionately about what
appeared to him as color-blindness in Mecca. But what of the fact that up until that time
Malcolm had been a very observant and incisive social critic? I wonder with Richard Brent
Tumer whether Malcolm's initial reaction holds up only at a superficial level. T umer wonders "how such an astute observer of human affairs could have missed the pattems of racial
separatism that had such deep roots in the Islamic world."'O Tumer is convinced that on a
deeper level Malcolm must have been aware of the racism among Arab Muslims of the
northem Afrikan region. Commenting further on Malcolm's conversion from being a Black
Muslim to a Muslim and how this affected his perception of race in Sunni Islam, Tumer
writes: "Perhaps the euphoria of conversion to the former interpretation of the religion and
the solidarity created by the hajj had temporarily blinded him to the racial and ethnic realities of the lands where orthodox Islam was predominant."II T umer goes on to say that dur-
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ing a radio call in show not many months after his retum to the United States, Malcolm,
when challenged on the point, exhibited an awareness of racism in the Arab Islamic world.
Between Cross and Crescent gives us a good sense of why Malcolm and Martin needed
each other, despite the fact that powerful forces in this country combined to keep them
apart; worked against their getting the opportunity to do what both knew privately he
must do, namely, get together with the other and to find ways of combining their efforts
in common cause. The book does an excellent job of showing how the oldest daughters
of Martin and Malcolm, Yolanda and Attalah, respectively, have joined as partners to continue to spread their fathers' message, as well as to remind all that to be pro-Martin or
pro-Malcolm does not preclude being pro- the other. Cone actually refers to the work of
Yolanda and Attallah, but does not discuss their effort 12 as Baldwin does (236, 422n82).
Regrettably, A1-Hadid does not think that either Malcolm or Martin was sexist, but
rather contends that each simply espoused views about women that were based primarily
on their respective religious traditions (137, I 4 I ). Baldwin, having grown beyond an earlier reluctance to do so, concludes unequivocally that both were in fact sexists (168, I 70,
182, 403n48). He then presents substantial evidence to support this conclusion. Martin
and Malcolm were sexists, even as they persistently fought for the survival, liberation, and
empowerment of the Afrikan American community as a whole. In Martin & Malcolm &
America James Cone unequivocally named both Malcolm and Martin as sexists. JJ
Prior to reading Between Cross and Crescent I had hoped that A1-Hadid, the Muslim,
would identify Malcolm and Martin's sexism and whether he thought either or both
would have responded positively to the women's movement had they lived longer. I had
also hoped that rather than devote separate chapters to women the authors would have
co-authored the discussion. I think this would have been instructive in a different way, for
the reader would have gotten a real good sense of how a male Christian and Muslim
scholar responded to each other's understanding of Malcolm and Martin's perspective on
women. The critical exchanges between the two authors would have been most instructive. In any case, I wish A1-Hadid had been critical in his discussion on the two men's perspectives on women, rather than simply appeal (uncritically) to their religious traditions for
an explanation. The problem A1-Hadid is not willing to acknowledge at present is that
sexism is embedded in the religious and cultural ideas, values and practices of both orthodox Islam and Christianity (as well as other religious faiths) .
Although Cone provides an excellent discussion on and evidence of Malcolm and
Martin's sexism, one cannot help noticing that he did not include feminist and womanist
reactions and challenges to it. Between Cross and Crescent does not merely present Martin
and Malcolm's perspectives on the public and private roles of women, but an instructive
discussion on how feminists and womanists have responded to Malcolm and Martin.
Mary Daly is identified as the first white feminist to point to the moral limitations of both
men, a challenge that other white feminists have been reluctant to take up in light of their
recognition of their own precarious moral position relative to race and class issues.
However, black feminists and womanists charted their own path in this regard. Baldwin
names and discusses the perspectives- some critical, some not- of a number of black feminists and first and second generation religionist womanists, e.g., Pauli Murray, Flora
Wilson Bridges, Jacquelyn Grant, Katie Cannon, Delores Williams, Cheryl J. Sanders, Kelly
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Brown Douglas, Emilie Townes, Gloria Joseph, Angela Y. Davis, and Patricia Hill Collins
(193-199). The discussion in Between Cross and Crescent goes well beyond what we find in
Cone's book. In the first place we see not only the much more extensive discussion of
Baldwin in chapter five, but there is also Al-Hadid's discussion in chapter four, although
he denies that Malcolm and Martin were sexists. But even this discussion by a Muslim
scholar, framed as it is in denial, is instructive, albeit negative, on the issue of black sexism.
It is a reminder of how difficult it is to be self-critical when one's group benefits from the
oppression of others. Moreover, by the time Cone published Martin & Malcolm & America,
black feminists and womanists had already begun voicing and writing (all too briefly)
about their perspectives on Martin and Malcolm. This notwithstanding, Cone does not,
like Baldwin, include a discussion of some of these perspectives. A hope is that by including these voices Baldwin's effort will trigger an ongoing inter-gender discussion among
Afrikan Americans on Malcolm and Martin's perspectives on women and what ought to
be happening around this issue and actual private and public relationships.
Cone was also interested to show how Malcolm and Martin were moving toward
each other near the end of their lives. At one place he writes that because of his disappointment with most white moderates, Martin was "moving toward Malcolm X's separatism. ... " '4 According to Cone this disappointment reached its peak during the planning
for the Poor People's Campaign. King had by this time experienced a face of racism in
Chicago's Marquette Park area that he said could not even be likened unto the most blatant racism in Alabama and Mississippi. 'S He was now convinced that racism is embedded
in the structures of this nation. In this regard King was much more realistic than he had
been prior to Chicago and ensuing events.
Cone maintained that King was rethinking his attitude toward separation and integration. He rightly held that King continued to be adamant about rejecting separation of the
races as a goal because of his conviction of the fundamental social and interdependent
nature of persons. By now King understood more clearly the need for blacks to have a
solid power base, and he concluded that from a strategic standpoint the best means of
accomplishing this might be through temporary separation of the races. This would allow
blacks the opportunity to unite and organize among themselves. This, King held, is a
viable means for blacks to be integrated into power. He saw temporary separation not as
an ethic, but as a political strategy. '6
Baldwin, influenced by Lawrence Mamiya, wrote that Cone made more of this notion of
the temporary separation of the races than he should have; that it was essentially a statement that King made in passing (306, 308-9, 326, 423n8S). While there is no question that
Cone's was too strong a claim that near the end King was moving closer to Malcolm's separatism, Baldwin down plays its significance too much. It is simply misleading to say, as Cone
did, that King was moving toward Malcolm's separatism. Although Cone did clarify this
somewhat by quoting King's statement to Jewish Rabbis that from a strategic standpoint it
might be politically feasible for blacks to temporarily separate from whites in order to form a
significant power base (e.g. in black caucuses), the reader is left with the impression that after
Mecca Malcolm continued to advocate unequivocally for absolute separation of the races.
This was not the case, since the post-Mecca Malcolm moved much closer to King's concept
of the thoroughly integrated society. In addition, Cone did not make clear enough that as
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one who was absolutely adamant that the universe hinges on a moral foundation and is fundamentally good and communal in nature, King could never have advocated anything other
than the briefest strategic separation of the races. Both this fundamental sense of the goodness and sociality of the universe, as well as the nature of United States society and the history of black-white relations, convinced King of the unreasonableness of any permanent or
absolute separation of the races. Baldwin rightly challenged Cone's claim, but in doing so he
implied that Cone read more into King's statements about the possible need for the temporary separation of the races than King actually intended. My own sense is that Cone was
mistaken only to the extent that he failed to clarify more fully what King meant
Between Cross and Crescent does not devote much attention to Martin's moral behavior,
or more specifically, his extramarital relationships. Baldwin introduces the subject, but does
not linger on it. Instead, he goes on to cite the concems raised by a number of womanists
and other black feminists. All in all, however, not more than one full page is devoted to it I
do not get the sense that Baldwin's aim is to minimize the significance of this matter, but
rather to suggest that although a limitation, it should not detract from the importance of the
contributions that King made nationally and intemationally, and the fact that all things considered he remained faithful to what he believed to be God's call and expectation that he
stand up for justice and righteousness for the least. A number of King scholars, e.g., David
Garrow,17 Taylor Branch,18 and Michael Eric Dyson,19 have already focused very heavily on
King's personal moral behavior. This notwithstanding, at the end of the day it was Martin
Luther King, Jr. who stayed the course and tragically fell victim to a 30.06 slug.
In his discussion on four early Church Fathers, Bertrand Russell marveled at the fact
that at a time when the empire was crumbling as a result of poor administration, the presence of large numbers of barbarians, and the unjust treatment of the masses, these men
were more concemed about the personal moral behavior of consenting adults than actually saving the nation and insisting that justice be done. By and large they were more concemed about encouraging virginity in women than ridding the empire of unjust political
practices and large numbers of barbarians. Russell put it this way.
It is strange that the last men of intellectual eminence before the dark ages were
concemed, not with saving civilization or expelling the barbarians or reforming the
abuses of the administration, but with preaching the merit of virginity and the
damnation of unbaptized infants.20
Martin chose to save the nation, indeed the world, although with other consenting adults
he dropped his guard in the area of personal morality. Suffice it to say that I find the criticisms by black feminists and womanists of Martin's sexual behavior more credible than
those made by white males who have benefited (and continue to benefit) materially from
such criticisms, even as they refuse to acknowledge their own uneamed white male privilege at the expense of Afrikan Americans.
One expects that there will be both agreements and differences of opinion between
Baldwin and A/-Hadid. This is as it should be, especially considering their different religious backgrounds and mental and social grids. What is significant, I think, is that an
Afrikan American Christian and an Afrikan American Muslim were able to effectively col-
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laborate in the production of Between Cross and Crescent. This book opens the door to
considerable expanded conversation, discussion, research, and writing. Anybody who
takes either Martin or Malcolm seriously must see Between Cross and Crescent as required
reading. Clearly influenced by Cone's earlier text on Malcolm and Martin, the book by
Baldwin and Al-Hadid stands very tall on its shoulder.
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1. INTRODu CTION: Is PSALM 23

A CHIASM ?

Approaches to this psalm are legion: theologians, teachers, preachers, seminarians, linguists, free-lance writers, death-bed counselors, spiritual shepherds, and
even a literal shepherd have all "looked" at Psalm 23. I Of course "looked" is
euphemistic for interpreted; and so many have looked that a new angle does not
seem possible or desirable. But although it seems every exegetical trend has been
employed to unlock the secrets and sense of this psalm, somehow it has almost
entirely escaped the chiasmic craze- until now (sadly or happily depending on
the reader's perspective). While I sympathize with those who are skeptical about
literary license looking for chiasm at every turn in the biblical text, I have
become convinced of the contextual and structural reality and intentionality of
this literary device in Psalm 23.
The outline or literary structure of this psalm is a major issue over which interpreters continue to disagree. Leupold laments the psalm's history of fragmentation by commentators/ but Craigie reminds his readers that its structure is "difficult to define with clarity or certainty."3 Is there only one metaphor being
employed by the psalmist (i.e., the shepherd) or are there two, three, or more;
e.g., shepherd, guide, and host? Almost every approach imaginable has been
tried in terms of an analytical and linear outline of one or more sections with
one or more metaphorical images; but not that of a conscious and careful, conceptual chiasm. The unresolved confusion and conflict among commentators
over this matter suggests that a new, non-linear, and more extensive explanation
is necessary as a possible solution to the debate over this psalm's intended literary form.
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2.INTERPRfTATION OF PSALM 23 AS A CHIASM

2. , An Interpretive History of the Literary Structure Psalm 23
To date only general and topical chiastic outlines have been hinted at on rare occasions,' and a detailed metrical chiasm has been worked out;5 but not a detailed conceptual chiasm with a central, unrepeated climax as the solution to the debate over this psalm's
structure. These conceptually and structurally suggestive chiastic interpretations of Psalm
23 in its relatively recent and mostly scholarly literary history will be reviewed next, followed by the non-chiastic treatments.
2. ,. , Chiastic Considerations
Clarke's commentary (1976 edition) exhibits a chiasmus, although this pattern (A-B-BA) is not mentioned per se as characteristic of the literary structure: provision (vv. 1-3),
protection (v. 4), protection (v. 5), and provision (v. 6) .6 Y. Bazaq's 1981 stylistic and
structural analysis interpreted verse 4 as a center-point around which the rest of the psalm
circles. A pattern of phonological and conceptual parallels was observed between verses I
and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6? The present proposal maintains the same verse (4) as the
theological fulcrum or thesis of the poem; but otherwise sees a chiastic pattern of similarities in purpose between verses 1-2 and 6 and 3 and 5. Gerstenberger hinted at a chiastic
nature for Psalm 23 in 1988 by saying that the final verse "returns to objective, confessional language," after explaining that it opens with a confessional.8 In 1990 L. F. Bliese
selected Psalms 1-24 for study, seeking to show that intentional structural symmetry
rather than randomness guided the psalmists. This author was satisfied that either metrical
chiasmus (28 times) or metrical homogeneity (12 times) is clearly present in these psalms
and should be expected in much of Old Testament poetry. In the former case (chiasmus)
the lines of the poem or of each stanza of a poem (working from the outside to the center) have the same number of word accents successively. For Psalm 23 the chiasmic
meter is 4655 6 5564:
A (v. I = 4 beats)
(v. 2 = 6 beats)
B
C
(v. 3 = 5 beats)
o
(v. 4a = 5 beats)
E
(v. 4b = 6 beats) = a marked peak
o
(v. Sa = 5 beats)
C
(v. 5b = 5 beats)
B
(v. 6a = 6 beats)
A (v. 6b = 4 beats).
The isolated central line or lines then become(s) its marked peak. In the latter instances
(i.e., those of metrical homogeneity) the accents per line are the same throughout a given
psalm, leading to a marked final (rather than centraD peak. 9

2. ,.2 Non-chiastic considerations
In 1982 R. Ahroni wrote on the unity of Psalm 23, arguing against what is viewed as
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forced attempts to show unity through emendations; and seeking to establish an imaginative conceptual and emotional unity. In line with, but more specifically than Bazaq, 10
Ahroni identified verse 4b as the key thought around which the rest of the psalm
revolves: the "rod and staff' representing God's justice and mercy." R. S. Tomback reconsidered verse 2 the same year and used Mesopotamian backgrounds to explain this verse
in a manner consistent with the master (lord) and shepherd of verse I. While this study
was not concerned with the overall structural implications of this interpretation, the chiastic character of Psalm 23, which this current paper seeks to defend, depends on the close
association of verses 1-2 and their collective disassociation from verse 3-in contrast to the
modem tendencyl 2 to disregard the strong Masoretic disjunctive accent (rebia mugrash) of
verse I (while inconsistently following it in verse 3) and thus create a bi-cola with verse
2a, leading to the need to harmonize the text by producing another bi-cola from verses
2b and 3a and yet another from verse 3bY In 1985 an essay by C. O 'Connor on the
structure of Psalm 23 appeared, taking into account the metrical system developed by M.
O 'Connor. Results were: (J) sixteen lines: I bU linel, 2a-b[2 linesl, 3a-b[2 linesl, 4a-d[4
linesl, 5a-d3 linesl, and 6a-d[4 linesl; (2) two sections or stanzas of eight lines each: I b-4c
and 4d-6d; and (3) four strophes or paragraphs, each of related material, of four lines
each- two per stanza: I. I b-3a and 3b-4c, then II. 4d-5c and 6a-d.14 This still suggests a
hinge purpose for verse 4 but splits its contents between 4c and 4d, making the former
the close of section I and the latter the opening for section II. The verse is transitional as
demanded by a chiasm but the development of thought as viewed by O 'Connor is linear
rather than cyclical, since the verses of each strophe are seen as related, or intra-related,
but not inter-related with verses in other strophes. He offers few clues for a chiasm.
But chiastic or other similar structures in Hebrew poetry in general and in the Psalms
in particular (not Psalm 23 per se) were being noticed in the mid- I 980s. J. Bazak spoke of
concentric circles characterizing the shape of Psalm 25 and concluded, after an analysis of
Psalms 25, 34, 37, and 145, that similar shapes were either synonymous or chiastic.ls At
the same time J. S. Kselman put forth a chaistic interpretation of Psalm 10 I, one exegetical significance of which was to suggest that the question posed in verse 2b was answered
by verse 8.16 Then P. Auffret questioned the traditional assumption of great literary artistry
in Psalm 23 . Yet his study, while noting previously overlooked structural features, was
based on its traditional, linear two-part structure: verses 1-4 (part one) and verses 5-6
(part twO) .1 7 In the following year (1986) K. K. Sacon applied a literary-structural analysis
to Psalm I 13 and arrived at a chiastic colometry. 18 This supported the assumptions that
Bliese would make four years later. 19
Related to the relationship of verses 2 and 3, which issue has bearing on the chiasm
proposed in this paper, T. M. Willis in 1987, while not concerned with the outline or
structure of Psalm 23, argued grammatically for a thematic connection between verses 23a. These three cola describe three functions of a shepherd.20 The next year M. S. Smith
evaluated the traditional bi-partite outline of Psalm 23 and the attempts to reconcile the
seemingly conflicting images of God as first a shepherd (w. 1-4) and then as a host (w. 56). He concluded that unity is found only in the psalmist's perspective of a spiritual journey, wherein verses 1-4 present what a pilgrim would see on a journey to the temple and
verses 5-6 what happens at the end of his pilgrimageY In the same year Y. Mazor defend-
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ed the traditional, gradual shift from shepherd to host (w. 4-5) as a compliment to another, earlier and sudden shift (vv. 3-4) from sheep (believer) to Shepherd (God).22 Mazor
claimed this results in an integrated, rhetorical unity that pictures God's grace through
twin images of "the stem protector and the generous host."2J By great contrast, also in
1988, D. P. McCarthy took a deconstructionist approach (a la Derrida), concluding that
Psalm 23 contains inherent contradictions that account for the interpretive confusion that
has characterized the scholarly study of these six verses to date. 24
In 1989 C. Gilead gave another approach to the standard double-stanza division of
Psalm 23. Each stanza was observed to contain three stichs and a conclusion, to be distinguished from the introduction and conclusion of the entire poem. Its literary and linguistic
substance and style were seen as a result of influence from the shepherd's hymn via the
contemporary Jeremiah. 25 The same year witnessed the publication of van Uchelen's 1989
article in which he sought to solve the problem of the diversity of interpretations of this
psalm's imagery and structure by looking for linguistic features that could provide empirical
evidence to point out the proper path to understanding the text. Structurally, however, he
still speaks of two different metaphorical halves.26 Noteworthy for the purposes of this present article is van Uchelen's conclusion that verse 4 (for grammatical reasons) provides the
key to the basic meaning of Psalm 23. This study's proposed chiasm centers on this verse
as the main and unparalleled point of the psalm as well. Finally in the most recent (1999)
return to Psalm 23 exegesis, Robinson adds little new for structural studies, presenting it as
a unity of two parts, vv. 1-3 then vv. 4-5. Verse six is deemed a conclusion. 27

2.2 An Interpretation of the Literary Category of Psalm 23
Psalm 23 should be viewed as an "Extended Confession of Trust," in form-critical
terms. 28 The Praise psalm flows in principle from the vow of praise, which is a typical feature of the classic and complete Lament psalm. In practice it comes from the reality of
release from ruin and its resulting resolve to recognize God's goodness and greatness
before others. Once saved the psalmist swears that public and vocal testimony will be
given as praise before the congregation. Likewise the standard petition section of a
Lament can lead to a single psalm devoted to prayer. So the confession of trust section
found in many or most laments gives rise to an externally but not existentially independent psalm, which (like the 23rd, for example) is categorically an extended Confession of
Trust in Yahweh as a certain savior and sustainer of life. This is a confession to Yahweh
that the psalmist still believes that He is his only true source of strength, sustenance, and
safety. Logically and functionally and necessarily this comes before the psalmist has experienced God's present promise and provision of victory, when it looks like defeat or death
is possible or even probable. Based on the consistent character of God and conduct and
commitments on behalf of the psalmist and other believers in the past, the psalmist determines to hang onto Yahweh as his only help, even if he fears the situation is hopeless.29

2.3 A Summary of the Debate over the Stnlcture of Psalm 23 and the Significance of a Solution
A major difference in interpretive approaches has been over how to explain the last
third of the psalm (vv. 5-6), where the poet shifts to imagery which seems to have nothing to do with shepherds and sheep, at least on the surface. Some, therefore, try logically
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to explicate the visual changes from pastures (vv 1-3) to a dark or deadly predicament (v.
4) to being pampered before enemies and etemally protected (vv. 5-6). But others try to
show how the entire context of the psalm maintains a connection to the theme of sheep
and shepherd. Leupold's 1959 observation is still apt:
Then there is the matter of the unity of the psalm or the unity of the figure
employed by the psalmist Some, the majority, perhaps, find only one figure, that of
the shepherd. Of a slightly more recent date is the interpretation that finds two figures, that of the shepherd and that of the host. Others insert a third between the
two, the guide. Others, giving special thought to v. 6, devise some kind of a fourth
figure. By this time one is compelled to admit that the beautiful little psalm has
been pretty sadly fragmentized.30
A selective survey of commentaries from past to present will quickly reveal this confusion. Leupold (1959)- as one would gather from his comment above-takes a unified
shepherding approach which explains each part of the psalm as stating something the
Shepherd provides.31 VanGemeren in 1991 followed the typical bipartite shepherd-host
division (the Lord is my shepherd, vv. 1-4; and the Lord is my host, vv. 5-6).32 He also
notes three opposing works in regard to the subject of vv. 3-4: Thierry (1963) and Briggs
(1952), who see this passage as being about people, and Willis (1987), who relates it to the
three tasks of a shepherd for his sheep.33 Merrill (1965) and Eaton (1965) both give them
a royal meaning.J4 Briggs sees people being treated as guests in three ways: with God as
their shepherd (vv. 1-3a), guide (vv. 3b-4), and host (vv. 5-6).35 Clarke (1979) somewhat
artificially applies the shepherding metaphor throughout the psalm. He also forces the text
into ten available and alliterated resources for God's human sheep (which heightens the
dubious quality of his analysis); rest (v. 2), refreshment (v. 2). restoration (v. 3), regulation
(v. 3), rescue (v. 4), reassurance (v. 4), reception (v. 4), rejoicing (v. 5), retainers (v. 6), and
residence (v. 6).36 Craigie (1983) recognizes the two-fold shepherd-host arrangement as the
consensus; but observes at least two other valid metaphorical pattems: (I) the unity of the
shepherd motif throughout (a la Koehler) and (2) the lack of metaphor at all in vv. 5-6 (a
la Vogt, who takes these verses literally as a sacrificial banquet, which is also the psalm's setting).3? Kidner (1973), as well, accepts the double metaphors of first the shepherd and then
the friend. The shepherd by definition incorporates the functions of "guide, physician and
protector."38 In terms of Gattling criticism Gerstenberger gives the outline of this so-called
"song of confidence" in three parts, as (I) confessional statement, vv. 1-3; (2) affirmation of
confidence, vv. 4-5; and (3) expression of hope, v. 6. Against most modem analysts he
believes the psalm is structured according to liturgical needs.39
When Keller tumed in 1970 to his na·ive exposition of v. 5, his experience with watching shepherds compelled him to see the "table" which is being prepared by the shepherd
as the "tablelands" where sheep graze. Linguistically, therefore, Keller's basis for maintaining sheep as the subject of v. 5 is erroneous; even if the basic idea is correct. 40 Numerous
commentators, for similar or distinct reasons, are comfortable with the complete characterization of this psalm in shepherding imagery. Another example is Maddux's 1965
unversified outline, which is typical, as Keller, of the many popular and published, but
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oversimplified, treatments of Psalm 23: the Shepherd's care; the Shepherd's redemption;
the Shepherd's presence; the Shepherd's protection; and the Shepherd's dwelling place.41
While some scholars also argue for the shepherding motif throughout Psalm 23, others
wonder how such imagery can reasonably be applied to sheep. As Kidner says parenthetically, 'The attempt to sustain the first metaphor [i.e., the shepherd] . . . would tum it
through a full circle, picturing men as sheep which are pictured as men-with their table,
cup and house-which is hardly a profitable exercise."42 As a final example, Alden (1974)
followed the shepherding theme consistently through the fourth verse, and then noted
there are multiple metaphors in verses 5-6. 43
If the present analysis is correct, the reason for the changes in imagery is to be
explained by the symmetric demands of the chiastic principles and parallels of the
ancient, eastern poetic mind and not by the dictates of western, analytic and systematic
thinking imposed on poetic literature, which has led to the false expectation of some type
of outline for the psalm in two parts (i.e., I. w. 1-4 and II. w . 5-6) and the need to try and
justify the transition from flock to feast.

2.4 The Chiastic Structure of Psalm 23 Exhibited
The charts that follow represent visually the conclusions reached in this examination of
Psalm 23 pertaining to its chiastic characteristics. It seemed best to allow the reader to
view the structure of the psalm suggested by this study, as a frame of reference, before
explaining the exegetical details used to support it.

2.4. 1 The Text of Psalm 23 as a Chiasm"
A
23: I Yahweh is my shepherd; [therefore] I shall not want.
23:2 He makes me lie down in green pastures; he leads me beside still waters.
S
23:3 He restores me: He leads me in right paths for his name's sake.
Even though I walk through the darkest valley,
a
C (23:4)
b
I fear no danger, for you are with me;
a
your rod and your staff- they comfort me.
S'
23:5 You prepare a table before me in the presence of my enemies;
you anoint my head with oil; my cup overflows.
A' 23:6 Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life, and I
shall dwell in the house of Yahweh my whole life long.
As an inclusio God's personal name, Yahweh, is used in the beginning and ending
verses. In terms of content both of these chiastic boundaries emphasize Cod's constant
and certain care. The Sovereign Shepherd of souls provides spiritually for His people
abundantly and appropriately.

2.4.2 The Themes of Psalm 23 as a Chiasm
When the previous chiastic scheme of the verses of Psalm 23 is translated into a thematic statement for each step of the chiasm, the following results :
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Complete provision (1 -2)
B
Purposeful Restoration (3)
a
Our need for rescue (4ai)
C (4) No need for fear: b
How to wait for rescue (4aii)
a'
His ability to rescue (4b)
B'
Purposeful Renewal (5)
Continual provision (6)

2.5 The Chiastic Significance of Psalm 23 Explained
2.5. 1 The Metrics of the Hebrew Text
The Masoretic major poetic disjunctive accents will be shown as used in Psalm 23 with
the MT. 45
: (silluq) ionK K7 II (rebia mugrash) 'l1i i11il' ( I b)46 A
: (silluq) 'J7i1J' mnJY.l 'Y.l711 (2b) II (athnach) 'JY':li' KIli, mKJ:l (2a)
II (athnach) :l:l,Ili' 'llibJ (3a) B
: (silluq) mlli 111Y.l7 II (rebia mugrash) p,y'7ll1Y.l:l 'JnJ' Ob)
II (pazer) nm7Y K'l:l17K""'I:J m (4ai)
(athnach) ',Y.l11 ilnK':J II (rebia magnum) l1iKi'K"k7 (4aii) C
: (silluq) 'JY.lnJ' ilY.lil II (rebia mugrash) 1nJl11lim 11.l:l1li (4b)
(athnach) 'iiY 'lJ II (rebia magnum) ln71li 'Jb71il1n (Sa) B'
: (silluq) il"i 't:l1:J II (rebia mugrash) 'IliKi lY.llli:l nJlli, (5b)
(athnach) "n 'Y.l,7:J II (dechl) 'J'b'i' ,on, :l'1.l1K (6a) A'
: (silluq) tJ'Y.l' 1iK7 II (rebia mugrash) i11il'-n':l:l 'n:llli, (6b)
Next the Masoretic major poetic disjunctive accents will be shown as used in Psalm 23
with an English translation :
A (J) Yahweh is my shepherd (rebia mugrash); II
I shall not want [for adequate carel (silluq) .
(2) He makes me lie down in green pastures (athnach) ; II
he leads me beside still waters (silluq) .
B (3) He restores me- (athnach); II
He leads me in the right paths (rebia mugrash), II
to protect His reputation (silluq).
ai If I might wander into the deepest,
darkest valley (pazer), I
C (4)
aii I fear no danger (rebia magnum); II
for you are with me (athnach) ; II
b Your rod and staff (rebia mugrash), I I
they comfort me (silluq) .
S' (5) You prepare a table before me (rebia magnum); II
in the presence of my enemies (athnach) . II
You anoint my head with oil (rebia mugrash); II
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my cup overflows (silluq).
A' (6) Surely goodness and grace will follow me (dechl) I
all the days of my life (athnach) ;
and I will dwell in the house of Yahweh (rebia mugrash), II a long time (silluq).

As the above treatments of the text of Psalm 23 demonstrate, this present study rejects
the decision of some translators and textual emendators to "correct" the Masoretic Text
by re-arranging v. 3a as the final part of a tricolon along with v. 2a-b4 ? or as part of a
bicolon with 2b: 8 The latter makes an artificial division between 2a and 2b and forces v.
1 into the role of the initial parallel member of a bicolon comprising w. 1-2a 49 All these
approaches require the translator to disregard the punctuation of the Masoretic Text. In
this case the text makes good sense and probably the best sense if the MT versification
and accentuation are faithfully followed. This means, of the current and most popular
English versions, the NKJV50 presents and preserves the best organization and punctuation
of Psalm 23, in light of the premises and proofs of this paper.
Verse I (ignoring the superscription attributing the psalm to David; which is a later but
reliable editorial insertion) should be taken alone as a "synthetic"l! bicola and not as the first
colon of a bicola with verse 2a as the second, parallel member or line. The reasons are that
the MT employs: (I) most importantly, a strong disjunctive accent (rebia mugrash) above the
Hebrew word (riYiy) meaning "my shepherd," and (2) notably, the silluq with soph pasuq after
"want" ('e/:lS1r) indicating the end of the verse. In effect this verse briefly states the theme of
the psalm, and should be read with verse 2, which is the beginning of the chiastic poem per
se and corresponds to verse 6. Another altemative, better yet than separating 2a from 2b in
order to make v. I and 2a a bicola, would be to see w. 1-2 as a "tricola" (monocolon plus
bi-cola). This alternative approach still, however, has to ignore the strong disjunctive in v. 1
to make it a monocolon; so the most consistent treatment is to take w. I and 2 together as
two lines of bicola, which provide the first level of the chiasm, linking a short thematic preface (v. I) with the initial thought of the following five verses. This finds its counterpart in v.
6, which is rather lengthy anyway, as a balance to w. 1-2, and ends with thoughts of "ever
dwelling" (v. 6b) as a fitting mirror image of "never wanting" (v. I bl. Either way w. 1-2 comprise the first chiastic level.
Whether verse I is a monocolon or bicola, the parallelism of verse 2 should be retained
as a bicola ending with the silluq of that verse, as in the MT, and not restructured to include
3a to produce either a bicola of v. 2b with v. 3a or a tricola of w . 2a-3a. A very strong disjunctive accent (athnach) divides verse 2 into a pleasing and productive bicola: "He makes
me lie down in green pasturesllHe leads me beside still waters," followed by the sign ending
a verse. While MT versification is not automatically absolute, the text makes good sense as it
stands, probably the best sense as this discussion will defend. The seeming bases for altering
the sense of the MT here are the assumptions of a necessity: (I) to parallel w. 3a with 2b
(because of the arbitrary decision to parallel w. 1 and 2a) and/or (2) to parallel v. 3a with
verse 2 because of a shared theme and since 3b can stand alone, theoretically, as a "synthetic"52 bicola. However, as will be developed below, the meaning of v. 3a fits as well if not better with the rest of verse 3 as with verse 2. Verse 3a is separated from 3b by another athnach and then 3b itself has two parts created by the strong but less strong rebia-the same
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but only accent of verse I b, following the non-original superscription in I a. Therefore verse
2 should be identified as a synonymous bi-cola and verse 3 with its major dichotomy after
3a as: (I) probably, a tricola composed of a monocolon (v. 3a) followed by a "synthetic"
bicola (v. 3b); or (2) possibly, as a synonymous or synthetic bicola. These options for verse 3
compare and contrast as follows :
He restores me:!/
He leads me in right paths,!
for His name's sake.
(or
He restores me [in righteousness, for the sake of His reputationl;!/
He leads me in right paths, for His name's sake).
As already noted, a chiasm based on the meter of Psalm 23 has been proposed by
Bliese: A:4, B:6, C:5, 0:5, E:6, 0 ':5, C:5, B':6, A':4. This scheme of nine elements was
based on a verse distinction of, respectively, verses I, 2, 3, 4a, 4b, Sa, 5b, 6a, and 6b. The
present study recognizes a different versification for the thematic chiasm: 1-2, 3, 4, 5, 6 but
still finds the same center. Based on this latter scheme and on one beat per word (counting
words joined with maqqeph as one beat:), the parallelism and meter of Psalm 23 may be analyzed as follows: A: I 0, B:6, C: 12, B': I 0, A': I O.
Verse

Parallelism

Meter

A (Ib)
"synthetic" bicola
2 :2
(2a-b) synonymous bicola
3:3
(3a)
B
monocolon
"synthetic" bicola
(3b)
[or 3a-b
"synthetic" bicola
(4ai)
C
monocolon
(4aii-b) "synthetic" bicola
(Sa)
B'
"synthetic" bicola
(5b)
"synthetic" bicola
A' (6a)
"synthetic" bicola
(6b)
"synthetic" bicola

Total Beats

10
2:
2 :2
2:41
4:4
3:2
3:2
4:2
2 :2

06
4:
12
10
10

If the parallelism is split as bicola at athnach only, a clear A-B-CB'-A' chiastic pattern
also emerges for this psalm, with verse 4 having a unique meter and, therefore, consciously constructed as the center of the psalm :
Section

Verse(s)

Metric Pattern

A
B
C
B'

1-2
3
4

4 :6
2:4
8:4

10
06

5

5:5

A'

6

6:4

10
10

Total Beats

12
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As seen v. 3 may be analyzed as either a monocolon with a synthetic bi-coloa or as a
synthetic bi-coloa in which the first line (3a, extant as only a monocolon) assumes a similar or related section of line 2 (3b) following "He leads me" for completion of its thought.
"He leads me" of line two would be parallel with "He restores me" of line one. If intended
as identical or very similar sentiments then this verse of poetry could be seen as synonymous rather than "synthetic." Either way-as synonymous or synthetic, or two, three, or
four stanzas of poetry- if the first line (v. 3a) is a shortened corruption or creation based
on an originally intended longer version (echoing or enhancing 3b), then the metrics
would come out closer to 8 or 10 beats, rather than 6, which would more closely parallel
the 10 beats of verse 5, its chiastic counterpart. In addition the metric pattems 4:6 in the
opening vv. 1-2 and 6:4 in closing v. 6 provide an inclusion for the chiastic poem and
together make a 6-4-4-6 chiasm.
For an altemative approach, if one combines 4ai with v. 3 the outcome is 10 beats,
leaving 8 beats for 4aii-b as the center or peak, and creating a perfectly balanced a-b-c-b'a' metrical chiasm of 10-10-8-10-10 beats (vv. 1-2, 3-4ai, 4aii-b, 5, 6). This outcome is
pleasant but it flies in the face of the weak pazer accent at the end of 4ai, treating it as a
strong disjunctive. But if the MT accents are viewed as usually reliable while not absolute
guides, then in this scenario, the result is a much longer B element (vv. 3-4ail which
would be seen as a monocolon of 2 beats (v. 3a) followed by a bicola of 4:4 beats (vv.
3b-4ail. The C unit (v. 4aii-b) or apex would be a bicola of 4:4 beats (or altematively two
bicola of 2:2 and 2:2 beats) which fits together well, perhaps synonymously: "I fear no
danger for you are [your protection is) with me! // [I fear no trouble forl your rod and
your staff comfort me!" Verse 4ai also goes well with the preceding verse 3 : "He restores
me: / / He leads me in the right paths to protect His reputation / / in case) might wander
into a deep, dark valley." When in this scheme 4aii-b is taken as the center section, as
with the previous proposal, it also reflects a micro chiasm within the macro chiasm of the
entire psalm, although in this case a-b-b'-a' (instead of a-b-a'). Still the main idea includes
Cod's presence which excludes all fear:
A
B
B'

A'

I fear no danger (rebia magnum)
for you are with me (athnach)
your rod and your staff (rebia mugrash)
they comfort me (silluq).

2 beats
2
2

2

No chiasm of the parallelism in Psalm 23 is observable. The first chart above of the
metrical chiasm has the advantage of showing the three parts of v.4, which themselves
can be seen to present an a-b-a' chiasm of 4-4-4 beats. There is in addition another way
to view verse 4, the fulcrum section of this poem. Verse 4aii, which has been presented
as the central theme around which the psalm rotates and the central phrase around
which this verse revolves (making a chiastic verse within a chiastic psalm), also demonstrates its centrality in another fashion.
The first phrase of this sentence (") fear no danger"; v. 4aii-cd fits well with the preceding and initial clause of this verse (4ail, while the second phase ("for you are with me"; v.
4aii-p) fits with the following and concluding clause/ sentence (v. 4bl. This highlights v. 4aii
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as the point around which the other parts of v. 4 rotate and from which they depart. In
4aii, the first phrase, "I fear no danger," is in line with the preceding statement and pronoun "even though I might wander into a deep, dark valley." And, although followed by
the athnach (a disjunctive pointing back), the second phrase of v. 4aii, "for you are with
me," is in keeping with the following sentiment and pronoun "your rod and staff, they
comfort me." Perhaps this is why the rebia magnum is used with the former phrase and
the athnach with the latter. The athnach marks the end of a complete thought, yet the last
part of that thought ("for you are with me") has to do double duty for what is before and
after. Therefore 4aii-a has a strong pause before moving on to 4aii-~. And together these
two phrases provide the fulcrum and foundational theme of Psalm 23 : "I fear no danger;
for you are with me!" Psalm 23 calls the reader to a fearless life, and uses a creative and
carefully constructed chiasm to do it conceptually, metrically, and dramatically.

2.5.2 The Mechanics and Meaning of the Hebrew Text
Level A, A' (Outer): (w. 1-2; II v. 6)
Yahweh Shepherds with Complete and Continual Provision
Verse la-b: "Yahweh is my shepherd; II
I will lack nothing [essential spirituallyl."
Verse 2a-b: "He causes me to lie down in green pastures; II
He leads me [to lie down] beside quiet water."
Verse 6a-b: "Undoubtedly goodness and grace will accompany me
every day of my life; II
and I will return to [or "dwell in"] the house of Yahweh a long time."
Level B, B' (Inner) : (v. 3 II v. 5)
Yahweh Shepherds with Purposeful Renewal and Restoration
Verse 3a-b: "He restores me [physically and spiritually]; II
He leads me along the right paths, I
For the sake of His own reputation."
Verse Sa-b: "You prepare a table before me in the presence of my enemies; II
You anoint my head with oil,!
My cup overflows."
Level C (Center) : Climax: (v. 4)
Never Fear!
Level C, -a, -a' (Outer Climax) : (v. 4a, b)
The Sheep's Need and the Shepherd's Nature for Rescue
All-Present, regardless of the environment (v. 4ai)
Verse 4a: "Yes, even though 1 might wander through a
valley of deep darkness," I
All-Powerful, regardless of the enemy (v. 4b)
Verse 4c: "Your rod and staff, they comfort me."
Level C, -b (Inner Climax) : (v. 4aiil
No Need for Fear! The Divine Shepherd is Always Near
Verse 4b: "I will not be afraid of any danger, for You are with me!"
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3. CONCLUSION: PSALM 23 Is A CHIASM!
Psalm 23 has a chiasm within a chiasm. Its formation is both simple and sublime. The
entire psalm exhibits an A-B-C-B'-A' chiastic pattern, with the climactic and center section/verse (C; v. 4) also displaying a sub-chiasm, having the pattern of a-b-a' (or a-b-b'-a').
In this way the psalm means to help the reader make no mistake by making it abundantly
clear: Yahweh's presence prevents all panic. The outer layer of corresponding verses is
composed of the cluster of w. 1-2 which parallels v. 6. The inner layer of correspondence
juxtaposes v. 3 with v. 5. Finally the focus falls on v. 4, wherein the psalmist's fearless
proclamation in the light of Cod's presence in the midst of deep darkness is framed by
reflections on his perilous situation and Cod's powers of salvation.
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and musical nature-which is intrinsic to all members of the Hebrew psalter- through the use of
poetic stanzas. The psalms are songs and the Old Testament Psalter (Book of Psalms) was the
hymnbook of ancient Israel. All psalms are poetry that was eventually set to music for use in the
worship that occurred in the Temple in Jerusalem and, later, the synagogues. On the other hand,
the NKjV, also like the KJV, does not necessarily have the best rendering for all words and phrases
in this psalm; more modem versions like the NRSV and NIV win in this category.
51 . This term can be meant generally (as here) for any parallelism besides those that are synonymous or antithetical; or it can relate specifically to a category of parallelism when more than
three types are assumed.
52. See nn. 13 and 51 above.

PRACTICING THE NEW CREATION:
WESLEY'S ESCHATALOGICAL
COMMUNITY FORMED BY

THE MEANS OF GRACE
.. I.
DEAN G. BLEVINS

INTRODUCTION

Wesleyan studies are constantly challenged to understand and articulate the broad
themes of John Wesley's thought and practice for the contemporary church. Such is
the case in current efforts to relate Wesley's emphasis on the "new creation" as both a
personal and global transformation.I Theodore Runyon, in the introduction to his
book The New Creation, concludes, "the cosmic drama of the renewing of creation
begins, therefore, with the renewal of the imago Dei in humankind. This is the indispensable key to Wesley's whole soteriology."z This assertion invites another key question: "how?" How is Wesley's emphasis on the renewal of humanity realized in the
intersection of prevenient grace and eschatological hope in the new creation for the
sake of persons today? Following justification by grace through faith, how does
Methodism "go on" to participate with the grace of Cod for the sake of the full transformation of persons and society, better known as holiness of heart and life?
Historian Henry Abelove, offers an interesting but controversial explanation open to
dispute.J An alternative, yet committed and constructive interpretation of Methodist
practice, may prove more helpful yet also open to ongoing revision and dialog.4
ABELOVE'S INTERPRETAnON

Abelove concedes Wesley's interest in the renewal of humanity. Abelove argues,
however, that this renewal's highest Wesleyan expression, Christian perfection, is primarily a reinterpretation of Puritan expectation of an imminent apocalyptic.5
Abelove writes, "Perfection was just the old Puritan apocalypse internalized. It was
an instantaneous change that produced 'Heaven below,' but inside the believer,
rather than in the world at large."6 Abelove's association of apocalyptic with internalized religious experience is reminiscent of the ongoing struggle between understand-
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ing Methodism as the doctrine and practice of holiness or a "re-assertion of religious experience as the key feature of Christian living."? As such, Abelove's interpretation seems to
maintain a division between disciplined practice and religious experience that was evident
at times in Wesley's generation, but much more indicative of subsequent Methodist periods when such practices, like the class meetings themselves, declined. 8
At dispute is how such an intemalized experience could be maintained in light of
Abelove's other characterizations. Abelove argues that Wesley relied upon deference to
distinguish himself from his lay ministers, creating a hierarchy of social control similar to
the social classes of Wesley's day.9 Through contrasts of dress, religious status (ordination),
and financial support, Abelove asserts that Wesley was able to "play the gentleman," and
thus distance himself from the next tier of Methodist leadership.lo Abelove argues Wesley
tried to control the societies by gamering their affection in a seductive manner,ll and that
Wesley mixed social distinction with the affection of Methodist followers to insure his
leadership. lz While these theses are interesting if not controversial they offer little evidence
as to why Methodists were able to sustain their "experience" of holiness.

A

DIFFERENT "HEAVEN BELOW"

Abelove's assertions, though contested, open the door to a new investigation of
Wesleyan experience and practice in anticipation of the New Creation. Wesley's emphasis on the means of grace, as community as well as individual practices, provides a more
adequate framework for exploring the new creation as a "communal" rather than merely
individual expression. Abelove is correct in asserting that this renewal is much like "heaven below," but Abelove misses a key assumption that this doxological term is a liturgical
expression, and therefore communal expression, rather than merely an individual, experiential term. Abelove's emphasis on Wesley's Puritanism overlooks John's Anglican sensibilities that provide an equally rich, sacramental understanding of the New Creation.
Wesley's vision of the New Creation included a "liturgical" community, shaped by
Christian practices known as the means of grace. There are preliminary clues to this form
of liturgical eschatology both from studies of utopian communities and from the re-shaping of English "custom" through Wesley's disciplinary efforts. In a sense, Wesley shaped a
particular community, and intentionally (and to some degree unintentionally) replaced
the local customs of the English countryside with a new set of practices that mirrored
their life in the New Creation. I} In addition, in contrast to Abelove, Wesley's manner of
leadership in shaping such a community was as much informed by his life as an Anglican
priest as by class deference.
Beyond the trajectories of commune and custom, Methodists lived on occasion as if
"heaven has come down" in their midst through a series of practices (and discipline) that
formed the community into a sacramental reality of accountability and action.14 Methodist
daily life in community was an extension of doxological worship through the means of
grace. The various practices in the means of grace (sacramental practices that Wesley categorized either as institutionaVprudential or as works of piety/works of mercy) shaped a community that provided a doxological vision of the possibility of living out Christian perfection.
Wesley's vision for the renewal of humanity included shaping a particular community
via the means of grace, in order to live this vision. We will first explore two trajectories
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that provide a better understanding of Methodist order and practice (including Wesley's
leadership). The rest of this endeavor will unveil the nature of the means of grace as a
series of sacramental and therefore liturgical practices that shape "heaven below" for
Methodist practice.
COMMUNE & C USTOM: TRAJECTORIES TOWARD PRACTICING THE NEW C REATION

The complexity of Wesley's efforts in discipleship is often beguiling in light of British
social class and custom. As Abelove seems to indicate, interpreters often fail to note the
paradoxical nature of Wesley's social deference and political control in tension with
Wesley's ministerial care and Methodist practices. 15 Wesley's efforts to change the lives of
Methodists from within the social structure raise interesting questions about communal
life of Wesleyans, particularly in light of eschatalogical ideals.
At least two such investigations, on utopian communes and social customs, reveal
some interesting, albeit limited, information that provides research "trajectories" into the
practice of the New Creation. The first trajectory compares Methodist practice with utopian communities who also sought to model an alternative life. A second trajectory, more
worth noting, includes Wesley's efforts to change the plebian customs of the Methodist
people. Did Wesley merely hope to end questionable customs or set new ones? If new
customs were indeed a part of Methodist practice, which customs were most fitting? Both
trajectories will be addressed.
UTOPIAN COMMUNITIES AND METHODISM

Investigating utopian practice may seem like an odd beginning. Utopian communities
and other communes are often perceived as a later American, European, and Israeli phenomenon, though their history actually goes much deeper, influencing the nature of
Christianity and the history of England as well. 16 Communes are most often groups
defined as "devoted to communal living for its own sake as a way of institutionalizing
friendship within and around a chosen domestic place." I? It appears clear that Wesley did
not adopt the most obvious communal practice where most utopian communities relied
upon a specified location to both provide group coherence and protect members from
the influences of broader society.18 Such an investigation warrants some consideration,
however, if only to compare/ contrast tendencies toward utopian visions of communal
life, beginning particularly with one Wesley may have been most familiar with, the
Moravian community of Hermhut.

Utopian Roots: Hermhut
The Moravians of Hermhut did manifest both a geographical identity and strong leadership, the community also influenced Wesley in a number of ways. Moravian group
practices, such as band meetings, did inform Wesley's future experimentation with
Methodist class meetings.19 Apparently Herrnhut also influenced Wesley's design at
Kingswood, Wesley's understanding of primitive Christianity including his use of the love
feast, and also influenced Wesley's communal economic vision at Hawnby in Yorkshire
where a number of families co-habitated in the same home.20
The relationship between Herrnhut and utopian communities might bear a closer
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investigation. Moravian efforts in England have been viewed as Utopian experiments.21
Hermhut bore several characteristics of communal living. including charismatic leadership
and selective membership.22 Other Moravian efforts in the United States, such as
Bethlehem and Nazareth, Pennsylvania, also demonstrate at least a quasi-communal effort
if not outright communes.2J

Utopian and Methodist Social Ideals
Communes are also given to utopian idealizations that, according to Rosabeth Kanter,
included the following traits: perfectability, order, brotherhood, merging of mind and
body, experimentation and the community's uniqueness. 24 These ideals were not always
realized but they do provide a set of goals/ purposes that reveal similarities in how utopian
communities pursued the development of their communities and how Methodism grew
as a movement.
The idea of comparing Methodist marriage practice alongside the complex marriage
arrangements of the Oneida community may seem quite jarring (or facetious), but there
are other parallels worth noting, if only in passing. 25 For instance, Methodism did operate
with a strong belief in human perfectibility, a tenant of utopian communities. However,
the articulation of perfectibility differs strongly between Methodism's emphasis of holiness
of heart and life and an utopian vision of identifying and following a natural order that
evoked perfectibility 26 Utopian idealizations concerning order, mutual relational ties
(including ritual practices), and an emphasis on holistic living also find points of correspondence with Methodist discipline and also with Wesley's behavior. 27 Finally Wesley did
come to see Methodism as emerging in a particular history and the practices that encouraged social solidarity occurred both within the Methodist societies and from outside persecution. 28 The combination of order and solidarity are particularly expressed in Wesley's,
"Advice to the People Called Methodists" where Wesley describes Methodists as "a new
people" who should "consider, with deep and frequent attention, the peculiar circumstances
wherein you stand." 29 Wesley acknowledged not only that the name "Methodist" was new
but that Methodist principles, opinions concerning certain moral stances, modes of worship, use of ordinances, strictness of life, communal unity and resultant persecution from
others provided a peculiarity to this Wesleyan community]O Indeed, Methodist lay leadership and class direction significantly influenced the spiritual experience of those who participated within the societies, suggesting a strong sense of social identity.]I So, with qualifications to come, there does seem to be some corollary between experiences within utopian communities and among Methodists.

Limits to Utopian Comparisons
As intriguing as the Hemnhut relationship might be, and in spite of the tendencies of
Methodism to mirror some aspects of communes, there are other sources to Wesley's
efforts that limit utopian comparisons. Wesley was also indebted to the Religious Societies
that predated his own movement, including the S.P.c.K. An emphasis on self-examination had already been established by these earlier Anglican efforts. While Wesley's
Methodist societies might have drawn educational structures from Hermhut, the desire
for mutual accountability was much older. Religious societies were also indebted to conti-
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nental influence, including pietism, which resulted in a strange mixture of Anglican conviction and Puritan practice.J2 The Societies, however, were also deeply concerned about
Anglican doctrinal orthodoxy. The societies' original guidelines, fashioned with the
Restoration's Act of Uniformity in mind, included oversight by clergy; though this was
sometimes more ideal than reaP3 Politically, Wesley would have never endorsed a communal model since many such efforts over the previous two hundred years were condemned as heretical and a direct challenge to the Church of England.34 Methodists were
already experiencing difficulty in some settings in attempting to meet as classes.
Challenges associated with the Conventicle Act of 1670 over issues of Dissent or Jacobite
concerns were more than enough to deter any Communal activity.35
ExCURSUS: WESLEY'S LEADERSHIP

Rather than sexual desire or communal charisma, as Abelove suggests, ministerial oversight might have fueled some of Wesley's personal application of deference and theological control. A quick overview of the Conference' minutes reveals that the third party
answers to the general questions came from one source, John Wesley himself. Wesley's
strong oversight of his Methodist Helpers was probably motivated by a desire to remain
doctrinally orthodox. This need to insure orthodoxy was also evident in earlier religious
societies, when an Anglican priest was required to oversee each society.36 There are other
reasons for Wesley's strong control of the leadership of the societies, such as his
encounter with the stillness controversy at the Fetter Lane Society. In all, Wesley was the
dominant leader of the Methodist movement throughout his life.37
Wesley's Methodist structure, combined with his Tory beliefs, also raises a number of
questions for further exploration concerning the relationship between the societies and
social control. E. P. Thompson asserted that Methodism actually fostered a working-class,
plebian, mentality of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century industrial England.38
Thompson's observations do acknowledge the tension in reconciling Wesley's politics
with other practices that empowered Methodist followers.
Additional investigation of the political climate of Wesley's day reveals an alternative
rationale. Wesley's Toryism is actually most evident late in his ministry during the American
Revolution, but following a time in the I 740s when many Methodists might have been suspected of Jacobitism and of supporting Charles II in his invasion of England. 39 Wesley, both
from political sympathy and from concern for the societies, was a supporter of the crown. In
spite of critiques by Thompson and others, Wesley's Toryism and hierarchy may not have
suppressed other beneficial practices within the societies. Historian John Rule notes:
As class leaders as well as local preachers, persons of humble birth had the opportunity to playa responsible role in their communities. Confidence gained and abilities
thus discovered, for example in organizing or in public speaking, could be harnessed for wider purposes.40
While later Methodism may have contributed to Thompson's critique, Wesley's social
structure embodied a paradox of hierarchical oversight combined with liberative local
practices within the classes themselves.41
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This paradox becomes more complex when one discovers that the leamed, politically
conservative Wesley also challenged other persons of similar social stature by preaching
against the sinfulness of "the rich, the patrician, or the conventionally learned."42
Methodists rejected the traditional hierarchical values of the higher social classes even
while certain Methodist practices empowered members to move up the social ladder. For
instance, Methodism's economic impact on its members was enough to rouse a concem
from Wesley in how the income was used. 43 This paradox is reminiscent of a struggle during the later Methodist revivals, where leaders had to reconcile expressions of experiential
enthusiasm with a conservative Methodist discipline. 44
The complexity of Wesley's social position, his political status, and his efforts to protect
the societies within the social context of the eighteenth century reveals that more information is needed before a true picture of Methodist leadership and discipleship can be
portrayed. Beyond utopian ideals and leadership, a different trajectory might shed greater
light on Wesley's vision of a communal "new creation" as English social customs were reconceived through Methodist discipline and devotional practice.
WESLEY AND SOCIAL CUSTOM

E. P. Thompson notes that the lower class's (plebian) emphasis on "custom" provided
them with a series of practices and beliefs that sustained them, particularly when aristocratic oversight demanded either a level of literacy or social sophistication not available to
the working class. Such customs ranged from legal issues, to economics and work, to
social life (including marriage and divorce) .45 Thompson sees these practices as subversive
to aristocratic control. 46
Wesley's personal use of the term custom is vague. Wesley did not plan to use customs as a specific strategy. He sometimes described foreign customs (as in the case of
Herrnhut), Catholic practices, or observed the local customs of people who chose not to
interfere with his preaching.47 At other times John used the term in a pejorative sense. 48
Other Methodists viewed customs as deplorable activities 49 Mary Bosanquet, for instance,
resolved the world to be sinful and vowed "no more to be conformed to its customs,
fashions or maxims."50 Wesley notes, in the Character of a Methodist, that he did not believe
in "actions and customs or usages of an indifferent nature," be they particular dress, position of prayer, or denial of a social practice (including marriage), if Cod did not ordain
their practice or call for abstention. 51 However, as this passage indicates, Wesley apparently believed there were some appropriate practices, even if describing them in cautionary
terms, "neither will any man who know whereof he affirms fix the mark of a Methodist
here, in any actions or customs purely indifferent, undetermined by the Word of cod."52
Wesley inadvertently provided new customs, or reinvigorated older practices, for social
groups through education, through the creation of the class structure, and through Society
chapel meetings. 53 While Wesley was reluctant to use the term "custom" to describe his
activities, others have been less constrained. 54

Changing Custom Through Education
Wesley's educational efforts impacted the popular religious ideas of the lower class.
Wesley's publishing efforts probably contributed to the popular education of many
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Methodists. For instance, Manfred Marquardt asserts that Methodist societies, as centers of
education, empowered individuals by creating a community where mutual discussion
could occur over texts like those in The Christian Library.55
How much of Wesley's literature was economically accessible by the lower classes is
questionable. There were, in addition, other vigorous publishing concems, including a number of chapbooks, or cheap popular literature, that would have competed with Wesley's
materiaP6 Actually Wesley was probably deeply indebted to the earlier work of the
S.P.C.K. in establishing markets for his publishing efforts. These publications, while later
competitive with Wesley's materials, set an example for popular religious pUblications.57
Adult literacy among the poor was a primary issue, but obviously Wesley's publications
served other functions as well for seventy percent of the workers in England who had a
limited literacy, many living in rural settings. Historians note that in rural settings the poor
incorporated a number of superstitious practices with their doctrine.58 Wesley's writings also
included everything from his account of his childhood ghost, "Old Jeffry," to later joumal
accounts of dramatic conversions, prophecy and supematural encounters. 59 Wesley's "plain
speech for plain people" may have provided a necessary bridge between the regional,
superstitious practices of the poor and the rational view of enlightenment religion. 60
Wesley's Methodism provided a language that moved people (sometimes slowly) from
superstition to religious belief. Thompson notes, however, that often in these settings, writings alone would not have helped since they were altered by the larger oral tradition of the
local customs, Wesley would use other means to respond to these circumstances.61

Changing Custom Through Discipline
E. P. Thompson notes that the lower class's (plebian) emphasis on "custom" provided
them with a series of practices and beliefs that sustained them when education was not
available. Often, in these settings, writings alone would not have helped since they were
altered by the larger oral tradition of the local customs.62 Beyond literacy, Wesley may
have provided another form of "education" (or socialization) through the various
Methodist practices. Methodism challenged the local popular pastimes of the lower class
{drinking, hurling, wrestling, bull-baiting and cock-fighting as well as certain feasts, festivals and fairs).63 Wesley noted how new faith often ended the destructive practices in
local communities like Cornwall, often destructive either to local inhabitants or others 64
Wesley writes, "they who had been eminent for hurling, fighting, drinking, and all manner of wickedness, continued eminent for sobriety, piety, and all manner of goodness.65
The strong moralistic code of Methodism, better known as Methodist discipline, left little
room for such distractions.66 David Hempton notes that "Serious Methodists could be
recognized by their dress, hairstyles and physical detachment from the world of revelry,
sports and dancing.67 While general characteristics are often fraught with limitation and
often open to caricature by Wesley's contemporaries (and apology by early Methodist
historians) it would be a fair estimate to acknowledge Wesley intended Methodists to
adopt rather strict lifestyles often opposing the "popular cultural" characteristics of many
in the English social system. 68
In spite of the restrictions on Methodists, Wesley inadvertently also provided new customs for poorer social groups through the creation of the Methodist class structure and
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Society chapel meetings.69 Altemative gatherings were offered-watch-night services, love
feasts, society and class meetings, and even Eucharist. Henry Rack notes,
Methodist devotions and duties, by accident or design, tended to monopolize the
scanty free time of the members. But this they seem to have welcomed, and even
members who were not preachers spent much of their time this way.70
Methodist practices, usually described as means of grace, offered the opportunity to create new customs.71 Adherence to this new way of life was crucial. 72 Methodists were
given a new set of social practices, new or revitalized customs as they were, to help shape
the total life of the Methodist people.
Abelove suggests that Methodists rejected theater-going by "making a theater of their
own among themselves."73 Abelove may be close to the truth with this observation.
Wesley, however, also connected the new Methodist gatherings to earlier religious customs by encouraging members to attend Communion, practice the means of grace, and
observe other religious "festival" activities. Indeed, it has long been hard to draw the line
between restrictive discipline and devotional practices like the means of grace. The
dichotomy between categories may be flawed, particularly if Methodism is to be understood as a way of life.74 These practices, as customs, probably provided as much influence
for the lower class as Wesley's written endeavors. As such, new "customs" were encouraged; replacing popular customs through the practices of the means of grace. With these
customs came a new version of "heaven below" for the Wesleyan community.
THE MEANs OF GRACE AND LITURGICAL ESCHATOLOGY
Combining both Discipline and Devotional Practice ultimately places Methodist "custom" under the rubric of the means of grace, a sacramental category that can be defined
as one of "liturgical" practice (broadly conceived). If one locates these many practices
under the various categories of John Wesley's means of grace a new question arises concerning their common connection. 75 What held these varying practices together? The clue
might be the primary liturgical practice within the means of grace, the Eucharist, and the
doxological character of this liturgical practice. Just as Eucharist occurs within a doxological framework of "heaven come down," all of the means of grace might well be attempts
to practice the New Creation, to live as if the eschaton has/ is/will occur. To establish this
thesis the means of grace must be defined and situated within Wesley's sacramentaVliturgical framework.
The means of grace is a term associated with Wesley, John's most explicit definition is
found in his sermon with the same title.

By "means of grace" I understand outward signs, words, or actions, ordained of
God, and appointed for this end- to be the ordinary channels whereby he conveys
to men, preventing. justifying or sanctifying grace 76
The term's use, for which Wesley sometimes substituted the term "ordinances," begins primarily during a controversy with Moravians over the Fetter Lane society and culminates
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with Wesley's instructions to ministers to utilize various practices (and dispositions) for Godly
living.77 Wesley's detailed argument for the means of grace at Fetter Lane set the stage for his
continued use of this term to emphasize an increasing number of Christian practices. Wesley
actually described the various practices in the means of grace using different categories in
sermons and other writings, particularly in key documents of Methodist polity. Practicing the
means of grace became a standard for Wesley in Methodist polity and ministry. Wesley, in
'/he Nature, Design and General Rules of the United Societies," stressed that Society members should evidence their desire for salvation in three ways, by doing no harm and avoiding
evil, by doing good, and by attending upon all the ordinances of Cod.78
The "Larger" Minutes of 1778 may be one of the most important documents to
demonstrate how Wesley incorporated the means of grace as a part of the regular examination of all lay ministers.79 Wesley encouraged his ministers to view their "helpers" as
pupils and to encourage them in using all the means of grace.80 In this document, Wesley
revealed a description of the means of grace that differs from the language of acts of
mercy and piety. Wesley now used the language of instituted and prudential means of
grace. The instituted means (very similar to Wesley's understanding of ordinances or acts
of piety) include Prayer (private, family and pub lid, searching the Scriptures (by reading,
meditating and hearing), the Lord's Supper, Fasting and Christian Conference.81 The prudential means include particular rules, arts of holy living, acts of ministry and larger attitudes toward daily living listed under the headings of watching, denying ourselves, taking
up our cross, and exercising the presence of God.82 Wesley's practice and advocacy of the
Eucharist grace provides the central sacramental emphasis of all of these practices.8)
Wesley lived a life anchored in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper and the worship
that surrounded this key practice. He regularly participated in the Eucharist and encouraged Methodist followers to do the same. 84 Wesley often avoided advocating a particular
"mode" of worship in his writing, allowing diversity of style much like that of varying religious opinion.8s Wesley, however, apparently uses "modes" of worship to compare
Presbyterian, Independent or Anabaptist liturgical practices. 86 It might be a fair assertion
that while Wesley would allow for some diversity in worship practice (as he would in religious opinion) there were some liturgical non-negotiables much like there were basic doctrines that could not be dismissed as opinion. Apparently, however, he did have a high
opinion of specific liturgical practices and expected persons to participate in worship, lest
they be guilty of a practical as well as speculative latitudinarianism.87
Wesley acknowledged that he was faithful to the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer
and had a high opinion of the BCP Eucharistic liturgy.88 Wesley was not only the leader of
a Methodist movement, he was also an Anglican priest and John made clear that
Methodism was not to be perceived as a nonconformist sect by diverging greatly from the
Church of England's liturgy.89
This "liturgical" disposition affords Wesleyans a framework for understanding the sacramental character of Methodist practice. It must be conceded that Wesley did not use such
a term as liturgical eschatology, however, his liturgical world was also an eschatalogical
one, shaped by the doxological expectation of "heaven come down." Such expectation
undoubtedly shaped Wesley's understanding of holy character and liturgical community .. .shaped through the practices of the means of grace.
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WESLEY'S LITURGICAL WORLD

Wesley's appreciation of, and participation in, the Lord's Supper cannot be understood
unless attention is given to the liturgical context (and the disputes) that surrounded the
Eucharist for three generations prior to his day. These ongoing formulations framed the
creation and revisions of the Book of Common Prayer (BCP) and shaped Wesley's own
liturgical sensibilities.90 The crafters of the Book of Common Prayer sought to create a world
for Anglicans through the practices defined by the various rubrics (instructions) to the
priests or ministers. The language of the Prayer Book indicated a particular view of both the
nature of the Eucharistic community and the "real presence" of Christ. Wesley's
Eucharistic theology was deeply intertwined with these sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century constructions and debates over the sacrament and accompanying liturgy.9l
Controversies over the actions of the liturgy and the placement of the altar continued
across the centuries preceding Wesley.92 The structure of the BCp, however, began to
shape a particular world of praise to God and celebration of the Eucharist. Each successive change in The Book of Common Prayer included elements of conservatism and controversy9J The intent is not to rehearse all the nuances in the history of the BCp, from 1542
to Wesley's day. The concepts that emerge from the historical process did influence
Wesley's practice, including the creation of many Methodist hymns. Even Wesley's
abridgement of The Sunday Service for American Methodists was a conservative revision,
primarily to accommodate the special circumstances of the American social environment
and to include extemporary prayer as well as John and Charles Wesley's Hymns 94 While
the battle for the Prayer Book included a number of political and social agendas, three theological issues seem to summarize the struggle: determining the culture of the Eucharistic
community (doxology), remembering Christ's sacrificial life in community (oblation), and
understanding the celebration of Christ's dynamic presence via the Holy Spirit at the table
and in the world (epiclesis) 95 Doxology provides a reference for entering into the nature
of the eschatological community.
The Eucharistic Community as Doxology
Doxology, praise and worship toward God, remains a key theme describing Wesley's
understanding not only of the focus of individual believers but understanding also the
character, or culture of the liturgical community that received the Eucharist. Descriptive
words were important in connection to the "speech act."96 While prayers often conveyed
meaning, the actions did likewise, suggesting a particular intent to the liturgy.97
Wesley's personal sacramental practices actually agreed more with the Anglican High
Church, the Nonjurors, than with the Nonconformists. Horton Davies notes that Wesley
actually preferred the first Prayer Book of Edward VI written by Bishop Thomas Cranmer98
Wesley favored Cranmer's collects and traditional lections when John wrote the Sunday
Service for American Methodists. 99 Wesley clearly observed practices consonant with the
tenor of the earlier 1549 Prayer Book, even when at variance with the 1662 Prayer Book.
Doxology, for Wesley and others, emphasizes the corporate context of worship as
praise to God. The broader liturgical setting that surrounded Holy Communion, generated a "world" for the participant, a culture inhabited by the God of the Eucharist. The creation of this world included ritual actions, the organization of space and ordering of time,
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as well as some degree of involvement by the participants. The arrangement of furniture,
including the altar, and the order of the liturgy often deterrnined who would and would
not be a part of the "world" of the Eucharist. 100 The Lord's Supper, in this interpretation,
becomes a transformative event in which eschatology, the new heaven, becomes realized
in the midst of the worshiping people. The arrangement of the worship "space" (from
placement of the Supper, reception of the elements, and other actions) indicates something of the representation (even nature) of heaven on earth. Tension often occurred in
determining who was able to participate in this new community.101 How persons were
included or excluded <including rulers, enemies and even the dead) and how they were
treated in the service indicated how they were or would be received in heaven. 102
Wesley, who fenced the table while in Georgia, later opened communion to all willing
to receive during the Methodist revival so that full participation in the liturgy was expected of all. l03 Although there is no detailed account of an early British Methodist
Communion service, John Bowmer provides a detailed reconstruction of Wesley's practice of the Lord's Supper. Bowmer notes that Wesley expected an attitude of reverence
when taking the Eucharist. Wesley, however, included the unconventional practice of
using hymns to establish the ethos of the service, and he inserted these hymns within the
BCP liturgy. The result was a modified text, but a text intent on preserving the doxological
ethos of worship that surrounded the Eucharist. 104 Doxology, in its fullest expression,
became the overall structure that defined our "etemal" relationship with God, best remembered in the sacrificial act of Jesus Christ and practiced in worship.

Doxology as Eschatology
If doxology describes the communal context of the Eucharist, it might also describe the
social world engendered by the practices of the means of grace. The same way that the
various actions and activities within worship were designed to assist persons in participating in the midst of a "realized" eschatology ("as if' heaven had come down) in worship,
the larger practices within the means of grace might be interpreted as extending this liturgical practice into the everyday lives of the Methodists.
Wesley was not deeply interested in eschatalogical categories, including millennial speculation, though he offered commentary on end time events. lOS It may be a fair assumption,
however, that Wesley did believe that Methodism, like the Church in general, was called to
live toward an alternative reality, or altemative Kingdom. Wesley writes of the Church,
[t is a body of men compacted together in order, first, to save each his own soul,
then assist each other in working out their salvation, and afterwards, as far as in
them lies, to save all men from present and future misery, to overturn the kingdom
of Satan, and set up the Kingdom of Christ. And this ought to be the continued
care and endeavor of every member of his church. Otherwise he is not worthy to
be called a member thereof, as he is not a living member of Christ. 106
The most persistent vision of this "kingdom of Christ" was nurtured in the eschatalogical
elements of doxological liturgy, and lived out through the various practices of the means
of grace.
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To review, Wesley's convictions and practice reveal that he considered the Eucharist
the chief exemplar of the means of grace, bestowing a sacramental quality to each practice. However, just as the Lord's Supper and its broader liturgical/worship context are
interrelated (so as not to be separated), the broader social context of Methodist discipline
and devotion informs and is formed by the means of grace. This broader community
practice provides a communal "liturgy" that is by analogy doxological, and therefore
eschatological in nature, at least eschatological in the sense of living as if "heaven comes
down" in the midst of the liturgical community. Admittedly these assertions are based as
much on Methodist "practice" as on Wesley's written thought. As noted, Wesley acknowledges that one specific mode of worship does not condition this practice but that there be
an overall worshipful participation "desiring only that the love of Cod and his neighbour
be the ruling principle in his heart, and show itself in his life by an uniform practice of justice, mercy, and truth ... this 'the way' (called 'heresy,' by Dr. Maclaine and others) 'according to which we worship the Cod of our fathers."'107 While Wesley did not comment
extensively on the nature of the liturgical community, he did draw from an ancient-future
metaphor that, according to his sources, embodies not only conduct but also worship in
defining the Christian life.
PIuMmvE CHRJSTlANITY
Henry Rack and others note that practicing Wesley's form of Eucharistic piety was
extremely difficult for Methodists and Anglicans alike due to the scarcity of communion
services in some settings. 108 Wesley overcame limited Eucharistic practice not only through
democratized versions of the Eucharist like the lovefeast, but by casting all devotional
practices in sacramental light. 109 The means of grace and, by extension, other Methodist
"custom," take on sacramental qualities, cast in the language of primitive Christianity.
Wesley apparently was interested in recovering primitive Christianity though he rarely
discussed this personal pursuit, or Methodist practice, as a form of eschatology. Wesley
focused instead on the practice of ancient Christians. I 10 For Wesley, the Methodist movement was an attempt to practice "primitive, scriptural Christianity" and adopted practices
he thought in concert with the primitive Church. I I I The exact meaning of the phrase,
much like its exact dating, is a bit ambiguous but seems to point to the Christian period
prior to Augustine.1I2 Wesley often related his efforts to that of the primitive church. As
such Wesley's efforts were an extension of the early church. Henry Rack often contrasts
Wesley's Anglican sensibilities and his desire to emulate primitive Christianity in reality
they might be more complimentary than realized.l13 Noting that Wesley's "High Church"
sensibilities were out of step in early eighteenth century England, Michael Hill and Bryan
Turner write,
BACK TO THE FUTURE: PRACTICING

Against this background it is not difficult to place John Wesley's initial innovations
very firmly in the high church tradition which emphasized the importance of the
primitive church: indeed the label 'innovations' is only appropriate in the context of
the eighteenth century Church of England because in most cases the practices
which Wesley instituted were simply reinstatements of primitive practices. " 4
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Wesley's vision of the Primitive Church was influenced by William Cave's Primitive
Christianity, a text which included not only the "lives and manners" of the early church,
but their liturgy, festivals and sacramental practices as their "ancient rites."I I S Cave's text,
organized around his understanding of Pauline views of "piety towards God, sobriety
towards ourselves, righteousness towards others" includes as well a vindication for persecuted Christians, and includes a number of chapters on the liturgical world of primitive
Christianity. I 16 Cave also includes chapters on worship space, time (festivals and fasts) and
church membership. 1I7 Cave also included specific direction on worship and the celebration of the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, all at the beginning of his text in
explicating piety towards God.IIB His description of the Eucharist was equaUy detailed,
including specific actions and the relationship between Communion and the Lovefeast. 119
In all Cave provided a detailed discussion of the liturgical world of the "heavenly
Banquet" as part of one's piety toward God.120
These liturgical descriptions influenced Wesley's later approach to the sacraments as
did his Anglican upbringing 121 Wesley would call the Lord's Supper "a little emblem of
the primitive church."122 He also acknowledged the presence of primitive Christianity in
the liturgy of Anglican moming and evening services.123 And Wesley, for all his toleration
of varying modes of worship, concluded that the worship he currently engaged in was
"truly primitive and apostolical."124 Wesley then saw no difference between the liturgical
practice of primitive Christianity (with its doxological implications) and the practice he
encouraged Methodists to embrace as primitive, scriptural, Christians.
As much as the original design of ancient worship included the doxological emphasis
mentioned earlier, primitive Christianity was not only an ancient practice but also a
"future" practice. Wesley's call to Methodists to practice primitive Christianity was also a
call to live out the liturgy's eschatological vision, to practice the New Creation, in the fullness of their lives individually and communally.
CONCLUSION

Henry Abelove's insistence on an intemalized eschatology appears flawed when one
considers a number of factors that may have created a communal or liturgical form of
eschatological practice more adept at sustaining holiness. Several trajectories seem to support the necessity of a communal understanding of living the new creation.
The investigation of utopian communes yields little evidence towards Wesley's "liturgical eschatology" as a way of practicing the new creation; however, the search does reveal
one source of possible influence in Wesley's efforts, Hernnhutt, and the importance
toward a communal as well as individual approach to holiness of heart and life. More
importantly, the search reveals a varying account of Wesley's leadership that may account
for a different interpretation than Abelove. Similarly the investigation into the nature of
English custom provides clues into a broader series of Methodist practices. Wesley strongly opposed certain customs of his day and noted Methodism's influence in alleviating certain practices. Wesley's practices, including his emphasis on regular meetings and church
attendance, may have influenced the poorer classes in British society as much as Wesley's
literacy efforts. More to the point, these same practices seemed to create new "customs"
oriented not only in Methodist discipline, but also in the means of grace.
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The means of grace provide a hermeneutical "clue" of worship or sacramentally oriented practices. These practices enabled Methodists to practice "primitive, scriptural
Christianity" that also embodied a liturgical eschatology. Heaven had indeed "come down,"
as Abelove contends, but in the midst of community, living in relative degrees as if they
were already a part of the New Creation. As Leslie Church noted the Methodists "grew in
grace together and realized, in fellows hip, the wonder of being themselves part of the family of God."'25 It seems only appropriate for Wesleyans to accept a via media between the
macrocosmic vision of the redemption of all creation and the microcosmic vision of personal transformation. An ecology of practices, known as the means of grace, provided
Methodism with a liturgical world, doxologically informed, as the mediating realm.
The decline of Methodist practices in subsequent generations may be one reason why
Methodism has had such an uneven history in living out the vision of the New Creation.
Methodist communities of discipleship, themselves means of grace, provide a necessary
form of life that fuels any possible vision of both personal and social transformation. It
may well be that recoveries of this form of liturgical eschatology may help future
Wesleyan communities better understand the shaping/transforming, liturgical, renewal of
persons in light of the New Creation.
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J. PRESCOTT JOHNSON

Two Pauline doxologies, laden with the freshness and purity of a divine atmosphere, set the theme of this work. Ephesians 3:2 I reads, "Unto him be glory in the
Church by Jesus Christ throughout all ages, world without end. Amen." Galatians
I :5, voicing a similar thought, reads, 'To whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen."
Their beauty and eloquence in the King James Version are unexcelled.
However, the English translation of the original Greek does not disclose the full
import of the passages. The literal translation of the phrase in Ephesians 3 :21 ,
"throughout all ages, world without end," is, in the original Greek, d~ 1t<icra~ 'ta.~
y£v£a.~ 'tou airovo~ 't rov aiwvO)v, "unto all generations of the age of the ages." The
relevant phrase in Galatians 1:5, "for ever and ever," £i~ 'tou~ airova~ 'trov
aiwvO)v, unto the ages of the ages.
Ephesians 3 :2 I carries the thought that the generations of the redeemed, those
who even in this time-bound life become the "children of the resurrection," are preserved in the final Age, the Age that embraces, without loss, all time-bound ages.
There is, then, the Age of the ages.
Now Galatians 1:5 plays on the plural, ages, and replicates the plural, so as to
emphasize the eternity in which the long stream of historical ages is comprehended
and finally saved. The eternity of the New Testament is not a static age, but rather is
the dynamic of an endlessness, the constituents of which are the innumerable series
of the ages of time.
These passages, then, address the question of time and eternity and their relation
to each other. We shall see that this New Testament view differs widely from
human speculation and brings time and eternity together in salvational harmony.
In order to pursue this subject, it is necessary to come to some understanding of
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the meaning of the crucial terms, time and eternity. Attention will be given to certain writers, historical and modem, so as to throw light on the subject under consideration.
The question of the nature of time is a very complex and difficult one. St. Augustine
(A.D. 354-430) put the matter very well: "What, then, is time? If no one asks of me, I
know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not."] There is a very good reason
why Augustine knows what time is but finds himself unable to explain its nature. First and
foremost, time is directly exhibited in awareness. But, secondly, like everything so exhibited,
it is therefore indefinable.
Now, the question emerges as to whether or not there is a "real" time in nature. That
is, does the moving flow of experienced time have some counterpart in nature? As we
shall see, attempts to establish the reality of objective time all too often proceed on the
assumption of a logical-mathematical paradigm of a time-series of instant-less points. But,
as we shall also indicate, this leads to insuperable difficulties. A few examples of the difficulties may be briefly noted.
The early Creek philosopher Zeno of Elea {cire. 490-430 B.C,} argued that, if time is
composed of indivisible instants, motion is impossible. The argument is that of the "paradox of the flying arrow." In a temporal instant, he says, no change of position can occur.
Hence, motion, which requires that a body change position, cannot occur, albeit, paradoxically, motion does appear to occur.
If it is incorrect to reify, i.e., apply to reality, a mathematically conceived time-series of
temporal instants, it is also incorrect to reify the past and the future. This reification lies at
the root of Augustine's dilemma concerning the reality of the past and the future. Having
confessed that, while he knows what time is, although he cannot explain it, he writes:
Yet I say with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed away, there would not
be past time; and if nothing were coming. there would not be future time; and if
nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two times, therefore, past and
future, how are they, when even the past now is not, and the future is not as yet. 2
Essentially the same problem occurs with respect to a "real" present. There is a real
present only on condition that the present cease to be, that it become non-existent:
But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past,
truly it could not be time, but eternity. If, then, time present- if it be time-only
comes into existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even this
is, whose cause of being is that it shall not be-namely, so that we cannot truly say
that time is, unless because it tends not to be?3
It may be, and has been, said that there is in nature an "absolute" time and that,
accordingly, the past and the future are accommodated in this order of time. This is the
position of Newton (1642-1727):
Absolute, true, mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably
without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration .... 4
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The main difficulty with this view is that we have no evidence for the truth of the theory. We are unaware, either directly or indirectly, of absolute time. Newton himself in
effect admits this. He argues that as improvements are made in the measurement of relative, common time, a closer approximation to absolute time will be achieved. But there is
no evidence that these measurements do indeed tend to approximate absolute time. And
they certainly do not yield any direct awareness of absolute time intervals.
A more contemporary argument against an objective time is proposed by j. M. E.
McTaggart (1866- 1925). He says that there are two time-series. The A-series is time
ordered as past, present, and future. This is dynamic time, or time as passage. The B-series
is time ordered according to the relation of before and after. In this series, time is static, in
that these relations are permanent. The B-series depends on the A-series.5
Now, McTaggart continues, the A-series, which is time as experienced, is not objectively real, and this for the reason that its reality implies a contradiction, as well as an infinite
regress. We experience time, he points out, as presentness (present perception), as pastness (memory), and as futurity (anticipation). When these distinctions in the A-series are
reified, a contradiction results. Every event now assumes the property of present, past,
and future. Since, however, these characteristics are incompatible, there is no way of reconciling them in an objective time series.
Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be
one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event is past,
that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others. And this
exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the only change we
can get is from future to present, and present to past.
The characteristics, therefore, are incompatible. But every event has them all.
The reality of the A series, then, leads to a contradiction. 6

C. D. Broad (1887-1971) rebuts McTaggart's argument, by pointing out that when a
complete description of an event is given, which requires the use of tense language, the
contradiction disappears.? However, we shall not here consider Broad's argument in detail.
Instead, we shall explore another feature of McTaggart's view.
He appears to restrict the experience of time to present perception, memory, and
anticipation. However, memory and anticipation are not in themselves the experience, or
awareness, of lived time. They therefore are not on the same level with the experience of
the present. What is remembered is not an actual event or a quale, the pas~ in which the
event is allegedly located, but rather an experience, the residual traces of which are present in the nervous system. Mutatis mutandis, this consideration holds for anticipation.
Now, if the experienced present is taken as a durationless moment (analogous to the
dimensionless point of geometry), past and future are completely disassociated from the
present. They then must be experienced as distinct from the present, apprehended only
in memory and anticipation.
However, our awareness of time is that of a specious present. The true present of
experience is not a durationless moment of time sharply dividing past from future and
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utterly distinct fro m both. On the contrary, the experienced present is also the awareness
of past and future.
As given in awareness, time is disclosed as an experience of a present that shades off in
two dimensions: towards an horizon of an immediate "retention" of the past and an
immediate "protention" of the future. Thus, in experience, past and future are elements of
the immediately experienced present. They must thus be distinguished fro m the past as
recalled in memory and the future as anticipated in expectation.
The experience of time, then, has a certain "thickness," which shades off into the nowexperience of pastness and futurity. The "now" of experience is not a "knife-edge" experience. Here there is no instant-less moment of time. Further, an abstract time-series, constructed mathematically as a series of instantaneous points, is in nowise the time-flow of
experience. It is purely and simply a conceptual construct and is abstract throughout.
Attempts to explain, or define, time in this manner do not reach the time that we actually
experience and live through.
Thus past and future need not be placed outside the experience of the present, as
something "out there" in reality that may be recalled in memory or anticipated in expectation. Augustine's difficulty conceming the reality of past and future that yet do not exist,
or McTaggart's difficulty conceming the reality of past and future as concurrent with the
present, do not appear when past and present are held within the experienced present.
To conclude this phase of the discussion, some attention may be given to the EnglishAmerican philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead (I 861 -1947). His view of time, as set
forth in chapter three of The Concept of Nature, is helpful.
Time is not a series of extensionless instants. There are no such instants or series of
such instants, in either experience or nature. Temporal instants, and their placement in a
series, are constructions of thought. The awareness of time is the awareness of a "duration," not of a duration less moment of time. What is posited in sense awareness as a fact
in nature is not a material object located in "a one-dimensional series of extensional
instants of time," but an event in process of completing itself. In so far as time is objective,
it is the duration required for that completion 8
While a moment has no temporal extension, a duration does. Since it is not a conceptual abstraction, a duration is directly given in sense-awareness. In contrast to a moment, it
has what Whitehead calls "temporal thickness":
. .. the ultimate terminus of awareness is a duration with temporal thickness. This
immediate duration is not clearly marked out fo r our apprehension. Its earlier
boundary is blurred by a fading into memory and its later boundary is blurred by an
emergence from anticipation. There is no sharp distinction between memory and
the present immediacy or between the present immediacy and anticipation. The
present is a wavering breadth of boundary between the two extremes.9
Since the immediate duration is temporally thick, there is no minimum of duration, a
point, that defines the present. Further, durations themselves overlap one another. This
means, then, that for even the individual, the present cannot be definitively determined.
This holds, mutatis mutandis, for a plurality of minds. Finally, since a mathematically con-
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ceived time-series of points is an abstraction, no such time-series defines an absolute
world-time. There is no absolute time, either in the passage of mind or the passage of
nature. On the contrary, there are times. Time, in mind and nature, is relative.1O
The approach to the question of the nature of time must be a phenomenologiml one. A
phenomenological consideration of time does two things: (I) it refuses initially to postulate an objective world-time, and (2) it insists that time be viewed as directly evident in
awareness. As thus viewed, time is a process in which durations fade off to past and
future and overlap each other.
The language in which the experience of time as duration that includes retention of
the past and protention of the future is taken from Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). This
view of time is developed in his 1928 work, Vorlesungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins, which has been translated by James S. Churchill as The Phenomenology of
internal Time-Consciousness. The only time of which there is certainty is immanent time.
When we speak of the analysis of time-consciousness, of the temporal character
of objects of perception, memory, and expectation, it may seem, to be sure, as if we
assume the Objective flow of time, and then really study only the subjective conditions of the possibility of an intuition of time and a true knowledge of time. What
we accept, however, is not the existence of a world-time, the existence of a concrete duration, and the like, but time and duration appearing as such. These, however, are absolute data, which it would be senseless to call in question. To be sure,
we also assume an existing time; this, however, is not the time of the world of
experience but the immanent time of the flow of consciousness.I I
Time, then, is the flow of consciousness, the sense of inner passage. This passage is
articulated as present duration retaining, containing in presentness, past and future as a
"shading-off." Husserl describes the retention of the past in present experience:
We now ... take the sound [a tone] purely as a hyletic datum. [t begins and
stops, and the whole unity of its duration, the whole unity of the process in which it
begins and ends, "proceeds" to the end in the ever more distant past. [n this sinking
back, I still "hold" it fast, have it in a "retention," and as long as the sound persists
the sound has its own temporality. It is the same and its duration is the same. 12
The greater portion of The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness deals with the
relation of present and past, i.e., with presence and retention. Yet Husserl indicates that
protention belongs to the experience of the present, as well as does retention. He states:
It pertains to the essence of the expected that it is an about-to-be-perceived. . . .
expectational intuition is something primordial and unique exactly as is intuition of
the past. i3

Husserl's earlier work, Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomen%gie und phiinomenologischen
Philosoph ie, appeared in 1913 . The English translation of the first part of the work
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appeared in 1928, under the title, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. The
term constitution appears there for the first time in Husserl's writings.14 Although he does
not define the term, the context indicates that it refers to the way in which a presentational content is built up out of many layers of sense qualia. The synthesis that is produced is,
at this stage in Husserl's thought, a passive one. He became increasingly disturbed by the
concept of a passive constitution of the object, because it suggested that the construction
was from the side of the object rather than from the side of the apprehending consciousness. Were this the case, the very foundations of phenomenology, which restricts itself to
appearances, would be threatened by an unwelcome "realism." At this juncture, he
tumed to the problem of the awareness of time. He believed that the constitution of the
inner consciousness of time was the key to all other processes of constitution, the constitution of hyletic data and other objectivities. He apparently suggested that the inner
stream of time-consciousness, which is operative in other syntheses, is itself produced
from a deeper source, from a primal source of active synthesis. Such a source, lying below
time-consciousness itself, would be the transcendental ego. It would be the ultimate root
of all processes of constitution.
Now, however it is to be explained, there is, in some sense, a "common world"
brought to view in human awareness. If there be an ultimate root of active synthesis, it
cannot be confined to any individual experience. That would issue in solipsism, which is
an outcome very few would tolerate. What this means is that Husserl's transcendental
subjectivity must, finally, be extended beyond the individual to a more comprehensive
experience. The possibility here intimated is what Whitehead suggests as but a conjecture,
namely, that "this alliance of the passage of mind with the passage of nature arises from
their both sharing in some ultimate character of passage which dominates all being."ls
To sum up thus far: What we can say about time is that it is a form of awareness. In
that awareness, the present embraces past and future. We cannot, by extrapolation or
abstraction, construct a mathematical time-series, in which past, present, and future are
located, and regard it as definitive of objective time. Yet time, as the form of awareness,
must extend beyond any individual awareness. For this consequence, where shall we look?
In philosophical literature, the term eternity is used in three main senses: as an unending expanse of time, as absolute timelessness, and as that which includes time, but also
transcends time.
The first theory, that etemity is endless time, is the popular view. It is also Kant's view.
Kant says that the supreme human good consists in conformity with the moral law. This
moral ideal cannot, he continues, be realized in this life. Thus an endless process is necessary for the attainment of the moral ideal.
Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of
his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only
be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the principle of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as
the real object of our will.
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Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the
immortality of the SOUO. 16
However, that there is such an unending expanse of time cannot be demonstrated by
the theoretical reason. And, to make matters worse, the notion is inconceivable.17 Kant
regards the time-series as one in which the antecedent parts cease to exist as the succeeding parts come into existence. Now, he continues, the time-order presupposes either a
first member in the series or an unending succession of antecedent members. Neither
alternative is conceivable. A first member in the series would have no antecedent member to determine its place in the time-order. Its antecedent would be but an empty time,
which is nothing at all. If there were no first member in the unending series, then the
series is one which never began-which would be a series that never existed at all. Thus,
to take Kant's argument, eternity as endless time is an impossibility.
The difficulties in the idea of an unending process have led the majority of philosophical
thinkers to regard eternity as a state of existence independent of temporal conditions. The
apparent timelessness of the "laws" and other general statements of scientific and philosophic discourse serve to occasion the belief in a corresponding timeless existence. However, our
ordinary experience appears, at least on the surface, as time-bound, so as to appear to
exclude any consciousness of timeless existence. Thus, if there is an eternity of timeless existence, it seems that it has no connection with our temporal mode of existence. The two
modes of existence-time and eternity-stand in complete separation and opposition.
At the dawn of western philosophical thought, the Greek philosopher Parmenides of
Elea (6th-5th century B.C.) argued that the only existent is the one, eternal Being.
Becoming and change are illusory. If anything comes into existence, it derives from either
Being or Not-Being. If it comes out of the former, then it already exists and thus does not
come to be. If it comes out of Not-Being, it is non-existent, since from nothing, nothing
can come. Hence the appearing world of change is illusory.
. . . And it [Being) never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now, a Whole all together,
One, continuous; for what creation of it will you look for? How, whence (could it
have) sprung? Nor shall I allow you to speak or think of it as springing from NotBeing; for it is neither expressible nor thinkable that What-Is-Not Is.18
The closing portion of Parmenides' poem is entitled 'The Way of Opinion." Here he
argues that the temporal world of sense appearances is illusory. However, he does not
attempt to explain why the senses delude us and give rise to false appearances.
Plato (428-7-348-7 B.C.) recognized the necessity of giving an account of time as well
as of eternity. The eternally Real is, as it was for Parmenides, available only to thought.
The Eternal is the Idea of the Good (iji8£u 'tOU ayu90U). It is the supreme reality, the
wholly other, transcendent in eternal self-subsistence. "... the good itself is not essence
but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power."19
In distinction to Parmenides, Plato holds that the visible world of time, of change and
multiplicity, is not an illusory world. It has some degree of reality. It is, as he calls it, the
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world of becoming. It therefore must be accounted for.
There is some sense, Plato argues, in which the Good is the cause of the world. In
Republic vii 5l 7b-c he says:
... the idea of the good . . . is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and
beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light ....
And in Phaedo 99c, he designates the Good as that ".. . which must embrace and hold
together all things."2o
There is, however, no conceptual, or scientific, way to define the respect in which the
Good is the cause of the temporal world. Yet, some account must be given, to indicate in
some fashion the incontrovertible truth that the Good is the cause of the world. To provide
the account, Plato turns to the myth.
The Timaeus tells of the creator-god (811I.1tOupy6~, demiurge) who fashions the
ordered universe by imposing the eternal forms up on the chaos of matter. He desired to
make it as nearly like its eternal model as possible. The likeness is but approximate, since
the world is a sensible world and nothing sensible can be eternal. To effect this approximation of the world to the eternal, the demiurge created time, which is the mediating link
between the eternal model and the ordered universe of physical reality. And time is able
to fulfill this mediating function because it is an image of eternity. But, unlike the eternal,
which abides the same forever, time is a moving image:
Accordingly, seeing that that Model is an eternal Living Creature, He set about
making this Universe, so far as He could, of a like kind. But inasmuch as the nature
of the Living Creature was eternal, this quality it was impossible to attach in its
entirety to what is generated; wherefore He planned to make a movable image of
Eternity, and, as He set in order the Heaven, of that Eternity which abides in unity
He made an eternal image, moving according to number, even that which we have
named Time.21
Time, then, is the moving image of eternity. It is such an image because its movement
is circular. A temporal movement that repeats itself in its circular process is "like" the eternity "which abides [forever] in unity."
Yet there is still the unbridgeable disjunction between eternity and time. The distance
is absolute. The eternal is alone in self-existent isolation, while the temporal is but a shadowy image severed completely from the eternal. In no sense does eternity include time.
It must be observed, parenthetically, that this Platonic view of eternity became the
dominant view in subsequent western philosophy: from Aristotle onwards through
Spinoza to Kant.
If the life of the world, including human life, is to have a meaning beyond the stretch
of time, then eternity must enclose time. The American philosopher Josiah Royce (185 5I 916) develops such a view of the relation of time to eternity.
Royce's conception of time is similar to that of Husserl. Time is not the time of mathematics, i.e, a series of durationless points. Rather, it is the experience of succession. He
writes:
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. . . we not only observe that any antecedent member of the series is over and past
before the next number comes, but also, and without the least contradiction
between these two aspects of our total experience, we observe that this whole succession . .. is present at once to our consciousness . ...22
The fact that the serial character of experienced time is also concurrently experienced
as a unified whole is the key to Royce's theory of the relation of the temporal to the eternal. More specifically, experienced time is, for us, an experience of Will. On the one hand,
the time-span of the experienced present is a limited one. The successions, the "before"
and "after," that are held within the unity of the experienced present are relatively few.
On the other hand, these short successions of present apprehension portend future experiences in which present intentions of Will may be realized and fulfilled. Time is the experience of yearning for the Other, i.e., that which is beyond any finite realization. But,
Royce maintains, this Other is not merely an Other, to be followed by some additional
Other in a serial endlessness. This Other is also Totality. And Totality is the Eternal.
For, as a fact, in defining time we have already, and inevitably, defined eternity; and
a temporal world must needs be, when viewed in its wholeness, an eternal world. 23
Again,
For the goal of every finite life is simply the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is
a fragment. When [ seek my own goal, [ am looking for the whole of myself. In so
far as my aim is the absolute completion of my Selfhood, my goal is identical with
the whole life of God.24
Thus, as in fmite experience the duration of the "now" is inclusive of past and future,
so in the infinite experience every portion of time is simultaneously present.
. . . [ declare that this same temporal world is, when regarded in its wholeness, an
Eternal order. And [ mean by this assertion nothing whatever but that the whole
real content of this temporal order, whether it is viewed from anyone temporal
instant as past or as present or as future, is at once known, i.e. is consciously experienced as a whole, by the Absolute.
Now the events of the temporal order . . . are divided, with reference to the point
of view of any finite Self, into what now is, and what no longer is, and what is to be,
but is not yet. These same events, however, in so far as they are viewed at once by
the Absolute, are for such view, all equally present. 25
Thus every portion of time is literally present for God. The temporal world is for God
a totum simul, which, however, also keeps the order in which events succeed themselves,
though in finite experience they disappear and are replaced.
The British philosopher Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) objects to Royce's theory of
eternity, on the grounds that it does not allow for the necessary transformation of finite
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experiences as included in the divine experience. He gives an example. A man grieves for
four hours, because he believes that he has offended his friend. At the end of the four
hours, he realizes that he was mistaken, and his grief is dispelled. Now, the question is: is
the series of events apprehended by the finite mind apprehended in the exact manner by
the Infinite Mind? Now, in finite experience the first term, the feeling of anxiety, is modified by the second term, the feeling of gladness. As the terms are taken up in God's experience, is the first term, the anxiety, modified?
If, in the divine experience, i.e., in eternity, the anxiety is not modified, the Divine
Mind would apprehend only a congeries, a lifeless, meaningless, aggregate.
If . .. the latter occurrences do not modify the earlier, ... then we have no transformation, but only a fixed panorama of exactly the same occurrences which form a
diorama for the man who goes through them. This gives a mere aggregate or congeries. Omniscience is then to see in any lapse of successive events nothing more
than a finite being would see so far as he followed that identical lapse. Surely this
will not do.
But suppose, now, that in the higher consciousness, which views the anxiety and gladness all at once, the anxiety is colored by the gladness. This experience is different from
the finite experience of temporal succession, which is marked, first, by anxiety and, second, by gladness. This means, then, that, in the simultaneity of the divine experience,
there is an experience that is alien to the absolute consciousness. Hence, on Royce's theory, not all finite experiences would be included in the divine experience. But this consequence, his theory of the Absolute will not permit.
But neither will it permit the transformation of temporal experiences as they are contained in the Divine Mind. Transformation, even in the higher consciousness, is a process,
a development, a completion, and this is inconsistent with the static character of the
Absolute. In short, neither alternative, i.e., that subsequent events do or do not affect previous events, is allowed for by Royce's theory of eternity.
It would appear, then, that the respect in which time is included in eternity must be
one in which process is not excluded from eternity. If time is the experience of process,
and if time is brought within eternity, then process must be a factor in eternity.
The third concept of eternity, that it includes time while yet transcending time, may
perhaps best be defined by reference to the work of Alfred North Whitehead.
For Whitehead, what he terms "actual entities" are the basic realities of the universe.
He writes:
'Actual entities'- also termed 'actual occasions'-are the final real things of which
the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything
more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the
most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations
of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actually exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these
actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent. 27
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Actual entities come into existence through a self-creative process. The process
involves two factors: an actual entity receives content from an entity, or set of entities,
whose life is over, and it also receives structure in terms of general characteristics (eternal
objects). Whitehead calls this process by which events create themselves prehension.
A prehension is a process of unifying. Accordingly, nature is a process of expansive
development, necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension. What is
achieved is thereby passed beyond, but it is also retained as having aspects of itself
present to the prehensions which lie beyond it.
Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process.28
Thus nature is a flux, the passage of events. There is an interminable flow of successive
events. Events briefly occur, then pass away into "the dead past." Only when their lives
are over, do they become content for transfer to newly arising events. Yet, even here,
there are intimations of immortality and eternity. For, as the above passage indicates, even
in their death there are aspects of their individuality present in the future course of events.
The self-constituting process whereby events come into being involves, we have earlier
indicated, the taking on of structure and pattern. Events are not only a that; they are also a
what. They are defined in terms of some certain general characteristics. Their definition is
itself a complex one. On the one hand, the indirect inheritance of pattern by way of the
transfer of content from events that have perished predisposes the reception of some characteristics. But, on the other hand, the range of possible characteristics, or eternal objects, is
infinite. Since the emerging event is to a large extent self-creative and thus tends toward
novelty, there are other characteristics called for. Yet no event can embody all the possible
characteristics. There must be some selection of eternal objects, made available consistently
with the self-aim of the emerging event, so as to enable the emergence of the novel occasion. The only agency in this process must be itself an actual entity. It must be an actual
entity that envisages the eternal objects and serves as the principle of selection, so as to
make available to the emerging event its relevant characteristics. This actual entity is God.
Since God envisages the eternal objects, there is, and must be, an eternal aspect of his
nature. Whitehead calls this the "primordial nature" of God. This aspect of God is his
absoluteness, his eternity.
The 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of an unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directed by
the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all
realizable conditions. 29
Thus the whole process itself, viewed at any stage as a definite limited fact which
has issued from the creativity, requires a definite entity, already actual among the
formative elements, as an antecedent ground for the entry of the ideal forms into
the definite process of the temporal world . . . . God, who is the ground antecedent
to transition, must include all possibilities of physical value conceptually, thereby
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holding the ideal forms apart in equal, conceptual realization of knowledge. Thus, as
concepts, they are grasped together in the synthesis of omniscience . . .. This ideal
world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of Cod himself. Thus the
nature of Cod is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms.
The kingdom of heaven is Cod .. .. Thus Cod is the one systematic, complete fact,
which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act. 30
Thus the eternal Cod is intricately involved in the world process. He is the eternal
antecedent fact who, from out the harmony of his wisdom, provides the lure for the selfrealization of the events of world process. But he is more. For he takes within himself, in so
far as the harmony of his nature permits, the events for which he is the lure, the
antecedent condition. But now the transfer of content is radically different from what
occurs in the transfer of content from events to events. There, the duration of the emerging
and new event is itself soon to slip into the irretrievable past, to become data for the future.
But this does not occur in Cod; Cod has no past. He continues to live as he increasingly
receives from creature-hood the transfer of content. He is, as it were, protected from perishing, as he undergoes some modification, by reason of his eternal nature, his primordial
nature. But, notwithstanding this eternity, his nature is yet changed. There is process in
Cod, process in eternity. This effect, Whitehead calls the "consequent nature" of Cod.
The 'consequent nature' of Cod is the physical prehension by Cod of the actualities of the evolving universe. This primordial nature directs such perspectives of
objectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such
elements as it can to a realization in Cod free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance.3 !
Now, in the transfer of content from finite actual entities into the consequent nature of

Cod, not all can be saved. While he exercises "a tender care that nothing be lost,")2 it nevertheless remains that this care is qualified by the import of the phrase, "that can be saved."
Those discordances that destroy the harmony of the Divine Life cannot be received in Cod's
inner life. In this respect, there is the transformation of content, as the temporal is received in
etemity, that Royce's account of the inclusion of the finite in the infinite cannot provide. But
the transformation goes further: the individuality that is saved in the Divine Life is saved in the
most comprehensive context of perfection. He is preserved, with undiminished reality, in
Cod. But, consistent with that individuality, he now lives in the harmony of the divine society.
The consequent nature of Cod is his judgment on the world. He saves the world
as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness
which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which
uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage))
.. . there is ... perfected actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without
qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. In
everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality)4
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Finally there is in God what Whitehead calls the "supe~ective nature" of God. This is
the phase in the divine nature whereby the content that is provided him from temporal
entities is made available to the new, emerging entities in the process of the ongoing
world. If we put this in terms of the lives of personal individuals, their constructive work
in the world, as it is received in God's everlasting life, is, by his tender care, given back,
with transformation, to the world.
The "supe~ective" nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal
instances.35
In the fourth phase [supe~ectl the creative action completes itself. For the perfected
actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each
temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the
kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action of the fourth phase is the love of
God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is
done in the world is transformed 36 into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven
passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the
world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this
sense, God is the great companion- the fellow-sufferer who understands . . . .
Throughout the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal creature, ... is the
transformation of Itself, everlasting in the Being of God. 37
Whitehead believes that the period from the Hebrew prophets to the death of
Augustine was an especially significant one in the history of religion. In the chapter, 'The
New Reformation," of his book, Adventures of Ideas, he says that there are three phases of
the period. "The first phase is constituted by Plato's publication of his final conviction,
towards the end of his life, that the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a
persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency."38 The second phase is the embodiment
of this idea in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Whitehead writes of this:
The essence of Christianity is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the
nature of God and of his agency in the world . . .. But there can be no doubt as to
what elements in the record have evoked a response from all that is best in human
nature. The Mother, the Child, and the bare manger: the lonely man, homeless and
self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love, and sympathy: the suffering, the
agony, the tender words as life ebbed, the final despair: and the whole with the
authority of supreme victory.39
The third phase is the intellectual effort to combine Plato's insight with Jesus' life. The
Christian theologians endeavored, perhaps none too successfully, to bring the etemal into the
temporal by finding God immanent in Christ and the Holy Spirit. The attempt was aborted,
Whitehead believes, because, in the final analysis, the theologians refused to follow their own
initialleadings: they refused to apply to God the conditions that hold for temporal process.
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The eternal is in time, but, also, time is in the eternal. Time makes a difference in the
eternal. The Cod who is primordial is also the Cod who is consequent. Charles
Hartshorne, who has carried Whitehead's thought more explicitly into the domain of
philosophical theology, argues that what happens in the temporal world does, indeed,
make a difference to Cod, brings added content to the divine experience. There is,
Hartshorne says, the absolute nature of Cod, but there is also his relative nature.
The divine relativity has been largely overlooked in traditional theology. For example,
Anselm of Canterbury (1033 -1 109), following the Creek doctrine of the absolute impassivity of Cod, writes:
For if thou art passionless, thou dost not feel sympathy; and if thou dost not feel
sympathy, thy heart is not wretched from sympathy for the wretched; but this is to
be compassionate. But if thou art not compassionate, whence cometh so great consolation to the wretched? ...
Truly, thou art so in terms of our experience, but thou art not so in terms of thine
own. For, when thou beholdest us in our wretchedness, we experience the effect of
compassion, but thou dost not experience the feeling. Therefore, thou art both
compassionate, because thou dost save the wretched, and spare those who sin
against thee; and not compassionate, because thou art affected by no sympathy for
wretchedness. 4o
But it is inconceivable that Cod should take cognizance of our condition and yet not
appreciate it with feeling. Further, Anselm asks us to believe that, if we respond to the
divine overture and are saved, this, too, has no affect in the quality of the Divine Life.
However, the Bible speaks with a truer, richer voice. Surely, it must be said of the eternal One that he is affected in the transaction, of which Isaiah speaks, when the great
prophet looks forward to the redeeming immanence of Cod in the Savior:
He is despised and rejected
of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief: ...
Surely he hath borne our
griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet
we did esteem him stricken, smitten
of Cod, and afflicted.
But he was wounded for our
transgressions, he was bruised for
our iniquities: the chastisement of
our peace was upon him; and with
his stripes are we healed ... .
He was oppressed, and he was
afflicted, yet he opened not his
mouth: he is brought as a lamb to
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the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he
openeth not his mouth.4 1
[f our knowledge of God is dependent upon grace, it is also dependent upon what is
best in our humanity. And the best in our humanity cannot accept the view that the
Father of unbounded love stands in an eternal impassivity, unaffected by, unmoved by,
that divine transaction that supremely brings the eternal into time. Nor is the Father unaffected by the salvation that results from the great work of the Savior: "He shall see the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied . . .. " The satisfaction is in heaven:
And when he cometh home,
he calleth together his friends
and neighbors, saying unto
them. Rejoice with me; for [
have found my sheep which was lost.
I say unto you, that likewise
joy shall be in heaven over one
sinner that repenteth . . .. 42
Hartshorne writes eloquently of all this:
. . . Cod has nowhere to hide himself from any sorrow or joy whatever, but must
share in all the wealth and burden of the world. The cross is a sublime and matchless symbol of this . ...
Only a mind completely free of selfish prejudice, ready to enter with instant sympathy into all existent forms of experience, to participate without reserve in every
last fragment of feeling and thought anywhere, and able to harmonize all this variety of experience into one tolerable aesthetic whole, can constitute the subject of all
change. Precisely this is also the religious idea of Cod, to whom all hearts are completely open because his sensitive sympathy is absolute in flexibility.43
Now, as we have indicated in the opening pages of this work, the scriptures speak of an
eternity that involves time and a time that involves eternity. The Pauline doxologies lift the
refrain that sings of "the generations of the ages of the ages," and of "the age of the ages."
The Hebrew equivalent to the Greek age (aiwv) is tJ~i:l1. Some have argued this word
is derived from the root, tJ?~, concealed, which means to veil from sigh~ to conceal. The
noun suggests a vanishing point, that which is out of mind, that which is in the remote
past or future. It thus signifies a temporal span of indefinite duration. It is used in the earlier Hebrew literature in this restricted sense.
Only in the later Hebrew scriptures is the plural form, tJ~p~iY, used. The plural is a
development of the singular, to raise the idea of indefinite duration to the idea of an eternity in which temporality is encompassed. It is found, for example, in Isaiah:
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But Israel shall be saved in
the Lord with an everlasting
salvation: ye shall not be ashamed
nor confused world without end. 44

The expression everlasting salvation (tJ'r.J~i:v I1~nilJf1) reads, literally, a salvation of ages. The
phrase translated as world without end is in the Hebrew 'l! 'P?ill'l!. The plural of tJ~ill, i.e.,
tJ'p~ill, is associated twice with the term 'l!. As a noun, the term means terminus, or duration, in the sense of advance or perpetuity. It may also be used as a preposition, and as such
it is prefixed to the plural tJ'P~ill . The noun form of the term follows the compound
term. Thus the phrase translated as world without end is in the Hebrew characterized in
terms of a doubling of the ideas of terminus and advance in the etemal ages. The expression in the Hebrew may, then, be translated, to ages of ages. The idea is that the temporal
ages culminate in and advance in the etemal ages, the ages whose advance is forever
open. It is thus comparable to the Creek phrase in Ephesians 3 :2 1.45
The very same duality of meaning is found in the Creek term aimv, or age. Here, too,
the ideas of time and etemity are intertwined. The word is derived from an obsolete
primitive noun, aci, which apparently means continued duration. The word means, properly, an age. The age is a temporal one. But by extension the meaning is advanced to connote perpetuity. Thus already the primitive term, aei, suggests the idea of endlessness.
When the present participle rou, being, is added, to form the term aimv (age), the implied
connotation is made explicit. Temporality is associated with eternity. This association is
carried forward in the formation of the word eternal, aimutO~. Thus, by way of its derivation, the term eternity is associated with the term age, of which itself, as we have just
observed, carries an implicit connotation of eternity.
The singular term aimv is found in classical Creek literature. Aristotle speaks of it with
reference to its implication in world time:
. . . the sum of existence of the whole heaven, the sum which includes all time
[Xpovo~] even to infinity, is aeon, taking the name from aci Etvat ("to be everlastingly"), for it is immortal and divine. In dependence on it all other things have their
existence and their life . .. .< 6
It may very well be defined as life or vital force. Homer writes in this regard: "yet shall
my life [aimv] long endure" (E1tt OT]pOV aimv DE f..l,Ot aimv £O"O"£'tat). The identification
is unequivocally indicated in another passage of Homer's, where he says: "and his sweet
life [aimv] was ebbing away."4? It appears, therefore, that aimv is connected, not only
with aci, but also with aT]f..l,t, to breathe, to blow, thus denoting that which causes life, or vital
force. If this be the case, we are here trenching upon the fully developed view that the singular age, the final and eternal aimv, is the Divine Life. But be that as it may, aimu is now
generally regarded as connected with aci..
This same word aimv is used in the New Testament to indicate things that appear
to be profoundly antithetical: the eternity of Cod and the duration of the world. Now,
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belief in creation brings with it a separation of the ideas of time and eternity. Thus the
New Testament employs aiwv in the sense of the time of the world, and, particularly,
the end-time of the world. Matthew says that Jesus spoke in parables as a way of disclosing "things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world." The
Master explains to his disciples that the harvest referred to in "the parable of the tares
of the field" is "the end of the world" (aiw'Uoc;-age). The margin of the Revised
Version translates the phrase as it is literally, the consummation of the age ('t11 (JUv't£A.£iq.
aiw'Uoc;). The word cruv't£A.£t<X, which is in the King James version translated as end, is
a compound word. It derives from its verb, cruv't£A.£W, which in its turn is a compound
of the preposition cruv (together with, with) and the verb 't£A.£O) (to end, i.e., to complete).
In composition, which is the case here, the preposition emphasizes the thought of consummation or fulfillment. The end-time, then, is emphatically the time of fulfillmentthe fulfillment of the age in its discharge of the divine purpose in the time of the world.
There is even here the implicit thought of the supreme age, the eternal age, in which
the temporal age is brought to its summons in God. Jesus himself voices this: "Then
shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father."48 Once again
time and eternity are intertwined.
There are passages in the New Testament where the singular aiw'U, used to refer to
the time of the world, is replaced by the plural. Although the plural breaks away from the
strict emphasis on world-unity, which is strictly the function of the singular, and approaches the eternity-formula, the reference is still to the unity of world-time. This use of aiwv is
found in Hebrews 9:26:
For then must he often have
suffered, since the foundation of
the world: but now once in the
end of the world hath he
appeared, to put away sin by the
sacrifice of himself.
The phrase the end of the world is in the Greek, cruv't£A.£iq. 'twv aicOvO)v, and means
literally, consummation of the ages. Here the plural is used, not to denote eternity, but the
dispensations within the unitary age of world-time, through which the divine purpose of
redemption is successively realized. The primary age is still the unitary age of world-time,
which holds within its embrace the several lesser ages.
The singular form of the term is also used in the New Testament to designate eternity.
Jesus declares to his disciples that he is ".. . the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread he shall live forever ...".49 The word forever is in the
Greek the phrase £ic; 'tOY aiwva, unto the age. Here the age is the eternal age. Now, the
singular form, which primarily denotes world-time, is often strengthened by adding to it
the singular genitive of aicOv. The Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the Son:
But unto the Son he saith,
Thy throne, 0 God, is for ever
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and ever: a sceptre of righteousness
is the sceptre of thy kingdom.50

The phrase for ever and for ever is

£~

'tov airova 'tOll airovo<;, which reads unto the age of

the age.
There is a further development in the use of the term, airov, to express the idea of
eternity. It consists in associating the plural of airov with the singular. This is employed in
the passage noted at the beginning of this work. Ephesians 3 :21 reads: "throughout all ages,
world without end," E~ redoUt; 'tat; YEVEat; 'tOll airovot; trov airov(Ov, "unto all generations

of the age of the ages. "
The phrase is a remarkable one. It contains two formulae. One formula expresses the
idea of eternity, or endless continuance, in terms of YEVEd, generations. The other formula
expresses the same idea in terms of airov and airovEt;, age and ages. The phrase is peculiar, in that the two formulae are conjoined and the singular, age, is used in the latter formula in connection with the plural of the term. Previously, as in Hebrews I :8, the singular
is used to express eternity, but it is not associated with the plural.
The first formula expressing the idea of eternity, cit; redoat; 'tat; YEVEat; (unto all generations), places the generations in the singular aiffiv, the one and single age of eternity. And
the second formula places the plural airov£<;, or ages, within one and single aiffiv, or age,
of eternity. The use of the singular has the effect of defining eternity as the one eternal fact
of the living God. It has the further effect of declaring that the ages within the one eternal
age are not merely abstract times, but the times of countless generations who, through
redemption, are enclosed in the eternal divine embrace. The emphasis is on the individuals
who are redeemed in God. In the one, eternal fact of the Divine Life, there is, indeed, in
the language of Whitehead, ". .. the phase of perfected actuality, in which the many are
one everlastingly, without qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. In everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality."si
But there is yet a further, and final, development of the eternity formula . This development consists in the formation of the double plural. It is the most complete expression for
eternity that the New Testament writers employ. It is used only in the New Testament.
The formula is the one, noted earlier, found in Galatians 1:5: "for ever and ever," £~
'tOut; airovat; 'trov airov(Ov, unto the ages of the ages. Here eternity is defined as "ages
upon ages." If, now, we combine the two forms of the eternity formula, i.e., Ephesians
3:2 I and Galatians 1:5, we get the result that the one eternal age is, instead of a static
one, the age of movement and life. "But the Lord is the true God, he is the living God,
and an everlasting king ..."S2 Eternity is no abstract thing; it is the actuality of the living
God. Eternity is the supreme and comprehensive experience of God. And the Christian
promise is that the time that is the form of our present experience shall, without essential
loss, be embraced within the life of Him who ever liveth.
How shall companionship with the Divine Life be interpreted? But before we consider
this, the final subject with which this work deals, a brief consideration of an allied question should be made.
We have seen, in connection with our consideration of Whitehead's theory, that God
in his primordial eternity is associated with finite events in two respects: he receives into

The Age of the Ages

123

himself content derived from finite events, and, secondly, he makes available the content
to the ongoing world of finite events. There is thus development in the divine nature and
an offering from that nature to the future of the world. [n this last phase, there is divine
enactment in the actual world. This enactment, we may say, brings etemity into time.
The Christian conception of Cod differs in certain essential aspects from Whitehead's
conception. This is particularly so with respect to the divine enactment that creates the
critical juncture of eternity and time. For Christianity that enactment is Jesus Christ in history. We may say that this personal event is within Cod's eternal envisagement. For of this
man it is written that he is "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,"53 that he
"verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifest in these
last times . .. ."54 He "was manifest in these last times":
And the Word was made
flesh, and dwelt among us, (and
we beheld his glory, the glory
as of the only begotten of the
Father,) full of grace and truth. 55
But to return to the question: how shall companionship with the supreme experience
be interpreted? There are two answers to this question. First, it cannot be understood in
conceptually clear or precise terms. John writes, "Beloved, now are we the sons of Cod,
and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. "56 We know our present state as children of
Cod, but we cannot comprehend the state of our future glory.
But as it is written, Eye hath
not seen, nor ear heard, neither
have entered into the heart of
man, the things which Cod hath
prepared for them that love him. 57
Second, there is even now some indication of the nature of our participation in heaven's glory. Paul states this where he writes: "For now we see through a glass, darkly .. . :
Now [ know in part."5B What this signifies is that our knowledge of the future is, and must
be, symbolic and metaphorical. The phrase "For now we see through a glass, darkly" can
be translated as either "For we see at present by means of a mirror in a riddle" or "For we
see now through a mirror, in (the fashion) of a riddle." The mirror is a reflecting mirror. It is
not of the order of a glass through which one looks. The word translated as "mirror" is
eO"o1t'tpov, which means "reflector." The adverb "darkly" is in the Creek a prepositional
phrase, EV a.iviy~a.n, which means "in a riddle." What we know are a few rays of truth.
And these are not given directly, but only as reflections.
What the future shall be, then, is, as the term suggests, an enigma. But the enigma,
given through the medium of human thought and language, indicates, even now, something of the reality to which it refers. What we do know is, as Paul says, that our reflected
glimpse of the realities of heaven will one day give way to direct and immediate appre-
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hension: "but then face to face: .. . but then I shall know even as also I am known." It is
remarkable that the word "know" is not the same word where Paul says that he now
knows "in part," but that in the future he will "know even as also I am known." His partial
knowledge is yw05crKOl, which is the approximate knowledge of the learner. The knowledge that he anticipates is illumination. The word is £1ttyv05crof.Lat (know-welD: "But then I
shall know-well, as also I was well-known." Paul is saying that, as his Lord knew him well
when he was converted, so in such fashion he will know in heaven. Then it shall be, not
so much that we know Cod, but rather that we are known of Cod.
Paul's discussion of this topic is formulated in conceptual terms, terms that have to do
with knowledge. The terms are, to be sure, but human terms. But there are also terms
that are symbolic and metaphorical. The New Testament employs these terms in its effort
to throw light on the future that awaits the children of Cod.
Now, we may experience some hesitancy to accept the view that our knowledge is
symbolic. This is especially so in our time when exact science reigns so predominantly.
We fear that, while science yields knowledge and truth, so it is widely believed, religion
does no such thing with respect to the declarations of faith.
However, there is here a great confusion. For science itself is symbolic. The constructions and theories of empirical science are the symbolic forms with which the attempt is
made to collate and systematize our perceptual encounter with the world. Were we to
ask the question, "are these constructions and theories 'literally' true-true of the world as
it 'really' is"? we would ask an irrational and unanswerable question. We would be asking
for a knowledge that transcends the very conditions of knowledge. That is but nonsense.
The inescapable fact is that we are here, as in all forms of thought and discourse, confined
to our "community of subjective form."59
The scientific symbol is an operational symbol, i.e., its reference is always to the perceptual. The religious symbol is an intuitive symbol, i.e., its function is to receive the sensible
and intuitible and then mould that content so as to apply it to the non-sensible and nonintuitible. The process is one in which the symbol leads into the reality symbolized and in
so doing transcends itself in insight.
Now, it is in the Book of Revelation that this is done par excellence. The writer draws
his images from the range of human experience: from heaven and earth, from darkness
and light, from sun and moon, from fountains and rivers and seas, from country and city,
from jewels and gold, from tears and sorrows, from joy and gladness, from death and life,
and from bride-hood and the lamb of the field. Yet all these images give way to insight, if
we will but wait and let the imagery lead us on and upward. Linger for a moment. You
will see neither darkness nor sunlight, for there is no pause in the activities of daylight
time and there is no need of borrowed light. You will see no sea of sorrow and unrest, for
now they are buried in the depth of the past. But you will see the eternal fountains of
grace, "the throne of God and the Lamb," from which flows the life-giving river. You will
see on its banks the trees of life that yield the fruits of sustenance and bear the leaves of
healing. You will see the city whose streets are of pure gold, upon which its people walk
the golden ways of peace and happiness. You will see no tears, for these streams of sadness throughout humanity's long history are wiped away in the divine gift of serenity. You
will hear no sound of mourning or crying.
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And I John saw the holy city,
new Jerusalem, coming down
from Cod out of heaven, prepared
as a bride adorned for her husband.
"As a bride adorned for her husband." Here the imagery speaks of the intimacy of communion, of the reality of the sharing of lives in the Divine Life. This is the final harmony.
And I beheld, and 10, in the
midst of the throne . . . stood
a lamb as it had been slain ...
And he came and took the
book out of the right hand of
him that sat upon the throne.
And they sung a new song,
saying, Thou art worthy to take
the book, and to open the seals
thereof: for thou wast slain, and
hast redeemed us to Cod by
thy blood out of every kindred,
and tongue, and people, and nation.60
And I saw a new heaven and
a new earth: for the first
heaven and the first earth were
passed away; and there was no
more sea.61
And when all things shall
be subdued unto him, then shall
the Son also himself be subject
unto him, that Cod may be all in al1. 62
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THE BOOK OF HOS EA
AS VISIONARY PROPHECY:
A S EARCH FOR GENRE

. ..

LAURA BARGE

As a literary critic presuming to write about the book of Hosea as an example of
the prophetic Scriptures of the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Old Testament, I
am constrained to begin with a definition of my critical approach. Unfashionably, I
do not read the texts under consideration using postmodem literary theories such
as deconstruction, reader response, or exploration of cultural determinism. I Instead,
I find much more useful an approach that is best described in literary terms as a
blend of the earlier theories of the New Criticism and structuralism. In fact, the
very concept of literary genre rests on elements that the earlier approaches, in contrast to the later, value in texts, elements such as unity, coherence, unique style,
and specific modes of thematic expression.
As an amateur in biblical studies, I work convinced that scholars such as
Brevard Childs and James Sanders are on target in their insistence that interpretation proceed from a canonical concept of the Old Testament. Such interpretation
interacts with a text as it presently exists rather than as a collage of various stages
through history of disparate composition. Recognition of a canonical whole does
not trivialize a study of the multiple historical processes and stages by which a
prophetic text has arrived at its present form, but it does insist that the canonical
form is the final Scripture to be interpreted as the record reflecting the "history of
encounter between God and Israel."2
The question of the authorial intentionality of such a view of the prophetic writings cannot be ignored. Who or what is ultimately responsible for the multiple
authorial processes resulting in a canonical text? Childs recognizes a "major literary
and theological force" in the shaping of the "present form of the Hebrew Bible."3
From original recorded oral fragments through the revisions of tradents to the emergence of texts as sacred canon, the message of the prophets is a "theocentric word"
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proceeding from a "divine source" that has ordered the stages of the composition of the
received text. 4
Another question that must be addressed in advance of any study such as this one is
the existence of the prophetic writings as both the Hebrew Scriptures of Judaism and the
Old Testament of Christianity. It is true that the writings differ in regard to text, scope,
and order and that numerous complex claims have been put forth for both the continuity
and discontinuity of the two versions. s Within the boundaries of my work here, however,
we need note only two basic facts that can hardly be disputed. The New Testament writers' use of the Hebrew canon does not demonstrate rejection or alteration but rather a
new interpretation of these Scriptures grounded on the New Testament's claims about
Jesus Christ. Furthermore, these Christian claims are dependent upon both the Christian
and Jewish Scriptures as the sacred canon that is the record of God's revelation of truth to
Israel, the church, and the world 6

I. THE PROBlEM OF GENRE
My interest in the genre of the Old Testament books of prophecy emerged in my
teaching of university courses on the Bible as literature. As I led students through the variety of genres that make up the Bible and arrived at the Old Testament books of prophecy- Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve minor prophets, Hosea through Malachi- I
made the discovery that the students were dissatisfied with both my classroom presentation of these books and with the published critical commentary about them. I have come
to understand their discontent. In standard works on the literary genres of the Bible, substantive content on the books of prophecy is scattered and fragmentary. In fact, critics
such as Northrop Fyre, Robert Alter, Tremper Longman, and Leland Ryken acknowledge
that offered treatments of the prophets are incomplete and less than satisfactory. Consider
the following introduction with which Ryken prefaces his application of the stylistic category of satire to the book of Amos:
The part of the Bible that gives literary critics most difficulty is the prophetic books.
The reasons are multiple .. . . prophecy in the biblical sense is not a common genre
at large. When judged by classical standards of unity, moreover, prophecy is too
miscellaneous in structure and content to seem manageable. Literary critics look in
vain for the superstructure that will provide a unifying impression of a prophetic
book of the Bible. . . . [A critical suggestion] finally emerges as too amorphous to
impose a firm unity on the prophetic book. 7
What are some reasons or difficulties that have prevented critics from defining such a
superstructure, a particular literary genre that can be applied to this collection of books as
a whole? One reason is that we must be careful not to join what Kugel somewhat mockingly calls the "Task Force on Genre.'" Modem categories of genre are just that, conventional categories that are neither "timeless" nor "ultimate." A responsible critic does not
impose modem conventions that are "foreign" to the givens of the Bible's linguistic/ historical origins.8 Perhaps there is no modem generic term that can serve as an umbrella for
this group of writings.
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An initial difficulty is that the differentiation between prose and poetry-a distinction
that is difficult to make in other types of biblical writings- is nowhere more problematic
than here. And even when a critic makes a beginning of useful distinctions, he faces the
daunting task of accounting for what Alter terms an unexplained and "uneven drift" in
the prophetic writings from strong poetry to weakened poetic forms to overt prose. 9 The
oracles of the book of Isaiah are in the linguistic shape of Hebrew poetry, but the lines on
the Scroll where they occur are in prose form.' o
A second difficulty is that the presently recognized generic term widely applied to this
collection of books- that of "oracle"-is inadequate from a literary approach. This application, initiated by historical form-critical research, assigns the genre of oracle only to separate
units in the prophetic books, claiming that the books as total entities are not "systematic
compositions" but collections of short speeches from the prophetic activities of Israel during
these centuries. To move beyond analysis and classification of these original speech units
becomes speculation." More recent form-critical efforts include study of redaction strategies that acknowledge the additions and changes made by editors other than the original
author that result in the final form of a book '2 Such efforts may move closer to the basic
premise of Tremper Longman's literary approach that "genre analysis is synchronic" and
thus "concerned to identify the type of literature [as it presently exists], not its prehistory"'3
and yet continue what is essentially analysis of separate segments of a text. Tucker can
agree that a "prophetic book itself is an appropriate unit for ... analysis, representing the
final stage in the development of the tradition and a quite distinct genre of literature with
certain typical features,"'· and yet continue to treat a prophetic writing as a collection of
"units ... whether large or small, 'original' or late .. . by means of form-critical analysis."'s
This complex and often frustrating identifying of types of oracles, although yielding
useful information about content, can demonstrate the law of diminishing returns in at
least three ways. Marvin Sweeney explains the first problem (read text as book in the following quotation) :

Genres [defined as these individual oracular units] can determine the overall form
of a distinct prophetic text, but they do not necessarily do so. Typical generic elements frequently function within a text and playa role in its composition or formulation, but they do not necessarily dictate its composition or formulation .... Each
text is unique even though it employs typical elements of genre. Genres do not
always define texts; they function within them as compositional tools. '6
A content primarily composed of short speech units is a common characteristic of
these books, but can we say that this characteristic is the "genre" that identifies the overarching literary structure of these books? As Tremper Longman insists, 'The literary
approach asks the question of the force of the whole."'7 A second problem is functional.
How many types of oracles are there, where do they differ and where overlap, and how
many pages of criticism would it take to squeeze the total content of these fifteen books
into these categories, categories that relentlessly slip and slide into multiplicity and division? Johannes Lindblom, the Swedish theologian who devoted forty years of his life to
studying the prophets, agrees with form criticism that the "primary form of a prophetic
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utterance was . .. the oracle." Lindblom describes the "original oracles" as "short, concise,
pregnant, and formulated in a peculiar fashion." While acknowledging that some such
original oracular forms are still recognizable in the prophetic books, Lindblom clarifies that
"the prophets also used the oracle form for utterances which were not oracles in the strict
sense." In fact, Lindblom believes that the writings as we now have them offer evidence
that "the old oracle form disintegrated and that the utterances of the later prophets are
mostly pseudo-oracles" that can be very different in content from the original form. ls
When Ryken mentions eight-"oracle of judgment, oracle of salvation, wisdom saying,
'woe' statement, report of visions, kingdom oracle, hymn, and lament" -he cautiously calls
them "subgenres" and points out that they define content but not "superstructure."19
The third problem to this form-critical solution to generic identification of the prophetic books is crucial in implication: Is there a characteristic order, or a variety of orders, that
can be determined for the oracles as collected in the different books? And what is the literary justification for and method of achieving this order? The form critic would answer this
question by focusing on the formulaic connections or linguistic signs, such as a change in
person or verb tense, that signal the beginning or ending of a separate oracle, and would
interpret "order" as rudimentary efforts to make the passages easier to read. 20 But ease of
reading is not literary order, nor can analysis of these formulaic "hinges" that join separate
oracles bestow literary unity. This claim holds true even if "each [Jinked] oracle is related
to a specific event" and "located in its original cultural milieu." As we shall see, the literary
unity of a prophetic book must be discerned in the book's total canonical form, a form
achieved by continued revision and addition through time.2I Only in this form, the
Scripture that subordinates original historical forms to theological, holistic interpretation,
can the question of literary unity be addressed. 22

II.

PARTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Confronting these difficulties, critics have suggested various choices of literary types
that might serve as an inclusive term for these books. Can we not say that a prophetic
book is a proclamation or sermon? According to Lindblom, "[Tlhe bulk of the utterances
reproduced in the prophetic books were really delivered as public speeches or sermons."23
And these designations hold, even if the eighth through the sixth century prophets do
not, for the most part, deliver their messages in the formal context of worship ceremonies
or as a recognized religious duty.24 However, both historical knowledge and the texts of
the books as we have them urge us toward more precise formulations. We are fairly certain that no prophetic book is an original and exclusive collection of the proclamations of
a single prophet. Books such as Isaiah and Zechariah give evidence that later anonymous
authors or editors have contributed to the final written form of the book. Two distinct
forms of the book of Jeremiah exist, one in the Greek and one in the Masoretic tradition.
Research is making increasingly clear that each of these books is a conscious literary creation with its unique structure and cumulative authorial intentions.25
Other analyses of prophecy successfully assign a literary mode or style to a particular
book. Thus Ryken analyzes both the book of Amos and that of Jonah as satire,26 and
Thomas Jemielity has written a book entitled Satire and the Hebrew Prophets.27 Obviously,
these designations are not intended as efforts to arrive at some common genre for the
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prophetic books as a whole but to offer evidence that these writings offer rich possibilities
for literary interpretation. In fact, the short book of Hosea can be variously described as
the narrative of the marriage of Hosea, the drama of his and Comer's relationship, the
diatribe pronounced against Comer (and Israel), the irony of a woman immoral in some
fashion being selected by God as a prophet's wife, the tragedy of Israel's departure from
Jehovah, and the symbol of Hosea's love for Comer as representing Cod's enduring love
for Israel. But, if all of these designations were assigned, the question remains: How do
these specific styles blend together into one unified composition? Or do they?

m. Focus ON A PARTICULAR SOLUTION
To my thinking. the richest and most exciting possibility in the search for a definitive
literary genre that might encompass and specify the prophetic writings as a group begins
with Ryken's term "visionary literature" or "visionary writing." Ryken uses the term as a
chapter heading in his handbook published in 1984, How to Read the Bible as Literature,
and means by it one of two "types" or general categories including all literature that,
rather than being a "replica of existing reality," is "an alternative to known reality." The
biblical literature that Ryken includes in this "type" is "represented chiefly in the related
genres of prophecy and apocalypse."28 In Words of Delight (1992), Ryken lists "visionary
writing" as a genre and includes in it prophecy and apocalypse. 29 In the remainder of this
article, I want to streamline this term to "visionary prophecy" and to limit its suggested
application to the fifteen prophetic books of the Old Testament. I will then develop the
term "visionary prophecy" by jumping off from chosen content in Ryken's chapter in How
to Read the Bible, comparing other similarly focused critical thinking on this problem, and
instancing the book of Hosea, which I have already referred to above, as an example of
my application. To pursue this task, I will consider the following elements as they build literary unity in a prophetic book such as Hosea: origin, source, purpose, surface structure,
use of figural language, and the relationship of this language to a deeper thematic structure that undergirds the surface of the text. Although my conclusions are of necessity
focused here on the book of Hosea, implicit in my argument is the belief that my analyses
can work toward the discovery of similar unified structures in the other prophetic books,
thus allowing the generic term "visionary prophecy" to encompass them as well.
IV. ORIGIN
While, as we have seen, descriptions of kinds of oracles fall short of arriving at a holistic
definition of genre, recourse to the term oracle-which has the primary meaning of "the
response of a god to a question asked him by a worshiper"- situates the writings in the
origins of their own time and place. Nearly all pagan oracular literature in the ancient
world was Creek, although Rome had its smaller national collection.30 In this tradition, the
oracle supposedly comes from persons directly inspired or spoken to by a god, or by assistants who interpret the original message so that the supplicant can understand it.3] For our
purposes, we can note the following about this pagan tradition. (I) The questions asked
pertain to the future and have an individual connection to the supplicant. (2) The person
directly inspired by the god speaks in some degree of ecstasy, of frenzied or mantic articulation, an utterance that must often be rendered understandable by an assistant. 32 (3) The
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activity and its written results occur primarily in times of national stress, such as the Creek
Peloponnesian War and the Roman Civil Wars.33 (4) The supplicant is often expected to
respond to the delivered oracle by making a sacrifice or founding a religious cult. H (5) The
god's response can be symbolic as well as verbal, such as sounds or sights in nature or the
actions of uninvolved persons. 35
Studies, including anthropological research, of prophetic phenomena in ancient Near
Eastem regions such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Canaan indicate the activities of persons
claiming to be in direct contact with the divine. Such prophets may appear on the edges
of a society and advocate change, or they may operate within established religious or
social structures. Typically organizing themselves into diverse groups, some prophets
undergo ecstatic experiences and some do not. All, however, are expected to exhibit certain stereotypical characteristics that mark them as prophets and insure their acceptance
as such by a given social group.36
The exact nature of prophecy in early Israel remains more a matter of questions than
of clear answers. The two major questions are those of the continuity of the early
prophets with the writing prophets and the complexity of coordinating the information
on prophets of the early period from the various Old Testament books.3? Research has,
however, established certain general descriptions of such prophetic activity. Samuel, a
judge and priest in the established religious orders, also functions as a prophet. He is
involved in various prophetic actions in regard to the selection and establishment of Saul
and David as kings, thus playing crucial and positive roles in the establishment of the
monarchy (( Sam, chapters 9-16 and 28). When Saul exhibits the prophetic trait of ecstatic behavior, however, Old Testament accounts vary in expressing approval (( Sam I 0-1 I)
and disapproval (( Sam 19:9-24) of his activities. 38 The two prophets Nathan (II Sam 7: 117) and Cad (I Sam 22:5) are presented as being in alliance with King David. Nathan
does denounce David for his adultery with Bathsheba (I( Sam 12: 1-14) but helps to
arrange the accession of Solomon (( Kngs 1:8-53).39 Ahijah of Shiloh, as late as the reign
of jeroboam, functions as a prophet in allowing the division of the kingdom and upholding jeroboam's rule of the Northern Kingdom (( Kngs II: 29-39). By the period of time
described in the Elijah and Elisha stories, such prophetic figures may no longer be allied
with royal establishments but instead have become spokesmen against what they conceive to be apostate regimes. Ahijah (( Kngs 14: 1-18), jehu (I Kngs 16: 1- 4), Micaiah ((
Kngs 22), and various bands of prophets deliver messages that are in opposition to the
social and religious status quo. Some bands of prophets are disciples or assistants of Elijah
and Elisha (2 Kngs 2:3, 5, 7, 15-16) and may have been responsible for preserving the
records of the prophetic tradition in Israel. 4o
This complex picture can yield the following conclusions regarding prophecy in
early Israel. The prophets' messages are based on their concepts of Israel's covenant traditions and their understandings of the people's response to these traditions. The
prophets' function is to communicate between the people and Cod. Some are related
to a cult and some operate as individuals. Some demonstrate ecstatic behavior, while
others do not. And the prophet's role increasingly becomes that of a reformer as the
kings and priests of Israel, and then judah, lead their subjects toward conditions that
result in captivity by foreign nations:'
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By the time of Israel's writing prophets of the eighth through the sixth centuries-from
Amos to Malachi-ties with particular situations are looser or broken, and the prophet has
become the unique spokesman of Cod's message, addressed not only to apostate kings
and false religious leaders but to all the sinful citizens. And the prophets' only prophetic
actions are a symbolic acting out of the content of the divine word delivered to them. 42
Furthermore, both the prophetic words and actions become more of a forth-telling than a
foretelling. But these prophetic events, like their pagan counterparts, occur during periods
of national stress, beginning during the dissolution of the Northern Kingdom, continuing
during the fall of Judah, and extending into the periods of exile. What we shall see as we
continue to search for a genre for the prophetic writings is that certain preternatural elements of the pagan writings are transformed in the Jewish historical crisis into Cod's divinatory inspiration of the prophets. Thus Israel's prophetic writings prefigure and move
toward the apocalyptic, a type of writing that occurs between the second century B.CE.
and the second century C E. and that exhibits even more divinatory traits, such as an
increased reliance on trance-like experiences, an emphasis on eschatology, and the use of
numerical symbolism and esoteric language. 43

V.

SOURCE

When Ryken states that visionary literature often deals with things "not in empirical
reality" but as they exist in the imagination of the writer (VL 165)/4 he situates the definitive source of such writing in the imaginative consciousness of the writer rather than in
realistic apprehension of the outward world. To accept the claim of the prophetic writings
that the original source of their language is a unique inspiration of Cod's Spirit does not
negate the fact that the imagination of the writer remains the human source. The inspiration occurs, by whatever method of divine impetus, within the human consciousness.
And this consciousness is, in a literary sense, Romantic in that perception of reality is
forcefully shaped by the imagination of the writer. In fact, it is precisely this imaginative
locus that allows the radical shifting in space and time that precludes any attempt at a
conventional definition of setting in the writings. Ryken describes these radical shifts as
"reversals and transformations" that portray reality other than as presently perceived. Thus
the prophet's vision reconstructs ordinary reality, merging the present almost indiscriminately with the future, either near or distant (VL 166-67) and with earthly and cosmic
space far beyond the prophet's present experience (Vl 167-68).
VI. PuRPOSE
By focusing specifically at this point on the book of Hosea as an instance of the
prophetic books, we can note that about 760 B.CE. Hosea begins his ministry to Israel, the
Northern Kingdom, during the reign of Jeroboam II (Hos I : I and 2 Kngs 15: I). The
prophet's imaginative perception of life in Israel is radically different from the view of the
ordinary, even religious, citizen. Life at this time seems generally productive and peaceful
in the land, but Hosea perceives the nation as morally and spiritually bankrupt and creates
language that both reverses and transforms the nation's present condition. In reversal,
Israel has already come under judgment; in transformation, the nation has moved beyond
judgment to restoration. The prophet's descriptions are those of a seer whose vision
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moves at will through time and space. The following passages from Hosea reveal this
visionary movement as encompassing Israel's judgment and restoration not only with
future historical time but also with eternal, cosmic realms of time and space:
Samaria [the Northern kingdom, IsraelJ shall bear her guilt, because she has rebelled
against her God; they shall fall by the sword, their little ones shall be dashed in
pieces, and their pregnant women ripped open. (13 : I 6) Israel . . . shall blossom like
the lily... . They shall again live beneath my shadow, they shall flourish as a garden
.... What more has Ephraim to do with idols? It is I who answer and look after
you (14:5-8). Shall I ransom them from the power of Sheol? Shall I redeem them
from Death? 0 Death, where are your plagues? 0 Sheol, where is your destruction? (13 :14)
Within the boundaries of a Jewish reading of this passage, the phrase denoting redemption from death can easily be read metaphorically- since the entire book is replete with figural language-as a reference to some kind of future historical restoration of Israel as the
nation of God. Thus the language could be thought to refer to either of two versions of
modem Jewish messianism described by David Novak as "apocalyptic messianism" and
"historical messianism." The first term denotes a Jewish nation forged by a powerful ruler
who gathers the exiles back to the land of Israel, establishes a government based on the
Torah, and rebuilds the temple. The second term describes a process not brought about by
human resources within history but by divine action at the end of history. Present-day
adherents to the first version find such processes underway in the establishment of the
state of Israel in the twentieth century. Those of the second wait still for the earthly reign of
a transcendent Messiah at the end of history.45 The first version pushes Hosea's prophecy
into twentieth-century history; the second pushes it into eternal, cosmic realms.
But a Christian reading of these Old Testament passages can also function as a foregrounding to substantiate the literary claim that the last passage does indeed stretch the
prophet's imagined conditions of God's people into etemal, cosmic realms. Paul, in his
treatise on the Christian resurrection in the book of First Corinthians, quotes the passage- in a slightly modified form- as referring to the post-historical resurrection of
Christians (both Jewish and Gentile) as the people of God (15 :55) . In this reading,
Hosea's writings become a prophetic rejoicing in God's counter forces of "plagues" and
"destruction" against death.
To make this allowance is not to suggest that the eighth-century Jewish prophet Hosea,
who addresses "real people in a given period of history,"46 has a New Testament theological understanding of the Christian resurrection. But it is to claim that the message of hope
in verses such as 14 :5-8 and 13:4 exists in a text that has its origin in the visionary imagination of an Old Testament seer/ prophet, and that this message is interpreted centuries
later by a New Testament Jewish Christian as referring to a post-historical resurrection of
God's people based on the resurrection of Jesus. The question here is what James Sanders
refers to as the "task" of "establishing a canonically permissible range of resignification. As .
. . texts journey through the Bible from inception through the last books of the New
Testament, they become resignified to some extent. The .. . question has to do with the
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limits to which the readjustments in meaning canonically may gO."47 Hosea's visionary language is not necessarily limited in its reference to Hosea's era but may become by divine
ordering a sacred word that, as Childs insists, continues to "offer judgment and hope to
future generations far beyond the temporal confines of Hosea himself."48

YD.

SURFACE STRUClURE OR STYLE OF THE TExT

When Ryken claims that biblical visionary literature is a "subversive form," he explains
what he intends by the adjective:
Visionary writing attacks our ingrained patterns of deep-level thought . . . to convince us ... that there is something drastically wrong with the status quo. Visionary
literature is a revolutionary genre. It announces an end to the way things are and
opens up alternate possibilities. (VL 169, 175)
Ryken is referring not only to the surrealistic descriptions of apocalypse (Vl 169) but also
to the jolting style of the prophetic writings, a style that is both compelling and disruptive as
it shocks readers into realizing that the language they are reading does not mirror the ordinary world in a familiar way (VL 170). To explore this idea is to realize that the subversive
use of language is often visionary in style and is nearly always associated with some degree
of incitement to revolution. Thus the British Romantic poets follow the French Rousseau in
writing highly imaginative literature (think of William Blake) that not only supports political
and social revolution but also advocates a radical upheaval in the established literary theory
and practice of the day. Even earlier the Italian Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) describes in
his primitive Sdenza Nuova humans who use visionary and mythical language as a verbal
weapon to seize power from whatever generation has preceded them. 49
The prophet Hosea is involved in revolution, but it is a counter-revolution. In the
"indictment" that the Lord has against Israel (4: I and 12:2), Hosea is on God's side-the
original and rightful ruler of the nation- and thus in active process of undermining its present misguided leadership. The sinful revolution of the people against God's governance
and God's choosing of Hosea as his spokesperson push the prophet to use the language
of subversion to incite a new revolution against the present order of things. This use of
disruptive language is apparent in a passage beginning with verse four of chapter thirteen
and continuing through verse eight:
... [ have been the Lord your God ever since the land of Egypt; you know no god
but me, and besides me there is no savior (4). It was I who fed you in the wilderness, in the land of drought (5). When I fed them, they were satisfied ... and their
heart was proud; therefore they forgot me (6). So [ will become like a lion to them,
like a leopard I will lurk beside the way (7). I will fall upon them like a bear robbed
of her cubs, and will tear open the covering of their heart; there I will devour them
like a lion, as a wild animal would mangle them (8).
To attempt to read these verses as a continuum or a unit is to encounter an unexplained
dissimilarity that jars both the reader's expected continuity of logic and his literary sensibil-
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ity. Herbert Marks likens the "persistence of [such) discordant features" to the "superimposed figures of paleolithic cave art."so Struggling to respond, the reader is forced to an
uncomfortable alertness by being dislodged from familiar expectations of what reading
language, even poetry, is supposed to be like. Verses four and five seem to be a common
recitation of Cod's mighty deeds on Israel's behalf- brought out of Egypt and cared for in
the wildemess. But in verse six the state of blessedness and dependency tums abruptly
and without explanation into the contrary condition of a satisfaction that has forgotten its
source, given way to self sufficiency and pride, and forgotten its need of the wildemess
Benefactor. In verses seven and eight that Benefactor tums against the wildemess dwellers
and becomes a lion or leopard who tears and devours them. Most absent from the
rhetoric of the passage are conjunctive, explanatory aids to cognitive progress through the
verses. The writer seems angry and punishes his readers by throwing language at them.
The imagery is no help but instead counterproductive to efforts to assimilate the intent of
the language. The lion here is a devourer, but several verses earlier, in the eleventh chapter, the Benefactor/ Cod roars like a lion and the people experience a new exodus from
enemy territory (Assyria) and are placed safely in their houses (II: I 0-1 I). Ryken
describes such disturbing language as having a "kaleidoscopic structure" and remarks on
the difficulty of any reader following its "shifting" and "diverse" content without being
forcibly brought into new ways of thought and response NL 170).
This cancellation of expected continuity can be described, then, as a deliberate linguistic strategy to carry out the prophet's subversive purpose of calling the audience away
from their revolution against their Benefactor/ Cod and into a counter-revolution of
responding with repentance to his offers of mercy and restorationSI Furthermore, this jarring surface structure is common rather than exceptional not only in the book of Hosea
but also elsewhere in the prophetic writings S2 Our best response to the writings as literature may be to heed Ryken's injunction not to look "for the smooth flow of narrative" but to
"be prepared for a disjointed series of diverse, selfcontained units." Ryken is surely right when he
agrees with numerous other critics that this "disjointed method" is exactly what "makes
such literature initially resistant to a literary approach" NL 170).
Having. in the preceding paragraph, labeled this disjunctive style as a "deliberate linguistic strategy," I must face the question as to whose strategy it is. Is the prophet Hosea- or his
scribes- responsible for the discontinuous juxtaposition of verses of judgment with verses of
forgiveness and restoration 7 If so, is the juxtaposition present from the beginning of the
book's composition or does the prophet add the verses of hope after he thinks the judgment is past, such as the period after the Syro-Ephraimite war in 735-732 when Israel is
subjected to Assyria but still continues to exist as a puppet nation? Or is the discontinuity
the result of later tradents altering the text to suit it to different historical situations, such as
the position of Judah after Israel's definitive fall in 722 but before that of Judah in 857?
A comparison between two redactional analyses of the first three chapters of Hosea can
shed light on this question. Clements and Childs both find evidence in the numerous references here to the Southem Kingdom of Judah that the entire book has been edited by
tradents a generation after its original composition, perhaps during the last twenty years of
the eighth century B.C.E., to confront Judah with the impending judgment of God after
Israel has already fallen. Both critics find particular evidence of such editing in the first three
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chapters but disagree about what this evidence reveals about the original text of Hosea. In
these chapters, Israel consistently receives judgment while Judah remains a possible "recipient of promise."53 This pattern is evident in verse six of chapter one-"I will no longer have
pity on the house of Israel or forgive them"- as contrasted with verse seven- "But I will
have pity on the house of Judah, and I will save them by the Lord their Cod." Clements
reads the verses of judgment as original warnings to Israel but the verses of blessing as
redaction additions, added after the fall of Israel, that are based on the false assumption
that Judah, unlike Israel, would repent and thus avert the disaster threatened by the verses
of judgment. For Clements, then, the majority of the messages of hope are added by
tradents who are mistaken in assuming that Judah, unlike Israel, will escape the judgment
of Cod.54 Childs also reads the verses of judgment as originally written to warn Israel of
judgment but as being applicable in the historical moment of the late eighth century to
Judah, now in need of a similar repentance. He reads the verses of hope as also originally
written and, in any later revision, applicable to Judah as they have been to Israel. Thus he
views any later discordant juxtaposition of the verses as variations of a similar original jolting text that had confronted Israel with predictions of judgment or of blessing.55 Because
Childs "subordinates the editorial process" to what he sees as the canon's intrinsic intent, he
avoids the problem of mistaken tradents and reads the discordant passages as saying that
"judgment and salvation are inextricably joined in the purpose of Cod for his people," held
"together in the one divine plan." In Cod's prophetic speaking, the warning call of judgment and the merciful offer of forgiveness and restoration are always present. 56

vm. USE OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE
A literary approach can take full advantage of the wealth of figurative language that
makes Hosea so typical of the other prophetic books. A survey through its fourteen chapters discloses examples of the use of simile (14:5), metaphor 0:8), apostrophe (10:8),
metonymy (3:4), synecdoche (12:2), and the pathetic fallacy (3:3) . Furthermore, the
major tropes of irony and paradox function in the motif of blessing or restoration as it
connects with judgment or national doom. The two contrary experiences fuse into a paradoxical whole that resonates with the ironic necessity of blessing or salvation never taking
place until judgment has first occurred.
IX. SYMBOL AS PRiMARy FIGURE
Ryken insists that the "basic mode" of any kind of visionary literature, including
prophecy, is symbolism. "Above all, visionary literature uses the technique of symbolism.
In fact, it is symbolic through and through, a point that cannot be overstated" NL 17 1).
While few problems surface in accepting this argument as it applies to apocalyptic literature such as the Revelation, questions may arise as to Ryken's claim that symbolism is the
"basic mode" that is used "through and through" the books of prophesy. I want to
respond to this questioning not only by agreeing with Ryken that symbolism is the dominant literary figure used in the prophetic writings but also by arguing that the symbol
becomes the device that uncovers a particular thematic substructure that bestows unity
and coherence on the book of Hosea.
Exploring the symbol as trope calls first for careful definition. Bullinger names a biblical
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symbol as a "material subject substituted for a moral or spiritual truth."S? But this definition
needs refinement. By accepted literary definitions of symbol (those of Coleridge,
Baudelaire, Proust), a symbol is a word as image that refers to an entity existing within the
boundaries of the literature that, in tum, evokes meaning(s) beyond itself outside the literature. By contrast, a metaphor or simile is a word as image that, instead of referring to an
entity within the literature, refers to something outside it for the purpose of comparing
that something with an entity that does exist within the literature.
Walter Brueggemann identifies the "offering of symbols" as the subversive means by
which the prophets challenge their audience to renounce the sinful and hopeless status
quo in favor of a future of righteousness and hope.58 But Brueggemann, whose interest at
this point is in the prophetic task rather than in the specifics of the language effecting the
task, allows a symbol to be any language segment bringing to mind some particular and
positive event from Israel's past history. Thus he seems to equate "symbol" with any
graphic word picture and fails to differentiate between image, metaphor, and symboJ.59
Conversely, Ryken explains that a necessary distinction between the pictorial and the
symbolic is the difference between the pictographic and the ideographic, a difference
between images that appeal immediately to the senses and objects that trigger multiple
ideas represented by the object (VL 173), A symbol is not merely an image that paints a
verbal picture but something that suggests or implies meaning beyond itself as an entity.
Thus a symbol, which, as noted, must be situated in the literature, functions to embody
certain ideas or qualities that the figure gathers up and communicates both within and
beyond the boundaries of the text containing the symbol.
This symbolic function relates to the already described visionary movement of prophetic
literature into future historical time as well as into extraterrestrial realms. Numerous critics
note a poetic quality in the prophetic writings that we can associate with this unlimited
range of movement, both into the past and the future. Alter suggests that one effect of
poetic figures in the prophets is to "lift the utterances to a second power of signification,"
giving to particular history "an archetypal horizon." He also sees poetic figures as often
functioning to situate "historical subjects" of "here and now in cosmic perspectives."60
Bullinger emphasizes the linguistic connection of the word mystery to the word symbol. The
Scriptural word nearest to the word symbol is the word mystery, with the patristic Fathers
using the terms synonymously. Mystery means secret, and comes to mean a "secret sign or
symbol,"61with "secret" referring to the layers of expanding reference beneath the surface of
the symbolic language. Brueggemann points out that, in spite of such archetypal movement
and multiple layers of meaning, prophetic symbols are always rooted in the history of Israel
as a nation. 62 Soulen also emphasizes the situated reference of biblical figural language by
describing how the use of any such figure is invariably related to some event in Israel's history. And even when a figure moves into "world time" or into "nature" in general, the
sequence of Israel's history as a nation remains the matter at hand 6J
In Hosea the cumulative event of Hosea's marriage, alienation from, and restoration to
Gomer, along with the birth and naming of the three children, functions as a prophetic
symbol as described above. 64 The early chapters of the book relate an event that can be
read as actually occurring. The prophet obeys God's instructions to marry a woman who
is either flawed or vulnerable sexually.6s He marries Gomer and they live together in a
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marriage that results in the births of two sons and one daughter. Gomer breaks her marriage vows by becoming sexually promiscuous. The husband and wife separate from each
other. But Hosea's love for Gomer is greater than her sin. He secures her once more, and,
after a time of testing, restores her to the former marriage relationship khap[s] 1-3).
My reading of the marriage event is not intended to deny the historical critical problems of the record of the event. Childs describes the critical efforts to relate as history the
events of chapters 1-3 as being "consistently frustrated" from ever reaching any kind of
consensus as to what actually occurs or what precisely the three chapters record. 66 My
claim that the marriage event is the symbolic paradigm that orders the prophetic text is
not dependent on some ordered narrative of the historicity of the marriage as recorded in
the first three chapters but on its literary function in the book as a canonical whole.
Unpacking the sequence of the marriage event results in the following paradigm: A.
What Hosea, directed by God, does for Gomer B. What Hosea expects of Gomer C.
How Gomer responds to these expectations D. How Hosea deals with Gomer because of
her response, and E. What Hosea does for Gomer in spite of her response. Although my
observations at this point are not attempts at any formal structuralist analysis, this paradigm is similar in an elementary way to a pattern or model so described. The paradigm
indicates "the inner organization of the .. . thematic content through which the text [here,
the marriage narrative] receives its intelligibility." It describes "the constituent elements ...
and the network of relationships existing between them." Also, a structural arrangement
of the elements of the paradigm adequately controls the flow of the narrative. 67

x. DEEP STRUCTURE OF TExT INDICATED BY SYMBOL
The symbolic meaning of this paradigm, which is obvious even on the surface of the
text, transfers the narrative sequence described from Hosea and Gomer to God and
Israel. Thus we can construct the following paradigm of the meaning of the marriage narrative as a symbol of the narrative or history of God and Israel. A. What God, directed by his
own purposes, does for Israel B. What God expects of Israel C. How Israel responds to
these expectations D. How God deals with Israel because of her response and E. What
God is doing-and will do- for Israel in spite of her response.
If we agree, one, that the paradigm of the marriage narrative is competent, that is, that
it includes everything that is in the narrative and excludes what is not in the narrative,
and, two, that the symbolic meaning of the marriage narrative transfers into the related
inclusive paradigm describing God and Israel, then we can say that the narrative of the
marriage becomes a prophetic symbol that orders the apparently disjunctive segments of
the text of Hosea. Every verse in the book, either as a single entity or in group format, can
be outlined under the five headings of the inclusive paradigm derived from the symbolic
paradigm of the marriage narrative. In fact, even the verses that relate the marriage event
can be subsumed under the inclusive paradigm that structures God's dealings with Israel.
The arrangement is neither arbitrary nor forced but seems to account competently for the
occurrence of all the verses in the fourteen chapters of the book.
This sequence of five actions, each initiated by God and each enacted in relation to
Israel, is, of course, the "story" or narrative that orders in a profuse generality the content
of the entire Old Testament in all its varied literary forms. In a prophetic book, this con-
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trolling "story" is condensed and pushed beneath the disruptive surface text, a surface
where rearrangement of the verses into the five-point sequence can reveal the book's hidden thematic cohesiveness and unity. Thus, in Hosea, the five-point paradigm of the narrative of the marriage becomes a prophetic symbol, a figural microcosm of the macrocosmic content of the complete book, welding together not only the disjunctive segments of
the individual verses but also fusing form and content into a single whole. 68
Child's analysis of the marriage narrative as its stylistic mode and thematic functioning
may have changed through the stages of the book's composition lends weight to the symbol's structural prominence in the text. Originally, Hosea's sign-acts that constitute the marriage event are an "attack upon Israel's syncretistic religious worship which had transformed
the worship of Yahweh into a fertility cult."69 Israel has adopted the Canaanite mythological
belief that deity and the land exist in a "symbiotic" relationship with each other. Worship of
this deity is enacted by the cultic practice of marriageable virgins temporarily acting as temple prostitutes and offering payments for such acts to the deity of fertility, behavior which
Hosea boldly denounces as a betrayal of religious loyalty which is idolatry. The Israelites
have subscribed to a cultic myth that has involved them in sexual immorality, and Hosea's
actions and words are an accusation within that mythological construct.'°
In the later editing of the original text where its message is extended to Judah, Childs
sees mythological language becoming purely metaphorical. The people of Judah as a
whole are not engaged in idolatrous acts of sacred marriage with the mythological Baal, as
their Israelite kinsmen had been earlier in the century. Rather the Southem Kingdom has
polluted its worship by a general breaking of the commandments of Yahweh that ignores
his covenant with the nation?! The present shape of the first three chapters gives evidence that the historical sign-acts have been changed into overt metaphor. Chapters one
and three cannot be read sequentially as an integrated narrative. These chapters are separated by chapter two, which relates no action but functions only as a metaphorical
description of actions referred to in chapters one and two. Childs reads these three chapters as a later redaction than whatever editing had occurred in chapters 4-14. The initial
chapters provide an "exegetical key" that unlocks interpretation of the sign-acts as a
metaphor that continues to speak as Scripture to generations that follow late eighth-century Judah. 72 By my definitions, this metaphor has become in the present text of Hosea an
example of the uniquely complex, multi-level symbol that I am suggesting is endemic to
the prophetic writings.
The question now arises as to how this prophetic symbol moves beyond the boundaries of Hosea as an isolated text. That is, how does the marriage narrative as symbol possess multiple layers of meaning, depict visionary movement, connect linguistically with
whatever the word mystery signifies, and yet remain rooted in Israel's history as a nation?
The names of Comer's three children add these visionary characteristics to the narrative,
thus qualifying it fully as a prophetic symbol. Each name, in its initial function within the
boundaries of the narrative of the marriage, signifies the unfaithfulness of Comer to her
husband Hosea and his rejection of his adulterous wife, and, if not all of the children, at
least the last two. The Hebrew text of the book Hosea is not clear as to whether the children belong to Hosea,73 but very clearly states that Comer has broken her marriage vows,
has "played the whore" and "acted shamefully" in going after her "lovers" (Hos 2:5). Also
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clear is Hosea's initial rejection at some point in the marriage of Gomer and, in some
degree, of the children (Hos 2:3-4).
The meanings of the children's names as assigned by God signify these narrative developments of betrayal, rejection, and judgment, but apply their linguistic weight, not to
Hosea's marriage, but to Israel's covenantal history. God's pronouncement of the first
son's name, Jezreel, connects with the incomplete obedience of Israel's king Jehu and
God's warning that after four generations Jehu's descendants will be cut off. The name
Jezreel also links with the unfaithfulness of Israel to God's decrees through many generations, as epitomized in the long history of national violence that has occurred in the geographical site called the Valley of Jezreel. In this valley, Jehu seizes with betrayal and murder the throne from Ahab's descendants and inaugurates the dynasty of Jeroboam II ([[
Kngs 10), the king to whose rule Hosea is prophesying an end. Thus the name becomes a
cumulative symbol of a definitive, imminent onset of judgment on the nation of Israel?4
The names of the daughter and the last son signify God's rejection of his covenant people. The name Loruhamah means "unpitied" or "no more mercy," and Loammi means
"you are not my people." These names indicate the removal of God's love from Israel and
the nullification of his covenant relationship with them. 75
But Hosea and Gomer's marriage story does not end here. Hosea finds Gomer and
secures her again as his chastised but restored wife. And the children's names as recorded
in the passages relating this final development in the marriage change their signifying. The
name Jezreel, previously signifying the bloody valley, appears in a passage describing the
sowing of seeds and an earth bearing grain, wine, and oil (Hos 2: 22-23). A play on
words in a comparison of the two appearances of the name "Jezreel" is that in the initial
context, which links the name with the bloody valley, "Jezreel" can be translated as "God
scatters." This translation logically implies the act of "scattering" as part of the destruction
of judgment. In the second context, which describes a fertile land and its products, the
translation becomes "God sows," with the verb "sows" being a Hebrew variant of "scatters" in the word "Jezreel."76 In further changed signifying, the name Loruhamah, meaning
"not pitied," loses its prefIX meaning "not" to become "Ruhamah" or "having obtained
pity," and the name Loammi, meaning "not my people" is reconstituted as "Ammi" or
"my people" (Hos 2: I). The reversal of these two names indicates a restoration of God's
covenant relation with Israel. 77
Functioning as part of the prophetic symbol that is the narrative in which they appear,
the children's names escape the particular record of the marriage narrative and expand in
symbolic representation to indicate the central message of the text of Hosea as a whole.
Because of Israel's unfaithfulness, God rejects her as his covenant people, but, because of
his great love and mercy, he is bringing the nation through judgment to a state of restoration with himself. A passage such as the following refers not to Hosea and Gomer but to
God and Israel :
And I will take you for my wife forever; I will take you for my wife in righteousness
and in justice, in steadfast love, and in mercy.... On that day I will answer, says the
Lord, I will answer the heavens and they shall answer the earth; and the earth shall
answer the grain, the wine, and the oil, and they shall answer Jezreel; and I will sow
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him for myself in the land. And I will have pity on Loruhamah, and I will say to
Loammi, 'You are my people'; and he shall say, 'You are my God.' (Hos 2: 19,21 -23)
Thus restored, Israel becomes faithful in her covenant with God: she says, ".. . [w]hat
have I to do with idols?" She has leamed that only from her Benefactor/ God is blessedness found (Hos 14:8).
Exactly when and how this national fulfillment of the domestic symbol takes place is a
matter of much debate among different religious groups as well as among various theological divisions in those groups. But as description of the fulfillment of Hosea's multi-layered
symbol, the quoted passage is in exact accord with what we can call other E verses (the passages of promised blessing that are discordantly juxtaposed with passages of judgment) in
the double layers of the textual structure of the book. And in the privilege of visionary
prophecy, the astonishing "reversal and transformation" N. L.166) simply takes place with
no apparent concem to offer definitive historical interpretation for either early or subsequent
readers. God's never-ending search for his people that results in their repentance and return
to him is described but not historically outlined (Hos 6: I and 8:2). As Brueggemann insists,
the emphasis in what I am categorizing as the E verses is not on how or when Israel is
restored but on the "gracious gifts" of the mighty God who is the restorer. 78
A Christian reading, then, is not the only way that this symbol can move beyond the
boundaries of Hosea as a single book situated in the group of the Old Testament
prophetic writings. Jewish readings can find Hosea's promises applicable to God's judgment and subsequent blessings to the Jewish people throughout history. All modem
Messianic Jewish writing is, of course, dominated by the twin events of the Holocaust and
the establishment of the modem state of Israel. In describing different versions of both the
despair (over the Holocaust) and hope (over the established nation), Novak concludes
that "the God who saved us [the Jewish people] from Hitler and who gave us the State of
Israel is neither a God whose covenant has been falsified nor a God whose final and
unique messianic victory has yet come. 79
But a Christian reading of this symbol is also longstanding and can offer an alternate
description of the symbol's reaching into the future. The New Testament has been the
primary interpreter of the Old for the church through two thousand years of history. The
apostles Paul, Peter, and John read Hosea's symbol as stretching beyond the repentance
and restoration of the Jews as an ethnic people to include the gathering of the church as
the new Israel by Jesus as the Jewish Messiah, that is, a gathering of persons from all
nations of the earth to Israel's God in repentance and faith. Paul's argument in the ninth
chapter of Romans is that God's promises of mercy in the Old Testament are not only for
the "children of the flesh," that is, the Jewish people, but also for the "children of the
promise," who, in Paul's first century terminology, are the Gentiles. To support his argument, Paul refers to the prophetic symbol in Hosea:
As indeed he [God] says in Hosea, 'Those who were not my people I will call "my
people," and her who was not beloved I will call "beloved.'" And in the very place
where it was said to them, "You are not my people," there they shall be called children of the living God.'" (Rom 9:25-26)
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In his first epistle, Peter addresses all of God's New Testament people who comprise the
church-Jews and Gentiles alike-as Cod's "chosen race," his "royal priesthood," his "holy
nation." This nation to whom Peter is writing are they which once "were not a people,
but are now the people of Cod: which had not received mercy, but now have received
mercy (J Pet 2 :9-10). Peter's allusion to Hosea in this passage makes possible an enlarged
understanding of a symbol that escapes the boundaries of an Old Testament book to
reverberate throughout the biblical canon.
Finally, John offers, in the twenty-first chapter of the Revelation a similar expansion of
Hosea's visionary language. The people of the new Jerusalem that John sees "coming
down out of heaven from God"-a population described in chapter seven of the
Revelation as "a great multitude that no one could count, from every nation, from all
tribes and peoples, and languages" (v. 9)- are those described by Hosea's mark of identification: " mhey will be his peoples, and God himself will be with them" (Rev 21 :2-3).
Here the prophetic symbol exhibits its visionary movement into cosmic and eternal
realms, and its close connection with the Greek word mystery already referred to as
explored by Bullinger. 80 That the chosen people of Cod are from all nations has remained
a secret to past generations, Paul says in his letter to the Ephesians. But that mystery is
now disclosed because God has "revealed to his holy apostles" that "the Gentiles have
become fellow heirs, members of the same body, and sharers [with Israetl in the promise
in Christ Jesus through the gospel" (Eph 3:5-6). In its disclosure of mystery, then, Hosea's
visionary symbol not only remains firmly rooted, as our definitions have indicated, in the
particular history of Israel but also reaches beyond the close of history.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND PossmlUTlES
What are the implications of this literary analysis of the book of Hosea? My definitions
of the various elements (origin through figural language) derived primarily from Ryken's
descriptions of visionary literature and fitted to Hosea as characteristics of a particular
genre coined "visionary prophecy" work well. Furthermore, the reading of the marriage
narrative as a symbol for God's covenantal relationship with Israel is, in Child's canonical
reading, endemic to the text in each stage of its composition. But to designate visionary
prophecy as a genre and to apply it to the fifteen prophetic books of the Old Testament,
we must learn whether the patterns that work in the book of Hosea hold in the other
books as well. Do similar descriptions of the literary elements apply equally well to other
prophetic books? Are these other books dominated by prophetic symbols that can be
arranged into doubles of the five-point (A, B, C, 0 , E) paradigm of God's covenant behavior with Israel?S' Can the verses of another such book be contained inclusively within the
double layers of such a paradigm? Only with answers to these questions can we move
toward claims about a unified literary structure typical of the prophetic books as a group.
If further studies do yield support to such claims, we witt be able to say that a literary
approach has offered something new in Old Testament studies, a generic term that gives
stylistic dominance to a symbolic structure-instanced here in Hosea- that appears uniquely and inclusively in the books of the Hebrew prophets.
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Belief in God is often characterized as antiquated and thoroughly disreputable in
the eyes of modem science and post-Enlightenment philosophy. Kai Nielsen considers rational efforts to disprove God's existence mere "mopping up operations in the
wake of the philosophical and scientific developments since the Enlightenment."I
Nielsen flatly states that
There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Christian is living according
to "the reality principle" while the non-Christian, and the secularist in particular, is deluded about man's true estate. Christianity is myth-eaten. The very
intelligibility of the key concepts of the religion is seriously in question; there is
no evidence whatsoever for the existence of God; and when we keep an
anthropological perspective in mind, we will come to recognize that the revelation and authority of Christianity are but one revelation and one authority
among thousands of conflicting revelations and authorities. Given this state of
affairs, it is the epitome of self-delusion to believe that Jesus reveals what the
true structure of reality is.z
In no uncertain terms Nielsen denies the facticity of religious truth claims, most
fundamentally the existence of God. It is of course understandable why the atheologian has focused so much effort at attacking belief in God, for such belief is the
"heart and soul of Christian belief as well of the other theistic religions. This is a sensible strategy: if. .. this belief is relevantly objectionable, he won't have to deal piecemeal with all those more specific beliefs."3 He can simply do away with them all in
one fell swoop. Nielsen's argument that there is no evidence for God's existence,
that religious pluralism poses an intractable difficulty for particular religious truth
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claims, and that theism is essentially incoherent and irremediably superstitious is obviously
designed to show that ongoing belief in such a deity is exceedingly irrational.
The typical way for a theist to respond to such atheological accusations is to construct
or at least rehearse arguments, both a priori and a posteriori, in favor of Cod's existence.
Teleological, ontological, cosmological, and moral arguments, and more besides those, are
trotted out and presented in the hopes of answering the skeptic, persuading the nearly
convinced, or at least satisfying the believer.
That approach will not be taken here. For one, such a huge task would simply be too
daunting. Each of those arguments for Cod's existence, not to mention those posed
against God's existence, represents a book in itself. Such a venture would simply take us
too far afield. How can a response be offered to Nielsen without the task becoming
unwieldy? What sorts of considerations can be offered to show that religious belief is not
irrational after all? The way it will be done here is by means of an extended comparison
between two American philosophers, one born in 1842 and now gone, the other born in
1932 and still quite alive. One was a pragmatist and radical empiricist, the other a leading
contemporary analytic philosopher and epistemologist. They both loved to climb mountains, attended Harvard, struggled with the problem of evil, and believed in God: William
James and Alvin Plantinga.
A comparison of Plantinga and James is instructive on several counts. Overlaps between
them, especially in the face of their differences of approach and conviction, can prove to
be helpful starting points in an analysis of the epistemic merits of theism. Discussing these
points of contact can also provide a general orientation to some of the prominent terms of
the debate about God's existence. An examination of their views is especially effective in
raising prior questions that often go unasked and unanswered, questions that really ought
not to be neglected given their centrality to religious conviction. This examination will primarily be a comparison, rather than a contrast, though points of difference between their
views clearly exist and will occasionally be mentioned in the context of the comparison,
especially when doing so offers a point of illumination. What is remarkable is the number
of poignant commonalities in their views, the convergence of so many of their conclusions,
often based on quite different sorts of reasons (only occasionally inconsistent ones, though).
What follows is a list of about a dozen or so of these similarities.
Both James and Plantinga were vitally concemed about the intellectual propriety and
philosophical reasonableness of theistic conviction. James counted himself among the
"crass" supematuralists, and he took seriously the charge by such eminent agnostics of his
day like Clifford and Huxley that theism and religious belief were irresponsible or even
immoral, a flouting of our epistemic duties. Louis Menand writes, "It's not exactly emphasized any longer, but one of James's original purposes in promoting pragmatism was not
to get rid of empirically unverifiable beliefs, but to make room, in a scientific world view,
for faith and Cod . .. . This was explicitly the context for the 1898 lecture."4 The 1898 lecture to which Menand refers, of course, is 'The Will to Believe," which has been
described by Richard Taylor as perhaps the most widely read defense of the rationality of
religious faith in the English language. In James's The Varieties of Religious Experience, his
concern to uphold the importance of religious belief and practice is patently obvious even
to the most casual reader.
Plantinga, similarly, has taken for one of his career goals the deployment of his work in
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defense of theism. His work on modality in the Nature of Necessity culminated in his
defense of a modal version of the ontological argument and a dismantling of the deductive version of the problem of evil; his God and Other Minds canvassed the traditional arguments for God's existence and ended with an analogical argument for theism; his Does
God Have a Nature? discussed the connections between God and various necessary truths;
and his trilogy on epistemology had for its goal all along Warranted Christian Beliel the
final installment of the series and a brilliant defense of both theism generally and robust
historical, orthodox Christianity particularly.
Both philosophers can thus be rightly characterized as concemed with religious epistemology, in two senses: epistemology as it is brought to bear on religious hypotheses both
broad and narrow. Secondly, they are also concemed with epistemology as it is shaped by
a perspective unwilling to stack the deck against theism from the outset, unwilling to presume the falsehood of theism. s Plantinga and James were theists, and thus they stand
among a crowd of prominent religious believers in the history of westem philosophy,
including Kant, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Descartes, Hobbes, Augustine, Aquinas, and
Ockham, to whom the religious hypothesis has seemed to be true, and perhaps even, in
Plantinga's words, "the maximally important truth."6
Concemed with the epistemic status of religious belief, both James and Plantinga examined the evidence for its truth and rationality; and when they did so they both concluded
that the decision to accept or reject theism was not a question that could be defmitively
settled on evidential grounds. As a radical empiricist, James insisted on looking at the evidence available both for and against the religious hypothesis- and unlike Hume he didn't
confine such experiential evidence to the bare deliverances of the physical senses. Neither
theism nor atheism was presumed to have the upper hand. What James encountered from
the perspective of the "purely logical perspective" was that there was not decisive evidence
for theism. Evidence and arguments could be cited and adduced for theism, but so could
evidence and arguments on the other side. A deductive version of the problem of evil, for
instance, was mistakenly believed by James to pose intractable problems for an AnseImian
conception of God. But his mistake is reflective of the fact that James refused to ignore the
counterevidence for any proposition. When he considered the arguments both for and
against theism, he concluded that this is not a question that can be definitively settled on
evidential grounds. Important to note is that James was as skeptical of the arguments favoring atheism or agnosticism as he was skeptical of those favoring theism.
Plantinga, likewise, assessing the traditional theistic arguments early in his career, concluded that none of them is successful from a strict evidential perspective. Years later he
wrote about his earlier work:
I employed a traditional. .. standard: I took it that these arguments are successful
only if they start from propositions that compel assent from every honest and intelligent person and proceed majestically to their conclusion by way of forms of argument that can be rejected only on pain of insincerity or irrationality. Naturally
enough, I joined the contemporary chorus in holding that none of the traditional
arguments [for theism] was successfuF
Also paralleling James, Plantinga similarly found the arguments against theism equally
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unimpressive. Plantinga's powerful refutation of the deductive version of the problem of
evil has now pretty much shifted that entire discussion to probabilistic versions of the
challenge. From the perspective of the early Plantinga's internalism and classical foundationalism and of what james called the purely logical intellect, evidentialism fails to provide a decisive case for either theism or its rejection. Both philosophers would thus agree
that strict evidentialism is likely of only limited efficacy in resolving this issue.
The question of what to do in the face of indecisive evidence with respect to theism
constitutes one of the great divides among philosophers. Plantinga and james represent
one side of that divide. Confronted with Clifford's dictum that indecisive evidence for
theism means one should suspend judgment and affirm agnosticism, and to do otherwise
involves a violation of one's epistemic duties, james remained unconvinced. His famous
"will to believe" doctrine was his elaborate way to argue to the contrary: that a religious
believer is well within his rights to retain his convictions. In his lucid and tightly crafted
book on james, Hunter Brown battles fideistic and subjectivist interpretations of james by
cogently arguing that james's robust empiricism's careful attention to all features of experience imposed a number of constraints on belief formation, constraints metaphysical, noetic, evidential, factual, discursive, and theological. Brown persuasively argues that the issue
that concerned james, particularly in his will to believe doctrine, is what would constitute
intellectually responsible behavior towards certain existing beliefs, including religious ones
that, while not entirely conclusive evidentially, are nonetheless generally congruent with
those constraints. Although Brown notes that james never developed his views on classical foundationalism so technically as Plantinga, james's rejection of Clifford's dictum certainly moves in the direction of rejecting the classical picture so prominent after Descartes
and Locke. Plantinga, even more so than james, insists that theistic believers can be deontologically justified in their convictions and thus flouting no epistemic duties in the exercise of their faith. In point of fact, Plantinga thinks that this question of justification is so
easy to answer that the real essence of any theory of knowledge certainly must not rest
content with an answer to it. Likewise with questions of internal and external rationality.
This is of course part and parcel of his wholesale rejection of justification with its deontological connotatations, and rationality too, as the basis of warrant, that quality or quantity
enough of which, when conjoined with true belief, constitutes knowledge. Not only is
such justification rejected as inadequate for warrant, Plantinga argues persuasively against
the whole traditional package involving classical foundational ism, evidentialism, and internalism, opting instead for a conception of warrant involving proper function of our cognitive faculties operating in a congenial environment with its relevant parts aimed at truth.
Clifford's dictum that "it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything
upon insufficient evidence" is taken by Plantinga to be a stellar example of the classical
package. Plantinga says, "Here we have the combination of deontologism and evidentialism. This passage doesn't display classical foundationalism as well (it doesn't say what the
evidence must consist in), but no doubt Clifford was a classical foundationalist; at least he
thought that belief in God requires evidence."8
Plantinga notes the way james's "The Will to Believe" is almost a companion piece to
Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief," noting that a better title for james's piece would have
been "The Right to Believe." In this suggestion Plantinga may well be correct, since the
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right to believe (more specifically, the right to retain an already existing belief) seemed to
be James's main concern. In a book review in 1875 of P.c. Tait's The Unseen Universe,
James spoke of a "duty" to believe, holding that belief in a transcendent realm was something one may be duty-bound to hold if it would, for the believer, be a source of commendable action or peace of mind. It has been suggested that such duty terminology had
its origins in James's contact with the work of Charles Renouvier, to whom james
announced his indebtedness at the outset of The Will to Believe. The influence of friend
and Cambridge philosopher Chauncey Wright seems to have changed james's mind
about the propriety of duty terminology.9 After 1875, james no longer used such language: entitling the essay 'The Will to Believe" and writing in 1904 to L.T. Hobhouse that
his essay should instead have been called 'The Right to Believe" (emphasis added) .
The basic idea of the will to believe doctrine is that under certain conditions it is not
contrary to duty to retain belief in a proposition that is not certain. The requisite conditions are the proposition's being forced, live, and momentous for the believer. Plantinga
characterizes James as endorsing belief in a proposition for which one has no evidence for
it, and suggests that in this way james tried to "make room for belief in God (even if not
full Christian belief) by inserting it in the gaps of the evidence. The evidential ism and
deontologism, again, are evident."lo Although james had made some movement away
from the classical picture, he was still implicitly beholden to it, Plantinga notes. This seems
right. I am less confident in Plantinga's claim, though, that james thought no evidence was
required for the proposition in question. As will be made clearer, james- perhaps exactly
because of vestiges of allegiance to the classical picture-insisted on continuing to speak in
the evidentialist terms of his day and certainly believed that a proposition was not a living
hypothesis unless it carried a great deal of evidential support.
Plantinga notes that earlier in his own career he was somehow both accepting and
questioning what was then axiomatic: that belief in God, if it is to be rationally acceptable,
must be such that there is good evidence for it. This evidence, he notes, would be propositional evidence: evidence from other propositions you believe, and it would have to come
in the form of arguments. This claim was not itself argued for, he notes. It was just assumed
as self-evident and utterly obvious. This view is what has come to be known as evidentialism (with respect to belief in God). Plantinga further notes that he failed to ask why justification is important. Further, why would rational justification require evidence? What is the
connection between these? And if evidence is required, why would that evidence have to
take the form of arguments? "I didn't raise these questions," he says. He continues:
It wasn't, however, because their answers were well known, so that further inquiry
would be carrying coals to Newcastle. On the contrary: no one else asked or
answered these questions either; instead, people tumed directly to the arguments
for and against theistic belief, taking it utterly for granted that this was the way to
investigate its rational justification.
But then Plantinga points out the one exception, the one philosopher who refused the
fashionable answer to the 'meta-question':
The exception was William james, whose The Will to Believe' ... was widely anthol-
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ogized and took the radical line (as it was then perceived) that if religious belief is a
live option for you, and a forced option, then believing even without evidence is
excusable." II
Recall that James thought that evidential considerations for and against theism were
not decisive from the perspective of the purely logical intellect. This is instructive, because
it suggests that the perspective of the purely logical intellect is potentially truncated and
incomplete, only a partial means of recognizing life's realities. If so, then James's admission
that there is not decisive evidential support for theism from one angle may be consistent
with his also thinking that there remain other kinds of evidence for theism that can distinctly tip the scales in its favor, even if not to the degree satisfactory to the classical foundationalist. That theism is not conclusively demonstrated to be the sober truth by the evidence does not, in other words, remotely suggest that James considered theism and its
alternatives to be on an epistemic par. In fact, James did not think they were commensurate in evidential support in the least (nor does Plantinga), and this is part of the significance of what he was getting at in discussing the liveness of the theistic hypothesis.
Hunter Brown has done the philosophical community a service by highlighting some
of the heretofore neglected aspects of Jamesean liveness, not the least of which is a
strongly noetic element in the believer. A proposition, to be living, must possess for the
believer a great deal of persuasive power and intellectual plausibility. Liveness involves a
strong inclination to believe a proposition. That this inclination is threatened for lack of
conclusive evidential support has usually been interpreted to mean that alternative beliefs
make comparable claims on the subject. But for James, there is distinct imbalance
between religious options and altematives, and it is only rationality construed narrowly
and evidential considerations construed strictly that make it appear otherwise. Unlike its
alternative, live theism involves a tenacious passional need, engages one's sympathetic
nature in ways not to be found in a purely abstract analysis of theism, and generates an
invigorating disposition, intellectual openness, and what James calls the 'strenuous
mood'.12 Depending on the expansiveness of one's conception of evidence, such considerations by James mayor may not be construed as evidentialist. If all evidence, for instance,
needs to be propositional, then some of these Jamesean considerations would fall outside
the purview of evidence. But if all evidence need not be propositional in nature, and can
be essentially unanalyzable, something more immediately felt and intuitively grasped, then
such Jamesean considerations can be incorporated into an evidentialist framework more
expansive than Clifford's classical and strict evidentialism. Such expansive evidential ism
seems to accord with Pascal's notion of the heart having reasons the mind knows not of,
Emersonianism's inner light, and the biblical conception of faith as being the "substance of
things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen." Live belief, as Brown has demonstrated, arises from a complex interdependence of many influences, the neglect of which
in the development of norms for responsible intellectual conduct risks creating only a
facade of doxastic responsibility behind which subjectivity may continue to exercise a
powerful and unregulated influence. Among what is constitutive of the delicate idiosyncrasy and labyrinthine character of the intellectual life include an incalculable number of
intertwining historical, cultural, linguistic, temperamental, neurological, and volitional influ-
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ences, rendering irredeemably simplistic those appeals to evidence per se or the deliverances of a dispassionately judicial intellect.
One of James's favored descriptions of moral knowledge was a kind of discemment or
divining power, a bringing to bear of all the resources at our disposal to catch a vision of
reality and truth. James's expansive evidential ism is undoubtedly pushing in the direction
of nondiscursive, immediately experienced, intuitively grasped insight, which will no
doubt remind readers of Plantinga's Reformed epistemology. According to Plantinga, the
reason why theistic belief, to be rational, justified, and warranted, need not be evidentially
supported by other propositions is because of the possibility that it is basic, and properly
so. Basic beliefs, on a foundationalist picture, are those starting-point beliefs on the basis of
which other propositions are derived and inferred deductively, inductively, or abductively.
They are not believed on the evidential basis of other propositions; one simply sees that
they are true and accepts them. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga demonstrates the
way testimony, memory, induction, and a range of other parts of our cognitive systems
function to provide us with basic beliefs. Plantinga's (and Wolterstorffs, etc.) huge contribution, of course, is the suggestion that theistic belief itself might be a properly basic belief.
If so, then to be justified it need not be grounded in evidential considerations at all, at
least classically construed. It can be justified, rational, and warranted if it is properly basic.
Plantinga's story of how theism can be properly basic hearkens back to Aquinas and
Calvin's notion that God has implanted within the human heart a capacity to know his
reality. If this faculty- the sensus divinitatus- is functioning properly, in accord with
Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function, then someone can come to believe
(and, if God really does exist, know) that God exists, and can do so nondiscursively,
nonevidentially, and basically.
Plantinga's account of the basicality of religious belief is quite different from James's
account of the intuitive, nondiscursive belief in God's existence. However, to grasp some
of the similarities here, recall that James presupposed that to be a living proposition a
belief has to be plausible and compelling for someone. There has to be a strong inclination to believe it, even after all the evidence both for and against it has been considered; a
"pre-existing tendency to believe," as James put it. What he defended was the intellectual
right of those already with such pre-existing tendencies to believe a proposition to retain
such a belief, so long as there are no compelling arguments against it. Induction, the deliverances of memory, testimony, etc. are all such that none of them can be noncircularly
established as reliable. Yet they are all also such that we possess a strong tendency to
believe them. This would seem to make the deliverances of such cognitive faculties conform to Jamesean liveness in this regard. Those examples are strategically selected :
Properly basic beliefs bear a striking resemblance to those propositions that conform to
Jamesean liveness. If a foundationalist theory of knowledge like Plantinga's is found compelling that avoids the circularity involved in trying to evidentially support the deliverances
of induction, testimony, etc. by emphasizing proper function, then just such a theory,
when conjoined with the sensus divinitatus, can make belief in God stand among our properly basic beliefs. That is, an epistemic account has been provided and story told that
could make belief in God rational, justified, and warranted.
James's conviction that theism bears the nondiscursive mark of rationality locates him
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in the company of contemporary epistemologists such as Plantinga, Brown insists:
James bears a closer family resemblance to a number of contemporary non-fideistic
philosophers of religion than to the prudential fideists with whom he is more often
associated. There is a significant resemblance, for example, between James's position
and the positions held by some contemporary philosophers regarding epistemically
'basic' beliefs. Discussion of what constitutes a properly basic belief is extensive.
One common theme, however, as Nicholas Wolterstorff has put it, is that 'the proper way to arrive at. .. a criterion [of basicalityl is, broadly speaking, inductive'. This
way requires looking to certain existing beliefs in the process of producing a criterion of proper basicality, rather than beginning with the criteria of classical foundationalism, for example, which Plantinga, Sosa and others have shown to have serious shortcomings. Norms of basicality should be developed from 'below', as it were,
avoiding what William Alston has deplored as the 'epistemic imperialism' involved
in the indiscriminate application of certain abstract standards of basicality. Such standards, he and many others argue, prematurely exclude claims to the reasonableness
of certain widely existing beliefs, including theism, and dismiss prematurely the possibility of the proper basicality of such beliefs.']

It might be suggested that theistic belief thus construed does not involve basicality at all,
but just quick inferences based on the evidence. The suggestion goes like this: Rather than
nondiscursively, knee-jerkedly coming to believe in Cod's existence when appeared to in
certain ways, one is actually making an inference-an inference from, say, the profound
sense of the deeply rooted moral nature of the universe to the conclusion of an omnibenevolent Creator as, say, the most plausible account of such moral phenomenology.
However, both James and Plantinga wished to emphasize that the degree of assurance and
conviction that this world is theistic far surpasses the level of belief characterizing the deliverances of natural theology. Bringing the notion of insight to the fore, James wrote about
the distinctly noetic characteristics of religious experience in Varieties. Many putative religious experiences reported there are "as convincing to those who have them as any direct
sensible experience can be," and such experiences are reported in terms not just of personal edification or subjective feelings but of "genuine perceptions of truth." A widespread
claim among such reports is that the noetic element involved in such instances more closely resembles an increased breadth and depth of insight than forms of comprehension garnered through scientific inquiry, and that belief in the factuality of theism is related closely
to these "states of religious insight into depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect." As an empiricist, James considered it his bounden duty not to neglect reports of such
accounts in any thoroughly empirical study of the phenomenon of religious experience.
Plantinga, similarly, contrasts the confidence and sense of certitude characteristic of religious phenomenology with the tentative, probabilistic inferences of arguments for religious truth. Plantinga has dubbed the sense of congruity or certainty, of rightness and
truth, that accompanies religious phenomenology (as well as other basic-belief providers
like memory), 'doxastic evidence' or 'impulsional evidence', showing his openness to a
more expansive evidentialism potentially in line with that of James's. Such evidence carries
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with it an assurance of conviction that exceeds what propositional evidence can provide.
Even supposing that a case can made for, say, the historicity of Christ's resurrection that
renders such a contingency more likely than not to have occurred (a case that I believe
can be made), that is not necessarily enough to generate belief (even in one who finds the
argument convincing!), and certainly not belief of sufficient strength to satisfy the requirements of knowledge. Suppose that from a tub of 1,000 balls, of which 499 are white and
50 I are black, I reach in and randomly select a ball. It is more likely, of course, that I
grabbed a black one, but that is hardly any basis for a belief to that effect of any significant
strength. Or put it this way: If the Bayesians are right that degree of belief can be measured by a willingness to bet, it would not be very rational of me to wager very much on
that ball being black. Though the proposition in question ("A black ball was selected") is
more likely than not to be true, my conviction that it is true is nowhere near the conviction characteristic of religious phenomenology: a depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. Besides, it makes perfect sense that God, if he exists, would not structure our
cognitive systems in such a way that only the most tutored evidentialists and skilled reasoners would believe in his existence on the basis of often complex philosophical argumentation. A sense of God's reality universally implanted within the human heart, making
knowledge of God available to king and peasant, educated and uneducated alike, certainly resonates more deeply with the message of God's universal love as revealed in the
Christian gospel. This account also, incidentally, makes considerable sense of the widespread belief in God's existence throughout the world and human history.'4
A few additional points of similarity between James and Plantinga deserve emphasis.
The epistemic theory being sketched here, with points of commonality between James
and Plantinga, can be characterized as a version of naturalistic epistemology. [n Warrant
and Proper Function, Plantinga talks about three senses of such epistemology, the most
stringent of which involves Quine's "transmogrification of epistemology into descriptive
psychology." Whenever epistemology accords great weight in determining normative constraints on intellectual behavior on the basis of widespread psychological phenomena, the
reminder invariably manifests: 'We're supposed to be doing epistemology, not psychology!" James was one of the first leading psychologists of course and the author of the magnum opus Principles of Psychology. He only naturally allowed his psychological interests, it
can be argued, to dictate the form of his epistemological musings. The bulk of 'The Will
to Believe" can be thought of as an elaborate parenthetical exploration of the actual psychology of human opinion and an exploration of the relations among the many influences that really do produce our creeds. The picture that emerges is one of considerable
complexity. But epistemology, contra Wittgenstein, is not the science of psychology.
Fortunately, there are weaker versions of naturalistic epistemology that do not commit
one to equating or reducing epistemology to descriptive psychology.
Both James and Plantinga expressed strong reservations about treating the religious
hypothesis like a scientific postulate. [n James this took the form of his denying that the
function or purpose of religion is to solve our intellectual problems. James did not think
the purpose of religion was to close questions, but to fire our imaginations and sustain
philosophical questions. He was opposed to all forms of clean-shaven theories that treated
questions as definitively closed. He did not consider scientific reasoning to be the most
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pristine form of reasoning to which all other forms should aspire; to the contrary, he
thought scientific reasoning was one kind among many others, and that the considerably
more fundamental method of rationality than scientific reasoning was the creative imposition of form that was as much within the artist's purview than the scientist's. James was
not a divine command theorist, for instance; most of James's moral concerns were bottom-up, less interested in moral metaphysics than moral epistemology. An ineliminable
aspect of his moral epistemology, consistent with his radical empiricism, were the actual
concrete historical processes by which we hopefully come ever closer to that maximally
inclusive moral order in which James believed. He had little patience for any top-down,
single-principled moral theory of any kind, theistic or otherwise, especially one that
claimed to give the definitive explanation of something so rich as morality. He thought
that the moral life necessarily requires not just theory but a dialectic between thought and
history, the theoretical and concrete. In speaking of a transcendent moral order, and heaven as symbolic of our deepest moral ideals, he occasionally sounded a bit like a divine
command theorist, but he was not. A large reason for this was his aversion to treating religion as a hypothetical postulate rather than a living experiential reality.
In Plantinga the analogous aversion takes the form of rejecting the practice of making
theism's epistemic status dependent on how well it functions as the best explanation of various phenomena, that is, treating the religious hypothesis as a mere scientific-like postulate.
He thinks that theism may well be a good or even the best explanation of various phenomena, morality included, but that even if it were explanatorily idle it would be no less warranted in the contingency that God exists. For again, religious belief for Plantinga is not warranted on the basis of abductive inferences. ls Such a foundation is neither necessary nor sufficient for the degree of belief religious knowledge requires. Robert Adams, too, in his latest
book on theistic ethics, also echoes scepticism conceming science-inspired epistemologies as
applied to either religion or ethics, epistemologies that outside the realm of an empirical
analysis of the physical world have not yielded nearly so much fruit as science herself.16
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga distinguishes the question of the truth of the theistic hypothesis from the rationality or epistemic status of theistic belief. He calls the former the de facto question, and the latter the de jure question. One of his recurring theses is
that answering the de jure question in the negative is difficult to do without presupposing
a negative answer to the de facto question. Without assuming the falsehood of theism one
is hard-pressed to argue for the irrationality, unjustifiability, or unwarranted nature of religious belief. In contrast to his former classical foundationalist self, he has now rejected
internalism, taking the salient lesson from Gettier problems to be the inadequacy of an
internalist model of justification as constitutive of warrant (even with the benefit of various contenders for fourth conditions). His theory of knowledge is now distinctly extemalist, recognizing the connections between ontological assumptions about the way the
world is and what strikes one as rational. If God does not exist, Plantinga admits that warrant is probably not enjoyed by religious believers, as there would be no sensus divinitatus
by which theistic conviction would enjoy the status of proper basicality, no functioning
internal instigation of the Holy Spirit to seal knowledge of the distinctively Christian God
on our hearts. Plantinga also admits, in consonance with his rejection of classical foundationalism, that a story like his about justified, rational, and warranted de jure belief in God's
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existence will by no means prove universally compelling to all rational persons. There is
thus no logical guarantee to which we can be privy given our epistemological limitations
that there is the requisite commensurateness between our de jure and de faao beliefs,
between persons and world. It is just such absence of a guarantee of commensurateness
that impels a classical evidentialist like Clifford to insist that the possibility of being wrong
- even in the face of the most personally compelling phenomenological features of religious conviction- makes agnosticism the proper course. Better lose truth than risk error.
Of course James wished to ask why this Cliffordian passional decision under the guise of
a purely judicial intellect is any less a risk of error. In fact, James insisted that, if it should
tum out to be the case that it is only by an experience of the world that accords epistemological significance to distinctive experiential states that a particular commensurateness
between persons and world can be discovered, then the a priori discounting of those
states would permanently preclude its discovery. As Brown makes clear, James found
entirely dubious the propensity to beg such questions by automatically privileging conventional canons of evidentially responsible behavior without due regard for the challenge
posed to those very canons by such a recalcitrant phenomenon as live theism. For James,
whether religious phenomenology functions as evidence depends on whether there is this
commensurateness between person and world. However, the potential evidence, to be
evidence, does not require our knowing in advance that it is. To require that it did would
be to say that knowledge requires knowledge that we have knowledge, and James explicitly rejected such a formula as reflective of the sort of rationalism and absolutism against
which he valiantly labored. So for both Plantinga and James, if the world turns out to be a
certain way, something like religious phenomenology can function evidentially for us, in a
broad sense. This would raise the possibility that we can have a firm knowledge of aspects
of divine reality without our knowing that we possess such knowledge.
Supposing that one is wrong about what he thinks to be divine reality, though, is it the
case that there is nothing that could possibly undermine his conviction here and now?
This question has been posed to both James and Plantinga in different ways. Cannot
James's will to believe doctrine be used for all sorts of beliefs, without anything holding
such liberal applications of his method in check? Similarly with Plantinga; does not his
view entail that all sorts of eccentric views can be held to be properly basic? Are there no
constraints in place to preclude such wishful thinking? Here James and Plantinga each has
an effective answer, it seems to me, though their answers somewhat diverge, owing to differences in their conception of God and, to some degree, differences in what it is they are
trying to defend. But each answer is worth mentioning. First, what was James's response
to such accusations of his view lending itself to unchecked willful wishful thinking? In
James's account subjective influences do not enjoy the degree of autonomy imputed to
them by critics who saddle him with the charge of wishful thinking. James depicted subjective states as framed and limited in their influence by their interrelations within the
unity of the many elements that together constitute immediate experience, and also by
their interrelations with the many different kinds of consequences which flow from particular beliefs. Brown attacks the long-standing propensity among commentators to ignore
this complex unity of immediate experience, and neglect therefore the degree to which,
within such a position, subjective influences are integrally involved in an immediate, multi-
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dimensional concrete relationship with the world which issues in results and consequences that cannot be responsibly ignored. The related prudential complaint that James
gave primacy to personally desirable consequences in defending theistic belief fails to
grapple with what consequences were in fact held by James to flow from live theism. The
major consequence of theistic belief as James construed it is the strenuous mood, which
suffuses the moral life with the note of infinitude and mystery. Living in the strenuous
mood is to reject self-interest, identify with the disenfranchised, elevate the fervor with
which the pursuit of moral discemment is undertaken, and heighten participation in the
historical dialectic of theory and demand. The often trying, counter-cultural, and costly
features of the strenuous mood bear little resemblance to easy conformism, personal
advantage, or wishful thinking.
Plantinga in the past has had to contend with the "Creat Pumpkin Objection": If belief
in Cod can be properly basic, then so can any other belief, no matter how bizarre, including belief in the Creat Pumpkin. To which Plantinga's answer is simply that just by recognizing that some kinds of beliefs are basic does not for a moment commit one to saying
that all other kinds of belief are. Michael Martin recognizes that that objection is a nonstarter, but still thinks that Plantinga's view is radically relativistic. Plantinga dubs Martin's
criticism "Son of Creat Pumpkin": Take any possible community and any beliefs accepted
as basic in that community. The epistemologists of that community could legitimately
claim that these beliefs are rationally accepted in the basic way, on Plantinga's view,
according to Martin. But Plantinga replies by showing that the only respectable objection
requires taking both "rationally" and "legitimately" as "warrantedly." Now, does it follow
that for any proposition p, if there were a community who endorsed p, these people
would be warranted in believing that p is properly basic with respect to warrant for those
in that community? No, for suppose that Plantinga's model is true and the central claims
of Christianity are true, there really is the sensus divinitatus, and the deliverance of such a
process meets the conditions for warrant. It by no means follows that, say, the voodoo
epistemologist is also warranted in claiming that voodoo belief is properly basic with
respect to warrant. For such belief could be false or the product of all kinds of cognitive
malfunction or could lack warrant for yet some other reason. Martin's argument fails.
Plantinga applies the notion of defeaters to warrant, though, in raising a way in which a
properly basic belief can be called into question. Suppose the following scenario: I see a
person from a distance at a party whom I think is Brian, but later discover from a totally
reliable source that he was elsewhere at the time. The belief I had earlier that Brian was at
the party was a basic one, based in immediate sense perception. I did not infer that Brian
was there on the basis of having seen someone whom I thought was him. Seeing that
person was just the occasion in which I automatically formed the properly basic belief
that Brian was there. The additional information I discover later serves as a defeater for
my warranted belief that Brian was at the party. A defeater makes it the case that the
belief that until then may well be warranted can no longer be believed rationally.
Plantinga admits that theistic belief in theory might confront such a defeater, just as James
believed that the theistic hypothesis could in principle confront some intractable experiential or consequential difficulty. Plantinga examines four possibilities: projective theories of
religion, contemporary biblical criticism, pluralism and postmodemism, and the facts of
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evil. He concludes that none of these defeaters works and, as the contemporary epistemological scene stands, he agrees with Chesterton that 'The philosophical case against
theism is rather easily dealt with. There is no philosophical case against theism."I?
Before applying this set of epistemic insights and perspectives to Nielsen's challenge to
theistic belief, a brief summary is in order. Classical foundationalism, C1iffordian evidentialism, and the notion of deontological justification pose no difficulties for theistic faith:
Classical foundational ism is self-referentially refuting; C1iffordian evidentialism is as motivated by its own passional subjective commitments that involve no less a risk of error as do
Jamesean rights to believe; and countless religious believers, having weighed the evidence
both for and against he religious hypothesis, have persisted in their intuitive sense that theism is the sober truth of the matter. As Plantinga has argued, they are thus subjectively justified, and if there is some objective duty that such believers are flouting, it remains unclear
what it is. The question of rationality really comes down to the question of warrant, and
something like Plantinga's account of warrant and proper function may well constitute at
least the approximately right view of the matter. Such a theory of knowledge, on the
assumption that Cod is real and has given us a faculty to recognize that, not only makes
religious belief possible and permissible, but knowledge of Cod intended and normative.
On such a picture, belief in Cod is properly basic, and this can be construed as consonant
with evidential ism broadly construed, where religious phenomenology can be taken to be
a kind of non propositional evidence. Such evidence is not assumed to be able to meet the
standards imposed by classical foundational ism, however. But for those for whom the religious hypothesis seems to be true, even after all the evidence against it has been carefully
weighed, such ongoing religious belief retains positive epistemic status. In fact, belief produced according at least roughly to Plantinga's story would be considerably stronger than
belief produced by the deliverances of the discursive intellect applied to natural theology.
The broadly empirical theory of knowledge adhered to here can be described as markedly
extemalist, which has for one of its entailments that if Cod does not exist, the religious
believer is radically wrong. But if Cod does exist, then the religious believers who allow
such belief to shape their view of rationality and the nature of the world- including morality- are likely radically right. Theism is not, however, to be treated by believers as a tentative scientific hypothesis that commands only as much conviction in its adherents as what
can be generated by abductive inferences to the effect that theism best explains various
phenomena. The account can also be seen as a mild species of naturalistic epistemology,
but one that avoids the reductionism of stronger versions of it, and one that by according
such weight to insight and the nondiscursive intellect carves out as much epistemic space
for intuitions to satisfy practically the most ardent intuitionist. Although by this account the
religious believer can be said to have knowledge that Cod exists if Cod exists, it remains
the duty of at least a critical mass within such communities, given our current epistemic
limitations (such as our inability to know that we know Cod exists), to critically examine
potential defeaters to religious belief, and for all religious believers to examine carefully and
honestly the consequences produced by their conviction.
As to Nielsen's claim, recall his bold assertion that there is simply no evidence for
Christianity in particular or theism generally.18 Most of what needs to be said has already
been covered. For simplicity's sake, let us confine our attention to the latter claim, that
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there is no evidence at all to suggest that God exists. Nielsen insists that this is the case,
repeatedly in fact. But it should be obvious by now that the mere assertion of such a bold
claim does nothing to make it true, and next to nothing by way of dissuading thoughtful,
committed theists from retaining their faith . What does Nielsen mean by evidence? Does
he automatically preclude the potential non propositional evidence provided by
Plantinga's impulsional beliefs or James's nondiscursive deliverances? If so, why? More
specifically, why should a committed theist concur? Nielsen reminds me of those who
claim that no right-thinking persons can possibly believe in Cod anymore, when it certainly seems like there are a great number of them! What could motivate such bold claims?
Does Nielsen really think that every effort to show that Cod exists, every person for
whom the existence of Cod seems as clear as anything, every piece of religious phenomenology, every deliverance of an expansively empirical study of religious experience, cumulatively add up to absolutely no evidence at all for the truth of theism? If he does, that
strikes me as monumentally unlikely, so much so in fact that further discussion with him
on the issue would probably prove pointless. For it would seem altogether probable that
his atheological bias is radically skewing his capacity for fair-minded examination of the
evidence. And if Cod does exist, and something like Plantinga's model is essentially right,
then it is not the theist who is cognitively at fault, but rather it is one like Nielsen who is
suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction. Though I point that out, it is not my goal to
engage in a contentious epistemic tit-for-tat here. I would rather counsel that we proceed
in the spirit of this passage from James:
We ought. . .delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom :
then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that
spirit of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which
is empiricism's glory; then only shall we live and let live in speculative as well as in
practical things. 19
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17.
Plantinga, op. cit., p. 357.
18.
Plantinga actually extends his epistemic model to allow for the possibility of the entire
panoply of distinctively Christian beliefs to be warranted as well. Most of that material was not
included here, but mention of it is made now just to suggest that much more could be said to
defend the positive epistemic status of Christian truth claims in particular.
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'TRINITARIAN' PNEUMATOLOGY IN THE
NEW TESTAMENT?-ToWARDS AN
EXPLANATION OF THE WORSHIP OF JESUS
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TURNER.

Members of the British New Testarnent Society have spent considerable time
and energy on the important questions of when, how and why Jesus came to be
worshipped as God.' Very much less time has been spent on the status of the Spirit,
and a trawl through the massive secondary literature of our discipline catches relatively few relevant fish. There are I think at least two obvious explanations for this.
One is what Professor Hurtado has called 'the binitarian shape of early Christian
worship'- that is, it appears that in the apostolic church cultic veneration was offered
to the Father and to the Son, but not apparently to the Spirit.2 We have to wait for
the 2nd Century Martyrdom and Ascension of Isaiah (9.33 -36) before we encounter
worship addressed to the Spirit. Second, debates about the personhood of the Spirit
are understood to be secondary to and even largely parasitic on the Christo logical
debates. One first settles the question of the divinity of Jesus, this establishes the allimportant principle of plurality within the unity of God; then one can set about the
relatively minor mopping up operation with respect to the Spirit. Arthur Wainwright
comments: The Spirit seems to have been included in the doctrine of God almost
as an afterthought about which men had no strong feelings, either favourable or
hostile'.] Wainwright was speaking, of course, about Patristic developments, but one
could apply it (mutatis mutandis) to NT scholarship.
So what excuse have I got for addressing you on this subject today? Those of
you who have read the Festschriften for Donald Guthrie and Howard Marshall will
know that I think the Spirit has much more to do with the explanation of the rise of
divine Christo logy and worship of Jesus than is usually allowed: In a nutshell, I
argue that Jesus' exaltation giving of the Spirit marks a defining moment of divine
Christology. I also briefly argued that the very same 'moment' thereby also gives
pneumatology a significant 'trinitarian' aspect. Such claims, of course, give pneuma-
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tology a much more central place than it usually receives, and it is to aspects of that claim
that I wish to return today.

I.

ASSESSING THE TRADmONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE PERSONHOOD OF THE SPIRIT.

Those New Testament scholars who have devoted attention to the issue have usually
done so in the context of more wide-ranging works on 'trinity'. Arthur Wainwright's is
probably the most comprehensive and nuanced account. Like the Fathers, he firs t
attempts (in ten chapters) to settle the binitarian nature of God revealed through the
incarnational Christ-event; only then does he tum to the Spirit. He analyzes the subject in
three short chapters. First he treats 'the nature of the Spirit and his relation to Christ' (ch
II). Like the Fathers, he finds 'abundant evidence that the Spirit was regarded as a personal being, who was capable of experiences of grief and giving approval, who could forbid and be lied to, who could guide and inspire'.s He is aware (through his reading of E.F.
Scott and Bultmann) that the NT also appears to conceive of the Spirit 'impersonally as a
divine energy which is at the same time a sort of substance'. But as several passages (esp.
Acts 2.4, 11 .16, 13.2-9) innocently combine both animistic ('personan and dynamistic
(fluid/ potentially impersonal) language of the Spirit it is unlikely that this means the writer
is working with two completely different conceptions of the Spirit without some attempt
at harmony6 Accordingly Wainwright argues that while the impersonal metaphors can be
accommodated within a more generally personal conception, the reverse would be far
more difficult. He concludes 'the more the Christians meditated about the Spirit, and the
more they experienced his activity in their own lives and in the life of the community, the
more they were conscious of his personal nature. 7 The crucial question then becomes
how we explain this 'personal' nature.
The first possibility he considers is that the Spirit came to be identified with the risen
Christ. On such a view, some or all the personal traits of the Spirit might simply be
derived from the risen Lord. But despite the attempt of Bousset and the History-ofReligions School to prove this in Paul (relying especially on 2 Cor 3.17; Rom 8.9-11 and
I Cor 15.45), Wainwright was able to show that the Pauline texts did not bear the weight
placed on them, and that within his epistles there was sufficient additional evidence of the
distinctness of Christ and the Spirit to overturn Bousset's claim. And if the case were
weak in Paul, it was hopeless in the Gospels (including especially the Fourth GospeD,
where the distinction between Christ and the Spirit was crystal clear. If anything, it is the
distinction between the Father and the Spirit that is more blurred.
With that, Wainwright turns to discuss 'the Spirit and God' (Ch. 12). He argues that the
Spirit is not actually called God, nor simply identified with Yahweh- even 2 Cor 3.17,
which asserts 'the Lord is the Spirit', nevertheless also makes some distinction when it subsequently refers to the Spirit as the 'Spirit of the Lord'. The Spirit is neither prayed to nor
worshipped, and- in contrast to the Son- the Spirit is not described as performing the
unique functions of deity, such as judgment, creation and salvation. So (he concluded) the
Spirit is probably distinct from the Father. If the New Testament contains many triadic
passages (so ch. 13), including Father, Son and Spirit in redemptive work, these describe
how the three are encountered in salvation history and christian experience, but on the
whole do not address the question of the inner relationships of the Spirit to Father and
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Son. Paul does confront the binitarian question, but not the trinitarian (cf. the exclusively
diadic confession of I Cor 8.6). The Fourth Gospel alone begins to do this. For John, the
Spirit-Paraclete is a distinct divine person sent from the Father, through the Son. Quoting
Barrett, with approval, he concludes: 'more than any other New Testament writer [John)
lays the foundation for a doctrine of a co-equal Trinity'.8
Even this, however, has been questioned. In a short but incisive report in the 1976 volume
of Expository Times, Professor Moule put his fmger on the essential question.9 What is not
clear' he writes 'is that the Spirit is distinguishable from God in a way in which Christ is
distinguishable from both God and the Spirit'. For Moule, talk of the Spirit of God is perhaps simply metaphor like the 'hand' or 'finger' of God, and so not something that invites
hypostasis. In that case, the Spirit may be 'personal' merely because it is the vital extension
of Yahweh's own personhood and action- that is, because the Spirit is the immanence of
God himself. 'What is there', Moule asks, 'to suggest that "the Spirit of God" means more
than simply, "God at work", "God immanent", or that "the Spirit of Christ" means more
than "God at work in a way made possible by Christ,,?,.10 He concludes that New
Testament Theology was essentially binitarian rather than trinitarian.
It is the challenge of those last two questions that I wish to take up in this paper, as
well as the relation of the emerging pneumatology to worship of Jesus within the
Christian communities. Because of constraints of space I will confine myself to the three
major New Testament witnesses, Paul, Luke-Acts and John.

II.

'TRINITARIAN' PNEUMATOLOGY IN THE NEW TEsrAMENT?-PRELIMINARY

CONSIDERAnONS

Let me begin with five contextual preliminaries that set the agenda.

First, let me agree with Professor Moule that for the Judaism out of which Christianity
sprang, to speak of the Spirit of God was to speak of Yahweh himself in action-in person,
as it were, as opposed to his action through mediating beings from within the order of creation. The Spirit is even more intimately associated with Yahweh's own being and with
the extension of his life, vitality and activity, than Wisdom or Word. The latter two may
be personified (and be portrayed as acting distinctly from Yahweh), but the Spirit is more
usually synechdoche for God. There is a relatively minor but potentially important tradition in which the Spirit is portrayed with angelomorph characteristics, but not in way that
threatened to turn Jewish monotheism into binitarianism (far less into trinitarianism). But
essentially, the Spirit is the self-manifesting, transforming and empowering presence of
God himself. The Spirit is so intimately God himself that it can be described as the very
'breath of his mouth' (job 33.4; 34.14; Ps 33 .6; Wisd I 1.20, etc.l. Josephus thus represents a quite typical Jewish view, when he has Solomon pray, at the dedication of the
temple, 'I entreat Thee also [0 God) to send some portion of Thy Spirit to dwell in the
temple, that thou mayest seem to us to be on earth as well [as in heaven)' (AJ 8.114; pace
Levison; this is not stoic panentheism). For 2 Baruch 75.34, the Spirit is God's inner intelligent being; and for Philo the same is often true.
Second, it should follow from what we have said how very difficult it would be for a
Jew to conceive of any person, however exalted, giving the divine Spirit from God's right
hand, and using the same Spirit as his own executive power, stamped with his own char-
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acter. There simply is no such example, or anything approaching it, in the whole ITP literature. This is not surprising, for such a view would appear to make the person concerned
somehow 'Lord of the Spirit' (( am leaving that title deliberately ambiguous), and, unless
this was accompanied by a fundamental change in the perception of the relation of God
and Spirit, it would risk the blasphemy of asserting that the exalted person in question
had become 'Lord' of God himself, at least in his immanent activities.
Third, and as a corollary, of the above, unless the Spirit were demoted to an impersonal force, or to a personal (e.g. angelic) power of the created order, it is difficult to see how
the person acting as 'Lord of the Spirit' could himself be conceived as less than God.
Within a monotheistic pneumatology, there is no place for a mere creature to become 'lord
of the Spirit'.
Fourth, the above notwithstanding, our three main New Testament witnesses appear at
first glance to put Jesus in precisely the position, with respect to the Spirit, that raises all
these difficulties in their sharpest form. If first appearances are right, then all three witnesses have embraced something approaching a 'trinitarian' pneumatology. We need, however, to re-examine the witnesses. First impressions may have misled us. On second scrutiny
we may find o ur authors have adopted subtle strategies for reducing the problem,
whether demoting the Spirit, or reducing the exalted Jesus' relation to the Spirit to acceptable limits, or whatever.
Fifth, if communities came to recognise Jesus as 'Lord of the Spirit' in the 'trinitarian'
way a first reading might suggest, we need to ask how they justified such conclusions, and
what part such beliefs played in the inauguration and sustenance of their worship of Jesus
as God. It has to be said that convincing explanations of the regular cultic worship of Jesus
are still thin on the ground. To what extent might the communities' experience of Jesus as
'lord of the Spirit' contribute to the explanation?
I propose (unwisely?) to start with what might be regarded as the easiest case, that of
the Fourth Gospel.

III.

'TRINITARIAN' PNEUMATOLOGY IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL?

A. THE TRADmONA L ARGUMENTS for the distinct divine personhood of the Spirit in John are
well-known, and were of greatest import in the decisions leading up to the Council of
Constantinople (381) which asserted the full divine hypostasis of the Spirit. The SpiritParaclete promised in John 14-16 has strongly personal features. Thus the Spirit is subject
of many verbs involving personal activities, such as teaching (14.26), bringing to remembrance (14.26), bearing witness (15.26), convincing/convicting (16.8), guiding into truth
(16.13), speaking and declaring about Christ and glorifying him (16.13 -14), etc.
It was also noticed that the masculine pronoun is regularly used in conjunction with
the Spirit, though this should not be overplayed as it may simply agree with the masculine
noun parakletos, and in any case in 14.17 John uses a neuter pronoun collocated with the
Spirit (pneuma).
Perhaps more important is the fact that John 14-16 seems to go beyond occasional
'personification' of the Spirit such as one finds in ITP and Rabbinic Judaism, to a very
extended portrayal of the Spirit as the personal replacement of Christ. The carefully crafted
parallels between Christ and the Spirit-Paraclete suggest the latter is equally distinctly per-
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sona!. But could not this all be an illusion? Could we not, as Professor Moule perceptively
asks, explain it all as 'God at work in a way made possible by Christ'.

B.

FOUR OBSERVA TlONS- WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER-SUGGEST THAT JOHN WOULD HAVE HAD

DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING WITHIN THE LIMlTS OF SUCH A STATEMENT.

First, there is the sheer christocentricity of the Spirit's saving work. As is well known,
the fundamental task of the Spirit-Paraclete promised within john 14-16 is to reveal the
content and implications of the Christ-event, from incamation to ascension (cf. especially
14:26; 15 :26; 16:8- 10, 12-14), and to do this in a way that mediates salvation to the disciple." This appears to go a little beyond 'God at work in a way made possible by Christ'
(as I think Moule would agree) to 'God at work with a binitarian Christocentric focus'.
And while that observation does not as yet help us towards an understanding of the Spirit
as any kind of divine person, it will come back to us more usefully at a later stage.
Second, there are two passages in john, which could be taken to portray Christ as the
very source of the Spirit: 7.37-39 and 2022. But while I would consider both of them
potentially fruitful for our topic, the discussion of them would take us into a level of complexity and detail that we can barely afford.
Third, we take a step towards a more genuinely trinitarian pneumatology when we
observe that for john the Spirit does not merely unpack the Christ-event to the believer,
but also lies at the heart of the crucial on-going relation of the believer with the Father and
the exalted Lord. For the johannine community, to know the Father and the Son is eternal life (17.3). But this knowledge does not consist merely in adoring understanding of
the Christ-event and the nature of Israel's God revealed in it, interpreted by the Spirit important as that is. For the community, 'salvation' is actually a communion with the Father
and the Son (as I jn 1.3 asserts), shaped, launched, and continually renewed by the Spiritgiven understanding of the Christ-event.
It might just still be plausible to squeeze this into a definition of the Spirit as 'God at
work in a way made possible by Christ'. It could be argued that john understands the
Spirit as synechdoche for God the Father (exclusively) but has come to understand the
unity between the Father and the Son as so close, that the Father's Spirit inevitably also
discloses the one with whom he is in such intimate union.
On consideration, I would be inclined to counter that interpretation by suggesting it
accords too passive a role to the exalted Christ in his relationship to the Spirit. The
johannine jesus is not content to say the Spirit-Paraclete will bring the presence of the
Father and the Son to the disciple. Rather the accent is on jesus' active role-'I will not
leave you desolate; I will come to you' (14.18), and he promises of the obedient disciple,
'I will love him and manifest myself to him' (14.2 I) . To be sure, the context clarifies that
this self-manifestation is the coming of the Father and the Son to abide in the disciple, in
and through the giving of the Spirit-Paraclete, but the emphatic first person singular pronouns and the active voice, indicate the Spirit is the Son's self-manifesting presence and
executive power as much as the Father's.
This, of course could still be understood in binitarian fashion. One could posit the
Spirit is the extension of the vitality and personhood of Father&Son, without necessarily
concluding the Spirit is a distinct divine person. Clearly, though, the Spirit is no longer
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merely the Spirit of the Father, but (in a very real way) the 'Spirit of Christ/the Son' too,
even if john does not use that precise terminology. And we cannot be content with
speaking of the Spirit merely as 'God at work in a way made possible by Christ', we are
forced to something more like the assertion that the Spirit-Paraclete is 'the Father and the
Son at work'. In this connection we may note that jesus promises that he himself will
answer the disciples' prayers in his name, when he has been exalted, by working greater
signs through them than he himself had accomplished (14.12-13). The Christian community will understand that he does this too through the Spirit. In this respect also, the
Spirit is his executive power. But in all this we have not yet got a clearly distinct personhood of the Spirit.
Fourth, two johannine motifs, however, potentially push us still further in a 'trinitarian direction'.
(a) In john 16.13-14, jesus asserts
When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all truth; for he will not
speak of his own authority, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will declare
to you the things that are to come. [141 He will glorify me, for he will take what is
mine and declare it to you.
This hardly comports with the view that john perceives the Spirit merely as an extension of the vitality and personhood of God himself, rather than as a distinct person. The
contrast 'ou yap ... Cx.q>' e<xwtOu, not of himself, but what he hears [from the Father and
the Sonl' would be meaningless if Spirit is merely synechdoche for the Father or the
union of Father&Son. V.14, taken with what went before, implies a further johannine
contrast- while the Father can glorify himself and the Son (12.28), the Son cannot glorify
himself, only the Father (8.54). Similarly, here, the Spirit will not glorify/ speak of himself,
but glorifies the Son. If the Spirit is not a distinct person, but to be understood as essentially an extension of the Son's own vitality and personhood, the contrast would once again
prove disingenuous.
(b) Even more important, however, are the sayings which speak of the ascended jesus
'sending' or 'commissioning' the Spirit from the Father. In 15.26, jesus states, 'When the
Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth who
comes from the Father, he will testify on my behalf (cf. 14.26), Similarly, in john 16:7, he
says, 'But if I go [to the Fatherl, I will send him [the Spirit-Paracletel to you'.
We have perhaps grown too familiar with these words to recognise how startling they
would have sounded in a first-century context with an informed knowledge of judaism.
God is the only one who 'sends' his Spirit in the Old Testament, and there only twice ((sa
48.16; Ps 104.30), In IT judaism, outside the Scriptures, we only find such statements in
5 places: jud 16.14; Wis 9.17; Ps-Philo 31.9; jos Aj 8.114 and 4Ezr 14.22. On a unique
occasion, in the much later PesRab 3.4, God can even put some personal 'distance'
between himself and the Spirit: here, in a retelling of the story in Gen 48.13-14, God
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cajoles an apparently reluctant Holy Spirit to foot it speedily down to Jacob and help him
prophesy over his grandson Ephraim. But this would probably have been viewed as
humorous literary personification, rather than a move towards binitarianism, or the demotion of the Spirit to creaturely status.
By and large, it would be quite unthinkable for anyone other than God himself to
'send' the Spirit, because the Spirit is too closely identified with himself. But the remarkable formulations in Jn 15.26 and 16.7 (and similar ones in Luke-Acts) make just that sort
of claim about Jesus. Astonishing as that claim is, it would become all but incomprehensible were we to assert that John regards the Spirit as synechdoche for God the Father- no
more than a way of speaking of the extension of his own vitality, personality, and activity,
into the cosmos. For that would be tantamount to the claim that Jesus somehow 'commissioned' the Father, or his animus, and that Jesus in some way became Lord over the
Father's own and most immediate and personal power of influence.
If we were to represent John's message in spatial metaphors, we might say that according to 15.26 and 16.7, Jesus is portrayed as stepping between the Father and the Spirit,
remaining subordinate to the Father, while nevertheless commissioning and sending forth
the Spirit as an executive power he will henceforth share with the Father. He thus
becomes (in some qualified way) 'lord of the Spirit', while the Spirit nevertheless proceeds
'from the Father' (1t<xpa 'tOu 1t<X'tp6<;; 15.26), and is sent from the Father, just as was the
Logos. Jesus' commissioning of the Spirit thus brings to light some sort of hitherto unsuspected bifurcation between the Father and the Spirit, which Judaism had largely regarded
as different ways of speaking of the same being.
(c) This 'distance' between the Father and the Spirit, however, does not result in any loss
of 'personality' in the Spirit. So it now becomes all the more difficult to explain the personal traits of the Spirit simply as the extension of the Father's personhood and vitality.
Rather, the strong traits of personhood in the Spirit-Paraclete are now best understood to
belong to the Spirit himself, as he relates (differently) to the Father and the Son. In short,
John appears to have come to understand the Spirit as a distinct personal being in some
kind of intimate unity with the Father (and with the Son), not merely as a way of speaking of the Father at work in ways made possible by the Son, or even as a shorthand for
'the Father and the Son at work'.

(d) What we have said does not of itself necessarily lead to what we would call a fully
'trinitarian' pneumatology. John could have avoided such a conclusion by reducing the
Spirit to a powerful being, but one somehow less than God-perhaps something like the
angel of the Name, or Michael, or the Spirit of truth at Qumran. But while there are clearly important angelomorph features to the Spirit-Paraclete, and while it is true that John
does not explicitly call the Spirit 'qeo,j', as he does the Logos and the risen Christ (In 1.2;
20.28), there is no evidence that he taken the radical step of pushing the Spirit outside
the habitual circle of God's own self-identity. Indeed, the exalted Son, who may rightly be
hailed 'Iord and God' according to 20.28, must nevertheless petition the Father to send the
Spirit (14. 16, 26)- which implies a closeness and delicacy of relationship between Father
and Spirit, which would more naturally belong within the circle of divine self-identity.
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I. While John shares with Qumran and T 12P the terminology of the 'Spirit of
truth', the conceptions are quite different. The 'Spirit of truth' is a complex 'sphere
of influence' provided by a variety of inputs, including the Prince of light(s), God
himself, angeJ(s) of truth, etc. All people share in different degrees in this 'spirit of
truth' and the contrasting 'spirit of error', and they do so at all times. This contrasts
with the Johannine gift, built on Ezek 36, which is purely eschatological (cf. Jn 7.3739), and corresponds more with the different perception of the Spirit of truth which
begins in I QS4.20f.
2. The powerful angels- such as the angel of the Name and Michael- provide
only relatively weak analogies for the Spirit-Paraclete, who is a permanent mediator of the self-revealing presence of the Father and the Son to all obedient disciples in all places.
3. If the Spirit is not called 'God', God is nevertheless called 'Spirit', and it is
deduced from this that appropriate worship can only be enabled by the Spirit
(4.21 -24).
4. The remarkable parallels between Jesus and the Paraclete, combined with the
assertion that it is to the disciples, advantage that Jesus depart (16.7), so the SpiritParaclete may be given to them, suggests the Paraclete is a fully divine presence, not
merely a creaturely mediator.
The exaltation gift of the Spirit by Jesus, then, appears to reflect a genuinely 'trinitarian'
pneumatology in John, even if a somewhat implicit one. But we may question whether
this is a theology of significance for John and his community, or whether it is simply something of an aside, or appendix. We must ask what part trinitarian pneumatology plays in
the spirituality of the community, including its worship.

C.

O N THE SPIRiTs PLACE IN PROM077NG WORSHIP OF JESUS AS GOD

It is clear that John's churches worship both the Father and the Son- and most probably (pace Casey) 12 as the one God of Israel. How did the community come to offer the
Son worship as one God with the Father? The details are of course lost in the mists of
time. A widespread older explanation finds its starting point in the Gospel's Logos
Christology: Jesus is worshipped because he is identified with the pre-existent divine
word. On such a view, the 'trinitarian' pneumatology of John could be seen as an appendix to such a move. If Jesus is the divine Logos from within the circle of God's self-identity, then he can be supposed to have a share with the Father in the giving of the Spirit.
There are three problems with this explanation.
First, it simply pushes the problem one step further back, leaving unexplained how the
community concluded that Jesus was the Logos.
Second, all our evidence suggests that acknowledgement of Jesus' sharing in the giving
of God's Spirit precedes and was much more widespread than the affirmation of him as
the Logos. Indeed, it is striking that the only saying shared by all four Gospels is the
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promise Jesus will baptise Israel with Holy Spirit. And the Gospels probably interpreted
this as a sending of the Spirit, not merely powerful acts performed by the Messiah
endowed with the Spirit.
Third, it ignores precisely the dynamic of the Spirit that the Johannine Gospel and letters offer. It is this third point on which I wish to expand here.
For John it is the experience of the Spirit in the community which inspires and shapes
the worship, and gives it its Christocentric focus. For John, the ministry and teaching of
Jesus- including in his view the climactic teaching in John 14-17- did not lead to the conviction Jesus was the Logos or theos. Before the gift of the Spirit his followers had only
fragmentary and fleeting insights into his true identity, and of the kind and degree of his
unity with the Father.
If I may put it provocatively, there is very little indeed in what Jesus says or does within
the ministry (as described by John) that in itself unequivocally points to Jesus as Logos or
theos (rather than as a powerfully endowed messianic agent). Indeed, ironically, it is perhaps Jesus' claims that he will give the Spirit from the Father, and that he will come with
the Father to the disciple in and through the Spirit, that provide the firmest single basis for
equating him with the divine Logos, though John will have seen many other traits pointing in the same direction.
But from John's perspective the important thing is that the disciples had not yet grasped
all this. That is why they needed the Spirit-Paraclete. For most Jews, the promised eschatological Spirit would bring charismatic revelation, wisdom and inspired speech. The SpiritParaclete is a tailor-made christocentric revealer-teacher within this tradition! But, as such,
he is also the driving force of Christian worship of Jesus. For John, it is the Spirit who leads
the disciple into the truth Jesus has inca mated, and allows him to enter it and inhabit it.
Part of what John means is that the Spirit affords the incisive spiritual insights into the
accounts of what Jesus did and said, and the fruitful interconnections between them, that
together provide the overall coherence, and striking power of the story of Jesus. It is the
Spirit who knits together, in the mind and heart of the believer, the authentically Christian
symbolic universe and metanarrative, of which the Fourth Gospel itself is a powerful
example. John perceives that even what he regards as the central saving event- the cross
itself- will for some seem little but an ugly execution, a scandal rather than a revelation
(6.60-63). It is only through the illumination of the Spirit that it becomes both the very
exaltation of Jesus and simultaneously the glorification of the Father, the epitome of his
loving wisdom. For John it is the revelatory, wisdom-creating, Spirit which brings the disciple to grasp- or rather be grasped by- the saving nature and full depth of the unity of the
Father and the Son.
To say that is of course not enough. It could suggest the Spirit's role is primarily conceptconstruction. As Cor Bennema has shown, what John envisages is something which is indeed
conceptual, but at the same time also deeply personal and liberatingly experiential. The Spirit
is experienced as bringing communion with the Father and the Son (J John 1.3), as enabling
the 'abiding of the Father and the Son in love with the disciple (In 14.23), and as the means
of the self-manifestation of Jesus to the disciple (14.21). Those who 'confess the Son' 'have
the Father also' (I In 2.23); they have both the Father and the Son (2 In 1.9). Reciprocally,
obedient disciples abide in the Son and the Father (note the order in I Jn 2.24D.
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These and other examples suggest that the revealer-Spirit confronts the disciple in a
variety of ways with a divine presence which is profoundly shaped by the Christ-event,
and by the unity of the Father and the Son which it expresses.
This spiritual 'confronation' might encompass a wide variety of distinct expressions. At
one extreme we might point to the kind of dramatic visionionary phenomena depicted in
the Apocalypse, including the opening prophetic addresses of the risen Lord to the seven
churches and the throne vision of chs 4-5. These were perhaps not so commonplace. At
the other extreme we might locate a multitude of experiences where individuals are challenged, moved, encouraged, receive a sense of forgiveness, or whatever, as the Spirit 'illumines' a gospel story or teaching, bringing it 'alive' as a 'word' from the Father&Son
addressing the individual and her situation. All this is encompassed in what John means
by asserting that the Spirit will 'teach the disciples' all things, bring to 'remembrance' all
that Jesus has said to them (14.26), lead them into all truth (16.13), and 'glorify' Jesus by
taking what pertains to him and 'declaring' it to the believers (16.13-15), and so forth.
For the writers of the Gospel and Johannine epistles the Spirit was a robust and
intrusive divine presence. The writer of I John has such confidence in the Spirit that he
can assure his readers: 'you have no need that anyone should teach you; as his anointing teaches you about everything, and is true ..., just as it has taught you, abide in him'
(2.27). And if anyone presses the question, 'How do we know he abides in us' the
writer's answer is as simple as it is unequivocal: 'We know by the Spirit which he has
given us' (3 .24).
All this has consequences for the tightly related issues of worship and the basis of
Christology. Let me offer some ill-disciplined and speculative comments.
In the Johannine context, worship of God is not something humans do in their own
resources on the basis of logical deductions about the divine status of the object and the
human duty of the subject. It would not have been a question of the community agreeing, for example, that now that they recognised Jesus as Logos and theos they should
probably add some prayers to him too. For John, authentic worship is worship 'in Spirit
and truth' (jn 4.23)- that is, worship prompted and enabled by the Spirit and shaped by
the truth he reveals. Given the profoundly 'trinitarian' shape of the theology and spirituality of the community, we may suppose its worship reflected this. It would be worship
offered to the Father and to the Son, in and through the Holy Spirit.
It is unlikely that worship to the Spirit would have been encouraged, though occasions
of it cannot be absolutely excluded. The Spirit was fundamentally understood as what
Bishop Taylor nicely called the Go-Between God; the two-way personal organ of communication between the believers on earth and the Father&Son in heaven. The Spirit was
conceived of rather as acting at the subjective pole of a believer's experience, but orientating him or her towards the Father and the Son, glorifying them, rather than himself.
If worship in the Johannine communities was as informal and corporately charismatic
as in the Pauline and Lucan churches, or more like enthusiastic and charismatic forms of
Christianity in the last century, we might envisage the focus of the worship and praise
shifting from Father to Son and vice-versa, depending on how charismata of the Spirit
more emphasised the one or the other. A prophetic word from the risen Lord, a vision of
him, or a healing attributed to him, could be expected to evoke praise especially
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addressed to Jesus, including, no doubt, such charismatic acclamations as 'Jesus is Lord',
and 'Lord, come', but by no means restricted to these. If charismatic teaching highlighted
the Father's love in sending the Son, corresponding worship, prayer and praise might be
expected to focus more on the Father- and the latter would certainly be the case in connection with the reading of Scripture. If for John, 'grace, mercy, and peace will be with us
from God the Father and from Jesus Christ the Father's Son' (as 2 John 1.3 puts iu, praise
and thanksgiving would naturally be offered to both. The overall shape of the community's
worship would reflect (and so sustain) its conviction that the community was one of communion with the Father and the Son.
We need not doubt that Christo logical polemics with non-believing Judaism and with
schismatic Christians highlighted the Christocentric focus in the worship of the Johannine
communities. But it is quite a different matter to suggest that there was an earlier form of
Johannine worship that was addressed exclusively to the Father alone (in the name of
Jesus) rather than to the Father and to the Son. To get back to such a position, one would
need to tear out the heart of John's 'trinitarian' pneumatology. And while attempts have
been made to bracket out the Paraclete sayings, they have proved less than convincing.

D:

O N THE RELATION OF LOGOS/THEOS TO SPIRfT-CHRISTOLOGY IN JOHN.

Finally, within this Johannine section we may tum to the basis of Johannine Christology.
Logos Christology is important to John, but we may question whether it is central in the
sense of being generative. Walter Kasper has argued that it is John's Spirit-Christology which
more fundamentally motivates his Christo-theology, including the Logos theology. There is
reason to take this seriously. Giving Logos theology primary place has tended to leave interpreters wondering why the Johannine Jesus needs the Spirit at all. The incandescent Christ
glows by virtue of his hypostatic union. And, as we have pointed out, it then becomes
unclear why and how John adopted such a Christological foundation . Walter Kasper argues
per contra that it is actually the Spirit-Christology that explains Jesus' identification with the
Logos.13 More precisely, he argues that Jesus can only 'become' (to the world) the Logos
incamate because he is given the Spirit without measure, and he then gives the Spirit as his
own Spirit. Important as the prologue of John is and as important as Thomas' climactic confession of Jesus as Lord and God is, you could remove these from the pages of the Fourth
Gospel without significantly changing its essential divine Christology. The prologue and
Thomas's confession most distinctly express that Christology, but it is driven from elsewhere-it is driven by the Church's multifaceted experience of the Spirit as simultaneously
the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. Not merely the Father's empowering presence, but
very much that of Christ as well. This kind of trinitarian and Christocentric pneumatology is
not, however, a Johannine distinctive. It is neither the product of polemics, far less the result
of an alleged adoption of Gentile self-understanding. It is clearly there in Luke and Paul as
well, and it is to these which we now tum, perforce briefly.
IV. 'TRINITARIAN' PNEUMATOLOGY IN LUKE-ACTS? A SKETCH
As I have presented most of the detailed argument elsewhere I can confine this sketch
to summary statements of conclusions, and amplification of areas not previously covered.14
For Luke, as for John, the uniqueness of Jesus' ministry is a result of the Spirit with him
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(Lk 1.35; 4.18-21; Acts 10.38), But the crowning point of Luke's Christology comes
through post-resurrection exaltation to the right hand of God (in accordance with Ps
110.1) and the pouring out of the gift of God's Holy Spirit Acts 2.33-36). The Pentecost
account-in the co-text of Acts- represents 'trinitarian' pneumatology, including divine
Christology, in most of its major traits. In this respect I make 7 brief observations:
( I) Professor Bauckham has a made a strong case that the position at God's right
hand in NT uses of Ps I 10. I refers to the divine throne itself, not to merely to
some more distant seat of honour, and that only figures included within the selfidentity of God could take their place there.ls
(2) The Holy Spirit given thence is emphatically the divine Spirit-Luke has Peter
deliberately emphasise that it was God who said 'I will pour out my Spirit (as the
Spirit of prophecy) ... on my servants' (2.17). Yet Peter goes on to assert that Jesus
had received this Spirit as gift and has now himself 'poured out' the startling
Pentecostal prophetic charismata (2.33). These activities of Christ through the Spirit
are identified (at 2.33, 36) as the beginning of his messianic rule promised in Lk
1.33-34). They mark the beginning of the fulfilment of the Baptist's promise that
the coming one would 'baptize' Israel with Holy Spirit and fire (Lk 3.16; Acts 1.5;
I 1.16). And they undergird Jesus' own claim that he will himself send the promise
of the Father, the power from on high (Lk 24.49). In the light of this Jesus is identified as one with Yahweh as the 'Lord' (2.36) upon whose name one is to call for
salvation, and in whose name one is baptised (2.38-40).
(3) If Jesus is hereby identified in some sense as 'Lord of the Spirit' it must be
observed that there is no consequent distancing of the Spirit from God. The Holy
Spirit remains the Spirit of the Lord God (5.9; 8.39) ; God is the ultimate
source/giver of the Spirit (5.32; 15.8); to lie to the Spirit is to lie to God (5.3-9); to
be anointed with the Spirit is for God to be with one (10.38), etc.

(4) Nor does Jesus' 'co-lordship' of the Spirit with the Father lead to any attempt to
make the Spirit 'impersonal' (contra JervelD. Indeed a wider range of verbs of personal action are collocated with the Spirit than anywhere else in the New
Testament. And the very lexemes Bultmann cited as pointing to an impersonal,
dynamistic, concept of the Spirit- e.g. 'pour out', 'fill with', etc., are actually elsewhere used in strongly 'personal' contexts. With respect to 'pouring out' we might
compare Yahweh's handling of Dame Wisdom in Sirach 1.9, 'The Lord himself created wisdom; he saw her and apportioned her, he poured her out upon all his
works. She dwells with all flesh according to his gift, and he supplied her to those
that love him'. That fill with/ full of language, collocated with HS, need not imply
lack of personhood is perhaps most dramatically instanced in Shepherd of Hermas,
Mandate I I. 9, 'the angel of the prophetic Spirit, who is attached to him, fills
(1TA:rlPo1) the man, and the man, being filled with (1TAllPro8et<;) the Holy Spirit,
speaks to the multitude, according to the Lord's will. For the language of people
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being filled by divine persons, or their influence, see e.g. the more contemporary
Col 1.19; 2.9 and Eph 1.23; 3.19, etc.
(5) Taking the above points together, we appear to have a similar picture to that in
John. The Spirit is the self-revealing personal and empowering presence of God, but
Jesus' exaltation reception of the Spirit from the Father, and his consequent 'lordship' of the Spirit, implies a distinct personhood in the Spirit, which can no longer
be that of the Father.
(6) As in John, too, the Spirit has now become not merely the Spirit of the Lord
God, but also the Spirit of /esus- a point confirmed by exactly that usage as a synonym for the Holy Spirit at Acts 16.6-7. To speak of 'the Spirit of Jesus' cannot simply mean 'God at work in a way made possible by Jesus'-for the Spirit here is the
revelatory Spirit of prophecy, and from Luke's perspective had always been so.
What is meant, rather, is that Jesus is the lord of the messianic mission, which he
prosecutes through the Spirit, as 'lord of the Spirit'. He does so by granting the
charismata normally associated with the Spirit of prophecy, namely revelation, wisdom and inspired speech. Typical here, is the example of Stephen. According to
6.1 0 his hearers and opponents cannot resist the wisdom and the Spirit with which
he speaks. But the careful reader knows this redactionally combines the promise of
the Spirit's aid in Luke 12.1 0 and jesus' words in 2 1.15: '/ will give you a mouth and
wisdom which none of your adversaries will be able to withstand or contradict'. In
short, Stephen is an example of jesus acting through the wisdom-giving Spirit of
prophecy. For Luke, as for John, all this means Christ is an active presence in the
Church. It is he who is baptising the church with Holy Spirit, in accordance with the
Baptist's promise.

(7) The extent which the Spirit affords encounter with and presence of Jesus in the
church is well illustrated in Acts. Stephen, full of the Spirit sees the glory of God,
and Jesus, as the Son of Man, standing at the right hand (7.55). His declaration of
this precipitates his ensuing execution. Near to expiry, his prayer is not the exclusively monotheistic 'Father, into your hands I commit my spirit', but 'Lord Jesus,
receive my spirit' followed by a prayer to Jesus as Lord for the forgiveness of his
executioners (7.59-60). The vision of Ananias in Acts 9.10-15 is another case in
point, as are those to Paul in Corinth (18.9- 10) and Jerusalem (22.17-21). In each
case the co-text clarifies that the 'Lord' who appears is Jesus, directing the mission
that witnesses to him, and bringing comfort and encouragement. As OToole and
Buckwalter have argued,16 Acts does not provide an absentee Christology; but a
Christology of divine omnipresence through the Spirit, well captured by the words
of the risen Lord to Paul in Acts 18.10: '/ am with you ...'.

To Conclude: Acts 2 and beyond depicts the same kind of 'trinitarian' pneumatology
that we observed in John. The Son, subordinate to the Father, gives the Spirit of Cod as
the Spirit of Jesus. As Lord of the Spirit, Jesus is uniquely identified with God as 'Lord of
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all' (10.36). The Spirit brings the self-revealing empowering presence of the Father and
the Son, and evokes prayer and worship usually addressed to Cod the Father, but also to
the Son. The direct evidence of the latter is slim, but due importance should be accorded
to Stephen's prayer, given the solemnity and finality of the moment. A martyr's last words
would be taken as exemplary. In addition, it should be noted that in Acts Christians are
referred to, both by believers and by Jewish opponents, as 'those who call on the name of
Jesus' (9.14; 21), which strongly suggests the regular worshiping invocation of the type
allowed exclusively to Cod in the Old Testament and IT Judaism. Even if the term
applied primarily to baptismal epiclesis (cf.22. 16; 2.21,38), and there is no reason to
believe it was, it would still be a highly significant act of worship. For Luke, it would constitute a plea to 'the Lord' for salvation, rooted in the programmatic Joel passage (joel
2:32; Acts 2.21 , 38). Within the context of Peter's Pentecost speech, calling on the name
the Lord Jesus in baptism (2.38) functions as calling on the name of Yahweh for eschatological salvation (2.2 J) .17

v. 'TRINITARIAN' PNEUMATOLOGY IN PAUL? A SKETCH.
Paul offers the same kind of trinitarian pneumatology. Here my first two major points
largely draw on the results of my student Mehrdad Fatehi's work, The Spints Relation to the

Risen Lord in Paul. 18
( I) The Spirit is inalienably the Spirit of God- not merely by name,I9 but by nature.
Cod's Spirit is his own personal indwelling of his eschatological temple, the people
of Cod (I Cor 3.16, etc.l. Remarkably, in I Cor 2.10-12, Paul compares the relation of the Spirit to Cod with how a person's spirit relates to himself or herself, i.e.
as the self-aware, self-scrutinising ego that can alone intimately search and reveal
one's deepest being. This might almost suggest that 'Spirit' is a way of speaking not
merely of the extension of Cod's vitality and personality, but of the very centre of
the Father's own personhood-as in 2 Baruch 75.
(2) In view of what we have just said, it is all the more surprising that Paul can also
speak of the Spirit as the 'Spirit of (jesus) Christ', and the 'Spirit of Cod's Son' (Rom
8.9; Phil 1.19; Cal 4.6). Fatehi has shown we misunderstand these expressions entirely if we restrict them to mean 'Cod, as Spirit, at work in a way made possible by
Christ' or 'the Spirit recapitulating the sonship of Jesus in us', or the like. The Pauline
concept certainly includes such ideas, but it moves beyond them to express Christ's
own lordship of the Spirit, and the Spirit as the executive power of the risen Christ.
It is true, as Professor Dunn observes, that (unlike Luke and John) Paul does not say
Jesus 'gives', 'commissions' or 'pours out' the Spirit- such things are said only of Cod.20 It is
not the 'giving' of the Spirit that is crucial, however (and in any case both John and Luke
agree it is the Father who is the ultimate 'giver' of the Spirit; the Son only gives the Spirit
'from' the Father}. The critical issue, rather, is that in all other respects the Spirit is portrayed as
related to the risen Lord in ways that directly mirror the relationship of the Spirit to God. This may
be illustrated time and again, but let us briefly mention some obvious examples.
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(a) In Romans 15.18-19, Paul portrays his whole ministry as something the
exalted Christ (not the Father} has wrought through him, and specifically by
the power of the Holy Spirit. Similarly, in I Cor 12.7-10 charismata of the
Spirit are identified simultaneously as 'workings' of Cod and 'services or ministries' granted by the Lord (a point emphasised even more directly in Eph
4.7-11). Once again, in 2 Cor 3.3, and echoing the new-covenant of Jer 31
and Ezek 36, the Corinthian church is described as a letter from Christ, written by the Spirit of Cod-not on tablets of stone but on human hearts. We
might rather have expected 'God' to be named the author of such Spirit-written letters. And the church is transfonned from one degree of glory to another by the Spirit, as it gazes at the glory of the Lord in Christ (3 . 17-18).
Similarly, in Rom 1.3-4, the phrase 'according to the Spirit of holiness' most
probably characterises the Spirit as the executive power of Jesus, post-resurrection sonship and of the activities that flow from it.
(b) If we return for a moment to I Cor 2.1 1-16, we have already noted how
the Spirit is portrayed as the discerning and self-revealing centre of Cod's personhood. In v.16, however, Paul effectively equates this with the unsearchable 'mind of the Lord', whom no man can instruct (quoting Isa 40.13), and
remarkably goes on to assert, 'but we have the mind of Christ'. In short, by
the Spirit the spiritual man does know the mind of Cod, and that is 'the mind
of Christ'. The Spirit searches and reveals the deep things of the Father and
the Son.
(c) A number of passages in Paul link 3 Old Testament covenantal themes:
those of God's people belonging to him, his dwelling in/amongst his people,
and the Spirit's mediation of this indwelling, see e.g. 1 Cor 3.16; 2 Cor 6.16,
Eph 2.21 -22, etc. These build largely on such texts as Lev 26.11 -12, Jer 31
and Ezek 36-3 7. Rom 8.9- 1 I, develops the same three themes, but
exchanges Christ for God, and uses 'Spirit of Christ' for, and in direct parallel
to, 'Spirit of Cod'.

(d) In Cal 4.6, the Spirit is called 'the Spirit of God's Son', because the passage
(3.23 -4.7) is part of Paul's elucidation of the probatio, especially of Cal 2.1920, with its central claims that 'it is not I who live, but Christ who lives in me',
and 'the life I now live, I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me'. The
Spirit lies at the heart of the rich Christ-mysticism that pervades Paul (see e.g.
2 Cor 4-5; Phil 1.21 ; 3.10, etc.).

In sum, Jesus relates to the Spirit in much the same way that Yahweh relates to Spirit in the Old
Testament and ITP literature, and indeed the genitive in the expression 'Spirit of Christ'
(Rom 8.9-11), and similar titles for the Spirit in Cal 4.6 and Phil 1.19, are most probably
modelled on the Old Testament expressions 'Spirit of God' and 'Spirit of the Lord'. It
expresses the theology that Chris~ as covenant Lord, indwells his people, brings them new covenant
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'life: addresses them in prophetic oracles (e.g. 2 Cor 12.9), acts amongst them and through themand does all this by the Holy Spiri~ in the same way as can be said of Cod himself
(3) How can Paul make such a claim- especially in the light of I Cor 2.10-16without making Christ's lordship through the Spirit sound too much like a bizarre
and blasphemous 'lordship' over the interiority and personhood of the Father? How
can the Father's Spirit simultaneously be the Son's self-revealing personal presence
and executive power?

The conception of the precise relationship of the one Cod to the Spirit he sends had
been hazy in the Old Testament and ITP literature, but the relationship of Christ to the
Spirit would have made it difficult for Paul to think in terms of synechdoche. The answer,
as with John and Luke, appears to be that he understands all the personal language used
of the Spirit to mean the Spirit had some kind of distinct personhood in union with Christ
and the Father, and 'sent' jointly by them (the parallel between the sending of the Son
and the sending of the Spirit of the Son, in Cal 4.4-6, might readily suggest such).

Paul can thus even come to portray some kind of dialogical relationship between Cod and the
Spirit in Rom 8. [n a move that partially parallels I Cor 2, Paul can say the Spirit intercedes to Cod through the believer, when she herself has come to the end of speech, and
that Cod who searches the believer's heart understands the intercession, because Cod
knows the 'mind of the Spirit' (Rom 8.26-27). The complementarity is noted: on the one
hand the Spirit searches the mind of Cod and of Christ and reveals the deep things of
Cod to believers; on the other, Cod knows the mind of the Spirit as he intercedes from
the groaning depths of believers. Here we seem to have at least interesting evidence that
Paul pneumatology had developed in a trinitarian direction.
(4) We may now briefly comment on the development of divine Christology and
worship of Jesus in Paul and the pauline churches. In an intriguing section on 1 Cor
15.45, Professor Dunn argues that Paul all but fully identifies Christ with the Spirit
when he speaks of Jesus as a pneuma zoopoioun. He glosses the apparent theological
significance of the passage as follows: 'Christ is experienced in and through, even as
the life-giving Spirit'Y But, surprisingly, Dunn appears to treat this rather as an
uncharacteristic break from the Pauline christological 'reserve'; one parallel to Rom
9.5, if the latter passage should be read to bless Christ as 'Cod over all'. Both passages, he appears to suggest, should be regarded as rather marginal to Paul's thinking; perhaps more expressions of his momentary lack of thought. 22
With Fee, I would question the particular exegesis of pneuma zoopoioun.2l I do not think
it is a direct reference to the Holy Spirit, though I would heartily agree that were one to
pose to Paul the question how Jesus can be 'a life-giving spirit (with a small 's'), he would
undoubtedly answer 'through the Holy Spirit, experienced as the Spirit of Christ'. But
even if Dunn's interpretation of I Cor 15.45 is correct, I submit it might be misleading to
suggest that the theology with which he appears to gloss it is 'uncharacteristic', or that we
should treat it with reserve. As Fatehi has shown, what Dunn attributes to 1 Cor 15.45 is
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in fact thoroughly 'typical' of Paul (except, perhaps, in the extent of the 'identification'
implied, and the mode of expressing it).
Dunn goes on to suggest that the sort of experience of Christ through the Spirit implicit in his understanding of I Cor 15.45 may ultimately have led to divine Christology. Or,
more precisely, early Christian experience of the Spirit leading them on the one hand to
cry 'Abba, Father'! (Rom 8.15) and on the other to proclaim 'Jesus is Lord!' (I Cor 12.3),
may have 'found its most lasting expression in a trinitarian understanding of God' (264).
The implication is that Paul's own 'reserve' did not allow him to take this (rash?) step himself. But we may doubt this.
As we have just seen in our discussion of his pneumatology, Paul, as easily as the
writer of I John, could have written 'our communion is with the Father and with his Son
Jesus Christ' - and both could have added 'through the Spirit'. As is well known, the salutatory prayer-blessings which open most of Paul's letters bid grace and peace on the readers from God and from the Lord Jesus. More remarkably, some six of the dosing benedictions single Jesus out as the source of grace, and five of them lack any corresponding
mention of Cod (Cal 6.18; I Thess 5.28; I Cor 16.23; Phil 4.23; Philem 1.25 and cf.
Rom 16.20). The five could almost seem blatant lese majeste. Again, the diadic nature of
the Christian experience of God and Christ through the Spirit is neatly represented in the
prayer of I Thess 3.11 -13. 24 A seventh closing benediction is triadic, and may perhaps
best serve as an epigram summing up Pauline spirituality: 'the grace of our Lord Jesus
Christ, and the love of Cod, and the fellowship in the Holy Spirit be with you all' (2 Cor
13. 13). This pattern of prayer only underscores what Dunn calls the 'double relationship'-to Cod as Father and Jesus as Lord- which characterised the church's experience of
the Spirit. But the pattern also sets the essentially 'trinitarian' relationship firmly within
Pauls own theological horizon.
Because the Spirit is experienced as the active presence of Christ, it is also natural for
Paul to pray to Christ, both individually (as at 2 Cor 12.8-10) and in the corporate worship of the church. The maranatha invocation of I Cor 16.22 is but one expression of
this; we have also noted the grace salutations and benedictions which would be read
within the context of worship, and provide a model for prayer there. Paul can even characterise Christian communities as 'those who call on the name of the Lord Jesus' (I Cor
1.2; cf Rom 10.12-13), which seems to imply cultic veneration of Christ was typical.
That Paul also regularly expressed a more hierarchical model of prayer and thanksgiving to the Father, in and though Jesus, or in his name (cf. Rom 16.25-27; Col 3.16-17,
etc), need not surprise us. It accords with his belief that Cod, who sent both Son and
Spirit, is the ultimate source of salvation. But it does not necessarily express any reservation about whether thanksgiving and adoration should be offered to the son.25 Phil 2.1 I
envisages an eschatological and universal worship of Jesus as 'the Lord' in accordance
with the vigorously monotheistic Isa 45.23; yet this will be to God's glory. It is difficult to
believe he thought this would only become appropriate at the End, and should not be
anticipated in the church. Against any such a reserve stands his remarkable Christological
redefinition of the Shema' at I Cor 8.6,26 and the matching joyful acclamation 'Jesus is
Lord' that Paul anticipates in the congregational worship at Corinth (1 Cor 12.3). His
readers, whether Jew or Centile believers, could barely take these as other than a declara-
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tion of some kind of divine status for Jesus, yet Paul offers no hints that he fears such an
understanding!
It comes then as no surprise that Ephesians 5.19-20 specifically includes 'singing and
making melody to the Lord' as part and parcel of worship offered 'in the name of our Lord
Jesus Christ' 'to Cod the Father'. If it be insisted that this is the voice of a disciple rather
than of Paul himself, I can only suggest that in that case he saw Paul's logic more clearly
than Paul himself. It may be noted that in I Cor 12.3 the worship of Christ is portrayed
as the direct inspiration of the Spirit and in Eph 5.19-20 as an expression of being 'filled
with the Spirit' (5.18). It would seem, then, that experience of the Spirit drives the worship of Jesus at every level- in understanding who he is (he is 'Lord of the Spirit'l, in bringing his presence and activity which evoke the response of prayer and worship, and in
direct inspiration of that worship.
Professor Dunn thinks that Paul suffered a Christological 'reserve' that prevented him
from taking the final step towards the kind of trinitarian pneumatology that later disciples
embraced. I think he has rested his case a little too much on exquisite distinctions of the
sort of 'worship' that might be offered to Cod and to Christ, and on Paul's failure explicitly to call Jesus theos, Rom 9.5 being a possible aberration. While I admire the distinctions, I
am not sure they face the central question. They may point to a quite different type of
trinitarian theology from that which was developed by the great Councils, but still one
worthy of the name. Let me put it this way. Had Paul stood up at the various trials in Acts
22 onwards, and he admitted the sort teaching we have been looking at, the court would
have had little doubt he was saying there are not merely two, but even probably three,
powers in heaven. They would also undoubtedly have concluded that in the usual sense
of the word, Paul clearly 'worshipped' the Father and the Son as one Cod-and-Lord,
whatever over-subtle caveats he himself may have protested. So might the apostle's
crown of martyrdom have been much more speedily achieved. It certainly would if he
had a faced a trial of post-Jamnia Jewish leaders, but that is a significantly different question.
CONCLUSION

Our three major witnesses agree that the Spirit belongs within the self-identity of Cod.
But Christ's exaltation as Lord of the Spirit both includes him within that self-identity, and
distinguishes the Spirit from the Father more sharply than had hitherto been attempted.
As a result, the traditional 'personal' features of the Spirit came increasingly to be seen as
belonging to the Spirit 'himself - if I can put it that way- rather than as a mere extension
of the personality of the Father. This, when combined with the strong insistence (of various kinds) on the relational unity of Father, Son and Spirit, leads to an essentially trinitarian type of theology. But I have also argued that the experience of Christ as Lord of the
Spirit, and of the Spirit's glorification of Jesus, may help us explain the rapid development
of divine Christology and the attendant rise of the worship of Jesus. The exaltation gift of
Spirit provides grounds for belief that Jesus is one with Cod; experiences of Cod and Christ
that evoke response of prayer and worship, and even direct inspiration of such worship.
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WHY DOESN'T GOD

MAKE

H IS
EXISTENCE MORE OBVIOUS?

. ..
KEVIN KINGHORN

In an influential book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, J. L. Schellenberg
has argued that God, if he did exist, would surely make his existence and ongoing
presence in the world more obvious. Schellenberg summarizes his line of argument
as follows.
A perfectly loving God would desire a reciprocal personal relationship always
to obtain between himself and every human being capable of it. But a logically
necessary condition of such Divine-human reciprocity is human belief in
Divine existence. Hence a perfectly loving God would have reason to ensure
that everyone capable of such belief (or at any rate, everyone capable who
was not disposed to resist it) was in possession of evidence sufficient to bring it
about that such belief was formed. But the evidence actually available is not of
this sort .... The most obvious indication that it is not is that inculpable .. .nonbelief actually occurs. Hence we can argue from the weakness of theistic evidence ... , or more specifically, from the reasonableness of nonbelief, to the
nonexistence of a perfectly loving God. But God, if he exists, is perfectly loving. Hence we can argue from the reasonableness of nonbelief to the nonexistence of God. 1
We can put Schellenberg's line of argument in the following form:
( I) A perfectly loving God would desire a reciprocal relationship always to
obtain between himself and every human capable of it.
(2) But a logically necessary condition of such a relationship is belief in
God's existence.
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(3) Hence, a loving Cod would bring it about that those not resistant to the truth
are in possession of sufficient evidence showing that Cod exists. (From (I) and (2))
(4) Yet the available evidence is not of this sort, as evidenced by inculpable nonbelief.
(5) Hence, a perfectly loving Cod does not exist. (From (3) and (4))
In what follows I shall discuss how certain Christian writers have sought to account
for the fact that Cod remains to some extent 'hidden' from us in this world. I shall
then outline what I take to be three plausible kinds of responses the Christian theist
might offer against the kind of objection Schellenberg raises.

I.

REALLy O CCUR?
Some Christian writers have not wanted to concede Schellenbergs working assumption that inculpable nonbelief does in fact occur (premise (4)) . John Calvin, for example,
seemed to suggest that, whenever a person fails to hold the beliefs requisite for theistic
faith, he does so as a result of willful spiritual blindness. Calvin maintained that all people
have at least some beliefs about Cod. He maintained
DOES INCULPABLE NONBEUEF

that a sense of Deity is indelibly engraven on the human heart. And that this belief
is naturally engendered in all, and thoroughly fixed as it were in our very
bones .... mhis is not a doctrine which is first learned at school, but one ... which
nature herself allows no individual to forget, though many, with all their might,
strive to do so?
At the same time, Calvin pointed to human sin in explaining why all people do not hold
further religious beliefs essential to a proper relationship with Cod, such as the belief that
we are bound to submit to Cod's authority. He asks,
how can the idea of Cod enter your mind without instantly giving rise to the
thought, that since you are his workmanship, you are bound, by the very law of
creation, to submit to his authorityLthat your life is due to himLthat whatever
you do ought to have reference to him?3
Calvin then puts it to his readers that, for those who do not form these further religious
beliefs, "it undoubtedly follows that your life is sadly corrupted."4
Calvin is not alone in maintaining that beliefs essential to a relationship with Cod
would inevitably follow from a life that was free from sin. Tertullian wrote that
the soul, be it cabined and cribbed by the body, be it confined by evil nurture, be it
robbed of its strength by lusts and desires, be it enslaved to false gods,- none the
less, when it recovers its senses, as after surfeit, as after sleep, as after some illness,
when it recaptures its proper health, the soul names Cod. The witness of the soul
[is] in its very nature Christian!5
More recently Mark R. Talbot has argued that, from the Christian perspective, it is entirely
appropriate to assert the contrary-to-fact conditional: "Everybody would believe in Cod, if
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it weren't for sin."6 Talbot goes so far as to claim that "Even unbelievers have some reason
to think this is true."7 He defends this last claim by pointing to Christians who testify that
only at their conversions did they recognize that sin had made them resistant to seeing
certain truths about God. Talbot then contends that even unbelievers can recognize this
testimony as evidence for the original contrary-to-fact conditional that all people would be
theists, were it not for sin.
Is it plausible to suggest that all cases of theistic nonbelief stem from morally culpable,
self-deceptive acts? Schellenberg certainly thinks otherwise and stresses the importance of
a subject's conduct "in other epistemic contexts."
Has he shown himself to be honest, a lover of truth? Does he resist his wants when
his head tells him he ought not to give in to them ? We may also have reason to
believe that S desires to have a well-justified belief that C or that not-G. If this is clearly so in some particular case, then (unless there is strong evidence to the contrary)
we may surely conclude that S is not self-deceived in arriving at [theistic nonbeliefJ.8
Schellenberg's point here in support of inculpable non belief is that, if a nonbeliever has
shown himself to be an earnest seeker of truth in non-religious contexts, then we have no
reason to suppose that he is willfully (and culpably) 'blinding' himself to the truth in religious contexts.
In response, the Christian theist might point out that there are different reasons why a
person might seek to hold true, well-justified beliefs. A person might seek to do so
because he desires to fulfill his obligations toward his creator and wants to make sure he
knows of all such obligations he has. If this is the case, then the person can indeed hardly
be accused of self-deceptive resistance to the truth about God. On the other hand, a person may in some instance seek to hold true, well-justified beliefs simply out of a general
desire to know lots of facts or because he likes to think of himself as an eminently rational
person. If this is the case, then it is far from clear that the person who seeks after truth in
non-religious matters will likely also be open to the truth on religious matters.
If God does exist and does seek to relate to us as lord, then his commands may fix for
us any number of obligations- obligations that may reach into such important and personal areas as one's finances, vocational choices and sexual behavior. Given that the kind of
behavioral implications stemming from religious questions seem (at least potentially) far
greater than with any other question, it seems unclear just how reliable one's attitude
toward the truth in non-religious contexts will be in predicting one's attitude toward religious truths. For religious questions have implications for areas of life in which all people
have heavy personal interest; and the greater one's personal interest in a subject matter,
the more impetus there is for self-deception.
Despite this possible response by the Christian theist, Talbot's contrary-to-fact conditional ultimately seems unpromising as a challenge to the kind of objection Schellenberg
raises. First, even if we suppose that, without sin, all people would form certain general
beliefs about God- such as the belief 'that God exists'-, it surely remains implausible to
think that, without sin, all people would form the beliefs requisite for specifically Christian
faith. A person who has never heard the gospel message about Jesus Christ represents an
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obvious example where it is more than sin that prevents one from forming Christian
beliefs. Second, even if we grant that all people's failures to form Christian beliefs do stem
somehow from sin, the Christian theist will still need to say more if she is to rebut the
charge that nonbelief undermines God's perfect goodness. Thomas Y. Morris explains.
Human-defectiveness theories .. .still fall short of what is needed. For any such
accounts, as typically developed, may explain why we do not see the ordinary
handiwork of God in creation and in his normal providential governing of the
world as manifesting him, or why we don't experience his indwelling presence spiritually in any sort of regular or continuous way, but they do not offer any explanation of why God does not do more extraordinary, dramatic miracles to demonstrate his existence and govemance 9
Thus, even if we grant that some sort of spiritual blindness is affecting the way in which a
person assesses the evidence available to her, and even if we grant that, without this spiritual blindness, she would form specifically Christian beliefs, we will still want to know
why God has not provided more positive evidence for her consideration.
This last point can serve to make Schellenberg's original line of argument even
stronger. Premise (3) in Schellenberg's original line of argument was this:
(3) Hence, a loving God would bring it about that those not resistant to the truth
are in possession of sufficient evidence showing that God exists. (From (I) and (2))

However, even if all nonbelievers are "resistant to the truth" about God in that they resist
the evidence they do have, we can still ask why a perfectly loving God would not do
more to overcome this resistance by providing more evidence for them to consider. Thus,
we might change premise (3) of Schellenberg's argument to the even more forceful
(3)_ Hence, a loving God would bring it about that those not resistant to the truth
(to the extent that no amount of evidence would leave them unconvincedl are in possession of sufficient evidence showing that God exists. (From (I) and (2))
With this adjusted understanding of Schellenberg's third premise, we are free to remove
the reference to inculpable nonbelief from his fourth premise. Thus,
(4) Yet the available evidence is not of this sort, as evidenced by inculpable nonbelief.
becomes simply:
(4) Yet the available evidence is not of this sort.
With this amended line of argument, premise (4)_ remains a challenge to the Christian
theist even if Calvin and Talbott are correct in maintaining that inculpable nonbelief does
not exist. For, even if all people are culpable for their failure to believe on the evidence
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available to them, the Christian theist may still be asked to explain why a loving Cod
would not provide the kind of evidence that would surely convince even the most resistant toward the truth.
Would it be possible for Cod to provide evidence of this sort? In David Hume's
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion the character C1eanthes imagines how Cod might
seek to remove doubts that he exists and has communicated messages to humankind.
Suppose .. .that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more
melodious than any which human art could ever reach; suppose that this voice were
extended in the same instant over all nations and spoke to each nation in its own
language and dialect; suppose that the words delivered not only contain a just sense
and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent Being
superior to mankind- could you possibly hesitate a moment conceming the cause of
this voice, and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose?1O
C1eanthes goes on to remark that a person who objects to theism may still reject this conclusion, reasoning that the 'voice' may well be the product of "some accidental whistling
of the winds." I I It seems more plausible, though, to suppose that most non-theists would
form theistic beliefs upon witnessing such a dramatic event. N. R. Hanson, who argued
against the existence of Cod, reflected on the possibility of a dramatic theophany in
which a "radiant Zeus-like figure, towering above us like a hundred Everests" exclaims for
every man, woman, and child to hear: "I have had quite enough of your too-clever logicchopping and word-watching in matters of theology. Be assured, N. R. Hanson, that I
most certainly exist." Hanson continued,
Please do not dismiss this example as a playful, irreverent Disney-oid contrivance.
The conceptual point here is that if such a remarkable event were to transpire, I for
one should certainly be convinced that Cod does exist. 12
So, if Cod does exist and does seek a personal relationship with all people, then why has
Cod not provided the kind of evidence that would remove all people's doubts about
these facts? For surely there are many people like Hanson who are not resistant to the
truth about Cod to the extent that they would fail to hold theistic beliefs if there were evidence of the sort Hanson describes. Is there some reason why Cod remains (at least to
some degree) hidden?

II.

HiSTORICAL REsPONSES TO DIVINE HIDDENNESS

BUTLER

Joseph Butler, in a sermon aptly titled Upon the Ignorance of Man, remarked that
humans should not expect to understand the ways of Cod- including Cod's reasons for
remaining partially hidden.
And as the works of Cod, and his scheme of govemment, are above our capacities
thoroughly to comprehend: so there possibly may be reasons which originally make
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it fit that many things should be concealed from us .... The Almighty may cast
"clouds and darkness round about him," for reasons and purposes of which we
have not the least glimpse or conception. I }
Butler held that some facts about Cod are clearly evidenced, remarking that "it is as certain that Cod made the world, as it is certain that effects must have a cause."14 But as for
the specifics of Cod's governance of the world, he maintained that the "wisest and most
knowing cannot comprehend the works of Cod, the methods and designs of his providence in the creation and government of the world."'S Drawing from Butler's line of argument, the Christian theist might be inclined to argue that Cod may well have good reasons for not providing us with greater evidence that he exists and seeks to relate to us
through the person of Jesus Christ. Yet, given our relative ignorance of the way Cod governs the world, so this line of argument would go, we should not be surprised that Cod's
good reasons remain inscrutable to us.
Implicit in Butler's remarks seems to be the acknowledgment that, from the human
perspective, divine hidden ness may not appear to be characteristic of a perfect world.
After all, if Cod does exist, and if the holding of true beliefs about Cod is a good thing,
then it may seem a natural enough judgment that a world with clear evidence in support
of these beliefs would be better than a world with religious ambiguity. Butler's response is
that we are not in a position to make such a judgment.
It is thought necessary to be thoroughly acquainted with the whole of a scheme . .. in
order to judge of the goodness or badness of it. . .. From our ignorance of the constitution of things, and the scheme of Providence in the government of the world; from
the reference the several parts have to each other, and to the whole; and from our
not being able to see the end and the whole; it follows, that however perfect things
are, they must even necessarily appear to us otherwise, less perfect than they are.
So, whatever bad effects might be associated with divine hiddenness, it may yet contribute
toward some greater good. At the same time, given our very limited understanding of the
ways in which the world is connected and managed by Cod, we should not expect to
understand what these further good things are and why divine hidden ness makes them
possible. In short, Butler's main assertion is that we are in a poor epistemic position to ascertain what good reasons Cod might have for remaining (to some extent) hidden from US. 16
In response to the contention that Cod's good reasons for remaining hidden are
inscrutable, Schellenberg comments as follows.
It is to be expected, perhaps, that a Cod would know of kinds of goodness that are
impossible for us to understand. But why should this lead us to suppose that evils
like that of the reasonableness of nonbelief. .. in fact serve such goods if Cod exists? '7
These comments seem telling against the adequacy of any appeal to inscrutability as a
means of rebutting Schellenberg's original line of argument. Schellenberg's original argument gives us reason to think that divine hidden ness precludes certain good things-
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specifically the good things associated with a reciprocal relationship with God. [f the
Christian theist's response is merely that we cannot grasp the ways of God, then the
Christian theist will have to concede that, as far as we know, it is just as likely that divine
hiddenness does not serve some further good as it is that divine hidden ness does serve
some further good. (Additionally, one might press the point that, if we look for some further good and do not find one, then we have prima facie reason for thinking that it does
not exist.> So, on the one hand we have a specific reason- apropos Schellenberg's line of
argument-to think that God's perfect goodness is undermined by divine hiddenness. On
the other hand we have the contention-stemming from Butler's comments-that at best
it is as likely as not that divine hidden ness is linked with some further good. This position
hardly seems a comfortable one for the Christian theist.
PASCAL
Other Christian writers have been more optimistic about the possibility of identifying
what God's good reasons might be for remaining hidden. Blaise Pascal in his Pensees
makes repeated references to human pride in addressing the question of why God does
not do more to remove the religious ambiguity in the world. Pride, of course, plays a central role in the Christian tradition's explanation of what keeps humans from the kind of
personal relationship with God for which they were created. Martin Luther remarked that
justification before God is only possible when humility overcomes pride.IS And Peter
Lombard commented that "pride is the root of evil, and the beginning of all sin."'9 The
aspect of human pride at issue here might be described in general terms as assuming a
role that belongs only to God. John Wesley defined pride as "idolatry; it is ascribing to
ourselves what is due to God alone."2o [n the case of Adam's fall, which serves in the
Christian tradition as a prototype for all human sins, pride is displayed as Adam comes to
regard his own opinion more highly than God's opinion with respect to where his own
best interests lie.21 Accordingly, Butler remarked that "Religion consists in submission and
resignation to the Divine will."22 And Augustine pronounced that

[sinfull things are done whenever Thou art forsaken, 0 Fountain of Life, who art
the only and true Creator and Ruler of the universe, and by a self-willed pride any
one false thing is selected therefrom and loved.23
Stated roughly, pride is the beginning of all sin because it is pride that leads us to dismiss
what God has commended in deference to our own planned course of action.
Pascal identified pride as a fundamental impediment to our relationship with God; and
he noted that God has taken steps to hold human pride in check.
God wishes to move the will rather than the mind. Perfect clarity would help the
mind and harm the will. Humble their pride.24
At first glance, this passage may appear somewhat enigmatic. However, whatever else
Pascal might be suggesting here, it seems clear that "perfect clarity" works against certain
aims God has for humanity. It also seems clear that God's aim of keeping human pride in
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check is somehow hindered by perfect clarity. Pascal goes on to explain this connection
between pride and perfect clarity as follows.
If there were no obscurity man would not feel his corruption: if there were no light
man could not hope for a cure. Thus it is not only right but useful for us that God
should be partly concealed and partly revealed, since it is equally dangerous for
man to know God without knowing his own wretchedness as to know his
wretchedness without knowing God. 25
As evidence that knowledge about God is harmful to the person who does not have an
accompanying recognition of her absolute need for God, Pascal points to the "arrogance
of the philosophers, who have known God but not known their own wretchedness."26
Pascal's point here seems to be: 'If the evidence for Christian beliefs were overwhelming,
then people with prideful tendencies would come to form these beliefs. An acquisition of
said beliefs in such people would actually lead them away from God, for it would bolster
their confidence in their own mental abilities and thus serve to enhance their prideful
commitment to self-sufficiency.'
Of course, Pascal did not suggest that God should provide no evidence in support of
Christian beliefs. He noted the "equal danger" of one coming "to know his wretchedness
without knowing God," and as evidence pointed to "the despair of the atheists, who
know their own wretchedness without knowing their Redeemer."27 Pascal's contention is
that our religiously ambiguous world leads (or at least, tends to lead)2B to the formation of
Christian beliefs only in those who would benefit from having these beliefs.
Thus wishing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart and hidden from those who shun him with all their heart, he has qualified our knowledge
of him by giving signs which can be seen by those who seek him and not by those
who do not. 'There is enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough
darkness for those of a contrary disposition.'29
So, God has provided some evidence for Christian beliefs so that those who humbly seek
him will come to see the truth about him. But God has not provided more evidence than
he has because greater evidence would tend to lead to theistic beliefs among those in
whom such beliefs would foster pride.
In response to Pascal's defense of divine hiddenness, Schellenberg offers several criticisms. First, he wonders whether evidence in the form of religious experiences really is
likely to foster pride.
Religious experience has its own distinctive psychological effects, and arrogance is
not very naturally construed as one of them. Feelings of gratitude, joy, reassurance,
astonishment, guilt, or dismay seem more likely]O
In response, though, the Christian theist may suggest that there is in fact some reason to
think that religious experiences may often lend themselves to pride. Children and adults
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alike often queue for hours just to glimpse someone famous. An autograph of a sports
star will often constitute a child's most prized possession and will trump most any other
child's claim to playground bragging rights. It is rare to find an adult who will not 'drop a
name' if he has an appropriate name to drop. Indeed, many people's self-described claim
to fame is simply to have accidentally crossed paths with someone famous. So, it does not
seem implausible to suggest that one who experiences a direct encounter with the divine
might well be tempted to take unwarranted pride in her experience.
Schellenberg offers a further criticism of Pascal that serves as a possible rejoinder to the
Christian theist's line of response here.
Part of what God might communicate to us through religious experience is the very
message of wretchedness and cO/1'Uption that Pascal suggests a Divine disclosure would
inhibit. Religious experiences, it can be argued, are not all likely to provoke an arrogant response, inasmuch as they would awaken in us a sense of our wretchedness
and corruption (a state incompatible with arrogance) .3 1
But is it really the case that a recognition through religious experience of one's own corruption is incompatible with an arrogant response to that recognition? In C. S. Lewis's collection of fictional letters from Screwtape-a 'senior devil' who offers written counsel to
his apprentice nephew in the art of temptation- we find the following instructions.
All virtues are less formidable to us once the man is aware that he has them, but
this is specially true of humility. Catch him at the moment when he is really poor in
spirit and smuggle into his mind the gratifying reflection, "By jove! I'm being humble," and almost immediately pride-pride at his own humility- will appear. If he
awakes to the danger and tries to smother this new form of pride, make him proud
of his attempt- and so on, through as many stages as you please.32
When we consider the varied and subtle forms pride might take, it does not seem at all
clear to what extent (if any) a divine message of one's own corruption would mitigate any
tendency for that encounter with the divine to become a source of pride in one already
tending toward prideful attitudes.
Schellenberg does offer, however, one objection to Pascal's line of argument that
seems quite forceful. In reference to Pascal's construal of divine hiddenness as a divinelygiven impetus to seek God with humility, Schellenberg remarks,
All these arguments suggest is that God has a reason for withholding good evidence
from those humans whose present actions and motives are such as to prevent them
from responding to it appropriately. No reason is suggested for withholding evidence from those who do not fall into this category-from those, for example, who
have felt their corruption and the emptiness of life without God and who have
begun to search for God with proper motives.33
Are there people who search for God with humility and do not find him?
Perhaps the proponent of Schellenberg's line of argument will point to the testimonies
of believers here. The Old Testament records the psalmist David crying out at one point,
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"0 my God, I cry out by day, but you do not answer, by night, and am not silent."14 In a
similar vein, we find the prophet Isaiah avowing, 'Truly you are a God who hides himself,
God and Savior of Israel."3S St. Augustine is among many professing Christians who
have wished that God would reveal himself more clearly.

o

So speak that I may hear. Behold, Lord, the ears of my heart are before Thee; open
Thou them, and "say unto my soul, I am thy salvation." When I hear, may I run and
lay hold on Thee. Hide not Thy face from me. Let me die, lest I die, if only I may
see Thy face. 36
And St. Anselm offers this poignant lament:
Never have I seen You, Lord my God, I do not know Your face. What shall he do,
most high Lord, what shall this exile do, far away from You as he is? What shall
Your servant do, tormented by love of You and yet cast off 'far from Your face'? ..
Lord, You are my God and my Lord, and never have I seen You. You have created
me and re-create me, and you have given me all the good things I possess, and still I
do not know You. In fine, I was made in order to see You, and I have not yet
accomplished what I was made for. 37
Granted, these cries are from believers; and our main concem is with the lack of evidence
available to eamestly-seeking nonbelievers. Still, these testimonies do seem to illustrate the
lack of any strict correlation between the extent to which one searches for truths about
God and the extent to which one finds clear evidence in support of these truths.
Interestingly, although we have noted Pascal's contention that "there is enough light"
for those who seek God with proper humility, he seemed at one point in his Pensees to
acknowledge that some earnestly-seeking people may yet find God hidden to such an
extent that they fail to hold theistic beliefs.
Amongst those who are not convinced, I make an absolute distinction between
those who strive with all their might to learn and those who live without troubling
themselves or thinking about it. I can feel nothing but compassion for those who
sincerely lament their doubt, who regard it as the ultimate misfortune, and who,
sparing no effort to escape from it, make their search their principal and most serious business.38
Even if we accept Pascal's earlier contention that God remains hidden so as not to encourage undue human pride, is there a reason why a perfectly loving God would remain (to
some extent) hidden from nonbelievers who do earnestly seek him with humility?
It might be thought that, even though some nonbelievers may be searching for God
with humility, God must still maintain religious ambiguity in the world if he is to keep in
check the pride of certain other nonbelievers who are not humble. Taking up Pascal's line
of reasoning as to why God remains hidden, Thomas V. Morris writes,
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Were God to reveal himself to people improperly prepared to come to know and
love him, such revelation would be more of a curse than a blessing. [n order to
allow us to develop to the point at which a knowledge of him would be the extraordinarily positive thing it can potentially be, God must govern his public manifestation in accordance with the needs of the least developed of his human creatures.39
Morris's point may well hold if we think of public manifestations of the divine as the only
kind of evidence for Christian beliefs. However, when we consider the possibility of private religious experiences, we are still left with the question of why God does not ensure
that all people who earnestly search for the truth about him come to see their evidence as
clearly supporting Christian beliefs.
SWINBURNE

Richard Swinburne has taken up this question and has argued that God does have
good reasons for withholding overwhelming evidence of his existence from people-even
from people who seek him with humility. Swinburne begins with the assumptions that (I )
people desire to be liked by others-and would especially desire to be liked by God, if he
exists; and (2) people have a desire for their own future well-being, which is in God's
hands if there is indeed a God who allocates a fate to people in an afterlife. It is natural
for one to believe, Swinburne continues, that, if God does exist, these desires will be realized if one acts well. Given a deep and certain awareness of God's presence, Swinburne
points out that one would have to have remarkably strong desires to do wrong in order
for serious moral decisions to be possible. For, a moral decision arises when one's desires
tempt one to act contrary to what one believes to be morally right. And if the balance of
one's desires does not seriously tempt one to act contrary to one's moral beliefs- as
Swinburne imagines that they typically would not, given (a) one's desires to be liked by
God and to secure future well-being, and (b) one's unwavering belief that by acting well
God will ensure that these desires are realized-, then one would not face moral decisions.
In order to provide people with moral choices, Swinburne acknowledges that God
could have provided overwhelming evidence for theism and also given us a much more
malicious nature, so that we lacked natural affection for our fellows. Because people
would then have such a strong desire not to act in accordance with what they believed to
be morally right, they would still-even with firm and certain theistic beliefs- have the
opportunity to make moral choices. Alternatively (and preferably), God could have-and
in fact has- made the evidence of his existence less than compelling. By doing so, he
makes it possible for us to be "naturally good people who still have a free choice between
right and wrong."40 For, where there is uncertainty about the existence of God, there is
uncertainty that one's desires to be liked by God and to secure a favorable afterlife will be
met by doing what is morally right. Thus, these desires will not incline one so strongly to
do what is morally right; and one will subsequently not need such strong and malicious
desires to do wrong in order to be tempted to do so.
There are various responses to Swinburne's argument one might offer in an attempt to
show that abundant theistic evidence would not in fact preclude moral choices. First, while
it is true that people will desire a favorable afterlife if they believe one exists, one might
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point out that people can be very imprudent, putting off greater future goods for more
immediate, short-term pleasures. And if short-term pleasures are not enough to tempt an
unwavering believer to forsake his desire for a favorable afterlife, then he might still be
tempted to put off performing the right acts he believes will help secure this favorable
afterlife. Thus, he may decide upon a plan of sowing his wild oats for the time being, with
the idea of asking for forgiveness and changing his lifestyle sometime later in life before he
dies. Another source of temptation one might point to for the unwavering believer
involves self-deceptive techniques to mitigate the badness of his acts. A person may convince himself that his acts are not that bad or that everybody performs bad acts such as
these. In this way, he may self-deceptively come to believe that the bad acts he desires to
perform will not significantly undermine Cod's approval or his chances of a favorable
afterlife. Finally, one might note that certain desires can have considerably more strength
in a passionate moment than when a person is dispassionately reflecting- in what Butler
termed 'a cool hour'-on his reasons for acting. A person may unwaveringly believe that
Cod exists and may in a cool hour consistently have as his strongest desires the desires for
divine approval and a favorable afterlife-both of which he believes will be afforded to
him if he acts rightly. The same person may nonetheless succumb to a desire to impress
his peers during a spirited boy's night out or to sexual urges during a meeting with a
woman he knows to be romantically off limits. Surely unwavering believers, one might
argue, can still succumb in the heat of the moment to temptations that they reflectively
consider to be of much less value than the good goals their heated actions compromise.
Still, whether or not abundant theistic evidence would always necessitate very strong
inclinations toward the bad in order for moral choices to present themselves, Swinbume
has at the very least shown that divine hidden ness represents a way in which Cod might
provide moral probation and choice for people in this world. Yet, Schellenberg has a general objection to the idea that Cod would use the intellectual probation associated with
divine hiddenness as a means of making moral probation and choice possible. He argues
that there are other ways in which Cod could make moral probation and choice possibleways available within an ongoing relationship with Cod. As an example, Schellenberg
points to the intellectual challenges afforded by a 'dark night of the soul', where Cod
intends "the believer to be troubled by questions that shake her confidence and motivate
her to examine more closely the content of her belief."41 Thus, even if some sort of intellectual probation were necessary for moral probation, this intellectual probation would not
have to come in the form of Cod remaining hidden to such an extent that eamest seekers could still fail to believe that Cod even exists.

III. To WHAT ExTENT Is A

LACK OF EVIDENCE FOR THEISM A BAD THlNG?

Schellenberg moves from the superfluity of this kind of intellectual probation to the
conclusion that a perfectly loving Cod would not use this kind of intellectual probation as
a means of providing moral probation and choice. His reasons involve the negative effects
associated with nonbelief.
now, in the midst of earthly pain and conflict, is when we require Divine guidance,
support, consolation, and forgiveness .... I suggest that there is indeed reason to suppose that a being who did not seek to relate himself to us explicitly in this life-who
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elected to remain exclusive, distant, hidden, even in the absence of any culpable
activity on our part- would not be properly viewed as perfectly loving.42
But does a lack of theistic belief preclude one from receiving such things as divine guidance and consolation? The recognition that God exists and has issued certain directives is,
of course, one obvious way in which one might receive guidance from God. But there are
also less obvious ways in which God might provide guidance- consistent with God
remaining hidden. It is quite conceivable that God could regulate a nonbeliever's desires
so that she wants to do what God judges it best for her to do. God could also see to it
that she simply comes to believe that a certain course of action is best or right or will
most likely realize the desires she has.
As far as providing consolation and support, God could well regenerate a nonbeliever's
emotions so that she came to experience such things as joy, peace, and relief from feelings of guilt. In support of the idea that God does this very thing, perhaps the Christian
theist would see as evidence the positive feelings that even nonbelievers experience when
giving to others or the way in which even nonbelievers experience an easing of conscience when they admit past wrongdoings. It is true that some forms of support and guidance are not available to a nonbeliever. For example, a nonbeliever cannot experience the
comforting thought that a loving and powerful God is aware of her problems and is
working to help overcome them in his perfect timing. Still, there seem to be a number of
ways in which a nonbeliever might yet receive divine support and guidance in the midst
of earthly pain and conflict.
Even so, Schellenberg points out that divine guidance and support are not the only
things of value within a divine-human relationship.
"God seeks to be personally related to us." In claiming that this proposition is essential to any adequate explication of "God loves human beings," I am claiming that
God, if loving, seeks explici~ reciprocal relationship with us, involving not only such
things as Divine guidance, support, and forgiveness, but also human trust, obedience, and worship.'3
The Christian theist will, I think, have to concede that a lack of theistic belief does preclude one from having with God the kind of explicit relationship of which things like worship are a part. Given that the Christian religion commends above all else a (explicit) personal relationship with God, one might put to the Christian theist the objection that the
Christian God, if he really existed, would at aU costs remove obstacles that stood in the
way of such relationships with himself.
In responding to this objection, the Christian theist might begin by stressing the point
that true beliefs about God do not automatically lead a person into an explicit and positive
personal relationship with God. Rather, true beliefs about God provide the opportunity for
a person to respond positively to God and thereby (with perhaps other conditions also
being met) enter into an explicit and positive personal relationship with him .
Correspondingly, true beliefs about God also provide the opportunity for a person to
respond negatively to God and thereby move further away from a positive relationship
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with him. The Gospel of Matthew records Jesus denouncing certain cities that remained
unrepentant in the face of miracles he performed in them.
'Woe to you, Korazin' Woe to you, Bethsaida' If the miracles that were performed
in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago
in sackcloth and ashes. But I tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on
the day of judgment than for you. And you, Capemaum, will you be lifted up to
the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed
in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day. But I tell
you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you."
One of the ideas here seems to be that, among those people who reject God, those who
are presented with greater evidence for certain theistic beliefs accrue more moral guilt
than those who are presented with less evidence. Yes, the opportunity that comes from
clear theistic evidence and from having true beliefs about God can tum out to be a blessing in that it can move one toward a fulfilling personal relationship with God. But such
opportunities also can tum out to have the opposite effect.

IV. DIVINE HIDDENNESS AND THEODICY
Schellenberg might at this point press the same type of objection he makes against
Pascal : Why would God not provide clear evidence for theism to those people for whom
such evidence will serve to move them toward a fulfilling relationship with God? Implicit
in this question is the suggestion that a perfectly loving God would always provide a person with clear theistic evidence if he knew that the person would respond positively to it.
We have already noted that the Christian religion affirms that God's chief purpose for us
is that we take part in a fulfilling and personal relationship with him. So why would God
not provide a person with clear theistic evidence if he knew that that person would
respond positively to it and thereby move toward the kind of (explicit) personal relationship with God for which the person was created?
In offering a theodicy on this point, there seem to be three types of responses that
the Christian theist might plausibly offer. First, the Christian theist might suggest that
God does not in fact know for certain just when people will and will not respond positively to clear theistic evidence. Granted, not all Christian theists would want to take
such a line. However, there are at present a growing number of Christian writers who
argue that human decisions cannot be free (on the libertarian definition of freedom) if
God knows in advance what these decisions will be. Proponents of the so-called 'open
view' of God suggest that the Christian religion's traditional understanding of God's
omniscience has long been unduly influenced by Greek philosophical id eas.
Specifically, they point to the Greek idea that change denotes imperfection. And they
submit that, in order to resist the notion that change might occur within God as he
comes to acquire new knowledge by observing what humans freely do, the Christian
tradition has tended to embrace a much stronger picture of divine immutability than is
warranted by the Christian scriptures. 45
If God does not know with certainty whether a person will respond positively to further theistic evidence at a given point in time, then he will not know with certainty
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whether the introduction of further evidence at that time will move the person toward or
away from a positive, personal relationship with himself. It is true that Cod could still
know whether a person is inclined to respond in a positive way to further evidence. But
we must also consider that, for one who already has good moral tendencies, a decision to
break with these tendencies may change significantly the shape of one's moral orientation. Conversely, a decision to follow the tendencies one already has does not have the
potential to re-shape one's character to as great an extent. So, the fact that Cod may
know people's tendencies to respond positively or negatively to a certain piece of theistic
evidence does not mean that Cod knows whether the introduction of this evidence
would, all things considered, tend to be a good thing. We conclude, then, that the appeal
to the incompatibility of (libertarian) free decisions with Cod's advance knowledge of
those decisions provides one way for the Christian theist to defend Cod's goodness in the
face of Cod's hiddenness.
A second type of response the Christian theist might offer draws upon the Christian
understanding of the universal nature of human sin. Schellenberg's line of argument stipulates that Cod would provide evidence for his existence sufficient for theistic belief to
those who are "capable" of a relationship with him.46 By 'capable' Schellenberg means
something like: 'able to enter positively into.' In response to Schellenberg, the Christian
theist might grant that perhaps many nonbelievers are not so resistant at a time t to the
truth about Cod that they are incapable of entering into some kind of beneficial relationship with Cod were they to have more evidence for theism. At the same time, the
Christian theist might insist that the introduction of further evidence at time t may
nonetheless in many cases make more difficult the kind of deep, long-term personal relationship with Cod commended by the Christian religion. In other words, the Christian
theist need not assert that all nonbelievers, if they were to possess clear evidence for
Cod's existence, would fail to form any relationship with Cod by which they might
receive certain benefits. Instead, the Christian theist might make the more modest suggestion that all nonbelievers would, upon considering clear evidence, fail to form the kind of
deep and trusting relationship with Cod that is Cod's ultimate purpose for each person.
This suggestion is quite natural when we consider the Christian theist's position that all
humans on earth- believers and nonbelievers alike-have sinful tendencies and thus resist
the kind of loving and completely self-giving relationship with God for which they were
created and which the redeemed in heaven enjoy.
If Cod's ultimate goal in providing theistic evidence is to draw people into this kind of
deep and self-giving relationship with him, then the Christian theist might suggest that, in
many cases, clear theistic evidence best draws a person into this kind of deep personal
relationship only after the person's character becomes developed in certain ways. Thus,
for the purpose of helping ready people for the kind of deep, personal relationship he
wishes to have with them, Cod may remove the obstacle of unbelief only after their willful resistance to him has been mitigated by a pattern of good moral choices through
which they become more capable of such a deep, personal relationship. Put another way,
moral growth may be best achieved among many people when they first make certain
moral decisions at earlier stages of their moral development and then at later stages are
presented with clear theistic evidence.
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It is not uncommon in human examples for one person to delay making to another
person an explicit invitation to become involved in a certain kind of loving relationship.
Even though a positive-albeit more superficial- relationship through which the beloved
can benefit might be possible early on, a person might still wait until the beloved is judged
to be in various senses more 'ready' to take part in the deeper relationship the person
wishes to have with the beloved. In the case of human readiness to commit every aspect
of life unhesitatingly into the hands of Cod, obstacles to such readiness may take any
number of forms. We have already discussed how pride can undermine the kind of relationship with Cod that Cod endeavors to have with people. Other obstacles include a
fear of commitment, a lack of understanding of the ways in which one needs a savior,
and the tendency to backslide from an existing relationship where one does not appreciate just how valuable that relationship is. Again, if the Christian theist is correct in affirming the universal nature of sin, then all people will face such obstacles to the kind of deep
relationship with Cod for which the Christian religion affirms they were created.
Schellenberg might at this point want to expand on a previously noted rejoinder of his
and insist that non-epistemic obstacles to a deep and fully self-giving relationship with
Cod are best overcome within an existing, explicit relationship with Cod. He appeals at
one point to the Christian theist's understanding of Cod's "infinite resourcefulness in
addressing human need" and notes "the testimonials of those who claim that precisely
through relationship with Cod all manner of ills of the sort that might be introduced
here- such as initial resistance to Cod or fear of Cod-have been defeated and indeed
turned into good."47
But it seems far from clear that an explicit, but less-than-ideal, relationship with Cod
would always lead one in the direction of the kind of deep, self-giving relationship with
Cod for which Christians maintain we were created. Suppose that a nonbeliever received
clear evidence that Cod does exist and has issued the commands contained throughout
the New Testament. Responding to her new beliefs about what Cod commands of her,
suppose the person responds positively to Cod's commands on stealing, forgiving, making
peace and caring for widows and orphans-yet resists Cod's commands regarding lying,
sexual behavior and finances. Thus, in some respects she becomes more like the kind of
person who can enter into the deep and trusting relationship with Cod for which the
Christian religion affirms she was created. On the other hand, she also resists in some
ways this type of relationship and thereby solidifies her resistance to some aspects of the
relationship Cod endeavors to have with her. So, has the original introduction of clear evidence led her, all things considered, toward or away from the kind of relationship with
Cod commended by the Christian religion? This question seems difficult to answer. At
the very least, it is not obviously correct that resistance to a deep and completely self-giving relationship with Cod is generally best overcome after epistemic obstacles are first
removed. And so it remains possible for the Christian theist plausibly to argue that Cod,
as he works to help us shape our character so that we can participate in the kind of relationship with him in which we will find ultimate fulfillment, will not see it as necessarily a
good thing that we enter into an explicit, but less-than-ideal, relationship with him during
the early stages of our development.
A third type of response open to the Christian theist is to emphasize that people's rela-
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tionships with Cod are enhanced by the fact that, in a world where Cod's existence and
character are not obvious to all, people must help one another to leam about God. The
Christian religion has always emphasized that Cod works through people to spread the
gospel message. Jesus's reference to how he envisioned the spread of the gospel is recorded in the Cos pel of John, where we find Jesus praying "for those [i.e., people throughout
the world] who will believe in me through their [i.e., his disciples'] message."48
Accordingly, we find Timothy encouraged by the person who shared the gospel message
with him to share in tum the gospel message with others.
What you heard from me, keep as the pattern of sound teaching, with faith and
love in Christ Jesus .... And the things you have heard me say in the presence of
many witnesses entrust to reliable men who will also be qualified to teach others. 49
In relying on the testimony of others to learn about the character and promises of Codas well as in tum testifying to others about these things- one learns what it is to be in a
relationship where one person depends on another for direction in religious matters. That
is, one learns what it is to be in the kind of dependent relationship into which, according
to the Christian religion, Cod invites us. And only if Cod remains to some extent hidden
from us do we have the opportunity to rely on others- and have others rely on us- in
obtaining spiritual direction in the form of true beliefs about Cod's existence, character,
promises and directives.
Continuing this third line of response, the Christian theist can insist that the testimony
of others does not merely provide a way for people to gain knowledge about Cod.
Rather, the testimony of others provides an essential way if we are to enjoy fully the relationships for which we were created. The 'communion of saints' is an important notion in
the Christian religion, which affirms that humans were created in such a way that their
relationships with Cod are, in a sense, actualized through their relationships with others.
While maintaining that humans were created to be in relationship with Cod, the Christian
theist can also affirm that humans were created such that their proper development and
well-being require things like physical contact with other people and a sense of belonging
to a community. As we relate to one another within a community where human touch
and supporting acceptance are present, we find a kind of fulfillment we would otherwise
not find. In Cod-centered, loving relationships with one another, the Christian theist may
emphasize, we experience the love of Cod as we relate to the 'image' of Cod within one
another. On the understanding that the Holy Spirit infuses those in right relationship with
Cod with Cod's presence and with Cod-like characteristics such as self-giving love, the
saints in heaven relate positively to Cod as they relate positively to one another. Thus, it is
open to the Christian theist to argue that people were created in such a way that they
find ultimate fulfillment in their relationships with Cod by being in right relationship with
Cod and with one another.
The relationships within the community of saints in heaven are meant to reflect the
loving, self-giving, interdependent relationships within the members of the Trinity. If the
saints in heaven are not in some ways dependent upon, and responsible for, their fellow
saints, then their relationships with one another will not be characterized by interdepen-
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dence. Clearly, they could not depend on one another for things only Cod can providesuch as atonement for sins and sanctifying grace. However, among those spiritually significant things the saints can provide for one another are instruction and insights into the
nature of Cod and his interaction in human history. And clearly, if the saints are to be
dependent upon, and responsible for, one another with respect to leaming about Cod,
then Cod will need to limit private revelations and other ways of helping people leam
about him that do not involve the activity of others.
While each of the three lines of response we have discussed provides a plausible way
for the theist to defend Cod's goodness in the face of Schellenberg's general argument
from divine hiddenness, the third line of response may have the most explanatory potential. For it involves Cod's general reasons for creating a world that contains a certain
amount of religious ambiguity. In defending this third line of response, the Christian theist
can acknowledge that Cod may have reasons for granting special revelations to certain
people at certain times. For example, the Christian theist may see St. Paul's Damascus
Road encounter with Jesus Christ as part of Cod's plan to use Paul to preach to the
Centiles. But while such special, private revelations to certain people may be necessary for
specific purposes Cod has, the Christian theist can still maintain that it is Cod's general
intention for people to learn about him with the help of one another. In taking this third
line of response, then, the Christian theist need not be bothered by the fact that some
people receive clearer theistic evidence than others. The Christian theist need not point to
any moral characteristic within unbelievers that accounts for the fact that Cod may have
made less theistic evidence available for them than for others. Rather, the Christian theist
can account for divine hiddenness by pointing to Cod's general intention that people
should learn about him from others.
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In recent years, two huge multi-volume works have been published to serve the
needs of those who, like myself, are eager to read the Old Testament in its ancient
Near Eastern context. The four volumes of Civilizations of the Ancient Near Eas~ edited by Jack M. Sasson (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1995; now in a less expensive twovolume edition published by Hendrickson, 2000), are a monumental work. The
same is true of the three huge tomes of The Context of Scripture; edited by William H.
Hallo, a collection of ancient sources in new annotated translations, which will be
hailed by all who subscribe to the slogan, "ad fontes" (Brill Academic Publishers,
I 997, 2000, 2002>. Compared to these large-sized volumes, Mesopotamia and the
Bible looks like a dwarf among giants. When seeing the slim volume for the first
time, I wondered whether there was anything in it that was not already available in
these larger works-in the introductions to the COS volumes and somewhere in the
189 articles included in CANE. So is there anything new?
Well, the answer is: yes, indeed, there is! But let me first summarize what the
learned editors have included in Mesopotamia and the Bible. Out of a total number of
fourteen contributions, two deal with the history of the assyriological contribution to
biblical studies, five sketch or illustrate large portions of Mesopotamian and Syrian
history (third, second, and, to a lesser extent, first millennium BCE), three survey the
value of individual textual corpora for biblical studies (Richard Hess writes on
Alalakh, Daniel Fleming on Emar, Wayne Pitard on Ugarit), and four elucidate
aspects of Old Testament history from Mesopotamian sources. In the last-named
category, Richard Averbeck writes on temple building reports, K. Lawson Younger
on Sargon's eighth-century BCE campaigns in Palestine, Bill Arnold on the formation
of the Iron Age state in Palestine, and Edwin Yamauchi on the Jewish Diaspora
under the Babylonians in the sixth century BCE.
The most fascinating and really new aspect that emerges from Mesopotamia and
the Bible comes from two papers which, as it were, rediscover Mesopotamian and
early Israelite tribalism. In recent decades, the quasi-consensus of biblical scholars
asserts that the Israelite tribes either never existed (and are to be seen as "late fictions") or were of minimal relevance to Israel's social organization. As a consequence, the editor of the six-volume Anchor Bible Dictionary (1992) did not feel it
necessary to include an entry on "tribe" in this standard reference work. In his paper
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"Syria to the Early Second Millennium," Victor Matthews reminds us that around 1800
BCE pastoral nomads played an important role in the kingdom of Mari. In "What has
Nebuchadnezzar to do with David?" Bill Arnold points out that tribal people-Chaldeans
and Arameans- made up a large proportion of the population of Babylonia in the first millennium BCE, and that they were instrumental in creating the Neo-Babylonian state
which they successfully defended against the Assyrians. On the basis of this evidence,
Arnold is able to challenge a number of assertions current in present-day mainstream biblical scholarship: Israelites were indigenous to Canaan, Israelites and Canaanites were culturally continuous, Israel's conquest accounts are fictive and late in origin, and a few others. Here Arnold raises serious questions and provides first, tentative answers. After having
read Arnold's truly brilliant paper and after having pondered his fresh arguments, scholars
will pause before pontificating about the irrelevance of the tribes for early Israelite history
and culture. So, indeed, there is something quite new and refreshing in Mesopotamia and
the Bible, something that would escape those who rely exclusively on the huge tomes of
COS and CANE.
BERNHARD LANG
University of Paderbom, Germany
University of St. Andrews, Scotland

Garrett, Duane. A Modem Grammar of Classical Hebrew. Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman and
Holman, 2002.
Duane Garrett's entry into the field of Hebrew grammar attempts to make biblical
Hebrew more accessible and less intimidating to the beginning student. This work sets out
not to cover every technicality of Hebrew grammar, but aims to lead students into scripture as quickly as possible. To accomplish this aim, A Modem Grammar uses concise, easyto-understand terminology coupled with brief and excellent explanations of the features
of Hebrew grammar. The work, on the whole, avoids technical jargon, and often uses literal English renderings to illustrate many points. The aim of A Modem Grammar is supplemented by excellent graphics and tables, which highlight the most important features of
various grammatical forms, and exercises, which conclude each lesson and quickly introduce scripture to the student. On occasion, however, perhaps in an effort to be userfriendly, the explanations are a bit too concise, especially in the treatment of the verbs. In
other sections, though, A Modem Grammar can be quite technical, and every bit as complex as purely deductive grammars.
The grammar seems to employ a partially inductive approach. Unlike other fully inductive grammars, there is not an immediate entry into the text that serves to feature certain
grammatical rules. Instead, A Modern Grammar presents a grammatical feature with
emphasis on forms, rather than the grammatical rules that lead to those forms . This
approach is taken with many vocabulary words, as well. These sections often give an
entire prepositional or nominal phrase, or a specific verbal form, supplying only the meaning and not the analysis of the form. This aspect of the grammar may be a positive or neg-
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ative, depending on the student's learning style. However, it seems that more emphasis
on the rules that lie behind the forms may reduce some of the repetitiveness in the grammar, and allow the student to leam related forms with greater ease.
The grammar concludes with introductions to text criticism and the text critical apparatus, as well as a discussion of genre-specific features of Hebrew grammar. Though each of
these lessons was enlightening. they were lacking in scriptural examples, a deficiency that
runs throughout the text.
Many grammars have weak elements because they choose a certain pedagogical
method. The weakness of A Modem Grammar, however, actually detracts from its stated
intent. One of these elements is organization. For example, it is not clear how each unit of
vocabulary was ordered, other than that these are the words needed to complete the
exercises. Sometimes, the scripture translations and vocabulary do not coincide at all, and
exercises which do involve the lesson's vocabulary are not from the Old Testament. A
simple listing of vocabulary by frequency would have been more effective in allowing the
student to delve into most narrative texts of the Old Testament. Similarly, much of the
scripture selected for each lesson does not always coincide with the grammar covered in
that lesson, yet another strange element in a seemingly inductive text.
The ordering of the lessons is also quite curious. To the reviewer, a structure or pattem
to the presentation of the grammar was not readily apparent. Materials are given brief
treatment in one chapter, and then covered again, in a bit more detail, a few chapters
down the road. Likewise, related topics, such as the cardinal and ordinal numbers, are
considered separately, with 27 other lessons in between. The grammar also frequently
presents a form in the exercises, with a brief note of what that form means, but the grammar of that form is not discussed until later - an approach that may be effective with
native speakers of Hebrew, but not North American students. On the whole, the structure of A Modem Grammar seemed scattered and confusing.
A Modem Grammar also needs more extensive treatment of the verbs, in particular the
derived stems and verbal aspect. The treatment of verbal coordination is especially inadequate, as the principle of governing verbs is not discussed. Along these lines, only a list of
possible translations of prepositions and particles is given, with little consideration as to
when a certain particle takes on a certain meaning. Again, this detracts from the stated
goal of leading the student to the text.
The underdeveloped treatment of the verbs extends to the charts and graphics that
present various verbal forms. A very helpful paradigm chart, including great graphics and
highlights, is provided for each derived stem. However, the infinitive absolute and the
imperative forms are completely absent from all of these charts, a significant omission,
particularly when the student is instructed to "master this table" (pg. 139). It is stranger still
that the section dealing with the infinitive absolute is quite excellent, with detailed
Hebrew examples and helpful discussion of the syntactical function of the infinitive
absolute. One wishes that sections dealing with the rest of the verbal system were as
detailed as this section.
A Modem Grammar is helpful in its use of simpler terms, and its graphic presentation of
the most important elements of Hebrew grammar, though it should be noted that the
charts cover only select forms. However, a critical flaw to this grammar is that it seems to
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be neither inductive nor deductive. At times, the author seeks a highly inductive
approach, stating "It is not necessary to comprehend fully the complexities of the grammar...in order to begin to read Hebrew verbs." (pg 40). This approach is weak, though,
because the lessons do not always coincide with the text presented as exercises. At other
times, the text seeks to be highly deductive, presenting various paradigms and grammatical rules for memory. This component falls short due to the text's lack of structure and
ordering, and the emphasis placed on forms, rather than the rules of grammar. Overall, A
Modem Grammar may be helpful in getting the student into a limited number of texts,
specifically, those that are included as lesson exercises, but its imbalance seems inadequate
in preparing the student for any sort of exegetical work.
JOHN H. (HOI
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Milgrom, Jacob. Leviticus 17-22 and Leviticus 23-27. Anchor Bible 3A and 38. New York:
Doubleday, 2000 and 200 I.
The completion of Jacob Milgrom's three-volume commentary on Leviticus is a
momentous event in biblical studies. The two volumes under review here complete the
work begun with the first volume, which appeared in I 991 (Leviticus 1-16, AS 3; New
York: Doubleday, 1991). The long-awaited appearance of this important commentary is
an event worthy of celebration because it makes accessible nearly four decades of
Milgrom's many significant contributions over a long and distinguished career (his first
publication on the dietary laws was in 1963), and because the set itself offers much of
rich insight and original thinking. Important volumes early in Milgrom's career were
ground-breaking redefinitions of our understanding of the ancient Israelite cult, which is
so intricately, and yet sometimes confusingly detailed in the Book of Leviticus (Studies in
Levitical Terminology [Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 19701, and especially Cult
and Conscience: The Asham and Priestly Doctrine of Repentance ILeiden : Brill, 1976]).
This is more than a commentary on Leviticus. It is certainly that; but the three volumes
also often include introductory issues and survey discussions, with original Milgrom contributions and insights on nearly any topic relevant to Old Testament studies today. It could
almost serve as a compendium of thorough and penetrating research on everything related to Pentateuchal studies at the close of the twentieth century. These two volumes both
open with an outline of Leviticus as a whole and Milgrom's fresh translation for the
whole book. The middle volume (AB 3A)-the first of the two under review here-also
has a 12S-page introduction for Leviticus 17-27. This introduction's location in the middle
of three volumes perhaps requires a comment. Milgrom has not repeated anything here
he included in the commentary proper, calling this introduction a supplement, not a compendium. The introduction contains frequent cross-references to the commentary.
Furthermore, the new introduction is limited to issues related to Leviticus 17-27 and the
composition of the book as a whole, whereas the introduction in the I 991 first volume
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(pages 1-67) is largely devoted to the priestly source behind Leviticus 1-16, known by the
standard siglum P.
The new introduction is divided into two sections; the first is "Structure, Vocabulary,
Extent, and Date" and the second 'Theology." Milgrom accepts the view that Leviticus
17-27 is comprised of the Holiness Code, or more accurately, the Holiness Source (or H).
In the first section of the introduction (pages 1319-1367), he gradually builds a case for
the distinctiveness of H over against P, as preserved in Leviticus 1-16 and elsewhere in
the Pentateuch. Milgrom adds his voice to a growing number of scholars who accept the
preexilic origins of both P and H in general, although he disagrees on a number of particulars with Avi Hurvitz, Israel Knohl, and others. His use of vocabulary as a criterion for
dating these sources is hardly an improvement over the atomistic approaches of source
criticism over the past 150 years (pages 1325-1330). However, these lexical observations
combine with his overall construction using a myriad of helpful observations to build an
impressive argument that H is preexilic (pages 1347-1364). If one buys the basic redactional principle that H only cites the P traditions when it wishes to polemicize or supplement them (352), then Milgrom's argument that H presumes earlier P traditions follows
logically. So Milgrom establishes the following chronological sequence for Pentateuchal
sources: JE, P, H, and D, and all are preexilic. The exilic H redactor (HR) used all these traditions in compiling the central books of the Torah (Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers) and
was possibly the final redactor of the entire Pentateuch (page 1443). Furthermore,
Milgrom argues here as he has done elsewhere, that narrative and law in the Pentateuch
are structurally interdependent. He suggests that behind each law rests a narrative case
and that the narrative is not "an artificial, fictive case." Rather both law and narrative arise
simultaneously, the narrative establishing the motive for the law. [n this way, Milgrom suggests that the narratives are authentic at their core, and although they have obviously
been reworked, they and the laws they generated "occurred in the distant past," attributable perhaps even to the Mosaic period (page 1348). Unlike earlier source critics,
Milgrom asserts the literary unity and integrity of Leviticus as a whole by demonstrating
the book's ring structure as a macrostructural, redactional technique (il la Mary Douglas,
pages 1364-1367).
The value of the commentary is apparent and it will undoubtedly become an important resource for years to COme. As such, these volumes (particularly 3A) will no doubt be
consulted frequently for those looking for help with the bits about homosexuality - certainly one of the most volatile debates of our times. Since readers of this joumal are likely
among those looking for such help, Milgrom's approach requires further COmment.
Specifically, how do we interpret and apply Leviticus 18:22: "You shall not lie with a
male as one lies with a woman: it is an abomination" (according to Milgrom's translation)?
Again, what application of Leviticus 20: 13 is legitimate in today's context: "If a man lies
with a male as one lies with a woman, the two of them have done an abhorrent thing;
they must be put to death - their bloodguilt is upon them." Milgrom's argument is
unique, to my knowledge (pages 1565-70, 1749-50, and 1785-88). First, he denies that
other attempts to explain the prohibitions against homosexuality have been successful.
Second, he proposes a common denominator for all the sexual prohibitions in Leviticus
18; that is, the emission of semen for purposes of copulation resulting in incest, illicit prog-
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eny, or in the case of 18:22, lack of progeny. In short, the issue is not the gender of one's
partner, but the lack of progeny. "In a word, the theme ... is procreation" (page 1657).
Finally, in an unusual attempt to draw implications of these findings for the contemporary
debate about homosexuality (unusual, that is, for this particular commentary series),
Milgrom offers the following suggestion. Non-jews living outside the boundaries of Israel
are not subject to these laws, and "jewish gays . . .do not violate the intent of the prohibition" if they adopt children (page 1568).
While I appreciate Milgrom's attempt, I must confess that his rather novel approach is
not satisfactory. If the principle of procreation were applied consistently, then surely similar strictures would have been proscribed against heterosexual activity during pregnancy,
or after the onset of menopause. Milgrom's terse explanations of the differences between
these situations and homosexual activity do not succeed in removing the difficulties (page
1568). Moreover, he makes no similar attempt to explain the interdiction against bestiality
in the very next verse in this list of "forbidden sexual relations" (18:23, and his commentary at pages 1570-7 t). Literary theory would require reading these verses together and
comparing the principles behind them. If a commentary offers a "discussion for our times"
on homosexuality (verse 22), why not similarly for bestiality (verse 23)? Reading this otherwise impressive scholar's treatments of each prohibition in sequence (against offering
children to the god Molek, against homosexuality, against bestiality, verses 21 -23) reveals
a rather disjointed treatment and methodology, let alone application to our times.
Several typographical errors, or similar slips of editorial responsibility, were surprising in
a series of this distinction and tradition. Most were only annoying, but occasionally more
confusing, such as the inclusion of two separate bibliographical lists for the same scholar,
including the repetition of the same entry (page 2507, the lists for j. joosten, and see
especially the ZAER article). But such editorial infelicities, or even occasional methodological slips, will not diminish the enormous value of Milgrom's accomplishment.
BILL T. ARNOLD
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Achtemeier, Paul j., joel B. Green, and Marianne Meye Thompson. Introducing the New
Testament: Its Literature and Theology. Grand Rapids/ Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 200 I.
This volume is the most recent entry into the stiff competition for best seminary-level
New Testament survey. Among chief rivals would be comparable volumes by the late
Donald Guthrie (New Testament Introduction, 4th edition 1990); by D. A. Carson, Douglas
Moo, and Leon Morris (An Introduction to the New Testament, 1992); by the late Raymond
Brown (An Introduction to the New Testamen~ 1997); by Udo Schnelle (The History and
Theology of the New Testament Writings, English translation I 998); and by Luke Timothy
johnson (Writings of the New Testamen~ 2nd edition 1999).
In terms of organization, the distinguished team of Achtemeier, Green, and Meye
Thompson begins with a pair of chapters on the nature and the world of the New
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Testament, respectively. They then tackle "The Nature of the Gospels" <Chapter three)
prior to separate chapters on Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. This brings us to chapter
eight, devoted to Jesus; in many ways this serves to synthesize the preceding four chapters, viewing dimensions of Jesus' ministry with the help that all four gospels, seen in the
light of recent discussion, offer. Chapter nine treats Acts, while chapters ten and eleven
deal with "Letters in the New Testament" and "Paul and His World." Nearly the entirety
of the rest of the volume takes up the remaining New Testament books in their canonical
order. Slight exceptions are Philemon, which is treated in chapter seventeen with
Colossians, and Jude, which is discussed in chapter 22 with I and 2 Peter. Chapter 24
takes up the Book of Revelation. The final chapter of the book covers "The Formation of
the New Testament Canon."
In terms of layout, this volume borrows an increasingly common device found in
undergraduate-level New Testament surveys: user-friendly components like sidebars, photos, charts, maps, and other illustrations or brief excursuses. By comparison such figures
play little to no role in the competing works listed above. The insertions break up the text
in helpful ways and impart a good deal of information. This is particularly true in the area
of primary source material from the likes of Josephus, the Old Testament Apocrypha,
Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, Thucydides, Philo, and other sources. Pedagogically this is one
of the book's strongest features. The bibliographies at the end of each chapter are a good
idea in principle, but some will feel they are too brief. They contain only a fraction of the
number of titles contained in any of the introductions mentioned above and fewer than
many undergraduate New Testament surveys.
In terms of content, emphasis is placed on the "story" that the New Testament tells- a
literary and narrative approach to the New Testament occupies center stage more or less
throughout. Emphasis is also placed on the multivalence of much that the New
Testament contains. Stress is laid on the uncertainty of our knowledge of New Testament
lore. Often more questions are raised than answers given. Answers that are given tend to
suggest that traditional views are no longer to be trusted. For example, Paul's authorship
of the pastoral epistles is not only questionable; it is irrelevant to their importance (p.
461) . A lengthy account of objections to Pauline authorship is given with no serious
attempt to refute them; it is interesting now to consult Luke T. Johnson's commentary on
I and 2 Timothy in the Anchor Bible series and be reminded of how very weak the case
against Pauline authorship has always been and remains today. Philippians is a compilation, "not a single unified letter" (p. 420). Are we really sure of this? Authorship of other
"Pauline" writings like Colossians and Ephesians is cast in serious doubt, with little corresponding effort to present the many good arguments for their authenticity and the capriciousness of much critical skepticism. There is no serious presentation, much less defense,
of John's (or anyone's) authorship of the fourth gospel; John the son of Zebedee, the
beloved disciple, is absent from the index as well as from the volume itself, replaced by a
shadowy "Johannine community."
A poignant tension pervades the book, because while it clearly wishes to take its stand
in the mainstream of church tradition, it tends to sound a (self-consciously postmodem)
note of uncertainty about many things that Christians prior to the Enlightenment, and
right up until now in many Christian circles worldwide, have never seriously doubted. I
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suspect that as a textbook this volume could baffle and destabilize the faith of poorly
grounded seminarians, of which there seems to be no shortage in today's divinity schools.
On the positive side, it might be replied that students who are overconfident of what we
know about the Bible will be encouraged either to adopt a more humble posture or to
study harder to justify convictions they have adopted with too little scrutiny.
Biblically grounded and doctrinally informed readers will profit from the fluency and
sophistication of this volume. Seminary professors who like its orientation will find it an
ally in the cause. Others will regard Guthrie (while too long) as more balanced in historical and literary judgments, Carson-Moo-Morris as less theologically thin and more focused
in achieving the aims proper to a graduate-level New Testament introduction, and
Johnson (and now and then even Brown) as more ambitious in taking on our age's touching but frequently naive skepticism toward the New Testament.
ROBERT W. YARBROUGH
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
Deerfield, Illinois

Evans, Craig A. and Stanley E. Porter, eds. Dictionary of New Testament Background.
Downer's Grove, Intervarsity Press, 2000.
In recent years a spate of books has appeared on the subject of what might be called
"New Testament Background," that is, non-linguistic contextual issues relating to the New
Testament. This is not to say that no such works existed in the more distant past. Bo
Reicke's book on the New Testament environment, for example, represents but one such
work from the 1950s and I 960s. But the number of works dealing with this subject seems
to have mushroomed in the eighties and nineties of the last century. Interestingly, however,
up to the present, we have seen no reference work in a dictionary format dealing specifically with background issues of the New Testament. Of course, many of these issues have
been dealt with in larger, more comprehensive, works such as the Anchor Bible Dictionary or
the Interpreter's Bible Dictionary, to name but two. Notwithstanding the excellent scholarship
of these kinds of works, we have not had anything exactly like Evans' and Porter's new reference work. Essentially, the editors have drawn upon a wealth of scholarly expertise to
put together a comprehensive dictionary on New Testament background issues.
The Dictionary (DNTB) begins with a short Preface explaining the work's intended
goal, followed by a very short survey of related works (see ix). As the editors write, 'This
volume is concerned with archaeology, geography, numismatics, related writings, various
historical figures, political institutions, historical events, peoples and cultures." (ix) In other
words the DNTB is intended to address problems and issues of historical, political, economic, religious and cultural contexts of the New Testament. The editors also explain that
their work is somewhat unique in that it deals with contexts related to late Judaism as
well as Hellenism and with relevant literature, rather than focusing on one type. Around
300 topics have been chosen for inclusion in the DNTB. The articles are of varying
length, running from a paragraph to over 10,000 words. Each article is written and signed
by a recognized scholar in a particular area.
As one peruses the list of contributors, it becomes immediately evident that this, like
the other three volumes in the series, is aimed at an evangelical readership. But as one
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reads the various articles (though it is impossible to read every one), it is also evident that
the scholarship represents the very best in evangelicalism. Moreover, each article is comprehensive in its coverage of a particular topic and each one includes a bibliography of
primary and secondary sources. The list of topics included articles on all the extrabiblical
literature relevant for New Testament interpretation, articles on archaeological sites and
their significance, on the relevance of coinage and inscriptions, and many other specific
articles such as, for example, the Jewish sacrificial system, Hellenistic Judaism, taxation in
the ancient world, and Roman politics. Articles are arranged in alphabetical order with
cross references to related topics.
Why however do we need another work on biblical backgrounds (or contexts)?
After all, there are several excellent monographic ones in existence already, for example, we could point to the much-used, and very helpful Backgrounds of Early Christianity,
written by Everett Ferguson. Moreover, one of the dangers of reference works is that
they may suffer greatly from the uneven quality of the articles. One very good reason
for a work like the ONTB is the extreme ease with which it may be used, given the
alphabetical arrangement of the articles. A monographic work, unless one has read it
thoroughly, is only as useful as its index. In addition, the quality of the articles was
excellent in terms of comprehensiveness and accuracy. An added benefit is the readability of the articles.
The ONTB is an indispensable work for New Testament studies, especially as the perception of the importance of background continues to increase. It may not surpass the
monographs in certain respects, but it does provide a useful and easy to use gold mine of
relevant information which will be of inestimable value to the New Testament interpreter.
Finally, I should add that the work may be accused of being theologically biased (what
work is not) toward evangelicalism, but I find that to be a non sequitur, since the contributors represent scholarship which is recognized even outside the evangelical camp.
Background or non-linguistic context is one crucial factor in accurate interpretation. This
new work will stand for some time as one of the best of its kind.
MARC A. CLAUSON
Cedarville College
Cedarville, Ohio

Hubbard, Moyer V. New Creation in Paul's Letters and Thought. SNTSMS 119; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.
This is a revised version of a 1998 Oxford O.Phil. thesis, supervised by Robert Morgan.
The author is currently Associate Professor of New Testament Language and Literature at
Talbot School of Theology, Biola University.
The thesis sets out to elucidate the concept of kaine ktisis ('new creation'), and the relationship of believers to it, in the undisputedly Pauline cases of 2 Cor. 5: 17 and Gal. 6 : 15.
The dominant interpretation of these passages (from Strachan's commentary on 2
Corinthians in 1935 to Mell's major 1989 monograph, Neue Schopfung) is a fundamental-
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Iy soteriological-cosmic (or 'apocalyptic') one, which focuses 'new creation' as the arrival
of the longed-for 'new age'.
Hubbard subjects this to rigorous scrutiny. His case against it is partly (even substantially) methodological. While not disagreeing in principle with the history-of-traditions method
which has been used to establish the dominant interpretation, he (rightly) criticizes it on
two counts. In the first place it has been much too one-sided in its account of Jewish newcreation concepts, concentrating largely on the development of deutero-Isaianic themes
(of which we may distinguish two main ones: the new exodus themes of Isa 40-55, and
the cosmic new heavens/ earth of Isa. 65-66). Secondly, the tradition-historical construct
of 'new creation' arrived at has certainly been used as a 'tool' to 'open' the Pauline meaning: but careful consideration suggests the hermeneutical device in question looks more
like a crowbar than a key. Examination of the lock mechanisms of Paul's own discourse
suggests that a quite different concept of 'new creation' (yet one still at least partly forged
in the Old Testament and Judaism) might open it more smoothly, and without interpretive damage to its parts.
Accordingly, Part I of Hubbard's thesis-less than a third of the book- revisits the Old
Testament and Judaism. He readily agrees that where Jewish writers from Isaiah to
Jubilees saw the external constraints of 'history' as producing the plight (of 'slavery' under
oppressive domination, spiritual and nationaI), they naturally focused a solution in terms
of the liberation of cosmic new creation. Other Jewish writings, however, from Jeremiah
and Ezekiel to Joseph & Aseneth, saw the essential plight as fundamentally internal and
anthropological-the problem of humankind-bound-in-sin. For Ezekiel, the only appropriate 'solution' is creation of a new 'heart' through the indwelling transformative and
enabling presence of Cod as Spirit (Ezek. I I: 18-20; 36:25-27; similarly for Jer. 31 :31 -34).
This is taken up in Jubilees I :23-29, but especially in Joseph & Aseneth, where the central
issue is how a Centile princess (characterized as in idolatrous sin, darkness and death) can
become a fitting wife for pious Joseph. And the answer is that she must be remade, recreated, reborn, and brought to life, light, and truth, through the work of Cod's Spirit in her
'conversion' (see esp. the central prayer in 8.9). Here (Hubbard argues) we meet an
anthropological-soteriology of 'new creation', which in important respects provides the closest analogy to (but note carefully, not 'explanation of) Paul's usage of that terminology.
Part II, just over one-fifth of the volume, provides a general orientation to Paul's fromdeath-to-life motifs, beginning with significant general insights from cultural anthropology
(chap. 5), then going on to analyze 'newness of life' in Rom. 6 : I- II and 7: 1-6 in successive chapters, before turning to the antecedents to the apostle's thoroughly pneumatic
explanation of all this (chap. 8), and finishing with a more detailed elucidation of Cal.
2 : 19-20. Hubbard manages to show that the antitheses Spirit-flesh and Spirit-letter, are
essentially new-covenantal equivalents (based esp. in Ezek. 36 and Jer. 3 I), and that
'Spirit' stands both in and for the nexus life-newness-grace-righteousness. As such it contrasts with law-flesh-sin-death-' old-man'. Conversion-initiation marks death-with-Christ to
all these, while present participation in Christ's resurrection leads to the nexus of salvation.
In all this, Paul's soteriology is avowedly 'eschatological', but it is also primarily anthropological and individual (without being at all individualist).
Part 1Il, almost half the volume, consists of two extended chapters on 2 Cor: 5: I 7 and
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Gal. 6: 15 respectively (and closing with a short conclusion). In both chapters, if in different ways, Hubbard sees Paul's essential disagreement with his opponents to hinge on their
trust in status and externals (whether rhetoric and power in 2 Corinthians, or circumcision and law in Galatians), while Paul's 'answer' is that those are the very things the cross
ironically proves foolish. For him, the gospel is fundamentally rather about fulfillment of
Ezekiel's and Jeremiah's new covenant hopes for 'life' from 'death' through personal new
creation, and inner renewal of God's image, by the life-giving Spirit. In the 'liminal' stage
that stretches between our first conversion-initiation participation in the Christ-event and
the final parousia realization of our resurrection liberation and glory, this new life-fromdeath is manifest precisely in the cruciform sufferings-and-missionary-successes of the
apostle, as inner strengthening in outer weakness and wasting, and as treasure in earthen
vessels. 2 Cor. 5: 17 and Gal. 6: 15 are simply the critical verses in each discourse which
sum up the complex constellations of associated and antithetical ideas.
I would have liked to see the treatment of the theme carried through to Col. 3: I 0, Eph.
4:24 and Titus 3:5; but there was probably no room for it. As it is, Hubbard wastes hardly
a word in this crisp, judiciously-argued, thoroughly critically-aware, yet admirably lucid
and well-signposted monograph: it is in many respects a model of the UK genre of doctoral thesis.

MAX TURNER
Scholar in Residence, Asbury Theological Seminiary
London Bible College, an Associated Institute of Brunei University, Great Britain

Thiselton, Anthony C. The First Epistle to the Corinthians. The New International Greek
Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000.
In this massive commentary on I Corinthians, Thiselton expertly combines multiple
approaches that will be of major assistance to interpreters of I Corinthians. These
approaches are all drawn together by the solid repetition of a theological framework for the
epistle. Thiselton argues that the epistle of First Corinthians is decisively shaped not by the
problems at Corinth, whether that be socio-cultural division or theological difference, but
that rather the epistle is shaped by Paul's understanding of Christ and the cross and his
own call as an apostle who walks in the way of the cross, the way of weakness (pp. 20-22).
The introduction to the commentary begins with a review of Corinthian history and
context followed by a discussion of issues related to status and recognition in the GrecoRoman world and an introduction of the theological framework that shapes Thiselton's
reading of the epistle. The introduction ends with a helpful review of Greco-Roman
rhetoric, its use in the ancient world, and suggestions about limitations of the method for
the purpose of interpreting Paul's letter.
The main body of the commentary follows a format of translation, introduction to the
pericope at hand, extensive bibliography that is usually divided into several categories, notes
on the textual evidence from the Greek New Testament, comment on individual words or
phrases, occasional excursus on particular issues (for example, ''The Four So-called Groups"
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of I Cor. I: 12), and a summary of important aspects of the history of interpretation related
to the passage under discussion. The work in each section is careful, detailed, and demonstrates excellent command of both the primary and secondary sources.
The strength of the commentary lies in Thiselton's ability to integrate exegetical scholarship with current hermeneutical work and a solid commitment to history and theology.
This creates a balance in the interpretation that allows Thiselton both to review the work
and arguments of major scholars around particular issues and press forward in new and
creative ways at particular junctures. For example, early on in the commentary (24)
Thiselton begins to address the issue of Paul's apostleship and its function in the
Corinthian situation. He allows this to build over the course of the exegetical work,
addressing it in the comments on I Cor I: I (pp. 55-6; 64-67) where he examines the
ideas of such commentators as Calvin who wrote that Paul uses the word apostle to gain
influence or authority (p. 64). But Thiselton rightly points out that the use of the title
"apostle" to gain power or to manipulate the audience of I Corinthians has been strongly
critiqued by Foucault and Nietzsche and their work on issues related to power. Thiselton
then contrasts the idea supported by Calvin and others with commentators from
Chrysostom to Lightfoot who have argued that the sign of apostleship is Christ and the
weakness of the cross. Thiselton then pushes this argument further by suggesting two
functions of an apostle: first, to witness to the death and resurrection of Christ and second, to participate and share in the weakness of Christ and his cross (p. 66). Thiselton's
ability to summarize and distill the work of other scholars helps him push the argument
one step further in many cases while allowing the reader to see the ideas and suggestions
of those who have gone before. The discussion of apostleship is then continued in a short
excursus entitled "Mimesis and alleged Paternal Authoritarianism (4: 15-16)" where
Thiselton addresses Castelli's argument that Paul's rhetoric is manipulative and aimed at
grasping rather than releasing power (pp. 371 -3). His consistent retum to the shaping theological themes of the epistle alongside careful and detailed study of the meaning and
structure of individual peri copes within the epistle allow him to argue contra Castelli.
Instead Paul's ministry and his call for those at Corinth to imitate him is not a grab for
power but a call for others to join with him in pursuing the way of Christ as it is understood in a cross that calls for weakness, foolishness, and humility. Paul himself is critiqued
by the cross rather than using it as a means of manipulation and power (p. 3 73) .
Thiselton closes the discussion of apostleship with his comments on chapter I 5 where he
relates Paul's apostleship to God's gracious work in the apostle's life (pp. 1211 -2). This is
one example of how the commentary is shaped by both the exegetical work that
Thiselton has done as well as his interaction with major scholars in the fields of philosophy, hermeneutics, and biblical studies. This type of attention to significant issues within
the epistle and their development over the course of the whole is characteristic of the
commentary generally.
There are parts of the commentary that are slightly unwieldy and that appear to be disjointed; although, considering the size of the work (1 ,446 pages), this may not be completely unexpected. While the segments that deal with the history of interpretation offer
valuable information and helpful reminders about the multiple ideas and perspectives that
have percolated around I Corinthians over the last two millennia, there are points at

Asbury Theological Journal

2 I9

which they seem to be only a listing of the opinions of major commentators from the
Early Patristics through to the Reformation and Enlightenment and they lack a framework
that would help mold the readers' understanding of these sections. Overall, this is an
excellent commentary, a major achievement in integrative work, and a resource that all
those with a serious interest in First Corinthians should have on their shelves.
RUTH ANNE REESE
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Comfort, Philip W. and David P. Barrett, eds. The Text of the Earliest New Testament Greek
Manuscn"pts. Wheaton, 111 : Tyndale House Publishers, 200 I .
This volume, in the words of the editors, "presents a complete revision and expansion
of The Complete Text of the Earliest New Testament Manuscn"ptf' (Baker, 1999) by the same
editors (p. 13). The present work gives a unified presentation of the few manuscripts that
had previously been handled as separate manuscripts but are actually parts of one manuscript (e.g., P4, P64, and P67), and includes newly available portions of some manuscripts.
It "provides a representative sample of the New Testament that was read by Christians in
the earliest centuries of the church" (p. 17).
This work is a significant contribution to the field of New Testament manuscript paleographical and textual studies. The texts of most, if not all, of these manuscripts have previously been published in various works over many years; but the present volume makes
available under one cover the complete available text of the sixty-nine earliest extant
manuscripts of the Greek New Testament, i.e. those dated from approximately AD. 300
and earlier. This means that all of these manuscripts are significantly earlier than the
famous Cod. Vaticanus (Cod. B) and Cod. Sinaiticus (Cod. Aleph). It is not surprising that
all but four are written on papyrus, since it was only about the beginning of the fourth
century that parchment, or vellum, came into use for New Testament manuscripts.
Indeed, Cod. 0189, a single leaf containing Acts 5 :3-2 I of a manuscript that presumably
originally contained the entire book of Acts, is called by the editors the earliest known
parchment manuscript of the New Testament (p. 639). The contents of these manuscripts vary greatly, of course, from a small fragment containing parts of three or four verses (e.g., P52) to a manuscript containing a nearly complete Gospel (e.g., P66) and another
that includes most of the Pauline Epistles (e.g., P64).
The manuscripts are presented in the order of their numeral designation : first the
papyri (plus one at the end which evidently has not yet been assigned the regular 'P' plus
a numeral designation), then the four parchment manuscripts under the common designation of '0' ('zero') plus a number. These latter are known as 'Uncial' (to distinguish them
from the minuscule hand of later manuscripts) although the papyri are also written in
uncial letters.
Much information is supplied in the introduction to each manuscript: contents, date,
source, present location, physical features, and where the text has previously been pub-
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lished. In the introduction a list is given of the standard abbreviations of certain words
called nomina sacra, including 'God', 'Christ', and others; and there are notes on other
abbreviations and how scribes made corrections, and the Greek letters used as numerals
(pp.34-35).
An important feature is the comment on the textual affinity of each manuscript
(except for the few whose text is too limited to ascertain the affinity). These earliest manuscripts give small comfort to those who claim that the Greek text that in general underlies the King James and New King James versions of the New Testament, the so-called
Majority Text (since it is found in most later manuscripts), is the most faithful to the original New Testament text. None of these earliest manuscripts support this text, and the
large majority support in general the fonn of the text found in the UBS Greek text and
the NIY and NRSY (see pp. 27-29). Likewise, this volume can be used to show the falsehood of claims by followers of some sects and religions that the original text of the New
Testament has been lost or falsified through the centuries.
The inclusion of photographs of a majority of the manuscripts enables the reader to
obtain a very infonnative idea of the manuscripts and their style of handwriting. The
Introduction includes a discussion of the four types of uncial handwriting (pp. 24-27).
Following a common practice, in the printed text letters that are uncertain have a dot
placed beneath them, and text that is missing but presumed to have been in the text is
enclosed in square brackets. The text is printed with lines matching the fonnat of the text
in each manuscript.
In this book textual students and scholars have a wealth of information available. But
persons who are merely curious to know what ancient manuscripts of the New
Testament looked like will be rewarded by looking at the book's many photographs.
Editors Comfort and Barrett are to be commended for their labors that have produced
this volume.
HAROLD GREENLEE
Fonnerly Professor of New Testament Greek
Asbury Theological Seminary

Anatolios, Khaled. Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought. New York: Routledge, I 998.
As the title indicates, this book describes the theology of Athanasius of Alexandria as a
coherent system. What may be surprising to many readers is that a book-length treatment
of Athanasian theology does not already exist. But while his historical importance is widely recognized, Athanasius has remained largely the property of patristics scholars until
recently. The great merit of Anatolios' book, a revision of his 1997 Boston College dissertation, is that he has identified this lacuna and undertaken to fill it with a monograph that
draws out the "implied systematic framework" underlying Athanasius' scattered, ad hoc,
and mostly polemical writings. Anatolios intends for his book to do three things: offer a
comprehensive, organic interpretation of Athanasius' writings; refute several current misunderstandings of Athanasius' work by showing that they rest on partial interpretations
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rather than a total view; and introduce the theology of Athanasius as a credible dialogue
partner for contemporary theology.
The great danger in this undertaking, Anatolios admits, is that of imposing a systematic
framework from later ages onto the fourth-century bishop. Instead, the proper procedure
is to pay close attention to the terms and rhetorical moves in the writings themselves, and
thereby to identify the intrinsic center of coherence in Athanasius' theology. The central
theme he selects is not at first sight an especially promising one for focusing the investigation: it is "the distinction, and simultaneous relation, between God and the world." But in
four chapters, Anatolios traces this "systematic insistence on the simultaneity of divine
transcendence and neamess to the world" through Athanasius' writings before, during,
and after the Arian crisis, as well as in its application to the Christian life.
Anatolios sets his chosen theme against a broad horizon of pre-Christian thought, surveying Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic models of the God-world relationship. But his main
interest is in tracing the history of Christian ideas about God's relation to the world.
Anatolios tells a fairly familiar story in which the second-century apologists, seduced by
the philosophical problem of transcendence (questions such as "how can the one bring
forth the many," and "how can the timeless have contact with the temporal"), veered
toward abstract ideas of God. Irenaeus emerges as the hero in this account, coming to the
rescue with a more biblical theology which sees God's transcendence as inclusive of an
immediate presence to creation via the fully divine Son and Spirit. Athanasius stands in
this tradition, restating the Irenaean theology in his fourth-century Alexandrian context.
Adolf Harnack famously argued that Athanasius was a soteriological thinker to the
exclusion of any discernible philosophical interest, but Anatolios marshals evidence from
more recent scholarship to show that Athanasius had a lively sense of the metaphysical
claims demanded by his account of salvation. Much of Anatolios' book proceeds by way
of lengthy quotations from Athanasius, followed by commentary designed to show how
his biblical theology served as the guide for his judicious philosophical eclecticism. The
exposition altemates between close attention to Athanasius' distinctive vocabulary ("participation," "appropriation," and a range of words connoting "interiorization,") and some
rather sweeping abstract summaries: "Salvation-history is preconfigured by ontological
polarities." It is a helpful combination, swinging the reader's attention back and forth from
close contact with the text to expansive views of its implications. Anatolios is a sympathetic listener who goes to great lengths to give Athanasius the benefit of any doubt. His reading of Athanasius is almost belligerently loyal.
Nowhere is Anatolios's hermeneutic of charity more evident than in his treatment of
Athanasian christology. The influential distinction made by Aloys Grillmeier between
Logos-Sarx and Word-Man models of patristic christology may have great explanatory
power, but it has long been invoked to sideline Athanasius as a church father having
nothing more than a "space-suit christology" in the words of one recent critic. Anatolios
undertakes to rehabilitate Athanasius' reputation by paying close attention to his characteristic vocabulary. Though it is true that he described Christ's human body as the "instrument" of the Word, the main emphasis for Athanasius was always on the fact of this
body's "appropriation" by the Son of God. The Son of God made this human body completely and properly his own, so that while the subject of the incamate experiences was
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the Word, the body was in no way external to the Word's subjectivity.
In an imaginative effort to let Athanasius respond to his modem critics, Anatolios takes
the offensive by using Athanasian categories to critique later christological assumptions. In
his view, it is fundamentally wrongheaded to juxtapose the human and the divine in
Christ as two natures facing each other in a static configuration. Rather than a "composition christology" concerned to describe the coexistence of two natures, Athanasius operated with a teleological conception oriented toward the dynamic intervention of God to
save the human race. Anatolios calls this way of thinking a "hina christology," a christology
of the purpose clause. This is why Athanasius is never content to say flatly that Christ suffered: he must immediately go on to add the "in order that" clause, to show that Christ
suffered as one who mastered suffering in the very act of undergoing it on our behalf.
The threat of apparent docetism dissolves into the promise of pervasive soteriology.
This suggestion for an Athanasian christology (with the emphasis on the transformative
purpose, the incarnation) is perhaps the most controversial element in Anatolios' book,
chiefly because he does not spell out the implications of this laudable fourth-century way
of thinking for the more rigorous conciliar christology of the next hundred years culminating at Chalcedon. In a footnote, he drops a hint that the later Egyptian rejection of
Chalcedonian thought may in fact be based on the an Athanasian mindset which sees
Chalcedonian christology as static, non-teleological and non-transformative. It is a
provocative and stimulating section of the book, raising far more questions than it can
possibly settle.
Rather than pursuing these questions, Anatolios makes a deft transition to his next discussion: the life of grace which follows from a transformative christology. Athanasius'
hagiography of the monk Antony is the primary text here, and two related themes
emerge from it: First, Antony's life of holiness is offered as evidence that Christ is risen
and active in the world, overthrowing wickedness; and second, Antony is described as
Christ's co-worker. Anatolios offers a careful description of this synergistic life of grace,
showing how Antony's labor is dependent on, derivative from, and directed toward the
work of Christ. Antony's balance between patiently waiting on deliverance from God on
the one hand and passionately striving and battling against evil on the other hand is a
good reminder of why John Wesley was drawn to the spirituality embodied here. Perhaps
the chief merit of Anatolios' book is that he shows how the broad outline of the theology
of Athanasius serves to underwrite this spirituality.
By way of conclusion, Anatolios attempts a direct comparison of the Athanasian view
of the God-world relation with the views of two modem theologians: Schleiermacher and
Barth. The result is little more than a puppet show, with Schleiermacher standing in for
one-sided pantheistic immanentism and Barth representing the one-sided transcendence
of a God who is wholly other. This is not quite fair to either thinker, but it is an especially
rough handling of Barth. After Anatolios has done so much careful work in bringing out
the lines of Athanasian theology, it is a shame that he resorts to such a facile maneuver at
the end. He has argued strenuously for Athanasius as the classic proponent of a distinctively Christian understanding of the convergence of God's immanence and transcendence, and this should have enabled him to engage the nature-grace discussion in twentieth century Roman Catholic theology, or at the very least to have interacted with Kathryn
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Tanner's celebrated thesis regarding the "non-contrastive" view of transcendence in
Christian theology. In spite of this disappointing final section, Anatolios' book does succeed in its stated aim of setting the theology of Athanasius before us as a systematic
whole, and as a viable dialogue partner for contemporary theology.
FRED SANDERS
Biola University
La Mirada, California

Black, Kathy. Worship Aa-OS5 Cultures: A Handbook. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998.
Kathy Black's Worship Aa-OS5 Cultures is a useful examination of United Methodist worship practices across twenty-one cultural groups in America. The author, professor of
Homiletics and Liturgics at the Claremont School of Theology in Claremont, Calif., has
provided brief, clear descriptions of worship in these various groups, arranging the information by a recurring set of categories. Black's use of these categories allows comparison
across cultural groups. She organizes the information on each group under the larger categories of Word, sacramental practices, and rituals of passage and, within these, under
more specific issues like language, time, space, prayer, music, preaching, baptism,
Communion, weddings, and funerals.
Black developed her book's findings by a process of clergy interviews and written
questionnaires. If appropriate (in the case of large groups or groups with generational differences), she interviewed more than one representative from each group.
Each cultural group gets its own chapter. The twenty-one cultural groups represent
those cultures that have established United Methodist congregations pastored by ministers
of that culture in the native language(s). (The book's cultural groupings do not necessarily
reflect all cultures represented by individual United Methodists') Some group identifiers are
large and not-unexpected, e.g., Euro-American and African-American, whereas many represent groups often overlooked or forgotten, e.g., Hmong-American, Laotian-American,
and Ghanaian-American. Asian or Pacific islander cultures make up fourteen of the twenty-one groups. Black provides two appendices (one on names for God, Jesus Christ, and
church in the various languages and one on calendars) and a glossary of worship-related
terms from the various cultures.
The book is a unique contribution to descriptions of current Methodist worship. While
there are, for example, single volumes which look at worship in a Hispanic or AfricanAmerican context, I know of no similar study that examines United Methodist worship
across such a wide range of ethnic and cultural groups. In particular, Black's desire to provide a format by which comparison can be made across the different groups on specific
issues is especially helpful.
The subtitle gives a hint as to the best use of this book: it is a handbook aimed at providing introductory, condensed information about cultural distinctives in worship. Thus,
someone asked to lead worship in a culture different than her/ his first culture would benefit from reading the appropriate section of this book. I have also used the book as a sup-
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plemental read for seminary students to stimulate their thinking about the relationship
between culture and worship and to make them aware of their own cultural assumptions
about worship. Beyond such specific uses, the book contains interesting material for anyone intrigued by how diverse and common United Methodist worship can be across the
United States.
At a technical level, the book's most valuable contributions might not be in the details
within each culturally-specific chapter but in the insights gained by comparing worship
across cultures. Most of these insights Black highlights in the introductory chapter. Some
deal with the origins of Christian worship in a culture as in her observing that a group's
practices-particularly baptism and Communion practices-tend to be that of the first missionaries or that of the dominant church in the home country whether these reflect
Methodist tradition or not. Some deal with varying levels of influence of culture upon
worship. For instance, Black finds that funerals tend to be highly reflective of culture and
thus across cultural groups are the most diverse of all church rituals. Similarly, her findings
about how worship changes as cultural groups move from first to second to third generations are very insightful.
At times, the book left me wanting more. The book's dominant mode is reporting
information, appropriately so given the author's purpose. Occasionally, however, more
explanation about the significance of the information would be useful. The information,
moreover, reported on some topics is not as full as one would hope. The treatment of
space, for example, tends to deal with decoration and not other culturally-related spatial
issues like arrangement, use, and cultural models for religious space. One wonders, too,
whether Black has used a broad enough sample to give accurate description for each cultural group. To her credit she is aware of the book's limitation in this respect, noting that
general observations for each culture may not be applicable to all congregations within
that culture.
These qualities are just small glitches in the book's usefulness, however. Given that
much of its data is not easily accessed elsewhere, it is a very helpful volume for students
of Methodist worship.
LESTER RUTH
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Boa, Kenneth D. and Robert M. Bowman, If. Faith Has Its Reasons. An Integrative Approach
to Defending Christianity: An Apologetics Handbook. Colorado Springs, Colorado :
NavPress, 200 I.
Many apologetics books, both newer and older ones, are unbalanced or incomplete.
Some represent very competent presentations of a single position or approach, but fail to
mention anything about other approaches, except to denigrate them (often unfairly).
Others purport to be comprehensive guides to apologetics in general, including all
approaches, but again, for whatever reasons, fail to treat some approaches or do not deal
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comprehensively with the approaches they do present. Many apologetics works are either
overly simplistic or unduly technical, the former approach making them less useful to the
serious student and the latter making them unusable to anyone but the professional
philosopher. Finally, a work has come along which appears to have avoided most, if not
all, of the problems mentioned above. Faith Has Its Reasons is a multi-faceted book, dealing
comprehensively with every form of apologetic approach in a way that is not only readable but also in-depth.
The authors begin this book with an excellent and helpful overview of the various
apologetic systems, including comparative charts for the reader's benefit, as well as a very
useful brief history of apologetics (including the Presuppositionalist approach). Following
this first part, the next five parts (Parts 2-6), each one consisting of several chapters, deal in
turn with one approach to apologetics : Classical, Evidential, Reformed or
Presuppositional, Fideist, and Integrative. Within each part, the authors examine the basic
tenets of each approach, the method by which it typically proceeds to defend the faith or
take the offensive in proclaiming the faith, the major proponents of each approach
(including their differences from each other), an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and a unique dialogue format in which the authors show an example of how each approach would tend to operate in practice.
In a book of about 600 pages, Boa and Bowman seem to have left few stones untumed,
and they accomplish this depth and breadth of treatment accurately and fairly, finding the
good aspects of each approach without naively endorsing any single approach. Moreover,
the philosophical sophistication of the treatment of the views of many apologists is truly
impressive. In addition, Boa and Bowman deal with the nuances of each approach. For
example, when the authors come to the Presuppositionalist approach, one of the "newest
kids" on the philosophical/theological block, they clearly distinguish among the views of
Cornelius van Til, Gordon Clark, and the newer Reformed apologists such as Alvin
Plantinga, while deftly holding them all together under the Presuppositional label. The same
can be said for their treatment of the Evidential approach, where they show the developing
sophistication of that system and also the differences between and among its modem proponents such as John Warwick Montgomery, Clark Pinnock, and Richard Swinburne.
I have already mentioned the issue of philosophical accuracy, but it bears closer scrutiny. A reader of an apologetics text has every right to expect a text which exhibits philosophical accuracy. In other words, the author should not be embarrassed to have a professional philosopher read his work, even though it is also intended for the general intelligent audience. This text satisfies the accuracy requirement quite well, without being overly convoluted, as philosophical works sometimes (necessarily) can become. But make no
mistake, the subtle analysis of each system and its proponents is quite impressive.
It was also a real thrill finally to see all the different apologetic approaches treated in
such detailed fashion in one book. I have rarely seen this in any apologetic work.
Moreover, the examination was not naive but properly critical regarding each system.
Besides that, the authors took great pains to show that few if any apologists have adopted a
single "pure" type. Rather it has more often been a matter of emphasis, though one should
not get the idea from this book (the authors certainly do not give itl that aU approaches
blend together. Each approach is carefully and lucidly distinguished by the book.

226

Book Reviews

For the general reader, it should also be a special treat to read the "dialogues" at the
end of each section. These dialogues are hypothetical conversations between a Christian
and two non-Christians (one of a "secularized" non-Western religious background and the
other from a Western background). In each one, the amateur Christian apologist overhears the conversation between the two non-believers, asks to engage in their talk, and
then proceeds to utilize his particular apologetic approach in the dialogue. These hypothetical dialogues provide excellent practical examples of the "real-life" use of apologetics.
Finally, one should not skip over the concluding questions and answers in the last
chapters of each section. These questions, along with their answers, are divided into two
types: (I) so-called metapologetic or "big picture" questions, for example, "On what basis
do we claim that Christianity is the truth?" (227, Evidentialist approach) or "Should apologetics engage in a philosophical defense of the Christian faith?" (343, Presuppositional)
and (2) apologetic questions, dealing with specific substantive issues which might arise in
the use of a given method, for example, "Don't all religions lead to Cod?" (230) or 'Why
should we believe the Bible?" (345, Presuppositional approach). The questions and
answers provide an excellent summary for each approach.
To give but one of example of how I benefited from this book, for the first time, I read
a full and nuanced account of the most misunderstood Presuppositonal approach. The
authors' analysis of that approach included an extremely valuable discussion of the disagreements among Presuppositionalists themselves regarding the precise way of applying
their essential tenets. For example, I read about the crucial (and frequently misunderstood) differences between van Til and Clark, an extremely helpful comparison not found
in most apologetics books. This is only one of many such useful details.
If there are faults with the book, they would have to be found only by nitpicking. No
doubt, it could be argued by a philosopher of religion that it does not deal in sufficient
detail with the very slightest nuances of apologetics, for example, the full arguments for
the existence of Cod, with the various objections, the full arguments by every major
philosopher of religion of every approach, and on and on. But one must remember that
this work is not an exhaustive treatise on the content or substance of apologetics. Rather
its aim is to introduce, in a much more sophisticated way than the normal work, the main
approaches to apologetics, to compare and contrast them, to show how apologetics has
been and is done by Christians, and to include major problems with each approach. No
single volume could possibly include everything desired by every philosopher.
One might also quibble with the authors' definitions and classifications, but even this is
a matter for debate. For example, when examining Fideism, the writers do define this
method in such a way as to "rehabilitate" the term (see 385). But, it appears that they
have legitimately distinguished an irrational Fideism from a "responsible" Fideism, though
some would like to view all Fideism as irrational. One can argue with the distinction, but
it is open to discussion, as is any classification of approaches which necessarily "pigeonholes" certain apologists to the dislike of students of apologetics.
This book cannot be too highly recommended for classroom use. It is, as I said,
extremely lucid, and well organized. Nor would it be at all beneath a professional philosopher or theologian to read it. In fact, many professionals, especially those whose specialty
is not in philosophy of religion, could benefit by the succinct, lucid, sophisticated and
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accurate account of the various apologetic approaches. I have used the book for a survey
in apologetics and have found it to be the best overall survey treatment of apologetics
available. I would venture to say that the book will be a standard for apologetic surveys
for some time to come.
MARC A. CLAUSON
Cedarville College
Cedarville, Ohio

Budde, Michael L. and Robert W. Brimlow. Christianity Incorporated: How Big Business Is
Buying the Church. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2002.
Michael Budde and Robert Brimlow, in their work Christianity Incorporated, level a very
serious charge indeed against the Christian Church: rather than faithfully fulfilling its calling to be a force for transformation in society, it has allowed itself to be relegated to the
role of serving as a chaplain to capitalism. Of course, assessment of such a charge requires
some clarifications, and the authors waste no time in identifying one of the underlying
presuppositions of the culture-at-Iarge which motivate such a fateful re-orientation of the
church: "the proper role of the church in capitalist democracies such as the United States"
is "that Christianity must be 'useful' in order to be a legitimate player in our contemporary
world."{p. I 0) The fact that this presupposition is shared by "nearly all of the powerful
political and economic institutions"{p. 10), regardless of political label, means that the
church almost inevitably falls into the trap of thinking that she must either become "useful" in a way that services her benefactors or she must face the reality of marginalization.
The extent to which accepting such an either/ or constitutes a loss of nerve and a failure
of faith is worthy of examination, but cannot detain us here.
What sort of "usefulness" do Budde and Brimlow believe those powerful economic
and political institutions require of the Christian church as chaplain? Well, for one thing
the church must be willing to accept "the roles of providing care for capitalism's casualties,
moral support for its functionaries, spiritual solace for its rulers, and in-house whispers of
'compassion'" (p. 13). Of course, to succeed, any chaplain must "submit to the formative
processes (physical, emotional, affective, and spiritual) of the institutions" for which chaplaincy is being provided- how else can chaplains "understand, serve, and empathize"{p.
I I) with the leaders of these institutions? Consequently, according to Budde and
Brimlow, the church as chaplain must be prepared to salve the consciences of any who
might question the ascendency of capitalism, and the church must use all its wiles to
make good citizens (and guilt-free consumers!) for the modem capitalist state. By the end
of the first chapter, the authors have laid out the general contours of their charge.
In the second chapter, the authors note how modem corporations, recognizing the
fundamentally spiritual aspect of the present age, have "gotten religion." Of course, this

corporate "conversion" is not, so they point out, a conversion to the Christian notions
of self-denial and cross-bearing, but rather to a more generic "spirituality." This "spirituality" takes on a number of forms, from helping persons see "their work as a spiritual
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path"{p. 31) to publications filled with "shallow sentiment, self-help c1iches"{p. 44) to
on site corporate chaplaincy programs. Nevertheless, the goal is the same throughout:
to define religion and spirituality in a way so as to benefit the bottom line and to minimize worker unrest. This theme gets played out in some more detail in the subsequent
chapter where the issue of formation is taken up-as the Christian life involves practices
that form the person into the image of Christ, so must persons be formed so as to be fit
for capitalism.(p. 61)
In chapter four, the authors consider a sample case by examining the impact of
"[tlhe corporate transformation of funerals, burials, memorials, and other aspects of
death and bereavement."(p. 83) In essence, they argue that the net effect of this transformation is remarkably inflated prices, dis-enfranchisement of family-owned business,
and a decline in quality of service. In chapters five and six, easily the most philosophical/theological chapters, the authors engage in a critique of Pope John Paul II's encyclical Centesimus Annus and then expand their critique in chapter six to a broader historical and ecclesiological focus. In short, they argue that, while the Pope might be a good
defender of Lockean liberalism, he has succeeded less in engaging modern capitalism
from the perspective of the Gospel of Christ. And, more broadly, they argue that,
while historical precedent exists for the church to offer a real alternative to the capitalist idea, the contemporary church, whether Protestant or Catholic, is largely mute
when it comes either to challenge or the offering of an alternative vision of life together. They conclude in chapter seven with a theological presentation, rooted largely in
the Sermon on the Mount, which provides some concrete proposals for "the church
as aikas," proposals aimed to once again enable the church to imagine and enact that
alternate community.
The central thesis of this work is quite provocative and is, in fact, one that deserves
serious evaluation by all who seek to advance the kingdom of Christ. The emphasis within contemporary trinitarian theology- particularly those theologies which argue that the
natural out-working of the doctrine of the Trinity is an understanding of personhood as
relationally constituted- reopens numerous questions for the role of Christians vis-a-vis
the economic and societal institutions which best mediate the rule God intends for the
present world. For too long, these topics have been swept under the rug by a church that
has sought largely to be non-offensive to the existing power structures.
Nevertheless, I have some concern with the arguments in their current state. First,
while I appreciate the proposals of chapter seven and think they should be pursued,
one is still left wondering about large-scale alternatives to the capitalist project. Has capitalism become so ensconced in modern economies as to be insuperable? Have the
fundamental presuppositions of capitalism come to be so utterly taken for granted that
expunging them is impossible? With stock market ownership, for example, so widely
dispersed (even with very disproportionate ownership in the hands of very few), is
movement to a non-capitalist economy possible? If Budde and Brimlow are correct that
the motivation of capitalism (self-interest-even if the enlightened self-interest as modern capitalist apologetics argues) is antithetical to the Gospel's call to self-denial, what
ought be the church's response? I presume no answer to these questions, but think
they must be asked- and persons with commitments like those of the authors must be
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involved in this process. AII-in-all, Christianity Incorporated is a must read for all who are
suspicious that the call of Christ is much more radical than many contemporary presentations of the Gospel suggest.
CHUCK GVTENSON
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Dever, Mark. Nine Marks of a Healthy Church. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2000.
Starting with the historical touchstone language of ecclesial marks (the one, holy, apostolic and catholic Church described in the Nicene Creed), Mark Dever lays out a biblically rich case for a healthy church in what was originally a sermon series in his church. He
does not center his discussion on the Nicene marks per se; rather he lays out nine indicators of church health found in churches that he assumes already bear the creedal
qualities.l Those marks are expositional preaching, biblical theology, the Gospel, a biblical
understanding of conversion, a biblical understanding of evangelism, biblical church discipline, a concern for discipleship and growth, and biblical church discipline. While
acknowledging that some churches can meet the criteria of the marks while still being less
healthy than others (p. 10), he focuses on the pure preaching of the Word (the first five
indicators) and leading disciples (the remaining).
Dever's work can be located in the flow of church health literature prevalent in the last
fifteen to twenty years. For the data hungry, probably the most helpful element of Nine
Marks is his summary of the church health literature in the appendix. His perspective feels
at times like the adage that right thinking equals right practice. For example, Callahan's
Twelve Keys, one of the pioneering voices in the church health chorus lays out six functional and six relational characteristics while Dever spends considerable energy in establishing a biblical understanding of the various health traits.2 The more contemporary
Christian Schwarz' eight health characteristics have a functional texture as welt> Yet, the
author is careful to weave Scripture throughout and clearly acknowledges the living out of
the principles in the power of the Holy Spirit.
In good evangelistic mode, the book places expositional preaching at the head of the
list. This mark is "far and away the most important of them all, because if you get this one
right, all of the others should follow ... if you miss this one and get all the other eight
marks right, in a sense these others would be just so many accidents" (p. 25). He contrasts
expositional with topical preaching and bases his bias on his high view of the authority of
Scripture (p. 26). The preacher's role becomes that of stewarding the life-giving and sanctifying Word.
Certainly the proclaimer enters the responsibility of "rightly handling the Word of
truth." The question becomes whether Dever's definition of preaching allows for alternative styles like narrative preaching as opposed to a strict verse by verse discursive. At the
same time, other traditions soften the priority of the preached Word and strengthen the
accent on communion. Where does the primacy of the Eucharist fit in this free church
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model? Can communion become as powerful a call to decision as the sermon?
His call to biblical theology translates as understanding the creative, holy, faithful, loving
and sovereign God (p. 46), The Gospel demands more than appeasement; it calls us to
transforming life in God through Christ beginning with conversion. "The change each
human needs, regardless of how we appear outwardly, is so radical, so near our roots,
that only God can bring it about. We need God to convert us" (p. 99).
Not surprisingly evangelism flows from these prior two emphases. As a good pastor,
Dever steps the reader/listener through the rationale for and potential approaches to sharing the good news with others. Once a person is drawn into a saving relationship, they
grow toward high commitment membership that includes baptism, and a signed statement of faith and covenant. Active members attend worship, communion, and meetings
regularly as well as pray and give regularly (p. 14 7ffi.
To ensure continued growth in the congregation, the author advocates biblical church
discipline highlighting Scriptural instructions like Hebrews 12, Matthew 18, I Corinthians
5, Galatians 6 and others. Healthy bodies enjoy freedom through healthy habits while
minimizing unhealthy practices. He acknowledges the difficulties inherent in practicing
discipline, but makes a strong case for the benefits outweighing the liabilities (p. 174ffi.4
Church discipline ties into his concern for continuing discipleship and growth in his people. Of course, discipleship and growth come by practicing the nine marks (p. 191).
The role of church leadership, which he defines as male elders (p. 216), in the context
of a congregation, becomes one of releasing the gifts of the Spirit and practicing godly
authority.s He uses the B.O.s.S. acronym to describe the varied expressions of the church
leader. "All four of those different aspects - the boss commanding, the out-front example,
the supplying of what's needed, and then the serving - will be part of biblical church leadership" (p. 226).
Whether the marks are Dever's, Schwarz' or Callahan's, the pendulum has swung
away from an alleged emphasis on numbers and techniques in the church growth literature to an attempt to properly diagnose and prescribe in the church health literature. The
mystery of the Church will always create a tension between plumbing the depths of what
the Church is in Christ while pursuing "how to do Church" in ways that live out that
mystery biblically.6
This text provides boundaries for understanding the Body of Christ in an evangelistic,
Protestant tradition, highlighting the biblical parameters as a framework for practice. The
reader will need to extrapolate the functional applications since we do not have the
advantage of seeing Dever's theology in action in Washington, D.C. He parallels much of
church health literature and gives insight into how one pastor seeks to guide his congregation toward God-honoring faithfulness.

NOTES

I. Howard Snyder (with Daniel Runyon) in his new book Decoding the Church: Mapping the
DNA of Christ's Body (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 2002) suggests the marks would match
Scripture more accurately if viewed as diverse as well as one, charismatic as well as holy, local as
well as catholic or universal, and prophetic as well as apostolic.
2. Callahan, Kennon L. Twelve Keys to an Effective Church: Strategic Planning for Mission (San

Asbury Theological Journal

23 I

Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), p. xii.
3. Schwarz, Christian A. Natural Church Development (Carol Stream, III.: ChurchSmart
Resources, I 996)
4. Compare the guidelines offered by such books as Ken Blue's Healing Spiritual Abuse
(Downers Grove, III.: Intervarsity Press, 1993) and David Johnson and Jeff VanVonderen's The
Subtle Power of Spiritual Abuse (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1991).
5. A good alternative view is provided in Ruth Haley Barton's Equal to the Task: Men and
Women in Partnership (Downers Grove, III.: Intervarsity Press, 1998).
6. For further theological study, consider Miraslov Volfs After Our Likeness: The Church as the
Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, Mich .: Eerdmans, 1998) and John D. Zizioulas' Being as
Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, N.Y. : St Vladimir's Seminary Press,
1985).

THOMAS F. TIJMBLIN
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Fanning, Steven. Mystics of the Christian Tradition. London and New York: Routledge, 200 I.
In this distinctive resource, Steven Fanning (Associate Professor, Department of
History, University of Illinois at Chicago) provides a comprehensive survey of mysticism in
Christian history. Defining mysticism as "that of Evelyn Underhill, 'the direct intuition or
experience of God,'" or as "every religious tendency that discovers the way to God direct
through inner experience without the mediation of reasoning" (p. 2), Fanning sets out to
demonstrate that "The Christian mystics prove the strength and persistence of the element in Christianity that is the core, fount and energizing spirit of all religion, the direct
encounter with God" (p. 3). Beginning with "Mysticism in the Greco-Roman World" (pp.
6- 14), he identifies the origins of Christianity in the Mystery Religions of the ancient
Eastern world, stating, "The Roman world in which Christianity arose was one steeped in
mystical religion" (p. 6). Fanning includes Gnosticism and judaism as mystical religions
that preceded the rise of Christianity and even characterizes Plato's philosophy as mystical. He concludes that "the search for direct contact with and knowledge of the divine
dominated the religious concerns of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, among whom
was jesus of Nazareth" (p. 14l.
Fanning's characterization of jesus as a mystic begins with his skepticism toward written historical sources such as the "canonical books of the Christian New Testament" and
"extra-canonical Christian works." He points out that "As scholars have investigated these
highly problematical sources, a number of different jesuses have emerged from the same
body of evidence, but that alongside these images "one can discern a remarkably clear
outline of jesus the mystic and mystagogue" (p. (4). Citing several carefully selected passages from the New Testament that include jesus' healing and prophetic powers, Fanning
establishes the core of jesus' ministry as that of a mystic, and His religion as mystical.
Citing the account in Acts 2 of the Day of Pentecost, Fanning concludes: 'Thus the
Christian church was founded in a mystical filling with the Holy Spirit, with the apostles
forming a community of mystics." The most prominent of the early Christian mystics was
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Paul the Apostle, who recounted his own mystical experiences (for example, his conversion) and "presented Christianity as a Mystery Religion" (p. 18), And since early Christians
were "recipients of the Holy Spirit," Fanning characterizes the "first-century church" as a
"mystical body" (p. 19).
Chapters 2 through 5 are composed of a thorough investigation of Christian mysticism
throughout Church history. Fanning has assembled a formidable arsenal of evidence that
mysticism is central to Christianity as a living religion- from widely diverse sources such as
the Homilies of Pseudo-Macarius, the Russian saint Sergi us, Francis of Assisi, Mechthild of
Magdeburg, Birgitta, jacob Boehme, Ignatius of Loyola, Madame Guyon, William Law,
George Fox, jonathan Edwards, and William Seymour. Fanning casts a wide net to make
his case, and he accomplishes this on account of his broad definition of mysticism. In fact,
the breadth of his cast is evident in the final paragraph of his "Epilogue," where he states:
"In common with Buddhism, Hinduism, the Sufis of Islam, Kabbalistic judaism, and
shamanism, Christianity, too, is a spirituality of the direct apprehension of the Absolute"
(p. 220), Fanning establishes Christianity as a mystical religion only because he has rejected confessional allegiances and dogmatic theology as defining elements. Methodologically,
he approaches Christian history from a phenomenological hermeneutic. His book is
essentially a collection of narratives about Christian saints that fit his broad definition of
mysticism, without questioning the credibility of those accounts. In other words, 'description' is an extension of essence.
Nevertheless, Fanning has made a valuable contribution to historical studies of
Christianity, bringing together a vast array of fascinating stories about Christian saints
throughout church history. He has woven together the famous and the obscure, women
and men, geographically dispersed across the ancient, medieval and modern worlds.
However, Fanning ends his story with Thomas Merton and does not provide any living
examples of Christian mystics. Nor does he provide any examples of Christian mystics
from developing nations. Most Christian readers across the theological spectrum will
question his inclusiveness that ranges from Plato to Teilhard. Others will take offense at
his religious pluralism that slights the distinctiveness of Christianity. But Mystics of the
Christian Tradition should doubtless be included in academic libraries with strong collections in Christian mysticism, and should also be considered as supplementary reading
material in related undergraduate/graduate/ seminary courses.
BARRY W. HAMILTON
Northeastern Seminary
Rochester, New York

Gilbert, james. Redeeming Culture: American Religion in an Age of Science. University of
Chicago Press, 1997.
In this new book by a cultural historian, we see elaborated the fascinating story of the
conflict and cooperation of religion and science in American culture in general and in the
scientific and theological communities between the Scopes trial in the 1920s and the
height of the Cold War in the I 960s. This book is not about specific theological view-
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points or about scientific theories per se, though it does touch on these. Rather it deals
with the broader notions of what it meant to individuals and groups of scholars to be scientific and how science ought to be related to religion. Moreover, Gilbert's book does not
aim to address in detail specific issues of this period, for example, the creation-evolution
controversy (dealt with by Ronald Number's excellent recent book, The Creationists: The
Evolution of Sdentific Creationism). Nevertheless Gilbert does establish the broader background for these specific issues and does touch on all of the most important of them. In
the process, the author ably develops the context for the crucial issues at the interface
between science and religion.
One of the most intriguing theses put forth by Gilbert concerns the varying definitions
of science during this period. He convincingly proposes these definitions as those held by
varying communities in America. For example, Gilbert mentions the definition of science
as "gathering the facts," a definition held by those coming out of a Scottish common sense
background and a Baconion scientific approach. This definition was associated, Gilbert
asserts, with many evangelical Christians, but also with American culture in general.
Another aspect of this definition is that science is "democratic" and thus ideally understandable to the average person. It should, therefore, many believed, be accessible to the
general public. On the other hand such a defmition of science was believed to be na'ive
by at least a portion of the scientific community, who viewed science as a practice and set
of ideas to be guarded by an elite who understood its ultimate implications (see pp. 9-11).
Besides these differing definitions of science, Gilbert discusses in great detail (given the
title of the book) the varying views held by the scientific community concerning the place
of religion in science itself. This aspect of Gilbert's book is woven throughout and makes
for fascinating reading. This reviewer for example, knew nothing of the exploits of the
Reverend Irwin Moon with the Moody Institute of Science (itself connected with Moody
Bible Institute). Moon's "Sermons from Science" gained a wide following and was even
used by the military from time to time. Moon represented one end of the spectrum of
beliefs about science and religion and one which not only popularized science for use in
evangelization (using a form of "natural theology") but made it accessible. But, as Gilbert
shows, it was not only conservative-fundamentalist scientists who advocated a prominent
role for religion in science, but also scientists who would not even be classified within the
orbit of nominal religious orthodoxy. Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum Gilbert
examines those scientists for whom science was religion.
In the process of his historical exploration into the relation of science and religion,
Gilbert details the work and writings of scientific organizations long defunct, but which, in
their heyday, were quite influential, and also those still in existence. Gilbert discusses not
only the Moody Institute of Science, but also the American Scientific Affiliation, the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Institute on Religion in an
Age of Science, the Religious Research Association, and the Society for the Scientific
Study of Religion, among others. All of these organizations and many scientists wrestled
with the precise relationship of science to religion. Gilbert succeeds well in helping the
reader to understand these struggles in an age often believed to be dominated by antireligious scientists (though to be sure these also existed, as pointed out by Gilbert).
I believe this book is the only one of its kind to attempt an examination of this period
of American history in this way, and for that we owe a debt of gratitude to the author.
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Having said that, I would add that Gilbert's book earlier on did not seem to "flow" well,
that is, his earlier chapters did not transition from one to the other as well as they could
have. Perhaps this minor criticism was only the reviewer's perception and this would be a
difficult task given the diversity of people and organizations with which the author had to
deal. Gilbert may also be forgiven for his less than carefully nuanced distinctions among
denominational groups and movements (for example fundamentalists, modernists, etc.
within the Christian camp and even within the Jewish camp). Though he might have pursued these fine differences profitably, in the end, they are not crucial to his overall thesis.
More than compensating for any deficiency in the book were the fascinating accounts of
the issues faced and the personalities involved during this period of change and ferment
in science and religion. As one example, I would mention Gilbert's treatment of the controversy engendered by the publication of Immanuel Velikovsky's book Worlds in Collision
(chapter 8), which epitomized the period covered by this book. The scientists Horace
Kallen and Harlow Shapley, the former a defender of Velikovsky's religious (not to say
orthodox) interpretation of biblical events such as the flood and the plagues, and the latter
a determined opponent of any religious interpretation of scientifically explainable events,
both represented at least two of the prominent viewpoints of the era concerning the definition of science and the place of religion in science. I will leave to the reader the details
of some of the other very interesting chapters illustrating the sometimes stormy relation
between religion and science: for example, the film industry'S role in popularizing (and, in
the estimation of some scientists, over-doing the place of religion in) science, or the flying
saucer "flaps" in the late I 940s and on. To be sure, I would have appreciated a more
detailed examination of some of these issues as well as a discussion of the response of
"professional" theologians and churchmen to these controversies. Nevertheless, Gilbert
took on himself the difficult but very helpful task of illuminating a facet of one small period of American history and the important question of "redeeming culture" for religion
without being anti-scientific. In doing this, Gilbert has, I believe, filled out and filled in a
major gap in tracing the history of the relationship of religion to science in America
(adding to excellent works by Bozeman and Hovenkamp on the antebellum period and
many books on the controversies following the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species,
including those by Moore and Livingstone). This book ought to be read by Christian scientists and theologians, historians of science, and scientists in general in all fields who are
honest and wish to discover how at least some aspects of the current controversies arose
in the past and how religion continues to be a major factor even in scientific issues.
MARC A. CLAUSON
Cedarville College
Cedarville, Ohio
Griffith, Lee. The War on TetTorism and the Terror of God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002.
In his introduction, Lee Griffith identifies something of the motivation for The War on

Terrorism and the TetTor of God, when he writes:
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This book is a protest against the cruise missile attacks on Sudan and
Afghanistan. It is a protest against the terrorist bombers of embassies as well as the
mighty powers who are indistinguishable from terrorists when they bomb and bum
people and buildings in retaliation for grievances real and imagined, with little sense
of any moral, political, or legal accountability. It is a protest against the hypocrisy of
nations that organize and subsidize "freedom fighters" to do their violent bidding
but then call them "terrorists" when they attack targets that were not part of the
original deal. But this book is also a protest against the next terrorist attack and
against the devastation of human lives that will take place when the bomb is set off
or the nerve gas is released by a guerrilla band which imagines that in so doing it is
saving the world ... or that it is doing the will of God (p. xii) .
If I were to impose an integrative motif upon Griffith's work, it might well be "and the
truth shall set you free." While one might disagree with the conclusions that the author
draws at various places throughout the text, he is relentless in insisting that we not adopt the
double standard which allows us to see the mote in the other's eye while missing the beam
(or even the mote when appropriate) in our own eye. In short, Griffith seeks to have us
released from the illusions that allow us to resolve questions of war and terrorism too simply. Not the least of these illusions (would "delusions" be more appropriate?) is the variety
of ethical dualisms that enable us to demonize the other and subsequently to feel warranted
in their destruction. Consequently, Griffith's work should not be seen as "anti-Americanism,"
notwithstanding the present popularity of so designating any who would challenge
American policy, for his critiques fall upon friend and foe alike in this thoughtful examination of terrorism. And as he shows, there are grounds aplenty for critique all around.
The flow of The War on Terrorism moves from an initial address of the definitional
problem (how does one know a terrorist?) to an examination of the effects of terror upon
the stability of community. From there, Griffith addresses ethical dualisms which have
made notable contribution to justifying for the use of terror and then on to the connection of terrorism with religious motivations. Finally, in a concluding chapter, he provides
concrete proposals for how Christians might resist the deployment of terror. My review
will consider very briefly three aspects of this book: I) the problem of defining terrorism,
2) the problem of disceming and achieving a goal in the war on terrorism, and 3) the
extent to which we Americans have sown seeds that have come to bear the fruit of the
very threat of terrorism we now face.
Just as one person's ceiling is another person's floor, so it seems, one person's freedom
fighter is another person's terrorist. As Griffith points out, coming up with a definition that
excludes the "wrong" people, but which includes the "right" people is notoriously difficult.
He notes, for example, that one definition of terrorism, proposed in I 986 by the Vice
President, was "the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives" (p. 284). However, as he goes on to note, this would
have the consequence of making those who make the laws immune to being classified as
"terrorists," even if they engage in genocide. Further, of course, this definition would have
the unfortunate consequence of making terrorists of George Washington and other early
American revolutionaries. Griffith considers other ways of defining "terrorism." Is "terror-
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ism" characterized by "randomness?" No, he argues, "terrorist" activities are undertaken in
response to some real or perceived injustice. What about the protection of non-combatants? Griffith thinks this proposal fails as well. In fact, he notes that the U.S. response to
the killing of 241 Marines in Beirut (combatants) was the shelling by the New Jersey of
Muslim neighborhoods, where honoring the just war criterion of non-combatant immunity was impossible. Next, Griffith cites a survey of definitions of terrorism that identified
three common elements: I) use of violence or force, 2) violence or force used in the pursuit of political goals, and 3) the intention of violence is generation of fear (p. 7). Yet,
problems remain, Griffith notes. What of religious motivation? And, would a definition
comprised of these three elements grant the desired discrimination? Would not any
deployment of violencelforce by any state be defined as terrorism? One has to wonder,
then, when one group refers to another as "terrorist," what can they mean except that the
others oppose them?
The next question we must consider concems the goals involved in pursuing a war on
terrorism-what can one hope to accomplish? The goal must be, must it not, the protection of life through the prevention of further terrorist acts. Yet, Griffith notes at least three
reasons why empirical evidences would not support a claim that a "war" on terrorism
either will succeed or is appropriate:
I. Violent and punitive responses have not curtailed terrorism, nor is there a reason
able prospect that they will do so in the future;
2. The actual harm done by counterterrorism often exceeds the harm done by the
terrorism it is intended to combat; and
3. The perspectives on security, freedom, and humanity that are intrinsic to the war
on terrorism are untenable from the vantage point of both human dignity and
biblical faith (p. 225),
On the first point, one only need consider two factors. First, how can one reasonably
think that terrorism will be stopped by killing when many terrorists see the sacrifice of
their lives as blessed in the eyes of God? Second, Griffith points out that acts of violence
not only increase abroad as violent response is seen as the appropriate response, but
domestic crimes of violence tend to increase as well. On the second point, Griffith gives
several examples, involving American response as well as others, let us cite only one. In
Argentina, a commission appointed to examine abuses of power by the pre-1983 regime
found that "the 'terrorism' of the military regime was 'infinitely worse' than the terrorism it
was claiming to combat" (p. 227). The just war criterion (assuming it is even the right
one) of proportionality of response is generally completely ignored in counter-terrorist
activities. On the last point, a biblical perspective on human persons would require us to
honor the dignity of all who are created in the image of God, a biblical perspective on
freedom and security would not be primarily about a "sufficient level of armed force to
deter potential attack from armed force" (p. 230), but would rather focus upon the freedom and security of human persons from "malnutrition and infant mortality, the global
epidemics of AIDS and other life threatening diseases, ... and poisoned waters that respect
no national boundaries" (p. 230). One can only wonder about the international good that
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could be done with the tens of billions of dollars being spent on such things as
"Homeland Security" and the resultant effect this good would have in undermining the
very foundations of terrorist actions.
An ever popular cartoon from the old series "Pogo" observes, "We have met the
enemy, and he is us." Griffith reminds us how often this has been true in American
efforts to fight terrorism. We had no qualms thinking of Afghans who opposed the
Soviet Union as "freedom fighters ." Yet, they are now "terrorists" who fight us with the
very weapons we provided and trained them to use. As America mOves to act "preemptively" against Iraq, we ought first to remember that "If Hussein was 'Hitler' after
Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, then prior to the invasion, he was clearly a
Hitler supported by the U.S. In fact, many of the horrendous actions that President
Bush [Sr.l later cited as evidence of Hussein's demonic character were actions performed by Hussein while he was being supported by the U.S. in his war in Iran" (p. 93) .
Of course, one could also mention the remarkable store of weaponry that the revolutionary government in Iran inherited from the Shah- supplied by the U.S. often to
enable the Shah to behave in ways that would meet most definitions of terrorism.
Griffith gives us more examples than one would like, but memories are short, and
sometimes it takes the full presentation to remind us.
The message that Griffith presents is one that all we, as Christians, need to hear and
consider. If we are to escape what he calls the "downward spiral of violence," we are
going to have to seek the truth-painful though it might be. And we are going to have to
realize and own the extent to which we have contributed to a world in which groups can
become so desperate as to feel they must resort to violence sooner rather than later. We
are going to have to face the fact that we have, in fact, sown many of the seeds that have
born their fruit in the form of terrorism. We are going to have to learn to speak of terrorism in ways that take it with complete seriousness without over-exaggerating it (for example, in 1986 less than 30 Americans were killed worldwide by terrorist acts. 12,000 were
killed in accidental falls in the home. Yet, surveys showed "terrorism" as the number one
concern among Americans (p. 304). No one who is a Christian can forget the obligation
to love one's neighbor as one's self; nor can we forget that the Parable of the Good
Samaritan demonstrates that our neighbor must be understood to be the one whom, for
us, is the consummate Other. Consequently, whatever the degree of agreement with
Griffith's conclusions, one cannot proceed to evaluate these issues seriously without consideration of the matters he brings forward in this book.
CHUCK GVfENSON
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Haugen, Gary. Good News About Injustice. Downers Grove, III.: InterVarsity Press, 1999.
Concerning his prophetically practical Good News About Injustice, Harvard and
University of Chicago Law graduate Gary Haugen writes,
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This book is an attempt to articulate something of the courage and hope that God
is yeaming to bestow on those who want to follow Christ into a world that needs
his love. But it is the courage to extend the love of Jesus to a particular category of
persons: the men, women, and children who are victimized by the abuse of power.
As Christians we have leamed much about sharing the love of Christ with people
all over the world who have never heard the gospel...We have leamed how to feed
the hungry, heal the sick, and shelter the homeless. But there is one thing we
haven't leamed how to do, even though God's word repeatedly calls us to task. We
haven't leamed how to rescue the oppressed (p. 13).
Haugen is uniquely suited for such articulation after serving in the civil rights division of
the United States Department of Justice and as director of the United Nations genocide
investigation in Rwanda. He is presently founder and president of the Intemational Justice
Mission (JJM), a Christian relief organization based in Washington DC committed to living
out the exhortation of his book.
Haugen divides Good News About Injustice into three parts: I) Taking Up the Challenge
2) Hope Amid Despair: God's Four Affirmations About Justice and 3) Real-World Tools
for Rescuing the Oppressed. In the first section, Haugen elucidates the heart-shattering
horror of his genocide investigation in Rwanda,
These were tough moments for me, but there was no longer any question about
what this horrible injustice in Rwanda had to do with me, a suburban American
lawyer who rode a bus to work during the week and taught sixth grade Sunday
school on the weekend. It had everything to do with me because of what my God
loves and what my God hates ... God hates injustice (p. 32),
Citing scripture and historical heroes such as William Wilberforce and Martin Luther
King Jr.; as well as lesser known Christians throughout history who fought oppression,
Haugen asserts that Christians must cultivate compassionate awareness of injustice and
prepare their minds to oppose it as God's agents on earth.
The great miracle and mystery of God is that he calls me and you to be a part of
what he is doing in history. He could, of course, with no help from us proclaim the
Gospel of Jesus Christ with lifeless stones, feed the entire world with five loaves and
two fish, heal the sick with the hem of his garment and release all the oppressed
with his angels. Instead God has chosen us- missionaries, agricultural engineers, doctors, lawyers, lawmakers, diplomats, and all those who support, encourage and pray
for them- to be his hands in doing those things in the world that are important to
him (p. 34).
In the second section of his book, Haugen demonstrates that God is a God of justice,
compassion, moral clarity, and rescue. God subsequently demands action from His people in accord with His character. Moral relativism is criticized for its dangerous implications. "Let there be no mistake, evil and injustice thrive on moral ambiguity, equivocation,
confusion and the failure to commit...In every case it will prevail against the uncertain, the
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unsure and the uncommitted" (p. 90).
Haugen writes that "[njustice occurs when power is misused to take from others what
God has given them, namely their dignity, liberty, or the fruits of their love and labor" (p.
72). [t is the strong using force and deceit to take from the weak. "The police officer who
beats and robs the orphan, the corrupt official who forces little girls into prostitution, the
jailer who tortures his detainee-all show contempt for or 'insult' (NRSY) the very God of
the universe who made the orphan, little girl, and the prisoner" (p. 86). justice, in contrast,
is "the right exercise of power" (p. 70).
[n his final section, Haugen perceptively delineates a viable response for believers who
encounter the abuse of power. "We may have experienced ...the Spirit of God stirring our
heart to help those who suffer under oppression, but...What exactly can we do?" (p. 119).
Haugen's answer to his rhetorical question is threefold.
First, we must recognize the two components of injustice, coercion and deception.
"Coercion is the compelling or constraining of a person to act against his or her free willusually by physical force, the threat of force, or some other dire consequence ...It can be as
blatant as a blow to the head or as subtle as the hint of economic destitution" (p. 125).
Coercion usually involves two parties, those who wield the tools of force and those who
tell them where to wield them. Deception involves hiding the coercion under a cloak of
normalcy or assent of the victim, along with a claim to lawfulness, proper authority, or
legitimacy. "Some oppressors are willing to look like criminals in the eyes of their community, nation, or world, but most are not" (p. 129).
When a believer is equipped with knowledge of the two components of injustice she
or he is better able to move into the second stage, investigation, or reporting the injustice
to someone better suited to investigate such as lawyers or trained professionals at
[ntemational justice Mission. Exposing deception through investigation consists of three
interlinking steps: getting the facts, substantiating the facts by asking the appropriate questions, and collecting all the evidence. [jM has an intricate international network of
Christian missionaries who report oppressive encounters to [jM, which is frequently better
equipped to investigate and intervene than the missionary.
Following recognition and investigation, the third step in battling injustice is intervention
on behalf of the victim. This is accomplished by taking the information uncovered to people or institutions that can help, which usually have power or leverage over the oppressor.
This may be a higher authority or an oppressors resource that refuses to tolerate wrongdoing. Sometimes documentation must be presented at several levels before justice is
implemented. A case may require presentation to a source of income for a government
official who has power over corrupt police because the government official and head of
police refuse to act on their own when initially confronted with evidence.
[n the final chapter, Haugen shows that anyone and everyone in the body of Christ is
capable of fighting injustice in some way. From the teacher-storyteller, the e[derly prayer
warrior, the businessperson with an international connection, and the professional with
special expertise, "God is in the business of using the unlikely to perform the holy" (p.
174). Haugen offers details on how.
Good News About Injustice is articulate, relevant, and meaningful for the pastor who
preaches, the missionary who recognizes atrocity but feels powerless when faced with it,
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the professor who appreciates Scriptural exposition as it applies to the mind, heart, and
hands; and to every Christian disciple who takes the Biblical mandate of rescuing the
oppressed seriously. Good News About Injustice is particularly poignant in its practicability,
its specific use of story and example, its concrete expression of how God can use every
member of Christ's body for accomplishing His purpose, and its vital linking of the Gospel
message with social justice and vibrant discipleship.
Two areas of possible improvement are more adherence in presentation of content
with the book's overall organization and a more thorough treatment of theodicy. While
the character of God comprises a full section and ideas surrounding theodicy are sprinkled throughout, a two-hundred page manifesto on Good News About Injustice merits more
than ten pages dealing with "Answers for difficult questions" (p. 109) on the compatibility
of a compassionate God of rescue with the reality of oppressive suffering. Even so, Good
News About Injustice packs a wallop.
BEN DEVAN
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina

Hunt, Anne. What Are They Saying About The Trinity? Mahwah, New jersey: Paulist
Press, 1998.
Anne Hunt is a Roman Catholic theologian who teaches at Yarra Theological Union in
Melboume, Australia. This brief book on the Trinity is part of Paulist Press' popular What
Are They Saying About... ? series, and replaces the I 979 volume by joseph Bracken which
had the same title. In keeping with the goals of the series, Hunt's book is a report
designed to bring a general audience up to date on recent theological developments.
Hunt writes in a clear, readable style, is careful to avoid jargon, and defines technical
terms as she introduces them. The style would be appropriate for undergraduates and for
adult study groups with some theological background, but would also not be out of place
for more advanced students.
So what are they saying about the Trinity? In this case, "they" are five recent Roman
Catholic theologians with distinctive approaches to the doctrine: Leonardo Boff, Elizabeth
johnson, Denis Edwards, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Anthony Kelly. Hunt devotes one
chapter to each figure, in which her main concern is to give a clear summary account of
each author's key ideas and characteristic vocabulary in a brisk fourteen pages. Her own
incisive summaries are interspersed with well-chosen quotes from each author, which
amount to a tiny digest of the best bits of each author's style. Wherever possible, Hunt
focuses on a single book by each author, usually that writer's major statement on the
Trinity. She appends an admirably short list of other works, including select secondary
sources, in a "recommended reading" section at the end of the book.
Hunt stresses what is novel and exciting in recent trinitarian theology, and she
selects her five thinkers to showcase their creativity in opening up "new areas of trinitarian imagination." Her goal is to show trinitarian theology as a journey of adventure
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or exploration, and the traits she values are revealed by her preferred adjectives: interesting, disclosive, persuasive, exuberant. One of the delights of the book is Hunt's
recognition that excitement and even progress in theology do not require a rejection
of tradition, let alone a trendy scramble for relevance at any cost. Her selections make
this clear: the fact that Hans Urs von Balthasar and Anthony Kelly are featured alongside Elizabeth Johnson and Leonardo Boff shows that (to use Vatican II terminology)
Hunt understands the need for both ressourcement and aggiomamento, a retrieval of the
riches of traditional orthodoxy on the one hand, and an updating of old forms of
thinking on the other.
Hunt selects Leonardo Boff s book Trinity and Society as an instance of Latin American
liberation theology's contribution to trinitarianism, posing the question: How is this doctrine good news for the poor? Boff uses a social model of the Trinity to argue that human
society should reflect the relationships of mutuality and equality found in the divine life.
The Trinity is a mystery of inclusive, perichoretic love, and human social life should be a
sign and sacrament of this trinitarian communion. With the motto "The holy Trinity is our
social program," Boff uses his vision of God to criticize the individualistic excesses of capitalism, the collectivistic errors of socialism, and the hierarchical authoritarianism of his
own Roman Catholic church. This chapter contains a few uncharacteristic lapses of judgment on Hunt's part: she omits Boffs boldest doctrinal innovations (for instance, his advocacy of a "spin·tuque" clause to balance the West's "filioque' clause), and then concludes
that he is content to accept standard Catholic trinitarianism in order to glean social implications from it. While it may be true that the most obvious trend in Boffs theology is to
supplement trinitarian orthodoxy with a corresponding trinitarian orthopraxis, Hunt overlooks his creativity at the doctrinal level.
For an example of feminist trinitarianism, Hunt takes up Elizabeth Johnson's book She
Who Is. Johnson's concern is to use the doctrine of the Trinity to explore how women are
imago Dei, in the image of God. Hunt's summary slightly obscures the threefold charge
Johnson makes against masculine God-language: that it has been used exclusively, literally,
and patriarchally by the church. One of the most interesting things about Johnson's work
is the strategy of using trinitarian resources at all, because just a decade ago "feminist trinitarianism" sounded to most of the theological world like an oxymoron. But Johnson
undertakes to describe the three persons of the Trinity in terms of feminine categories,
with the leading idea being Sophia, or wisdom. Thus she describes the Spirit as "SpiritSophia," Jesus as Sophia incarnate, and the first person of the Trinity as Mother-Sophia.
Hunt is enthusiastically positive in her presentation of Johnson's work, and if she has any
criticisms, she withholds them.
The next trend Hunt examines is ecological approaches to the Trinity, and for a
spokesperson she turns to fellow Australian Denis Edwards. In his book Jesus the Wisdom
of Cod, Edwards develops a vision of God as a fountain of self-expressive goodness overflowing in a love that must be shared interpersonally. In order to put Edwards' work in
context, Hunt devotes several pages to describing his two main theological sources,
Bonaventure and Richard of St. Victor. The unique contribution of Edwards is to extend
this line of tradition to include the modem idea of nature and contemporary ecological
consciousness. Edwards develops a wisdom theology of cosmic scope, with an emphasis
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on mutuality, sharing, and the inherent value of all creatures as flowing from the selfexpression of the triune Cod.
These preceding three chapters form a tidy group in that they show how elements of
the contemporary mindset can be informed by trinitarian theology. Boff, Johnson, and
Edwards are all concerned to demonstrate the relevance of the doctrine for ethical action
in various spheres: human liberation, feminism, and ecology. The next two theologians
are more concerned with delving deeper into the mystery of the Trinity itself. Hunt's
chapter on Hans Urs von Balthasar is a masterpiece of summarization, and quite possibly
the clearest brief explanation of his theology ever printed. She concentrates on his book
Mysterium Paschale in order to describe his theology of Holy Week, and his emphasis on
the aesthetically enrapturing and dramatically captivating core of reality which is the
Trinity. This section is a marvel, because Hunt has obviously caught von Balthasar's vision
and shares some of his joy in moving from doctrine to doxology, from thinking about
Cod to praising Cod. The final theologian Hunt examines is Anthony Kelly, an Australian
who belongs to the religious order of Redemptorists. Kelly's project is to retrieve the classic Augustinian psychological analogy of the Trinity, which appeals to our experience of
being a self with faculties of knowledge and love as a basis for describing how Cod is a
Trinity. This analogy has not been considered popular or persuasive for quite a while, so
Kelly's attempt to retrieve it is in some ways against the temper of the times. His strategy
is to transpose the old analogy into more contemporary ways of thinking about the self,
trading in the old concept of faculties for concepts like consciousness, intentionality, experience, and subjectivity. Hunt is especially sympathetic to Kelly's work because both share
an interest in the theology of Bernard Lonergan, and Hunt's own work as a constructive
theologian involves creatively reconciling the psychological analogy with the more salvation-historical approach of recent times.
What Are They Saying About The Trinity? fulfills its task nearly to perfection: it "whets the
theological appetite" by showing some new and creative directions in which theologians
are taking the doctrine. It does not cover the basics of trinitarian theology, either in its biblical foundations or its patristic development, and therefore it should not be used as the
only book on the Trinity in a theology class. For those who already have an acquaintance
with the basic outlines of traditional trinitarianism though, this book provides an excellent
array of answers to the frequently-heard question, "Why does this doctrine matter?"
FRED SANDERS
Biola University
La Mirada, California

Strehle, Stephen. The Separation of Church and State: Has America Lost Its Moral Compass?
Lafayette, La.: Huntington House Publishers.
I began to read this book with some ambivalence, not because the author is a shabby
scholar- Strehle has written two fine works in the history of theology- but because I have
read so many books and articles with titles like this one that I did not believe anyone
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could make any significant contribution to the existing literature. I was wrong. Stephen
Strehle's new book combined two excellent features: high quality of scholarship and a
clarity of thought and writing that will appeal to the general reader without insulting the
specialist. It is, essentially, an indictment of the modem (read, recent) developments in the
political, but also the theological, educational, legal, and economic arenas, which have
attempted to remove religion from the public sphere. In short, Strehle's book is a sustained, and well-reasoned, argument against modem anti-religious liberalism and its manifestations in the public sphere.
Strehle shows that if one examines the current landscape of church-state relations, one
can see at least four possible approaches to the issue: (I) the "wall of separation"
approach, currently in the ascendancy, and supported by political and theological liberals;
(2) the theonomic approach, held by many conservative, non-fundamentalists, particularly
Reformed thinkers; (3) the reactionary fundamentalist approach, which tends to be heavily politically active, but biblically and theologically naive; and (4) the pluralist position,
arguably the dominant one among non-liberal Christians, arguing for an equal place for
the Christian religion among other religions and so-called religions. Strehle has adopted a
form of the pluralist position, but he has not done so uncritically. His attack on current liberal policies and ideas that would marginalize or eliminate Christianity from public life can
be quite strident in this book. His stridency, however, is not an unthinking reaction, but a
carefully crafted argument which shows the clear Christian historical roots of American
public life, as well as the philosophical roots of secularization and modem separation
advocated by the radical left.
Chapter I begins the historical element of Strehle's book, tracing the essentially
Christian roots of American political thought and focusing on men like John Locke as the
primary influences on the Declaration and other seminal documents of the republic.
Strehle's point is well-made that explicitly Christian ideas existed in the earliest days of
American life and persisted to the founding era and far beyond. There simply never was
any "wall of separation." Religion permeated and informed all of public life.
Chapter 2 continues the historically oriented approach with an examination of the
thought of Kant, Hume, and other more recent philosophers with respect to their ideas
about the place of God in the modem world. Kant believed that he was destroying reason (and the objective knowledge of God) in order to make room for faith. His and more
radical ideas became the rallying cry of modem philosophy, which has little interest in the
classical metaphysical issues and has in essence separated God questions from itself, leaving them in the realm of subjectivity. Though this chapter may be a bit difficult for some
readers, it is pivotal for the argument of the book.
At the outset of Chapter 3, Strehle writes, "Atheism represents the final expression of
those who view their life as existing apart from God" (p. 101). The idea of separation is
carried here to its next limit and the stage is set for Strehle's discussion of modem separation theories and policies. The concem in this chapter is more with "popular" or "practical" atheism than philosophical disbelief, as the author shows how the implications of
atheism came to infiltrate American culture, indirectly, through humanism (a precursor to
modern secular humanism, though by no means equivalentl, secularism of the
Enlightenment movement, and American pragmatism. Thomas Jefferson has a prominent
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place in this chapter, especially since he held to the tenets of the ideas just mentioned and
since he was revered (or despised) for his advocacy of the "wall of separation." Jefferson's
ideas are used as a springboard for a discussion of the development of the separation
notion by courts and other secular groups (see pp. 11 3ft). It was only in the twentieth
century that the courts, not accidentally, began to enact what the philosophers of the previous two centuries had espoused. Strehle rightly points out, this legal doctrine of separation was not part of the original Constitution, but was "read into" it. Strehle delves into
the arcane world of judicial reasoning in order to examine the criteria of the Supreme
Court for determining whether a govemmental unit has unconstitutionally penetrated the
wall of separation theoretically erected by the Constitution. It is here also that the author
brings into the picture a pointed discussion of the left-wing bias of supposedly "neutral"
groups. He argues moreover, in opposition to the notion of neutrality, that "There is no
way to separate church and state, beyond the philosophical naivete, historical revisionism,
and secular prejudice of the Court" (p. 12 1l. The most prominent example is public education. Chapter 4, entitled "Left v. Right," continues his discussion of education by chronicling the secularization of higher education and the virtual banishment of religion from
modern public and many private American universities (and even many so-called
Christian colleges).
In conclusion, Strehle does not seek more legislation to solve this radical secularization
problem. As he states, "It is the spirit of a people that provides the impetus for its life." (p.
178) There is no "blueprint," no several "easy steps" to attack the problem. Anything like
a theonomic or quasi-theonomic approach would amount to legalism. Though he is
somewhat ambiguous at this point, Strehle seems to suggest a two-fold approach: (I)
reduction of the all-pervasiveness of govemment and (2) most importantly, a change in
the hearts of men so that political-legal change (of a proper kind) comes from within (see
pp. 182-183).
This book exhibits an excellent historical awareness, clearly tracing the roots of the secular separation idea to philosophies at the beginning of the modem period. In addition,
refreshingly, even while he is making a real substantive contribution, Strehle pulls no
punches, with either the left or right, though he clearly aims at the radical left as his target.
Third, the book offers no facile solutions, as many have attempted in recent times. It is
correct and important to emphasize the heart as the ultimate seat of the problem. Finally,
the treatment of the philosophies which influenced the secular separation idea was
sophisticated and clearly written, as was the discussion of the place of religious thought in
American life.
This is not to say I agreed with all I read or that the book could not be improved. His
pluralist approach is problematic, although, apart from a theonomic approach, fraught
with its own problems, pluralism of a reasonable kind seems to be the best possible world
(at least at present). Second, it might not be quite fair to give such positive emphasis to
Locke or to leave out other important influences such as Calvin, Puritan thinkers,
Althusius, and others. Moreover, the book seems to overemphasize democracy and egalitarianism in a positive way, missing the equally (possibly more) positive influences of
"monarchical," "aristocratric," and "representative" elements bequeathed to political
thinkers of the early republic by Presbyterians and Anglicans. Third, I detected an implicit
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criticism of the theonornic movement that betrayed a misunderstanding of it. Moreover, I
had reservations about the positive use made of some theologians like Paul Tillich and, to
a lesser extent, Karl Barth. However, the reader should not thereby miss the essential correctness of these thinkers with regard to church and state. Conservative Protestants could
leam much from them.
All that having been said, this book is well worth the read and it is an easy, but
"meaty" read. It ought to be used in classes on church-state relations or classes which
touch on that problem. It certainly should be read by those on the radical left, who seem
bent on eliminating Christianity from all of life. For its relatively small size, Strehle's book
is packed with truth and may well state what no scholar has said in a single work.
MARC A. CLAUSON
Cedarville College
Cedarville, Ohio

Wessinger, Catherine, ed. Millennialism, Persecution, & Violence: Historical Cases. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2000.
What do Emperor Mao, Jim Jones, Lakota Sioux Ghost Dancers, a Tokyo subway
tragedy, and Patriot groups have in common? They are part of a unique collection of profiles of seventeen religious movements or groups that are associated with millennial ideology and consequential persecution or violence. Rarely has a collection of essays produced
such a melting pot of religious ideology as Catherine Wessinger's most recent work that
discusses how this tripartite dynamic of millennialism, persecution, and violence have
occurred together in recent history.
Stirred by several episodes in the early 1990s that connected apocalyptic expectation
and violence, editor Catherine Wessinger, chair of religious studies at Loyola University in
New Orleans, realized that these millennial-based tragedies were not as similar as they
appeared. She categorizes millennial religious groups experiencing hostility into three sets.
The "attacked" millennial groups are persecuted due to fear or misunderstanding. such as
the enduring Mormons or the more rare Branch Davidians. In a second category are the
"fragile" millennial groups who initiate violence only in self-defense to preserve their religious objectives, such as the Aum Shinrikyo with its self-created "persecution complex"
and the still-remembered Peoples Temple of Jim Jones. Thirdly, there are "revolutionary"
millennial groups who endorse violence in order to further their existence and their causes, as exemplified by the Montana Freemen, the Taiping Revolution, and the complex
Japanese Lotus Movements. An additional entry that Wessinger was unable to fit neatly
into these categories describes two very different nativist movements in South Africa.
Each essay provides an in-depth analysis into the people, their antagonists, and the religious ideology that prompted acts of violence, although some essays do not integrate the
millennial variable into the sociological realm quite perfectly. Some prefer to report the
historical and controversial factors of the events, tying in millennialism almost as a secondary variable (such as the essays on Wounded Knee, Order of the Solar Temple, and

246

Book Reviews

the South African tragedies). At times the reports show as much affection for the people
group as for anything theological; some essays are practically anthropologies of the people
or detailed chronologies of the tragic events. A special regard is rightfully given to
Wessinger's definition of millennialism by several of the authors, as her work on millennialism and violence in the last ten years shows its influence.
Like the current trend in religious studies, this book broadens the notion of traditional
millennialism from a biblical context to one of an imminent "collective salvation" (p. 7).
Some of the essays do not deal with millennialism in its traditional sense, but each
demonstrates how shared religious expectation among believers in any context prompts
them to alter their lives toward pacifism, withdrawal, institutionalism, hostility, or radical
self-destruction. Unfortunately, "religion" is also redefined to mean "anything of ultimate
concem" (pp. 7-8). The result is a collection of essays that are not necessarily about any
expectation of divine rule or spiritual paradise, but about a hope for any type of utopia
with at least marginal religious undertones. For example, calling Mao's atheist political
regime or the hopes of the peasants "millennia!" is surely problematic, although that
essay's author concedes that such a definition is non-traditional but "opens up interesting
new angles for would-be interpreters" (p. 233).
In reading this collection of essays, one gets a sense that the events-although dissected
and analyzed- were real tragedies. There is great empathy toward what prompted these
catastrophes, toward recognizing the motives and passions behind each incident. This is
most powerfully seen in Rebecca Moore's analysis of the Peoples Temple, where she
reveals that three of her own close family members were among those lost at Jonestown.
She is able to recognize the weaknesses of the disaster while providing insight into the
apocalyptic paranoia of its leader (p. 135). The most impressive essay of the collection is
the introduction, which explores all the "interacting dynamics of millennial beliefs, persecution, and violence" (p. 3). Here, the main themes of the book are outlined and their
occurrence in the various case studies in the book are all tied together into a wellinformed whole. The work is a powerhouse of methodology-it is replete with theories
and categories of understanding phenomena in sociological and religious realms. For
example, Ian Reader suggests that Aum Shinrikyo and Heaven's Gate engaged in "the
pragmatics of failure" when their peaceful methods failed to achieve religious goals. He
introduces this new term to describe how peaceful groups who fail to further their cause
may resort to violence, or vice-versa (p. 14).
The research and analysis of the collection draws from a strong bibliography related to
apocalyptic movements, religio-political clashes, innocuous persecutions, Mormon studies,
revolutionary groups, millennia! expectations, and many anthropologies, particularly Asian
religious studies. Each case study contains a helpful conclusion that (sometimes) ties the
happening into this larger trend of millennialism and violence, while also summarizing the
author's outlook on it. The positive side to this is that this work is a multi-disciplinary treasure trove for anyone studying a certain people group contained in this essay collection.
Additionally, Wessinger's work provides some surprises, such as Hitler's use of "magic" to
allude to millennialism, how the Branch Davidians at Waco may not have been suicidal,
and that Rastafarians even had millennial ideology. That 20,000 Old Believers in 17th
century Russia burned themselves in a "baptism by fire"-at least 2,000 at once- reminds
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us that more recent suicide horrors (Heavens Gates, Peoples Temple, Order of the Solar
Temple) are not exclusive to our era.
This book also raised questions for further study, revealing a need for a more thorough
analysis of this tripartite phenomenon beyond these case studies: Why do some groups
respond with violence against society, while others commit suicide? What trends are
unique to certain people groups, such as the similarities within the Japanese case studies
or within the American case studies? Although the collection of essays is quite diverse, it
fails to consider any archetype of theology-based persecution. Can any book on religious
millennialism rightfully omit a treatment of Montanism, the classic prototype for Christian
millennial curiosity when other groups share its ideology?
The unique contribution of the book lies in its exploration of three interrelated themes
in religious traditions from Tokyo to Wounded Knee. This work will certainly invite others to integrate traditional themes into similar notions in other religious arenas. However,
if one is looking for a full-length study of persecution or millennialism on a religious level,
they easily will be disappointed. Lest we suppose that millennial-based clashes are behind
us as we savor a new millennium, Wessinger points out that we may revisit a time of
heightened millennial hopes approaching the year 2033 .
W. BRIAN SHELTON
Toccoa Falls College
Toccoa Falls, Georgia
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author of Divine Discourse

"John Stackhouse is a model for evangelical
scholars addressing an audience outside the
guild. No scandal here-unless evangelical
readers fail to pay attention."
-John Wilson, editor, Books & Culture

"A model of irenic debate. Readers will learn
how it is possible for evangelicals to discuss
their disagreements respectfully and constructively. This is must reading for anyone interested in open theism or concerned about the
present state of evangelical theology."
-Roger E. Olson, Baylor University
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